

MANUAL ON NEW JERSEY

SENTENCING LAW

by

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INTRODUCTION

This Manual is designed to outline and summarize sentencing and juvenile disposition law in New Jersey. It provides brief topical discussions of court rules, case law, and statutory provisions primarily in Title 2C (Criminal Code) and Title 2A (Code of Juvenile Justice). Since it is intended as a complement to the Criminal Code and the Code of Juvenile Justice, statutory sections have not been reproduced; they have been paraphrased and quoted where pertinent.

Chapters I to XX of this Manual address sentencing laws applicable to adults and juveniles tried as adults in the Superior Court, Law Division. Chapter XXI addresses dispositions imposed on juveniles adjudicated delinquent by the Superior Court, Chancery Division, Family Part.

The research into statutory changes, court rule changes, and published court decisions is current through November 30, 2023. Legal discussion of relevant statutes is addressed to the current versions of these provisions, unless specifically noted otherwise.

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I. SENTENCING PROCEDURE

The process of sentencing generally begins with a presentence investigation and report (see section A). The matter then proceeds to a sentencing hearing (see section B) where the court may impose a number of dispositions (see section C). The chapters in this manual discuss in more detail the specific dispositions available to the court. This chapter provides a general overview of the process. Section D discusses case law on the process.

A. The Presentence Investigation and Report: Statutory Provisions and Court Rules

1. Statutory Authority for a Presentence Investigation and Report. N.J.S.A. 2C:44-6(a) provides that before sentencing on an indictable offense, the court must order a presentence investigation of the defendant to be conducted by court support staff. See also R. 3:21-2(a). If a municipal court is imposing the sentence, no presentence investigation is required. R. 7:9-1(a).

(a) Information Included in the Presentence Report. N.J.S.A. 2C:44-6(b)(1) to (3) provides a list of information the presentence investigation shall address, including (among other factors): the circumstances attending the commission of the offenses; any history of delinquency, criminality, substance abuse and treatment or civil commitment; the defendant's family situation, financial resources and debts, child support obligations, and employment history; the disposition of charges against any codefendant; and the harm the victim suffered.

(b) Medical and Psychological History. N.J.S.A. 2C:44-6(b) provides that unless the court exercises its discretion to waive a medical and psychological examination (discussed further below), the presentence report should include information on the defendant's medical and psychological history if the court is imposing sentence on a first- or second- degree crime of violence and the defendant has any of the following:

- a prior acquittal by reason of insanity or suspension of charges on a finding of unfit-to-proceed; or
- a prior conviction for murder (N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3), aggravated sexual assault or sexual assault (N.J.S.A. 2C:14-2), kidnapping (N.J.S.A. 2C:13-1), or endangering the welfare of a child in the

second degree (N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4), third-degree stalking (N.J.S.A. 2C:12-10); or

- a previous diagnosis of psychosis.

The court may "order any additional psychological or medical testing of the defendant" after reviewing the initial presentence report. N.J.S.A. 2C:44-6(c). See also R. 3:21-2(b).

(c) Medical and Psychological History Exception. N.J.S.A. 2C:44-6(b) grants the court discretion to waive the medical and psychological examination, unless the case involves a conviction for: endangering the welfare of a child (N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4); criminal trespass of a school building or on school property (N.J.S.A. 2C:18-3); attempting to lure or entice a child with purpose to commit a criminal offense (N.J.S.A. 2C:13-6); stalking (N.J.S.A. 2C:12-10); or kidnapping where the victim is less than eighteen years old (N.J.S.A. 2C:13-1).

(d) Victim Statement. The presentence report may contain a statement by the victim regarding the physical, psychological and financial harm the defendant caused. N.J.S.A. 2C:44-6(b).

B. The Sentencing Hearing: Statutory Provisions, Court Rules and Directives

1. Timely Sentence. Rule 3:21-4(a) requires the imposition of a sentence "without unreasonable delay." "Pending sentence the court may commit the defendant or continue or alter the conditions of release." Rule 3:21-4(a).

2. Defendant's Presence at Sentencing. Rule 3:21-4(b) provides: "Sentence shall not be imposed unless the defendant is present or has filed a written waiver of the right to be present." Similarly, Rule 3:16 instructs: "The defendant shall be present at every stage of the trial, including . . . the imposition of sentence, unless otherwise provided by Rule."

3. The Defendant's Right to Speak at Sentencing (the Right of Allocution). "Before imposing sentence the court shall address the defendant personally" and ask if he or she wishes to speak on his or her own behalf or "present any information in mitigation of punishment. The defendant may answer personally or by his or her attorney." R. 3:21-4(b).

4. The Victim's Right to Speak. The Crime Victim's Bill of Rights, N.J.S.A. 52:4B-34 to 38, grants the victim the right to speak at sentencing. N.J.S.A. 52:4B-36(n). In the case of a homicide, the victim's survivor may speak and present a photograph of the victim. N.J.S.A. 52:4B-36.1(a).

5. Consolidation of Charges in Multiple Counties. Rule 3:25A-1 provides that prior to sentencing, the defendant, or a prosecutor with the defendant's consent, may move for consolidation of charges pending in multiple counties for the purposes of entering a plea and for sentencing. The prosecutor in each county shall receive written notice of the motion and be provided an opportunity to be heard. Ibid.

(a) Factors for the Court to Consider in Deciding a Motion to Consolidate Charges. In determining whether to order consolidation and, if so, the forum county, the court should consider the number of crimes committed in each county, the comparative gravity of the crimes, the similarity or connection of the crimes, the locations of the most recent and most serious crimes, the defendant's sentencing status, the victim's rights, and any other relevant factor. R. 3:25A-1.

(b) Post-Consolidation Proceedings. "Each county prosecutor of the county in which a charge is pending shall be allowed to participate fully in the disposition of that charge after consolidation is ordered. If a plea agreement is entered that resolves less than all of the consolidated charges, the judge in the forum county shall order each unresolved charge to be returned immediately to the originating county. In the event that the consolidated charges have not been resolved within a reasonable period after consolidation, the judge in the forum county shall order each charge to be returned immediately to the originating county." R. 3:25A-1.

6. Rationale and Findings. At the time of sentencing, the court must explain its reasons for imposing the sentence, "including findings pursuant to the criteria for withholding or imposing imprisonment or fines under N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1 to 2C:44-3; the factual basis supporting a finding of particular aggravating or mitigating factors affecting sentence; and, if applicable, the reasons for ordering forfeiture of public office, position or employment, pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:51-2." R. 3:21-4(h). The judgment of conviction must also include the court's reasons for the sentence and a statement of any jail credits to which the defendant is entitled. R. 3:21-5.

7. Sentencing Guidelines During the COVID-19 Pandemic. Pursuant to Sentencing Guidance During the COVID-19 Pandemic, Directive # 13-20, p. 1 (April 2020), in order to further social distancing efforts during the COVID-19 pandemic, the court, with consent of all parties, may remotely conduct the sentencing hearing by video or telephone. If a remote hearing occurs, defense counsel must remotely review the presentence investigation report with the defendant prior to the court's imposition of sentence, and victims may participate in the hearing. Directive # 13-20, p. 1.

(a) Prison Terms. "For sentences in which a state prison term will be imposed, those sentences can proceed or be adjourned at the judge's discretion." Imposition of sentence should not be delayed by a Department of Corrections transportation or commitment delay. Id. at 2.

(b) Probation Sentences. "If a probationary sentence is anticipated to be imposed and to commence immediately, Probation must be advised prior to the sentencing date," and Probation staff shall participate in the remote hearing. Ibid. The court may adjourn the hearing in its discretion. Id. at 3.

(c) Probation and County Jail Sentences. "For sentences imposed that include a county jail term of 364 days or less, as a condition of probation, judges should consider whether the commencement of the custodial portion of the sentence will be stayed. If the custodial portion is stayed, the defendant shall report to Probation as directed in the interim." Ibid.

(d) County Jail Sentences. Where the court imposes a county jail term of 364 days or less without a probation component, "judges should consider whether the sentence can be adjourned to a later date. If the custodial sentence is imposed, judges should consider whether to stay the commencement of the custodial term until a later date." Ibid.

(e) Staying Commencement of a County Jail Sentence. The court may stay a sentence to county jail "because of risks attendant to the COVID-19 public health emergency. The court shall state the reasons on the record for immediately commencing or staying" the sentence. Ibid. "[T]he court must consider and make findings on the risk of danger to the public, the risk of flight, and the seriousness of the offense, as well as other factors relevant to public safety. The court should also consider the positions of the defendant, the prosecution, and any victims." Ibid.

(f) **Non-custodial Sentencing Provisions.** Non-custodial aspects of the sentence shall commence upon sentencing, even if the court imposes a stay of the custodial term. Ibid.

C. Sentencing Policies and Dispositions: Statutory Provisions

1. Statutory Authority on the Purposes of the Sentencing Laws. N.J.S.A. 2C:1-2(b) provides that the general purposes of sentencing provisions are:

- (1) "To prevent and condemn the commission of offenses";
- (2) "To promote the correction and rehabilitation of offenders";
- (3) "To insure the public safety by preventing the commission of offenses through the deterrent influence of sentences imposed and the confinement of offenders when required in the interest of public protection";
- (4) "To safeguard offenders against excessive, disproportionate or arbitrary punishment";
- (5) "To give fair warning of the nature of the sentences that may be imposed on conviction of an offense";
- (6) "To differentiate among offenders with a view to a just individualization in their treatment";
- (7) "To advance the use of generally accepted scientific methods and knowledge in sentencing offenders"; and
- (8) "To promote restitution to victims."

2. Sentencing in Accordance with Chapter 43. N.J.S.A. 2C:43-2(a) provides: "Except as otherwise provided by this code, all persons convicted of an offense shall be sentenced in accordance with this chapter [i.e., Chapter 43, N.J.S.A. 2C:43-1 to -22]." "'Offense' means a crime, a disorderly persons offense or a petty disorderly persons offense." N.J.S.A. 2C:1-14(k).

3. General Authorized Dispositions. N.J.S.A. 2C:43-2(b) to (d) provides that a court may impose as a sentence:

- A suspended sentence;
- A fine;
- Restitution;
- Probation;
- Imprisonment;
- Community service;
- Participation in a halfway house or other residential facility;
- Participation in a training or educational program in addition to imprisonment at night or on the weekends;
- Revocation of a license;
- Forfeiture of, or removal from, office; and
- A civil penalty.

4. Young Adult Offender Sentencing. N.J.S.A. 2C:43-5 provides that when sentencing a defendant who is less than twenty-six years old at the time of sentencing, the court may impose an indeterminate term to a youth correctional facility.

(a) Excluded Defendants. The court may not sentence a young adult offender to an indeterminate term at a youth correctional facility if:

- The crime is subject to the Graves Act mandatory minimum term (N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6(c)), N.J.S.A. 2C:43-5; or
- The defendant has a prior conviction for a crime punishable by imprisonment in State prison, N.J.S.A. 30:4-147; or
- The defendant has been previously sentenced to a State Prison in this State or any other state, N.J.S.A. 30:4-147.

(b) Maximum Length of the Sentence. The maximum sentence imposed on a young adult offender shall not exceed five years, absent "good cause shown." N.J.S.A. 30:4-148. If good cause is established for a longer term, then the maximum term shall not be "greater than the maximum provided by law." N.J.S.A. 30:4-148. If the maximum sentence for the crime for which the court is imposing sentence is less than five years, then the maximum term applicable to the crime--not five years--shall be the maximum sentence. Ibid.

5. Downgrading and Non-Custodial Terms for First- and Second-Degree Crimes. N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(f)(2) provides that where the defendant committed a first- or second-degree crime, the court may sentence the defendant to a term appropriate to a crime of one degree lower (i.e., a downgraded term) or impose a non-custodial term if the court is "clearly convinced that the mitigating factors substantially outweigh the aggravating factors" and "the interest of justice demands" a reduction in sentencing.

State's Right to Appeal. Pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(f)(2), the State may appeal a downgraded or non-custodial term within ten days. Upon the State's filing of a notice of appeal, "execution of sentence shall be stayed," but the "defendant may elect" to serve the sentence pending appeal. R. 2:9-3(c). If the defendant does so, "such election shall constitute a waiver of the right to challenge any sentence on the ground that execution has commenced." R. 2:9-3(c).

6. Rationale for the Sentence Must Be Stated. N.J.S.A. 2C:43-2(e) instructs: "The court shall state on the record the reasons for imposing the sentence, including its findings pursuant to the criteria for withholding or imposing imprisonment or fines under sections 2C:44-1 to 2C:44-3 [criteria for imposing imprisonment, fines, restitution and extended terms], where imprisonment is imposed, consideration of the defendant's eligibility for release under the law governing parole and the factual basis supporting its findings of particular aggravating or mitigating factors affecting sentence."

7. Parole Laws Must Be Explained to the Defendant Sentenced to Imprisonment. N.J.S.A. 2C:43-2(f) provides: "The court shall explain the parole laws as they apply to the sentence and shall state":

- (1) The approximate period the defendant will serve in custody before becoming eligible for parole;
- (2) Any jail credits that will be subtracted from the sentence;
- (3) The defendant's entitlement to good time and work credits; and
- (4) The defendant's potential eligibility for participation as an inmate in the Intensive Supervision Program (N.J.S.A. 2C:43-11).

"Release of offenders on parole, recommitment and reparole after revocation shall be governed by the 'Parole Act of 1979,'" N.J.S.A. 30:4-123.45 to -123.76. N.J.S.A. 2C:43-9.

D. Imposing a Sentence: Case Law

1. The Court's Authority to Impose Sentence. "Sentencing is a core function of the Judiciary. 'Although sentencing discretion is shared to some extent among the three branches of government, the determination of the sentence is committed to the discretion of the judiciary.'" State v. Coviello, 252 N.J. 539, 552 (2023) (quoting State v. Lagares, 127 N.J. 20, 27-28 (1992)).

2. Waiver of the Right to Be Present at Sentencing. A defendant does not have an absolute right to be absent from sentencing. State v. Tedesco, 214 N.J. 177, 182 (2013). He or she must submit to the sentencing court a written request to be absent from the hearing. Id. at 191. In deciding whether to grant the request, "trial judges should be guided by a number of relevant factors: the interests of the public, the defendant, the victims, and the State." Id. at 191-92.

3. A Sentence May Not Be Based Solely on Failure to Appear at the Hearing. The court may not use the defendant's failure to appear at sentencing as the sole rationale for a sentence. State v. Wilson, 206 N.J. Super. 182, 184 (App. Div. 1985).

4. Consideration of Inadmissible Evidence. "[S]entencing judges may consider material that otherwise would not be admissible at trial, as long as it is relevant and trustworthy." State v. Smith, 262 N.J. Super. 487, 530 (App. Div. 1993). Accord State v. Davis, 96 N.J. 611, 619-20 (1984); N.J.R.E. 101(a)(3)(C).

5. Crimes for which the Jury Acquitted. Under the fundamental fairness protections afforded by New Jersey Constitution, the sentencing court may not consider facts that supported crimes for which the jury acquitted the defendant. State v. Paden-Battle, 464 N.J. Super. 125, 149-50 (App. Div. 2020), aff'd sub nom., State v. Melvin, 248 N.J. 321, 349, 352 (2021). In other words, the court may not "rel[y] on a view of the evidence the jury refused to adopt. In sentencing a defendant, the judge's 'sense of moral outrage' cannot trump the jury's verdict." Paden-Battle, 464 N.J. Super. at 151 (quoting State v. Tindell, 417 N.J. Super. 530, 571 (App. Div. 2011)).

6. Crimes for which the Jury Deadlocked. "[C]ourts should not consider evidence offered on deadlocked charges at sentencing 'unless and until the defendant no longer faces the prospect of prosecution for those charges.'" State v. Paden-Battle, 464 N.J. Super. 125, 150 (App. Div. 2020), (quoting State v. Tillery, 238 N.J. 293, 327 (2019)), aff'd sub nom., State v. Melvin, 248 N.J. 321 (2021).

7. Dismissed Charges. "Prior dismissed charges may not be considered for any purpose." State v. K.S., 220 N.J. 190, 199 (2015). See also State v. Tillery, 238 N.J. 293, 326 (2019) (citing K.S. for the proposition that it is "improper" for the sentencing court to "draw[] inferences from the mere fact that charges had been brought").

8. The Defendant's Right to Speak at Sentencing (the Right of Allocution). A defendant's right of allocution is satisfied where the defendant exercises the right at the start of the sentencing hearing. See State v. Jones, 232 N.J. 308, 320-21 (2018). If the State presents new material in its remarks, the defendant should usually have an opportunity to respond to the new material. Id. at 321-23. The onus is on the defendant to request an opportunity to respond. Id. at 322-24.

Denial of the Right. Denial of the right of allocution will usually require a remand. State v. Blackmon, 202 N.J. 283, 298, 305 (2010); State v. Cerce, 46 N.J. 387, 396-97 (1966); State in the Interest of J.R., 244 N.J. Super. 630, 639 (App. Div. 1990). But see State v. Spivey, 122 N.J. Super. 249, 256 (App. Div. 1973), rev'd on other grounds, 65 N.J. 21 (1974) (discussing the court's authority to remove an unruly defendant for disruptive behavior). If the defendant raises a denial of the right of allocution claim in a petition for post-conviction relief, he or she must establish prejudice or other aggravating circumstances to warrant a remand. State v. Cerce, 46 N.J. 387, 395-96 (1966). See also R. 3:22-2(c) (on post-conviction-relief sentencing challenges).

9. Statements from Others. "[O]ther than defendants, and crime victims or their survivors, there is no absolute right to speak at a sentencing proceeding; instead, permitting others to address the court directly is a matter entrusted to the sentencing court's discretion." Sentencing courts "need not entertain mere pleas for mercy" or "permit presentations that are cumulative" or repetitive of "previously-submitted written comments. Nor are they required to permit presentations that are scurrilous, vengeful, or inflammatory." The court should consider whether the individual "has information that bears upon an aggravating or mitigating factor, and may require a proffer consistent with one of those factors from defendant's counsel, electing to limit the grant of permission accordingly." State v. Blackmon, 202 N.J. 283, 305 (2010).

Jurors May Not Participate in Sentencing. While the sentencing court has discretion to hear from others, this rule does not apply to those who served as jurors at the defendant's trial. State v. Mahoney, 444 N.J. Super. 253, 259 (App. Div. 2016). Jurors "have no relevant information to add for consideration by the sentencing judge because they are limited to addressing the evidence presented during the trial." Allowing jurors to speak at sentencing "ignores the primary and important fundamental role of the jury and unnecessarily runs the substantial risk of distracting the jurors and undermining the sanctity of the jury's deliberative process." Ibid.

10. The Right to Counsel. The defendant has a constitutional right to have counsel present at sentencing. N.J. Const. art. I, ¶ 10; State v. Jenkins, 32 N.J. 109, 112 (1960). "Sentencing hearings under the Criminal Code are crucial stages of a trial for which counsel must be available" State v. Briggs, 349 N.J. Super. 496, 501 (App. Div. 2002) (internal quotation omitted).

There Is No Right to Good Rapport with Counsel. "'A criminal defendant's constitutional guarantee of loyal counsel and open communication . . . does not equate to a guarantee of attorney-client rapport,' State v. Miller, 216 N.J. 40, 64 (2013), particularly when the rapport is undermined by the defendant's own abusive or threatening conduct." State v. Coclough, 459 N.J. Super. 45, 55 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 240 N.J. 84 (2019). "That defendant had a conflict with his attorney does not necessarily mean his attorney had a conflict of interest." Id. at 56.

11. The Right to Represent Oneself. A defendant may assert the right to represent himself or herself at sentencing. State v. Coclough, 459 N.J. Super. 45,

54-55 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 240 N.J. 84 (2019). The court is not obligated, however, to advise a defendant of the right to proceed without an attorney. Id. at 55.

12. Counsel's Alleged Conflict of Interest. If the defendant alleges a conflict of interest and requests an adjournment to retain new counsel, the court must address the conflict of interest claim prior to proceeding any further. State v. Vasquez, 432 N.J. Super. 354, 359-60 (App. Div. 2013). If a per se conflict of interest arose prior to sentencing, a reviewing court will presume prejudice, in the absence of a waiver by the defendant, and will order a new sentencing hearing. State v. Alexander, 403 N.J. Super. 250, 257-60 (App. Div. 2008). This is so even if the defendant raises the challenge for the first time in a petition for post-conviction relief. Ibid.

13. Sixth Amendment Right to a Speedy Trial. The Sixth Amendment guarantee to a speedy trial "protects the accused from arrest or indictment through trial, but does not apply once a defendant has been found guilty at trial or has pleaded guilty to criminal charges. For inordinate delay in sentencing, although the Speedy Trial Clause does not govern, a defendant may have other recourse, including, in appropriate circumstances, tailored relief under the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments." Betterman v. Montana, 578 U.S. 437, 439 (2016) (fourteen-month delay in sentencing).

14. Considerations as of the Date of Sentencing. "[A] defendant should be assessed as he stands before the court on the day of sentencing." State v. Jaffe, 220 N.J. 114, 116 (2014) (citing State v. Randolph, 210 N.J. 330, 354 (2012)). Thus, "the sentencing court must consider a defendant's relevant post-offense conduct in weighing aggravating and mitigating factors." Ibid. Accord State v. Bellamy, 468 N.J. Super. 29, 39-40 (App. Div. 2021) (explaining that absent specific language limiting a resentencing, a remand for resentencing requires the court to consider the defendant as he or she stands on the day of sentencing).

15. Decrease in Punishment Prior to Conviction. When the Legislature lessens punishment prior to conviction and imposition of sentence, the court applies the law in effect at the time of sentencing, not the harsher penalty that was applicable at the time of the offense. State in the Interest of C.F., 444 N.J. Super. 179, 189-90 (App. Div. 2016).

16. Foundational Principles of the Code's Sentencing Laws. The Code's sentencing laws are based on the principles that sentences should be the product of

"structured discretion designed to foster less arbitrary and more equal sentences"; punishment should fit the crime, not the criminal; and sentences should be subject to meaningful appellate review to promote uniformity. State v. Roth, 95 N.J. 334, 345-49, 361 (1984).

17. Individualized Assessment. In imposing sentence, the court must make an individualized assessment of the defendant based on the facts of the case and the aggravating and mitigating sentencing factors. State v. Jaffe, 220 N.J. 114, 122 (2014). See also State v. McDuffie, 450 N.J. Super. 554, 577 (App. Div. 2017) (disapproving of a "one size fits all" sentencing approach for codefendants). "[A] remark in open court, even in a subsequent, unrelated proceeding, that a judge 'always' sentences defendants convicted of" a particular offense to a specific prison term "undermines public confidence" in our criminal justice system and suggests that the court did not set a sentence based on "the unique facts of a defendant's case." State v. McFarlane, 224 N.J. 458, 469 (2016).

18. Excessive and Arbitrary Sentencing. N.J.S.A. 2C:1-2(b)(4) provides that one general purpose of the provisions governing sentencing is "[t]o safeguard offenders against excessive, disproportionate or arbitrary punishment." To that end, "[t]he central theme' of our sentencing jurisprudence is the exercise by courts of 'a structured discretion designed to foster less arbitrary and more equal sentences.'" State v. Roach, 146 N.J. 208, 231 (1996) (Roach I) (quoting State v. Roth, 95 N.J. 334, 345 (1984)).

19. Uniformity. Our Court "has consistently stressed uniformity as one of the major sentencing goals in the administration of criminal justice." State v. Roach, 146 N.J. 208, 231 (1996) (Roach I). See also State v. Hodge, 95 N.J. 369, 379 (1984) (providing that "there can be no justice without a predictable degree of uniformity in sentencing"). To that end, the Code grades offenses based on severity and provides corresponding sentencing ranges for each degree of crime. State v. Hodge, 95 N.J. 369, 375 (1984).

20. Sentencing Codefendants. In light of the Code's goals to promote uniformity, fairness and public confidence in sentencing, an "otherwise sound and lawful sentence" will be invalid if it is different from a similarly situated co-defendant's sentence. State v. Roach, 146 N.J. 208, 232-33 (1996) (Roach I). However, the court must conduct an individualized assessment of each codefendant and may not apply a "one size fits all" approach. State v. McDuffie, 450 N.J. Super. 554, 577 (App. Div. 2017).

The Substantially Similar Standard. In sentencing a co-defendant, the "trial court must determine whether the co-defendant is identical or substantially similar to the defendant regarding all relevant sentencing criteria. The court should then inquire into the basis of the sentences imposed on the other defendant. It should further consider the length, terms, and conditions of the sentence imposed on the co-defendant. If the co-defendant is sufficiently similar, the court must give the sentence imposed on the co-defendant substantive weight when sentencing the defendant in order to avoid excessive disparity." State v. Roach, 146 N.J. 208, 233 (1996) (Roach I).

21. Findings and Rationale. "At the time of sentencing, the court must 'state reasons for imposing such sentence including . . . the factual basis supporting a finding of particular aggravating or mitigating factors affecting sentence.'" State v. Fuentes, 217 N.J. 57, 73 (2014) (quoting R. 3:21-4(h)). "Central to the success of" the sentencing "process is the requirement that the judge articulate the reasons for imposing sentence." State v. Case, 220 N.J. 49, 54 (2014). But see State v. McDuffie, 450 N.J. Super. 554, 577 (App. Div. 2017) (explaining that a remand may be avoided where the "sentencing transcript makes it possible to 'readily deduce' the judge's reasoning") and State v. Molina, 168 N.J. 436, 442 (2001) (providing that "on occasion" courts have "dispensed with the need for a remand for a statement of . . . reasons when . . . convinced that the sentences clearly fall within the sentencing guidelines"). Inconsistent and unclear findings will require a remand, even though a remand may not result in a lesser sentence than the one initially imposed. State v. Sene, 443 N.J. Super. 134, 144-45 (App. Div. 2015).

Discrepancy between the Hearing Transcript and Judgment of Conviction. "In the event of a discrepancy between the [trial] court's oral pronouncement of sentence and the sentence described in the judgment of conviction, the sentencing transcript controls and a corrective judgment is to be entered." State v. Abril, 444 N.J. Super. 553, 564 (App. Div. 2016).

22. The Standard for Downgrading. In deciding whether to downgrade an offense pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(f)(2), the court considers whether the mitigating factors substantially outweigh the aggravating and whether the interest of justice demands the downgrade. State v. Megargel, 143 N.J. 484, 495 (1996); State v. L.V., 410 N.J. Super. 90, 112-13 (App. Div. 2009). The decision to downgrade "in the interest of justice" should be limited to circumstances where a defendant can provide "compelling" reasons in addition to, and separate from, the mitigating factors that substantially outweigh the aggravating factors. State v.

Megargel, 143 N.J. 484, 505 (1996); State v. L.V., 410 N.J. Super. 90, 112-13 (App. Div. 2009) (downgrading where the defendant's mental illnesses, young age, "very limited intelligence," cognitive inabilities, language and social barriers, years of having been sexually abused and threatened by her father, and having been twice impregnated by him explained why she had acquiesced to his orders to throw her newborn infant out a window and to not aid the other newborn when her father threw that infant out a window).

Note that the standard applicable to non-custodial sentences for first- and second-degree crimes is discussed in Chapter IV on Imprisonment, Sections A and D.

(a) Factors to Consider in Deciding Whether to Downgrade. In deciding whether to downgrade an offense, the court should consider the degree of the crime, whether the surrounding circumstances make the offense similar to one of a lesser degree, and the defendant's characteristics as they relate to the offense. State v. Megargel, 143 N.J. 484, 500-01 (1996); State v. Rice, 425 N.J. Super. 375, 384 (App. Div. 2012). The severity of the crime is the most important factor. State v. Megargel, 143 N.J. 484, 500 (1996).

(b) Offenses with Enhanced Penalties. Where the Legislature has provided an enhanced penalty for an offense, "the downgrade of that offense requires more compelling reasons than the downgrade of an offense for which the Legislature has not attached an enhanced penalty." State v. Rice, 425 N.J. Super. 375, 385 (App. Div. 2012) (quoting State v. Megargel, 143 N.J. 484, 502 (1996)). A sentencing court should not use its discretion to ignore the legislative design. State v. Lopez, 395 N.J. Super. 98, 108-09 (App. Div. 2007).

(c) Rationale for a Downgrade. A trial court must state on the record its reasons for downgrading and should particularly state why a sentence at the lowest end of the sentencing range is not a more appropriate sentence. State v. Megargel, 143 N.J. 484, 502 (1996).

(d) Presumption of Imprisonment. On a downgrade from a second- to third-degree crime, the defendant remains "convicted" of a second-degree crime for purposes of applying a presumption of imprisonment. State v. O'Connor, 105 N.J. 399, 404-05 (1987); State v. Lebra, 357 N.J. Super. 500, 507 (App. Div. 2003).

(e) **The No Early Release Act (NERA).** When a defendant pleads guilty to a second-degree crime subject to the NERA and the court downgrades the crime to one of the third degree, the court must impose a term of incarceration because the crime to which the defendant pled guilty was subject to a mandatory minimum term of imprisonment. State v. L.V., 410 N.J. Super. 90, 113 (App. Div. 2009).

(f) **Drug Offenses and Parole Ineligibility.** When downgrading from a first- to second-degree crime, the mandatory period of parole ineligibility for first-degree drug-distribution (N.J.S.A. 2C:35-5(b)(1)) survives the downgrade. State v. Barber, 262 N.J. Super. 157, 162 (App. Div. 1993).

(g) **Downgrades Pursuant to a Plea Agreement.** Where the parties agree to a downgrade in a plea agreement, the court must consider the aggravating and mitigating factors and whether the interest of justice warrant a downgrade before imposing sentence pursuant to the agreement. State v. Nemeth, 214 N.J. Super. 324, 326-27 (App. Div. 1986).

(h) **Maximum Term Permissible on a Downgraded Offense.** The court may grant a request to downgrade an offense and impose the maximum term on the downgraded offense. State v. Balfour, 135 N.J. 30, 38 (1994); State v. Nemeth, 214 N.J. Super. 324, 326-27 (App. Div. 1986). The decisions to downgrade and to set a term of imprisonment are distinct and independent decisions within the court's discretion. State v. Balfour, 135 N.J. 30, 38 (1994). The court may conclude that a plea agreement tipped the scale in favor of downgrading, but that a term at the higher end of the range is warranted in light of the aggravating and mitigating factors. Id. at 39.

23. Young Adult Offender Sentencing.

(a) **Certain Defendants Excluded.** The court may not impose an indeterminate sentence under the young adult offender statute (N.J.S.A. 2C:43-5) if the defendant: committed a Graves Act offense, State v. Des Marets, 92 N.J. 62, 76 (1983); has previously been sentenced to a state prison or to a federal prison or penitentiary, State v. Levine, 253 N.J. Super. 149, 162 (App. Div. 1992); committed a crime subject to the No Early Release Act period of parole ineligibility, State v. Corriero, 357 N.J. Super. 214, 217-18 (App. Div. 2003); or committed a drug offense that requires a period of parole ineligibility, State v. Luna, 278 N.J. Super. 433, 437-38 (App. Div. 1995).

(b) No Preference in Favor of a Young Adult Offender Sentence. The young adult offender indeterminate sentence is an option within the sentencing court's discretion; the Code contains no preference for it. State v. Styker, 262 N.J. Super. 7, 21-22 (App. Div.), aff'd o.b., 134 N.J. 254 (1993).

(c) Ordinary Term of a Young Adult Offender Sentence. The ordinary term for a young adult offender sentenced to an indeterminate term is five years, since the sentence may not exceed five years, absent good cause shown. State v. Scherzer, 301 N.J. Super. 363, 497 (App. Div. 1997).

(d) Good Cause Standard for a Longer Term. Good cause to impose a term longer than five years may exist where the aggravating factors preponderate over the mitigating factors, State v. Ferguson, 273 N.J. Super. 486, 495 (App. Div. 1994), or where the facts and circumstances of the case, or the real-time consequences of the sentence warrant a term longer than five years, State v. Scherzer, 301 N.J. Super. 363, 498-500 (App. Div. 1997).

(e) Consecutive Terms. A judge may impose consecutive indeterminate sentences on a young adult offender; however, "routine use of this kind of sentence . . . is undesirable and should be avoided." State v. Carroll, 66 N.J. 558, 561 (1975). Because young adult offender sentencing focuses on correction and rehabilitation, not punishment, the Yarbough factors (discussed in the chapter on concurrent and consecutive terms) do not apply. State v. Hannigan, 408 N.J. Super. 388, 396-400 (App. Div. 2009). Rather, consecutive indeterminate sentences for young adult offenders "must be justified with reference to offender-based criteria centered on rehabilitation." Id. at 400.

II. SENTENCES ASSOCIATED WITH PLEA AGREEMENTS

Plea bargaining is "central to the administration of the criminal justice system," Missouri v. Frye, 566 U.S. 134, 143 (2012). Section A of this Chapter discusses Court Rules on plea bargaining, and Section B discusses relevant case law.

A. Plea Agreements: Court Rules

1. Court Rule Authorizing Plea Negotiations. Rule 3:9-3(a) authorizes the State and the defendant to discuss pleas and sentences to "promote a fair and expeditious disposition of the case." For a discussion of plea agreements in drug cases where the prosecutor waives enhanced terms, see the chapter on drug offender sentencing.

2. Consolidation of Charges in Multiple Counties for Purposes of Plea Negotiations and Sentencing. Rule 3:25A-1 provides that at any time prior to sentencing, the defendant, or a prosecutor with the defendant's consent, may move for consolidation of charges pending in multiple counties for the purposes of entering a plea and for sentencing. The prosecutor in each county shall receive written notice of the motion and shall be provided an opportunity to be heard. If a plea agreement does not resolve all charges, the unresolved charges shall "be returned immediately to the originating county." If the defendant and prosecutor do not resolve the consolidated charges "within a reasonable period after consolidation, the judge in the forum county shall order each charge to be returned immediately to the originating county."

3. Authorized Discussions with the Court. Rule 3:9-3(c) allows the parties to disclose to the court a tentative plea agreement. The court may indicate "whether it will concur in the tentative agreement or, if no tentative agreement has been reached," the court may notify the defendant of "the maximum sentence it would impose in the event the defendant enters a plea of guilty."

4. Conditional Pleas. So long as the State consents and the court approves, the defendant "may enter a conditional plea of guilty reserving on the record the right to appeal from the adverse determination of any specified pretrial motion. If the defendant prevails on appeal, the defendant shall be afforded the opportunity to withdraw his or her plea." R. 3:9-3(f).

5. Plea Cut-Off Date. The court may not accept a plea "[a]fter the pretrial conference has been conducted and a trial date set," unless the criminal presiding

judge approves the plea "based on a material change of circumstance, or the need to avoid a protracted trial or a manifest injustice." R. 3:9-3(g).

6. Accepting a Plea. Rule 3:9-2 provides that the court may accept a plea of guilty if, after questioning the defendant on the record, the court is satisfied that the admitted facts support the charges, and that the defendant is entering the plea knowingly and voluntarily. The court may accept a written stipulation of facts signed by the defendant, defense counsel and the prosecutor.

7. Waiver of the Right to Appeal. If the defendant waives the right to appeal in a plea agreement, the court must notify the defendant that he or she may still file an appeal, but that the State may annul the agreement upon the defendant's filing the notice of appeal. R. 3:9-3(d).

8. Withdrawal or Vacation of the Plea at the Time of Sentencing. Rule 3:9-3(e) provides: "If at the time of sentencing the court determines that the interests of justice would not be served by effectuating the agreement . . . or by imposing sentence in accordance with the court's previous indications of sentence, the court may vacate the plea or the defendant shall be permitted to withdraw the plea."

9. Post Sentencing Motion to Withdraw a Guilty Plea. The court may grant a motion to withdraw a guilty plea after sentencing "to correct a manifest injustice." Rule 3:21-1.

B. Plea Agreements: Case Law

1. No Constitutional or Statutory Right to Plea Bargain. Plea bargaining is "an accommodation which the judiciary system is free to institute or reject." State v. A.T.C., 454 N.J. Super. 235, 253 (App. Div. 2018) (quoting State v. Hessen, 145 N.J. 441, 452 (1996)), remanded on other grounds, 239 N.J. 450 (2019). "Although plea bargaining is an accepted practice in this state, '[t]here is no constitutional or statutory requirement that the New Jersey judicial system recognize plea bargaining.'" Ibid. (quoting State v. Brimage, 271 N.J. Super. 369, 374 (App. Div. 1994)).

2. Constitutional Right to Counsel. A defendant has Sixth Amendment rights that attach when the State offers a plea agreement and when a defendant accepts a plea offer. Missouri v. Frye, 566 U.S. 134, 143-44 (2012). Accord Lafler v. Cooper, 566 U.S. 156, 165 (2012).

3. Entering a Plea Waives Constitutional Rights. "[A] defendant who pleads guilty waives important constitutional rights, including the right to avoid self-incrimination, to confront his accusers, and to secure a jury trial." State v. Barboza, 115 N.J. 415, 420 (1989). But see Class v. United States, ___ U.S. ___, ___, 138 S. Ct. 798, 804 (2018) (holding that by pleading guilty, the defendant did not waive the right to challenge on appeal the constitutionality of the statute of conviction).

4. Maximum Sentence Authorized by the Sixth Amendment. The maximum sentence authorized for Sixth Amendment purposes depends on the defendant's admissions at the plea hearing and on the defendant's prior criminal convictions. Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 309-11 (2004); State v. Franklin, 184 N.J. 516, 537-38 (2005); State v. Natale II, 184 N.J. 458, 495 (2005). The defendant may also "consent to judicial factfinding as to sentence enhancements." State v. Franklin, 184 N.J. 516, 538 (2005) (quoting Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 309-11 (2004)). Implicit agreement to judicial factfinding may be found where a defendant pleads guilty and acknowledges exposure to a specific sentence in exchange for waiver of trial by jury. State v. Natale II, 184 N.J. 458, 495 n.12 (2005); State v. Soto (I), 385 N.J. Super. 247, 253-55 (App. Div. 2006); State v. Anderson, 374 N.J. Super. 419, 423-24 (App. Div. 2005).

5. Consolidation of Charges in Multiple Counties. Pursuant to Rule 3:25A-1, a defendant, or the prosecutor with the defendant's consent, may move to consolidate charges in multiple counties for the purpose of entering a plea and for sentencing. State v. Rountree, 388 N.J. Super. 190, 212 (App. Div. 2006). "Consolidated plea negotiations are generally advantageous to a defendant. Obviously, consolidated plea negotiations have potential benefits for the State and for the judicial system as well." Ibid. "[W]hen a defendant has indictments pending in more than one vicinage, defense counsel is obligated to consider the factors set forth in Rule 3:25A-1, and to move for consolidation at an early stage where appropriate." Ibid.

6. Post-Verdict Plea Agreements. "While not common, post-verdict guilty pleas are not against public policy." State v. Owens, 381 N.J. Super. 503, 510-11 (App. Div. 2005) (referring to N.J.S.A. 2C:35-12, which allows the defendant and prosecutor to enter a post-conviction agreement that waives the extended and mandatory minimum term applicable to certain drug offenders).

7. Prohibited and Authorized Provisions of a Plea Agreement.

(a) The Agreement May be Conditioned upon Defendant's Presence at Sentencing. A plea agreement may be valid and enforceable if it allows a court to increase a defendant's sentence in the event the defendant fails to appear for sentencing. State v. Shaw, 131 N.J. 1, 15 (1993) (allowing the State to condition waiver of a minimum term in a drug case on the defendant's appearance at sentencing); State v. Cambrelen, 473 N.J. Super. 70, 84 (App. Div. 2022). But see State v. Wilson, 206 N.J. Super. 182, 184 (App. Div. 1985) (holding that an extended sentence based entirely upon nonappearance is illegal because it is unrelated to any of the sentencing criteria set forth in the Code).

(b) The Agreement May Not Include a No-New-Charges Condition. Notions of due process and fundamental fairness preclude a plea agreement from including a condition that the defendant not be arrested on new charges prior to the sentencing hearing. State v. Cambrelen, 473 N.J. Super. 70, 80-84 (App. Div. 2022).

(c) The Agreement May Not Restrict Judicial Discretion. A plea agreement may not restrict the court's discretion in imposing sentence. State v. Hess, 207 N.J. 123, 151 (2011). "[A] criminal sentence is always and solely committed to the discretion of the trial court to be exercised within the standards prescribed by the Code of Criminal Justice." Ibid. (quoting State v. Warren, 115 N.J. 433, 447 (1989)); State v. Watford, 261 N.J. Super. 151, 157 (App. Div. 1992) (explaining that the prosecutor may not make any binding promises regarding the sentence).

(d) Restrictions on the Defense Are Prohibited. A plea agreement that restricts the defendant's ability to present mitigating evidence, or to argue for a sentence lesser than the one agreed to, denies the defendant the right to effective assistance of counsel. State v. Hess, 207 N.J. 123, 152-53 (2011); State v. Briggs, 349 N.J. Super. 496, 501-03 (App. Div. 2002).

(e) Illegal Sentences Are Prohibited. The court may not impose an illegal sentence, even if the prosecutor and defendant request the sentence. State v. Crawford, 379 N.J. Super. 250, 258 (App. Div. 2005); State v. Manzie, 335 N.J. Super. 267, 278 (App. Div. 2000), aff'd, 168 N.J. 113 (2001); State v. Baker, 270 N.J. Super. 55, 70 (App. Div.), aff'd o.b., 138 N.J. 89 (1994).

(f) Civil Commitment of a Sexual Predator. "A plea agreement by a county prosecutor which operates as an impediment to a valid civil

commitment of a sexual predator is void as against public policy." In re Commitment of P.C., 349 N.J. Super. 569, 572 (App. Div. 2002).

(g) A Plea Agreement May Provide for Restitution. Since compensation to the victim is a relevant sentencing factor, the parties may include a restitution award in a plea agreement. State v. Corpi, 297 N.J. Super. 86, 92-93 (App. Div. 1997).

8. Conditional Pleas. When a defendant enters a guilty plea and intends to appeal an issue, other than a search and seizure issue, the defendant must enter a conditional plea with the court's approval and consent of the prosecutor. State v. Benjamin, 442 N.J. Super. 258, 263 (App. Div. 2015) (explaining that "[o]rdinarily, the failure to enter a conditional plea would bar appellate review of other than search and seizure issues"), aff'd as modified, 228 N.J. 358 (2017).

9. Rules Relating to the Factual Basis of a Plea.

(a) Factual Basis for a Plea. "The factual basis for a guilty plea can be established by a defendant's explicit admission of guilt or by a defendant's acknowledgment of the underlying facts constituting essential elements of the crime." State v. Gregory, 220 N.J. 413, 418-19 (2015). Accord State v. Urbina, 221 N.J. 509, 527-28 (2015). The court may not "presume facts required to establish the essential elements of the crime." State v. Gregory, 220 N.J. 413, 421 (2015) (internal quotation marks omitted). Accord State v. Vasco, 456 N.J. Super. 382, 395-96, rev'd for the reasons given by the dissent, 235 N.J. 365, 365-66 (2018); State v. Tate, 220 N.J. 393, 406 (2015); State v. Perez, 220 N.J. 423, 433-34 (2015).

(b) Challenge to the Factual Basis of a Plea. "Challenges to the sufficiency of the factual basis for a guilty plea are most commonly brought by way of a motion to the trial court to withdraw that plea"; however, "a defendant may also challenge the sufficiency of the factual basis for his guilty plea on direct appeal." State v. Urbina, 221 N.J. 509, 528 (2015).

(c) Motion to Vacate a Plea Based on Inadequate Facts, Standard of Review. "The standard of review of a trial court's denial of a motion to vacate a guilty plea for lack of an adequate factual basis is de novo." State v. Urbina, 221 N.J. 509, 528 (2015) (quoting State v. Tate, 220 N.J. 393, 402 (2015)).

(d) Remedy for an Insufficient Factual Basis for a Plea. If an appellate court finds "that a plea has been accepted without an adequate factual basis, the plea, the judgment of conviction, and the sentence must be vacated, the dismissed charges reinstated, and defendant allowed to re-plead or to proceed to trial." State v. Barboza, 115 N.J. 415, 420 (1989). The same remedy applies when the defendant enters the guilty plea "without a plea offer from the prosecutor, but after the defendant has been advised by the trial court regarding the maximum sentence the judge was 'inclined' to impose." State v. Ashley, 443 N.J. Super. 10, 13 (App. Div. 2015).

10. Collateral and Penal Consequences of a Guilty Plea.

(a) Knowledge of the Consequences. To ensure that a plea is entered knowingly and voluntarily, as required by Rule 3:9-3, the court must advise the defendant of the penal consequences of a guilty plea. State v. Johnson, 182 N.J. 232, 236-37 (2005); State v. Smullen, 437 N.J. Super. 102, 110 (App. Div. 2014). Lack of understanding of a collateral consequence, however, will not warrant a reversal unless the collateral consequence was "a material element of the plea." State v. Jamgochian, 363 N.J. Super. 220, 225 (App. Div. 2003). Accord State v. Maldon, 422 N.J. Super. 475, 485 (App. Div. 2011) (stating that "if a defendant is affirmatively misinformed about a collateral consequence that is a central issue in the plea negotiations, the plea may not be knowing and voluntary"). In assessing a lack-of-understanding claim, the court's statements to the defendant at the plea hearing are the primary concern, but the contents of the plea form are also relevant. State v. Williams, 342 N.J. Super. 83, 91 (App. Div. 2001); State v. Rumblin, 326 N.J. Super. 296, 299-302 (App. Div. 1999), aff'd, 166 N.J. 550 (2001).

(b) Parole Ineligibility Must be Explained. The court must advise the defendant of any period of parole ineligibility associated with a guilty plea. State v. Kovack, 91 N.J. 476, 483 (1982). See State v. Bailey, 226 N.J. Super. 559, 567-68 (App. Div. 1988) (requiring the court to notify the defendant of a mandatory parole ineligibility term pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6(c) (the Graves Act)).

(c) Sex Offender Consequences of a Guilty Plea Must be Explained. The court must notify the defendant of the parole consequences and potential sex-offender treatment consequences of a guilty plea to a sex offense. State v. Howard, 110 N.J. 113, 124-25 (1988); State v. Luckey, 366 N.J. Super.

79, 89-90 (App. Div. 2004). This includes instruction on parole and community supervision for life requirements. State v. Smullen, 437 N.J. Super. 102, 110 (App. Div. 2014); State v. Schubert, 212 N.J. 295, 307-08 (2012); State v. Bellamy, 178 N.J. 127, 138 (2003); State v. J.J., 397 N.J. Super. 91, 99 (App. Div. 2007), appeal dismissed, 196 N.J. 459 (2008); State v. Jamgochian, 363 N.J. Super. 220, 224 (App. Div. 2003).

(d) The No Early Release Act (NERA) Must be Explained. If the defendant pleads guilty to an offense subject to the NERA, the court must advise the defendant of the NERA requirements, including explanation that if the defendant violates a term of parole, parole supervision may extend beyond the term of the original sentence. State v. Johnson, 182 N.J. 232, 240-41 (2005).

(e) Consecutive Terms Must be Explained. "Where it has been brought to the attention of the court that the defendant has either pleaded to or has been found guilty on other charges or is presently serving a custodial term and the plea agreement is silent on the issue, the accused should, in all fairness, be informed of the contingency that all sentences may be made to run consecutively." State v. Cullars, 224 N.J. Super. 32, 40-41 (App. Div. 1988). However, the court need not inform a defendant that if the defendant violates a term of probation in the future, the court may impose a consecutive sentence. State v. Garland, 226 N.J. Super. 356, 364-65 (App. Div. 1988).

(f) Extended Term Must be Explained. The court must advise the defendant of the consequences of an extended term where the prosecutor reserves the right to request one. State v. Cartier, 210 N.J. Super. 379, 381-82 (App. Div. 1986).

(g) The Possibility of an Enhanced Term in the Future Need Not be Explained. The court need not inform the defendant that pleading guilty to a crime could result in the imposition of an enhanced sentence in the future if the defendant were to commit another crime. State v. Wilkerson, 321 N.J. Super. 219, 224-28 (App. Div. 1999).

(h) Probation Violation Penalties Must be Explained. Rule 3:21-4(c) requires the court to inform a defendant sentenced to probation of the penalties that might be imposed upon revocation of probation. State v. Ervin, 241 N.J. Super. 458, 470 (App. Div. 1989).

(i) Community Service Need Not be Explained. Prior to accepting a guilty plea, the court need not explain to the defendant that the sentence may include community service. State v. Saperstein, 202 N.J. Super. 478, 483 (App. Div. 1985).

(j) Failure to Mention the Possibility of Restitution May Not Require Reversal. Prior to accepting a plea, the court should advise a defendant on a possible restitution award; however, failure to do so will not necessarily require a reversal. State v. Kennedy, 152 N.J. 413, 425-26 (1998); State v. Rhoda, 206 N.J. Super. 584, 596 (App. Div. 1986). The question is whether the restitution award was "beyond defendant's reasonable anticipation." State v. Saperstein, 202 N.J. Super. 478, 483 (App. Div. 1985) (remanding to allow the defendant to withdraw the plea where the court imposed a \$150,000 restitution award that the defendant did not reasonably contemplate in pleading guilty).

(k) The Court Should Explain a Substantial Fine. Where a substantial fine is an integral and material part of a sentence, the court should have instructed the defendant on it prior to accepting the plea. State v. Alford, 191 N.J. Super. 537, 540 (App. Div. 1983).

(l) Forfeiture of Public Employment Need Not be Explained. Forfeiture of public employment is not a penal consequence of a plea; thus, the court does not have a duty to advise a defendant that it may be a consequence of a guilty plea. State v. Medina, 349 N.J. Super. 108, 122 (App. Div. 2002); State v. Heitzman, 209 N.J. Super. 617, 621-22 (App. Div. 1986).

(m) Clearly Defined Deportation Consequences Must be Explained. Failure to notify a noncitizen defendant that deportation is a "presumptively mandatory" consequence of a guilty plea will form a basis for a post-conviction relief plea withdrawal when "the terms of the relevant immigration statute are succinct, clear, and explicit in defining the removal consequences." Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 368 (2010). See State v. Gaitan, 209 N.J. 339, 372 (2012) (holding that the Padilla ruling has no retroactive effect). Under State law, defense counsel is ineffective if he or she affirmatively provides incorrect information or misleading advice on the deportation consequences of a plea. State v. Gaitan, 209 N.J. 339, 354-55 (2012); State v. Nuñez-Valdéz, 200 N.J. 129, 140 (2009); State v. Blake, 444 N.J. Super. 285, 295 (App. Div. 2016). When the deportation consequences

are "unclear or uncertain," trial counsel is not ineffective under Padilla and Núñez-Valdéz in advising that deportation "might" be a consequence of a guilty plea. State v. Telford, 420 N.J. Super. 465, 470-71 (2011).

(n) Drunk Driving Mandatory Jail Time Must be Explained. The court must notify the defendant of the mandatory jail time applicable to third-time drunk driving offenders. State v. Regan, 209 N.J. Super. 596, 607 (App. Div. 1986).

11. Rejection of a Guilty Plea.

(a) The Court May Reject a Plea. "[T]here is no absolute right to have a plea accepted." State v. Salentre, 275 N.J. Super. 410, 419 (App. Div. 1994). Accord State v. Barboza, 115 N.J. 415, 422 (1989). The court may reject a plea at the time of sentencing if it determines that "the interests of justice would not be served by effectuating the agreement." State v. A.T.C., 454 N.J. Super. 235, 252 (App. Div. 2018) (quoting R. 3:9-3(e)), remanded on other grounds, 239 N.J. 450 (2019).

(b) Self-Defense Suggested by the Facts. "[I]f a suggestion of self-defense is raised in the plea colloquy, then the trial court must inquire whether the defendant is factually asserting self-defense. If the defendant states that he is not claiming self-defense, then the plea can be accepted. On the other hand, if the defendant claims that he used deadly force against the victim in the reasonable belief that his life was in danger, then the defendant is asserting that he did not commit the crime," and the court may not accept the plea unless the defendant waives the defense. State v. Urbina, 221 N.J. 509, 528 (2015).

(c) Standard of Review of the Trial Court's Rejection of a Plea. An appellate court reviews a lower court's refusal to accept a plea under the abuse-of-discretion standard. State v. Daniels, 276 N.J. Super. 483, 487 (App. Div. 1994). A trial court abuses its discretion when it rejects a plea because the court believes the agreed upon sentence was too lenient or a jury could convict the defendant of a greater offense. State v. Madan, 366 N.J. Super. 98, 110 (App. Div. 2004).

12. Rules Relating to the Sentence.

(a) The Sentence Must be Based on Evidence. Like a sentence imposed after a trial, a sentence imposed pursuant to a plea agreement must be "based upon findings of fact that are grounded in competent, reasonably credible evidence." State v. Roth, 95 N.J. 334, 363 (1984). The court may "look beyond [the facts admitted in] a defendant's plea allocution." State v. Hupka, 407 N.J. Super. 489, 498 (App. Div. 2009), aff'd, 203 N.J. 222 (2010).

(b) Imposition of a Lighter Sentence and Withdrawal by the State. If the court imposes a sentence that is less than that agreed to, the State may not rescind the agreement. State v. Hess, 207 N.J. 123, 151 (2011); State v. Warren, 115 N.J. 433, 442 (1989).

(c) A Harsher Sentence than Agreed upon. "If the sentencing court is convinced that the sentence envisioned by the plea bargain is inappropriate, the court may vacate the plea or permit the defendant to withdraw the guilty plea." State v. V.D., 401 N.J. Super. 527, 535 (App. Div. 2008).

(d) Defendant's Right to Appeal. A defendant may appeal a sentence that was the product of a plea agreement. State v. Vasquez, 129 N.J. 189, 194 (1992).

(e) Imposition of a Suspended Term versus Probation. A defendant's reasonable expectations under a plea bargain are not violated when the court imposes a five-year suspended sentence instead of a five-year probationary term, since the potential future consequences of both sentences are the same. State v. Cullen, 351 N.J. Super. 505, 509 (App. Div. 2002).

(f) Standard of Review of a Sentence Imposed Pursuant to a Plea Agreement. Unless the appeal raises a question of law, a court reviews a sentence imposed pursuant to a plea agreement under the abuse-of-discretion standard. State v. Sainz, 107 N.J. 283, 292 (1987); State v. Roth, 95 N.J. 334 (1984). Where a defendant receives the exact sentence bargained for, a presumption of reasonableness attaches to the sentence. State v. S.C., 289 N.J. Super. 61, 71 (App. Div. 1996); State v. Tango, 287 N.J. Super. 416, 422 (App. Div. 1996).

13. Plea Agreements and a Violation of Probation. On resentencing after a violation of probation, the court is not required to impose a sentence in accordance

with the initial plea agreement, as "the original plea agreement does not survive a violation of probation." State v. Frank, 280 N.J. Super. 26, 40 (App. Div. 1995).

14. Motion to Withdraw a Guilty Plea.

(a) The Slater Factors. In considering a motion to withdraw a plea that is supported by an adequate factual basis, regardless of whether the defendant makes the motion before or after sentencing, the judge must consider and balance: "(1) whether the defendant has asserted a colorable claim of innocence; (2) the nature and strength of defendant's reasons for withdrawal; (3) the existence of a plea bargain; and (4) whether withdrawal would result in unfair prejudice to the State or unfair advantage to the accused." State v. Slater, 198 N.J. 145, 157-58 (2009). Accord State v. Tate, 220 N.J. 393, 404 (2015); State v. McDonald, 211 N.J. 4, 16 (2012).

(b) Standard of Review of the Slater Factors. In reviewing a trial court's findings on the Slater factors, an appellate court applies the abuse of discretion standard. State v. Tate, 220 N.J. 393, 404 (2015).

(c) Standard of Review Based on Lack of Factual Basis. In reviewing a trial court's denial of a motion to withdraw a guilty plea based on an inadequate factual basis, the appellate division owes no deference to the lower court's decision and reviews the decision de novo. State v. Tate, 220 N.J. 393, 405 (2015).

(d) Colorable Claim of Innocence and Sentencing Exposure. A defendant does not establish a colorable claim of innocence simply by requesting a plea withdrawal, the effect of which, if granted, is to expose the defendant to a harsher sentence than the negotiated sentence. State v. Williams, 458 N.J. Super. 274, 282-83 (App. Div. 2019) (rejecting the trial court's finding that "there must be a colorable claim of innocence since defendant could be sentenced to a significantly higher alternate sentence if convicted at trial").

(e) Plea Agreements and Jail Credits. "An incorrect calculation of a defendant's jail credits may impact the voluntariness of the guilty plea." State v. McNeal, 237 N.J. 494, 499 (2019). Where the sentencing court repeatedly and clearly informed the defendant "that the jail credits should not be relied upon to assume his parole ineligibility period," a court will not

find that an alleged misunderstanding of the jail credits warrants a plea withdrawal. Id. at 500.

(f) Unanticipated Jail Credits and Reasonable Expectations. Jail credits unexpectedly acquired between the time of the plea agreement and sentencing had no effect on the plea agreement, which provided for a Drug Court (renamed Recovery Court) sentence with no jail time; thus, they did not alter defendant's reasonable expectations or form a basis for a plea withdrawal. State v. Williams, 458 N.J. Super. 274, 282 (App. Div. 2019). "The subsequent accrual of additional jail credit that makes the risk of going to trial more palatable is not a valid reason for setting aside a guilty plea." Ibid.

(g) Post-Sentencing Plea Withdrawal. A defendant may withdraw a plea after the court imposes sentence "only if withdrawal of the plea is necessary to correct a 'manifest injustice.'" State v. Johnson, 182 N.J. 232, 237 (2005) (quoting R. 3:21-1). That discretionary determination necessitates a weighing of "the policy considerations which favor the finality of judicial procedures against those which dictate that no man be deprived of his liberty except upon conviction after a fair trial or after the entry of a plea of guilty under circumstances showing that it was made truthfully, voluntarily and understandably." Ibid. (quoting State v. McQuaid, 147 N.J. 464, 487 (1997)).

(h) Remedy When a Court Grants a Motion to Withdraw a Plea. Where the court grants a motion to withdraw a plea the defendant may: (1) "renegotiate the plea agreement, if the State is willing to do so;" (2) proceed to trial on all counts charged in the indictment; or (3) withdraw the motion to withdraw or vacate the plea and accept the original sentence. State v. Johnson, 182 N.J. 232, 244 (2005) (citing State v. Kovack, 91 N.J. 476, 485 (1982)).

(i) Post-Sentencing Plea Withdrawal and Double Jeopardy. When the defendant withdraws a plea after sentencing "the slate [i]s wiped clean," and the court may impose any lawful sentence after conviction. State v. Naji, 205 N.J. Super. 208, 216 (App. Div. 1985) (noting that a defendant is "not subjected, oppressively and vexatiously, to multiple or enhanced punishment" when the defendant chooses "to be resentenced fully aware of the possible benefits and detriments").

15. Reversal of the Conviction on Appeal.

(a) Downgrading by the State. Where a reviewing court reverses a conviction that was the product of a plea agreement, the State may not downgrade the conviction to a lesser-included offense in an effort to save the plea, unless the defendant consents to the downgrade. State v. Barboza, 115 N.J. 415, 422 (1989). "[T]o allow a court to direct the entry of a guilty plea to a lesser-included criminal offense without defendant's consent is tantamount to permitting a court to direct a verdict against a defendant in a criminal case." Id. at 423. "[I]t would also violate Rule 3:9-2, which prohibits the use of an admission elicited in support of a refused guilty plea." Ibid.

(b) Remand Preferred. Where an appellate court vacates a conviction that was part of the plea agreement, the appellate court should ordinarily refrain from exercising original jurisdiction to modify the sentence and instead remand for the parties to either negotiate a new agreement or try the case. State v. Bell, 250 N.J. 519, 544-45 (2022).

16. Misunderstanding as a Basis to Vacate a Plea.

(a) Defendant's Misunderstanding. A defendant may successfully challenge a guilty plea on the ground that he or she misunderstood the sentencing terms of the plea agreement. State v. Alevras, 213 N.J. Super. 331, 338 (App. Div. 1986) (misunderstanding applicable credits and real-time consequences of the plea); State v. Reinhardt, 211 N.J. Super. 271, 275 (App. Div. 1986) (erroneously believing the plea agreement allowed for drug treatment).

(b) Court's Misunderstanding of Merger. As a matter of fundamental fairness, a defendant may withdraw a plea on remand where the defendant detrimentally relied upon the court's mistaken understanding of the effect of merger on eligibility to drug-court special-probation. State v. Ancrum, 449 N.J. Super. 526, 540 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 231 N.J. 222 (2017) (reversing a sentence of special probation because the defendant committed an offense that precludes special probation, and that offense survived merger for purposes of determining special-probation eligibility).

17. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Claims.

(a) Claims Based on Incorrect Information. "[A]n attorney's gross misadvice of sentencing exposure that prevents defendant from making a fair evaluation of a plea offer and induces him to reject a plea agreement he otherwise would likely have accepted constitutes remediable ineffective assistance." State v. Taccetta, 351 N.J. Super. 196, 214 (App. Div. 2002). Accord Lafler v. Cooper, 566 U.S. 156, 168 (2012).

(b) Claims Based on Failure to Convey an Offer. Failure to notify a defendant of a plea offer may result in a successful ineffective assistance of counsel claim if the defendant accepted a less favorable offer. Missouri v. Frye, 566 U.S. 134, 144-46 (2012).

III. MERGER

Merger prevents a defendant from being punished more than once for a single wrongdoing. Prior to imposing a sentence, the court must determine whether similar crimes merge (see section A). Section B of this Chapter addresses offenses where the Legislature has prevented merger. Section C discusses case law on merger.

A. Merger in General: Statutory Provisions

1. Statutory Authority for Merging Offenses. N.J.S.A. 2C:1-8(a)(1) provides that when conduct establishes more than one offense, the defendant may be prosecuted for each offense, but may not be convicted of more than one offense if:

- (1) "One offense is included in the other," as defined in N.J.S.A. 2C:1-8(d);
or
- (2) One offense is a conspiracy or preparation to commit the other offense;
or
- (3) The offenses require inconsistent findings of fact; or
- (4) The offenses differ only in that one prohibits "a designated kind of conduct generally," and the other prohibits "a specific instance of such conduct."

2. "One Offense Included in Another." Pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:1-8(d), an offense is included in another if any of the following circumstances apply:

- (1) "It is established by proof of the same or less than all the facts required to establish the commission of the offense charged";
- (2) "It consists of an attempt or conspiracy to commit the offense charged or to commit an offense otherwise included therein"; or
- (3) "It differs from the offense charged only in the respect that a less serious injury or risk of injury to the same person, property or public interest or a lesser kind of culpability suffices to establish its commission."

Note: The New Jersey Supreme Court has criticized the N.J.S.A. 2C:1-8(a) standard as "mechanical" in nature, choosing instead to apply the more flexible pre-Code standard set forth in State v. Davis, 68 N.J. 69, 77-81 (1975). State v. Tate, 216 N.J. 300, 306-07 (2013). However, the decision in State v. Miles, 229 N.J. 83, 92 (2017), (which involved double jeopardy and not merger) might require application of the more mechanical standard to merger. Section C of this chapter discusses the Davis standard and Miles decision.

B. Merger Precluded: Statutory Provisions

1. Leaving a Motor Vehicle Accident Resulting in Death. N.J.S.A. 2C:11-5.1 precludes merger of the offense into a conviction for aggravated manslaughter (N.J.S.A. 2C:11-4), reckless vehicular homicide (N.J.S.A. 2C:11-5) and strict liability vehicular homicide (N.J.S.A. 2C:11-5.3).

2. Second- or Third-Degree Leaving the Scene of a Boating Accident. N.J.S.A. 2C:11-5.2(c) prohibits merger into a conviction for aggravated manslaughter (N.J.S.A. 2C:11-4), reckless vehicular homicide (N.J.S.A. 2C:11-5) and strict liability vehicular homicide (N.J.S.A. 2C:11-5.3).

3. Leaving a Motor Vehicle Accident Resulting in Serious Bodily Injury. N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1.1 precludes merger of the offense into a conviction for aggravated assault (N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1(b)) and assault by auto (N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1(c)).

4. Endangering an Injured Victim. N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1.2(d) provides that the conviction "shall not merge with a conviction of the crime that rendered the person physically helpless or mentally incapacitated."

5. Luring or Enticing a Child. N.J.S.A. 2C:13-6(f) precludes merger "with any other criminal offense."

6. Luring or Enticing an Adult. N.J.S.A. 2C:13-7(f) precludes merger "with any other criminal offense."

7. Third-Degree Recording and Third-Degree Disclosing Images of Sexual Contact. N.J.S.A. 2C:14-9(h) precludes one offense from merger into the other.

8. Bias Intimidation. N.J.S.A. 2C:16-1(e) precludes merger with an offense, or attempt to commit an offense, in Chapters 11 through 18 of Title 2C, or with the

following offenses: false report to law enforcement (N.J.S.A. 2C:28-4); harassment (N.J.S.A. 2C:33-4); prohibited weapons and devices (N.J.S.A. 2C:39-3); possession of a weapon for an unlawful purpose (N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4); and unlawful possession of a weapon (N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5). **Note:** L. 2020, c. 73 (eff. Aug. 31, 2020) added N.J.S.A. 2C:28-4 to the list of offenses with which N.J.S.A. 2C:16-1 may not merge.

9. Leader of a Cargo Theft Network, Repeat Offender. N.J.S.A. 2C:20-2.4(a)(2) precludes merger with the crime of robbery. N.J.S.A. 2C:20-2.4(b) precludes merger "with the conviction for any offense which is the object of the conspiracy."

10. Leader of Organized Retail Theft Enterprise. N.J.S.A. 2C:20-11.2 prohibits the offense from merging with any offense that is the object of the conspiracy.

11. Use of a Juvenile in Theft of an Automobile. N.J.S.A. 2C:20-17(a) prohibits merger with the offense of auto theft.

12. Leader of Auto Theft Trafficking Network. N.J.S.A. 2C:20-18 prohibits the offense from merging with any offense that is the object of the conspiracy.

13. Computer Theft. N.J.S.A. 2C:20-25(h) provides that the conviction shall not merge with a conviction under any subsection of N.J.S.A. 2C:20-25 (computer theft), with a conviction under N.J.S.A. 2C:20-31 (wrongful access, disclosure of information), or with a conspiracy or attempt to commit either offense.

14. False Use of Personal Identification. N.J.S.A. 2C:21-17.2(b) prohibits merger with another conviction under this statute or any other statute.

15. Financial Facilitation of Criminal Activity. N.J.S.A. 2C:21-27(c) precludes merger "with the conviction of any other offense constituting the criminal activity involved or from which the property was derived, and a conviction of any offense constituting the criminal activity involved or from which the property was derived shall not merge with a conviction of an offense defined in" N.J.S.A. 2C:21-25 (financial facilitation of criminal activity).

16. Leader of a Child Pornography Network. N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4.1(d) (eff. Feb. 1, 2018) provides that "a conviction of leader of a child pornography network shall

not merge with the conviction for any offense which is the object of the conspiracy."

17. Use of a Juvenile to Commit a Crime. N.J.S.A. 2C:24-9(c) prohibits merger with the underlying offense.

18. Witness Tampering. N.J.S.A. 2C:28-5(e) prohibits merger with "an offense that was the subject of the official proceeding or investigation."

19. Official Deprivation of Civil Rights. N.J.S.A. 2C:30-6(c) precludes merger with any other criminal offense.

20. Pattern of Official Misconduct. N.J.S.A. 2C:30-7(b) provides that the conviction "shall not merge with a conviction of official misconduct, official deprivation of civil rights, or any other criminal offense."

21. Solicitation of Street Gang Members. N.J.S.A. 2C:33-28(g) provides that the conviction shall not merge with another conviction under this statute, nor with "a conviction for any criminal offense that the actor committed while involved in criminal street gang related activity."

22. Leader of a Dog Fighting Network. N.J.S.A. 2C:33-32(c) provides that the conviction "shall not merge with the conviction for any offense, nor shall such other conviction merge with a conviction under this section, which is the object of the conspiracy."

23. Leader of a Narcotics Trafficking Network. N.J.S.A. 2C:35-3 precludes merger with any offense that is the object of the conspiracy.

24. Booby Traps in the Manufacturing or Distribution of Drugs. N.J.S.A. 2C:35-4.1(e) prohibits the conviction from merging with a conviction for any drug offense in Chapter 35 of Title 2C, or a conspiracy or attempt to commit a Chapter 35 offense.

25. Employing a Juvenile in a Drug Distribution Scheme. N.J.S.A. 2C:35-6 provides that the conviction shall not merge with a conviction for a violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:35-3 (leader of narcotics trafficking network), N.J.S.A. 2C:35-4 (maintaining or operating a CDS production facility), N.J.S.A. 2C:35-5 (manufacturing, distributing or dispensing a CDS), or N.J.S.A. 2C:35-9 (strict liability for drug induced death).

26. Manufacturing, Distributing or Dispensing a Controlled Dangerous Substance on School Property. N.J.S.A. 2C:35-7(c) precludes the conviction from merging with a conviction under N.J.S.A. 2C:35-5 (manufacturing, distributing or dispensing a CDS) or N.J.S.A. 2C:35-6 (employing a juvenile in a drug distribution scheme).

27. Drug Distribution within 500 Feet of Public Property. N.J.S.A. 2C:35-7.1(c) precludes merger with a conviction under N.J.S.A. 2C:35-5 (manufacturing, distributing or dispensing CDS), or N.J.S.A. 2C:35-6 (employing a juvenile in a drug distribution scheme).

28. Drug Induced Death. N.J.S.A. 2C:35-9(d) precludes merger "with a conviction for leader of narcotics trafficking network, maintaining or operating a controlled dangerous substance production facility, or for unlawfully manufacturing, distributing, dispensing or possessing with intent to manufacture, distribute or dispense the controlled dangerous substance or controlled substance analog which resulted in the death."

29. Terrorism. N.J.S.A. 2C:38-2(f) precludes merger with any other offense.

30. Possession of a Bump Stock or Trigger Crank. N.J.S.A. 2C:39-3(1) (eff. Jan. 16, 2018) prohibits the court from merging a conviction for knowing possession of a bump stock or trigger crank with a conviction for possession of an assault firearm (N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(f)) or machine gun (N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(a)).

31. Possession of a Weapon during a Drug or Bias Crime. N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4.1(d) prohibits merger with any of the following offenses:

- Leader of a narcotics trafficking network (N.J.S.A. 2C:35-3);
- Maintaining or operating a drug production facility (N.J.S.A. 2C:35-4);
- Manufacturing or distributing drugs (N.J.S.A. 2C:35-5);
- Manufacturing and dispensing Gamma Hydroxybutyrate (N.J.S.A. 2C:35-5.2);
- Manufacturing and dispensing Flunitrazepam (N.J.S.A. 2C:35-5.3);

- Employing a juvenile in a drug distribution scheme (N.J.S.A. 2C:35-6);
- Possession of drugs on or near school property (N.J.S.A. 2C:35-7);
- Distribution or possession of drugs on public property (N.J.S.A. 2C:35-7.1);
- Possession, distribution, or manufacturing imitation drugs (N.J.S.A. 2C:35-11); and
- Bias intimidation (N.J.S.A. 2C:16-1).

32. Purchasing Firearm Parts to Manufacture a Firearm without a Serial Number. Pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:39-9(k), a conviction for purchasing or obtaining firearm parts to manufacture a firearm without a serial number "shall not merge with a conviction for any other criminal offense and the court shall impose separate sentences."

33. Certain Persons Prohibited from Possessing a Firearm and Enticing Another to Transfer a Firearm. Pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:39-10(a)(5) (eff. July 16, 2019), it is a crime for a person who is disqualified from possessing a firearm to entice or solicit another to transfer or assign a firearm to the disqualified person, and this crime shall not merge with a conviction for any other criminal offense.

34. Leader of Firearms Trafficking Network. N.J.S.A. 2C:39-16 prohibits merger with any offense that is the object of the conspiracy.

C. Standards Regarding Merger: Case Law

1. Merger Described. Merger prohibits a defendant from being punished more than once for a single wrongdoing. State v. Tate, 216 N.J. 300, 302 (2013); State v. Davis, 68 N.J. 69, 77-81 (1975). Under the New Jersey Constitution, the right derives from "double jeopardy, substantive due process, or some other legal tenet." State v. Davis, 68 N.J. 69, 77 (1975). Accord State v. Diaz, 144 N.J. 628, 637 (1996). See also State v. Tate, 216 N.J. 300, 302-03 (2013) ("merger implicates a defendant's substantive constitutional rights," has "sentencing ramifications," and "has a measurable impact on the criminal stigma that attaches to a convicted

defendant"). Under the Federal Constitution, the right falls within the prohibition against double jeopardy. State v. Dillihay, 127 N.J. 42, 47-48 (1992).

2. The Federal Blockburger Test. Under the same-elements test set forth in Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 304 (1932), one offense will not merge into another if it requires proof of an element, or fact, that the other offense does not require. Rutledge v. United States, 517 U.S. 292, 297-98 (1996); State v. Miles, 229 N.J. 83, 92 (2017). This test mirrors the standard set forth in N.J.S.A. 2C:1-8(a), which our Court has criticized as "mechanical." State v. Truglia, 97 N.J. 513, 520 (1984).

3. The New Jersey Davis Standard. Under the test set forth in State v. Davis, 68 N.J. 69, 78 (1975), in determining whether a defendant may be punished for two convictions, a court must first determine whether the Legislature intended to create separate offenses. If it did, then the court must decide whether the offenses are so similar that conviction for both is nonetheless prohibited by the Constitution. Id. at 81. The court should employ a "flexible approach" that considers the elements of the crime and the facts of the case "attended by considerations of fairness and fulfillment of reasonable expectations." Ibid. (internal quotation omitted). The court must consider the following, in addition to any other relevant circumstances: "the time and place of each purported violation"; whether the proof for each offense is the same; "whether one act was an integral part of a larger scheme or episode; the intent of the accused; and the consequences of the criminal standards transgressed." State v. Davis, 68 N.J. 69, 81 (1975). The weight that any factor receives "depend[s] on the circumstances of the particular case." Ibid.

4. Legislative Authority to Impose Multiple Punishments. Under federal law, the Legislature may impose multiple punishments for one offense, so long as it clearly expresses its intention to do so. Missouri v. Hunter, 459 U.S. 359, 368-69 (1983). The New Jersey Supreme Court has not determined "whether or to what extent New Jersey's constitutional guarantee affords greater protection." State v. Dillihay, 127 N.J. 42, 47-48 (1992) (citing State v. Churchdale Leasing, 115 N.J. 83, 108 (1989)). But in Davis, the Court said that if the Legislature did "no more than simply apply different labels to what is in fact the same charge, it would plainly exceed its authority." Id. at 80. In a later decision the Court said that this proposition expressed "a more restrictive view of legislative power" than that authorized by the United States Supreme Court in Hunter. State v. Churchdale Leasing, 115 N.J. 83, 123 (1989).

5. Greater Offenses Do Not Merge. "No crime of greater degree or culpability can merge into one of lesser degree or culpability." State v. Hammond, 231 N.J. Super. 535 (App. Div. 1989). Accord State v. Dillihay, 127 N.J. 42, 49-50 (1992); State v. Battle, 256 N.J. Super. 268, 283 (App. Div. 1992).

6. Mandatory Penalties. "[M]andatory penalties attendant upon a lesser charge" survive merger and must be included in the sentence on the greater offense. State v. Frank, 445 N.J. Super. 98, 109 (App. Div. 2016) (quoting State v. Baumann, 340 N.J. Super. 557 (App. Div. 2001), in holding that a mandatory penalty for a motor vehicle violation survived merger). See also State v. Wade, 169 N.J. 302, 303 (2001) (driving while intoxicated); State v. Dillihay, 127 N.J. 42, 55 (1992) (drug distribution in a school zone); State v. Connell, 208 N.J. Super. 688, 696 (App. Div. 1986) (the Graves Act).

7. The Harshest Sentence Must Be Imposed. When offenses merge, the court must impose "the more severe aspects of the sentence for each offense." State v. Robinson, 439 N.J. Super. 196, 200 (App. Div. 2014) (imposing the maximum term on the conviction that merged and the parole ineligibility term on the conviction that survived merger to impose the most severe sentence authorized by the two convictions).

8. Merger of the General with the Specific. Convictions for lewdness and endangering the welfare of a child merge when the basis of the conviction for endangering the welfare of a child is the same as the facts that establish lewdness. State v. Hackett, 166 N.J. 66, 77 (2001).

9. Additional Element. Aggravated arson and first-degree arson for hire do not merge because arson for hire requires an additional element of offering or accepting payment to start a fire. State v. Allison, 208 N.J. Super. 9, 24-25 (App. Div. 1985).

10. Separate Culpable Harm. Similar crimes will not merge when they involve separate culpable harms. State v. Soto, 385 N.J. Super. 257, 264-65 (App. Div. 2006) (drug possession within 1000 feet of a school and unlawful possession of a firearm while committing a drug offense do not merge); State v. Walker, 385 N.J. Super. 388, 409-11 (App. Div. 2006) (maintaining a structure within which drugs are sold and possession of drugs with intent to distribute do not merge).

11. Different Protected Interests. Aggravated sexual assault of a child, (N.J.S.A. 2C:14-2(a)(1)) and child endangerment (N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4(a)) do not

merge because the statutes protect different interests. State v. Miller, 108 N.J. 112, 118 (1987).

12. Different Elements. Aggravated assault (N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1(b)(1) and (4)) and possession of a handgun with the purpose of using it unlawfully against another (N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4(a)) do not merge because the elements of the crimes differ. State v. Truglia, 97 N.J. 513, 521 (1984).

13. Separate Victims. Aggravated assault convictions will not merge when the defendant harmed separate victims. State v. Lewis, 223 N.J. Super. 145, 152 (App. Div. 1988).

14. Conspiracy and Preparatory Offenses. When the only purpose of the conspiracy or preparatory offense was to commit the substantive offense, the convictions will merge. State v. Grunow, 102 N.J. 133, 147 (1986); State v. Hardison, 99 N.J. 379, 386-91 (1985).

15. Broader and Independent Purpose. A weapons offense will not merge with a substantive offense when the evidence supports a finding that the purpose in possessing the weapon was broader than, or independent of, the purpose of the substantive crime, and the jury charge did not limit the defendant's purpose to the commission of the substantive crime. State v. Diaz, 144 N.J. 628, 636-37 (1996). An example is when a defendant uses a weapon to commit a robbery and also to frighten victims. Ibid. The purpose in possessing the weapon exceeds the intent to commit a robbery, thus the two convictions do not merge. Ibid. Accord State v. Tate, 216 N.J. 300, 302 (2013) (explaining that "a conviction for third-degree possession of a weapon for an unlawful purpose must merge with a conviction for first-degree aggravated manslaughter when the evidence does not support the existence of another unlawful purpose for possession of the weapon"); State v. Best, 70 N.J. 56, 65-67 (1976) (merging a conviction for possession of a weapon with a robbery conviction); State v. Bellamy, 468 N.J. Super. 29, 41-42 (App. Div. 2021) (merging a possession of a weapon conviction into a murder, robbery and/or carjacking conviction because the defendant possessed the weapon to commit those crimes).

16. Motor Vehicle Offenses. Title 39 motor vehicle violations "fall within the generic category of petty offenses that do not fit within the Code's definition of a lesser-included criminal offense." State v. Frank, 445 N.J. Super. 98, 108 (App. Div. 2016) (quoting State v. Stanton, 176 N.J. 75, 98 (2003)). However, when motor vehicle offenses are consolidated with indictable offenses for purposes of

trial, it is appropriate for the court to merge a motor vehicle violation with a criminal conviction. Ibid.

17. Special Verdict Form. When a defendant is charged with felony murder and more than one felony that resulted in the murder, the court should ask the jury to designate on a special verdict form which felony or felonies constitute the predicate crime. State v. Hill, 182 N.J. 532, 548 (2005). "If the jury designates more than one felony, . . . the trial court at sentencing is to merge only the predicate felony that set in motion the chain of events leading to the murder--the 'first-in-time' predicate felony--into the felony murder conviction." Ibid.

18. Special Verdict Forms and Possession of a Weapon for an Unlawful Purpose. When the verdict does not answer whether the defendant possessed a weapon with a purpose broader than that needed to commit a substantive offense, the court should not merge the weapons offense if: (1) the indictment charged possession of a "weapon with a broader unlawful purpose, either generally or specifically, than using the weapon to" commit the substantive offense; (2) the evidence supports a finding of broader purpose; (3) the judge instructed the jury on the difference between possession with the specific unlawful purpose to commit the substantive crime and a broader unlawful purpose; and (4) the verdict "express[es] the jury's conclusion that the defendant had a broader unlawful purpose." State v. Diaz, 144 N.J. 628, 639 (1996).

19. Jury Charge and Purpose in Possessing a Weapon. If the jury charge instructed that the purpose in possessing a weapon was to use it against a victim in the substantive offense, then the weapons offense must merge with the substantive offense, even if the evidence could have supported a separate unlawful purpose for the weapons offense. State v. Diaz, 144 N.J. 628, 641 (1996).

20. Ambiguity Resolved in Defendant's Favor. "Where one set of facts would support merger and another not, and neither the charge to the jury nor the verdict gives any clue as to which set of facts the jury chose, the convictions should merge." State v. Bull, 268 N.J. Super. 504, 516 (App. Div. 1993).

21. Possession and Distribution Convictions. A conviction for possession of a controlled dangerous substance (N.J.S.A. 2C:35-10) will not merge with a conviction for distribution of a controlled dangerous substance (N.J.S.A. 2C:35-5) if the "core conduct" and "mental element" of the offenses is different; if the two are not different, then the offenses will merge. State v. Davis, 68 N.J. 69, 82-83 (1975) (distinguishing State v. Booker, 86 N.J. Super. 175, 177-78 (App. Div.

1965)). See also State v. Miller, 237 N.J. 15, 34-35 (2019) (fourth-degree possession of child pornography did not merge with second-degree distribution of child pornography because the periods in which defendant possessed and distributed the material did not coincide, and the material defendant possessed was not limited to the computer files that he distributed).

22. Drug Distribution and Distribution in a School Zone. While N.J.S.A. 2C:35-7 precludes merger of distribution-within-a-school-zone with a N.J.S.A. 2C:35-5 distribution conviction, subjecting a defendant to punishment under both statutes would violate principles of double jeopardy because N.J.S.A. 2C:35-5, does not require proof of any additional element. State v. Dillihay, 127 N.J. 42, 45, 51 (1992); State v. Brana, 127 N.J. 64, 67 (1992). To comply with double jeopardy principles, a N.J.S.A. 2C:35-7 offense may merge with another drug offense, so long as the "period of parole ineligibility mandated by Section 7 is preserved." State v. Dillihay, 127 N.J. 42, 54 (1992); State v. Brana, 127 N.J. 64, 67 (1992).

23. Drug Distribution and Distribution on Public Property. The same rationale applies to the anti-merger provision of N.J.S.A. 2C:35-7.1 (precluding merger of a conviction for distributing within 500 feet of a public housing facility, public park, or public building with a conviction under N.J.S.A. 2C:35-5 (drug distribution), or N.J.S.A. 2C:35-6 (employing a juvenile to distribute drugs)). State v. Gregory, 336 N.J. Super. 601, 607 (App. Div. 2001) (merging a third-degree conviction under N.J.S.A. 2C:35-5 into a second-degree conviction under N.J.S.A. 2C:35-7.1); State v. Parker, 335 N.J. Super. 415, 420 (App. Div. 2000) (holding that a "third-degree conviction under N.J.S.A. 2C:35-7 should have merged into" the defendant's N.J.S.A. 2C:35-7.1 second-degree conviction, with the N.J.S.A. 2C:35-7 mandatory minimum term's surviving merger).

24. Drug Induced Death and Drug Distribution. Although the anti-merger provision of N.J.S.A. 2C:35-9 (drug induced death) explicitly prohibits merger into a conviction under N.J.S.A. 2C:35-5(a) (drug distribution), a Section 5 offense will merge into a Section 9 offense if the crimes arise out of the same transaction. State v. Maldonado, 137 N.J. 536, 583-84 (1994).

25. Drug Induced Death and Distribution within a School Zone. These two offenses (N.J.S.A. 2C:35-9 and N.J.S.A. 2C:35-7) do not merge because they require different proofs. State v. Maldonado, 137 N.J. 536, 582 (1994).

26. Possession of a Weapon during a Drug Crime. N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4.1(d) (precluding merger of a conviction for possession of a weapon while committing certain drug offenses with the underlying drug conviction), does not violate principles of due process and double jeopardy under either the Federal or State Constitution. State v. Martinez, 387 N.J. Super. 129, 142-46 (App. Div. 2006); State v. Soto (II), 385 N.J. Super. 257, 261-66 (App. Div. 2006).

27. Booby Traps during Drug Distribution or Manufacturing. N.J.S.A. 2C:35-4.1(e) (precluding merger of a conviction for using booby traps in connection with drug manufacturing or distribution with a drug offense) does not violate a defendant's right of due process or protection against double jeopardy under either the Federal or State Constitution. State v. Walker, 385 N.J. Super. 388, 408-11 (App. Div. 2006).

28. Penalties and Assessments. The court may not impose penalties and assessments on a merged conviction. State v. Francis, 341 N.J. Super. 67, 69 (App. Div. 2001).

29. Merged Crimes Are Not Extinguished. Because merger does not extinguish the conviction on the lesser charge, if the conviction on the greater charge is reversed on appeal, the State may request the court to impose sentence on the lesser offense instead of retrying the defendant on the greater offense. State v. Pennington, 273 N.J. Super. 289 (App. Div. 1994). This principle also applies where the State retries the defendant on the greater offense and the jury acquits the defendant of that offense. State v. Becheam, 399 N.J. Super. 268, 275-76 (Law Div. 2007).

30. Merged Offenses and Drug Court (renamed Recovery Court) Eligibility. An offense precludes a sentence of drug-court special-probation, pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:35-14(b), survives merger and renders a defendant ineligible for special probation. State v. Ancrum, 449 N.J. Super. 526, 540 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 231 N.J. 222 (2017) (reversing a sentence of special probation because the defendant committed an aggravated assault). The merged offense is not extinguished for purposes of determining special-probation eligibility. Ibid.

31. Merger Is Inapplicable to Charges. Convictions merge; charges do not. State v. Martin, 335 N.J. Super. 447, 450 (App. Div. 2001). Thus, the court may not merge a charged offense into an offense to which the defendant pleads guilty. Ibid. For a discussion on the difference between merger and multiplicity of charges (i.e., charging multiple counts of the same offense when the defendant's

conduct supports a conviction for only one count), see State v. Hill-White, 456 N.J. Super. 1, 6-9 (App. Div. 2018).

32. Illegal Sentence. "[T]he failure to merge convictions results in an illegal sentence for which there is no procedural time limit for correction" because merger implicates a defendant's substantive state constitutional rights. State v. Romero, 191 N.J. 59, 80 (2007). Accord State v. Bellamy, 468 N.J. Super. 29, 41-42 (App. Div. 2021) (explaining, in an appeal of a resentencing, that merger errors dating back to the initial sentence must be correct when discovered).

33. Plea Agreements.

(a) **Waiver.** A defendant may waive the right to merger in a plea agreement. State v. Crawley, 149 N.J. 310, 319 (1997); State v. Truglia, 97 N.J. 513, 523-24 (1984).

(b) **Information at Plea Entry.** "[W]here the ultimate resolution of the merger issue is uncertain, a guilty plea need not necessarily be overturned when a trial court fails to inform a defendant about the possibility of merger because such a failure does not misinform the defendant about his potential sentence." State v. Crawley, 149 N.J. 310, 316-17 (1997).

34. Murder and Felony Murder. Where felony murder provided an alternative theory of liability for the homicide of a victim and the jury convicts the defendant of the underlying felony, felony murder and murder, the felony murder conviction merges into the murder conviction and the underlying felony survives the merger. State v. Bellamy, 468 N.J. Super. 29, 41-42 (App. Div. 2021).

35. Second-Degree Leaving a Motor Vehicle Accident Resulting in Death and Third-Degree Endangering an Injured Victim. Where the defendant struck a pedestrian with his truck and drove away before the pedestrian died, his convictions for second-degree leaving-the-scene and third-degree endangerment should have merged as both crimes were based on the same conduct, and thus, constituted the same crime. State v. Herrera, 469 N.J. Super. 559, 475-76 (App. Div. 2022).

IV. IMPRISONMENT

In deciding whether to impose a term of imprisonment, the court must first consider whether the offense is subject to the presumption of imprisonment or the presumption of non-imprisonment (see section A). If the court decides to impose a sentence of imprisonment, the court must set a term within the ordinary range applicable to the offense (see section B), unless the court decides to downgrade the offense (see Chapter I on sentencing procedure) or to impose an extended term (see Chapter VIII on extended terms). The location of incarceration depends upon the length of the sentence (see section C(4)). For statutory rules and case law relating to imprisonment, see sections C and D, respectively.

A. Presumptions in Favor of and against Imprisonment: Statutory Provisions

1. Statutory Authority on the Presumption of Imprisonment. N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(d) provides that the court shall impose a sentence of imprisonment on a defendant convicted of: (1) a first-degree crime; (2) a second-degree crime; (3) a third-degree crime if the court finds (a) the defendant is involved in organized criminal activity, (b) the offense involved an act of domestic violence in the presence of a child under sixteen years of age, or (c) the offense involved an act of domestic violence and "the defendant committed at least one act of domestic violence on more than one occasion," N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(a)(15); or (4) a third-degree crime of auto theft or unlawful taking of an auto if the defendant "has previously been convicted of either offense," N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(d).

An Exception to the Presumption of Imprisonment. The court need not impose a sentence of imprisonment on a defendant subject to the presumption of imprisonment if the court concludes, "having regard to the character and condition of the defendant, . . . that his [or her] imprisonment would be a serious injustice which overrides the need to deter such conduct by others." N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(d). See also N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(f)(2) (authorizing the State to appeal a non-custodial term imposed for a first- or second-degree crime).

2. Statutory Authority on the Presumption of Non-Imprisonment. N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(e) instructs: "The court shall deal with a person convicted of an offense other than a crime of the first or second degree, who has not previously been convicted of an offense, without imposing a sentence of imprisonment unless,

having regard to the nature and circumstances of the offense and the history, character and condition of the defendant, it is of the opinion that his [or her] imprisonment is necessary for the protection of the public under the criteria set forth" in N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(a) (the aggravating factors).

3. Offenses to which the Presumption of Non-Imprisonment Does Not Apply.

The presumption of non-imprisonment does not apply if the court finds that (a) the defendant is involved in organized criminal activity, the offense involved an act of domestic violence in the presence of a child under sixteen years of age, the offense involved an act of domestic violence and "the defendant committed at least one act of domestic violence on more than one occasion," N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(a)(15), or (b) the defendant committed any of the following crimes (N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(e)):

- Third-degree theft of a motor vehicle (N.J.S.A. 2C:20-2);
- Third-degree eluding (N.J.S.A. 2C:29-2);
- Third-degree strict liability vehicular homicide (N.J.S.A. 2C:11-5.3);
- Third-degree using a false government document (N.J.S.A. 2C:21-2.1(c));
- Third-degree distributing, manufacturing, or possessing an item containing personal identifying information of another person (N.J.S.A. 2C:21-17.3(b));
- Third- or fourth-degree bias intimidation (N.J.S.A. 2C:16-1);
- Third-degree assault (N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1(b)(12));
- Third-degree knowingly leaving the scene of an accident that results in serious bodily injury to another person (N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1.1);
- Third- or fourth-degree gang-criminality (N.J.S.A. 2C:33-29); or
- Third- or fourth-degree promotion of organized street crime (N.J.S.A. 2C:33-30).

The following offenses also provide that the presumption of non-imprisonment shall not apply:

- Leaving the scene of a boating accident (N.J.S.A. 2C:11-5.2(a));
- Strict liability vehicular homicide (N.J.S.A. 2C:11-5.3(b)) (effective July 21, 2017);
- A first offense of third-degree interference with the custody of a child (N.J.S.A. 2C:13-4(a));
- Possession of 100 or more items depicting the sexual exploitation or abuse of a child (Note that the court may make an exception if "imprisonment would be a serious injustice which overrides the need to deter such conduct by others" (N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4(b)(5)(b)));
- Corrupting or influencing a jury (N.J.S.A. 2C:29-8(c));
- Pattern of official misconduct, first-time offender (N.J.S.A. 2C:30-7(b)); and
- Enhanced sentence for drug distribution to a minor or a pregnant female (N.J.S.A. 2C:35-8).

B. Ordinary Terms of Imprisonment: Statutory Provisions

1. Statutory Authority for Ordinary Terms of Imprisonment. The Code classifies crimes into four degrees (first through fourth). N.J.S.A. 2C:43-1(a). If the Code is silent on the degree of crime, or if the offense is designated a misdemeanor, then the crime is one of the fourth degree. N.J.S.A. 2C:43-1(a). A high misdemeanor is a crime of the third degree. N.J.S.A. 2C:43-1(b).

N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6(a) sets forth the following ordinary terms of imprisonment for first- through fourth-degree crimes, while N.J.S.A. 2C:43-8 provides for disorderly persons and petty disorderly persons offense:

- First-degree crime: between ten and twenty years;
- Second-degree crime: between five and ten years;

- Third-degree crime: between three and five years;
- Fourth-degree crime: not to exceed eighteen months;
- Disorderly persons offense: a term not to exceed six months; and
- Petty disorderly persons offense: a term not to exceed thirty days.

2. Enhanced Ordinary Terms for Certain Offenses. The following offenses have enhanced ordinary terms.

(a) Murder. A murder conviction requires one of the following two sentences, unless the defendant is a juvenile who was tried as an adult, in which case the defendant shall be sentenced under N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3(b)(1) to a term between thirty years and life imprisonment with a thirty-year period of parole ineligibility, N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3(b)(5) (eff. July 21, 2017):

(1) Thirty-Year Minimum. A defendant must serve between thirty-years-to-life imprisonment for first-degree murder with a thirty-year period of parole ineligibility. N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3(b)(1). The thirty-year minimum term also applies to a conviction for an attempt or conspiracy to murder five or more persons. N.J.S.A. 2C:5-4(a).

(2) Life without Parole. If the following circumstances apply, the defendant "shall be sentenced" to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole:

(i) The victim was a law enforcement officer murdered while performing official duties or because of his or her official status, N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3(b)(2); or

(ii) The victim was less than eighteen years old and the murder was carried out during a sexual assault (N.J.S.A. 2C:14-2) or criminal sexual contact (N.J.S.A. 2C:14-3), N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3(b)(3)(a) (effective July 21, 2017 **Note:** under the former version of N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3(b)(3)(a) the victim had to be less than fourteen years old); or

(iii) The defendant purposely or knowingly caused the death, or serious bodily injury resulting in death, "by his her own conduct," or procured the commission of the offense by the payment or promise of payment of something of pecuniary value, or solicited the commission of the offense as a leader of a narcotics trafficking network, or committed a crime of terrorism during which a murder occurred, and a jury finds beyond a reasonable doubt that any of the twelve aggravating factors listed in N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3(b)(4), are applicable. N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3(b)(4).

(b) First-Degree Aggravated Manslaughter: between ten and thirty years (N.J.S.A. 2C:11-4(c)).

(c) Kidnapping in the First Degree:

(1) Victim Is Sixteen Years of Age or Older: between fifteen and thirty years. N.J.S.A. 2C:13-1(c)(1).

(2) Victim Is Less than Sixteen Years Old: twenty-five years without parole eligibility, or a term between twenty-five years and life imprisonment with a parole ineligibility period of twenty-five years, if: (a) the defendant subjected the victim to a sexual assault (N.J.S.A. 2C:14-2), a criminal sexual contact (N.J.S.A. 2C:14-3), or child endangerment (N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4) or (b) the defendant sold or delivered the victim for pecuniary gain, and the sale did not lead to the victim's return to a parent or guardian. N.J.S.A. 2C:13-1(c)(2).

(d) Human Trafficking: twenty years without parole eligibility, or a prison term between twenty years and life with a parole ineligibility period of twenty years. N.J.S.A. 2C:13-8(d).

(e) Aggravated Sexual Assault of a Victim under Age Thirteen: a prison term between twenty-five years and life with a parole ineligibility period of twenty-five years. N.J.S.A. 2C:14-2(a). However, N.J.S.A. 2C:14-2(d) authorizes the State to negotiate a plea agreement, in the interest of the victim, with a prison term and parole bar of at least fifteen years. For the Attorney General's guidelines on plea negotiations under this statute, see the Uniform Plea Negotiation Guidelines to Implement the Jessica Lunsford Act (May 29, 2014), available at www.nj.gov/oag/dcj/agguide/lumsford_act.

(f) Carjacking: between ten and thirty years with a five-year period of parole ineligibility. N.J.S.A. 2C:15-2(b).

(g) Bias Intimidation: where the underlying crime is a crime of the first degree, between fifteen and thirty years. N.J.S.A. 2C:16-1(c).

(h) Unauthorized Acts at a Nuclear Electric Generating Plant: between fifteen and thirty years. N.J.S.A. 2C:17-7.

(i) Gang Criminality: where the underlying crime is a crime of first degree, between fifteen and thirty years. N.J.S.A. 2C:33-29(b).

(j) Promoting Organized Street Crime: between fifteen and thirty years. N.J.S.A. 2C:33-30(b).

(k) Leader of a Narcotics Trafficking Network: life imprisonment with a twenty-five-year period of parole ineligibility. N.J.S.A. 2C:35-3. (Note that pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:35-12, the State may waive this enhanced term. See Chapter XIV on drug offender sentencing for further discussion.)

(l) Drug Distribution to a Minor or a Pregnant Female: "twice the term of imprisonment, fine and penalty . . . authorized or required to be imposed by" any provision of Title 2. N.J.S.A. 2C:35-8. (Note that pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:35-12, the State may waive this enhanced term. See Chapter XIV on drug offender sentencing for further discussion.)

(m) Terrorism:

(1) Death Does Not Result: thirty years without parole eligibility, or a term between thirty years and life imprisonment with a parole ineligibility period of thirty years. N.J.S.A. 2C:38-2(b)(1).

(2) Death Results: life imprisonment without parole. N.J.S.A. 2C:38-2(b)(2).

(n) Producing or Possessing Chemical Weapons, Biological Agents, or Nuclear or Radiological Devices:

(1) Death Does Not Result: thirty years without parole eligibility, or a term of years between thirty years and life imprisonment with a parole ineligibility period of thirty years. N.J.S.A. 2C:38-3(a)(1).

(2) Death Results: life imprisonment without parole. N.J.S.A. 2C:38-3(a)(2).

C. Standards Relating to Imprisonment: Statutory Provisions

1. Guilty Pleas and Failure to Plead May Not Be Considered in Deciding Whether to Impose a Prison Term. Pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(c)(1), the court may not consider a plea of guilty or a failure to plead guilty in deciding whether to withhold or impose a sentence of imprisonment.

2. The Court Must Consider the Real-Time Consequences of Incarceration. N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(c)(2) instructs: "When imposing a sentence of imprisonment the court shall consider the defendant's eligibility for release under the law governing parole, including time credits awarded pursuant to Title 30 of the Revised Statutes, in determining the appropriate term of imprisonment."

3. Presumptive Terms Eliminated. The Code used to require the court to impose presumptive terms set forth in N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(f) unless the aggravating and mitigating factors warranted a longer or shorter term. In State v. Natale II, 184 N.J. 458, 487 (2005), the Court declared this practice unconstitutional under the Sixth Amendment. See section D of this chapter for further discussion.

4. Statutory Authority for Places of Imprisonment. N.J.S.A. 2C:43-10(a) to (c) provides for the following places of incarceration based on the length of the sentence:

(a) Terms of One Year or Longer. Unless the court imposes an indeterminate term pursuant to the young adult offender statute (N.J.S.A. 2C:43-5), and except as provided in N.J.S.A. 2C:43-10(b) below, "when a person is sentenced to imprisonment for any term of 1 year or greater, the court shall commit him [or her] to the custody of the Commissioner of the Department of Corrections for the term of his [or her] sentence and until released in accordance with law."

(b) Terms Not Exceeding Eighteen Months. A defendant sentenced to imprisonment for a term not exceeding eighteen months may serve the time at a county penitentiary or workhouse.

(c) Terms Less than One Year. A defendant sentenced to one year or less shall serve the term at "the common jail of the county, the county workhouse or the county penitentiary In counties of the first class having a workhouse or penitentiary, however, no sentence exceeding 6 months shall be to the common jail of the county."

5. Place of Imprisonment Based upon the Aggregate Sentence. For purposes of deciding the location of imprisonment, the court shall aggregate the length of the sentence. N.J.S.A. 2C:43-10(d).

D. Standards Relating to Imprisonment: Case Law

1. Deciding Whether a Presumption Is Applicable. The first step in imposing a term of incarceration is to determine whether the presumption of incarceration (N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(d)) is applicable. Sate v. Rivera, 124 N.J. 122, 125-26 (1991). The presumptions for and against incarceration are not all-inclusive. For example, a second-time offender charged with third- or fourth-degree crimes is generally not subject to either presumption. State v. Maurer, 438 N.J. Super. 402, 411 (App. Div. 2014); State v. Devlin, 234 N.J. Super. 545, 555 (App. Div. 1989). Accord State v. Crawford, 379 N.J. Super. 250, 259 (App. Div. 2005) (explaining that neither presumption applied because the "defendant was convicted of three fourth-degree crimes but he was not a first-time offender").

2. When Neither Presumption Applies. Where neither presumption applies, the court must weigh the aggravating and mitigating factors to determine whether incarceration is appropriate. State v. Baylass, 114 N.J. 169, 173 (1989).

3. The Presumption of Imprisonment and Plea Agreements. When a defendant pleads guilty to a first- or second-degree crime, the presumption of imprisonment applies even if the plea agreement can be construed as providing that the defendant would be sentenced as if for a crime of a lesser degree. State v. O'Connor, 105 N.J. 399, 404-05 (1987). The presumption's applicability is determined by the offense for which the defendant is convicted. Ibid.

4. Overcoming the Presumption of Imprisonment, the Serious Injustice Exception. "The 'serious injustice' exception to the presumption of imprisonment

applies only in 'truly extraordinary and unanticipated circumstances.'" State v. Jabbour, 118 N.J. 1, 7 (1990) (quoting State v. Roth, 95 N.J. 334, 358 (1984)). See also N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(d) and (f)(2). To satisfy the standard, the defendant should show that he or she is "idiosyncratic." State v. Jarbath, 114 N.J. 394, 408 (1989). See State v. E.R., 273 N.J. Super. 262, 274-75 (App. Div. 1994) (uncontradicted prognosis of imminent death within six months due to AIDS-related disease constitutes "idiosyncratic" situation). The court must also consider "the gravity of the offense with respect to the peculiar facts of a case to determine how paramount deterrence will be in the [sentencing] equation." State v. Evers, 175 N.J. 355, 395 (2003).

(a) Clear and Convincing Evidence. The court should determine whether there is "clear and convincing evidence that there are relevant mitigating factors present to an extraordinary degree and, if so, whether cumulatively, they so greatly exceed any aggravating factors that imprisonment would constitute a serious injustice overriding the need for deterrence." State v. Evers, 175 N.J. 355, 393-94 (2003).

(b) Mitigating Factors Preponderate and First-Time Offenders. The court is not justified in finding the presumption of imprisonment overcome on the basis that the mitigating factors preponderate, and the defendant is a first-time offender. State v. Evers, 175 N.J. 355, 388 (2003). Rather, these are reasons to downgrade a sentence or impose a sentence at the low end of the sentencing range. Ibid. Accord State v. Lebra, 357 N.J. Super. 500, 511 (App. Div. 2003).

(c) Hardship. A defendant's finding incarceration difficult and the hardship that will come to his or her family are not sufficient reasons to overcome the presumption of imprisonment and the need for deterrence. State v. Jabbour, 118 N.J. 1, 8 (1990); State v. Johnson, 118 N.J. 10, 17-19 (1990). This is true even if the defendant is a police officer who might face peculiar hardship in prison. State v. Corso, 355 N.J. Super. 518, 528-29 (App. Div. 2002).

(d) Court's Disagreement with the Verdict. Disagreement with a jury verdict cannot justify a finding of "serious injustice" so as to overcome the presumption of incarceration. State v. Cooke, 345 N.J. Super. 480, 489-90 (App. Div. 2001).

(e) **Discretionary Finding.** The court's finding that the presumption in favor of imprisonment has been overcome for a third-degree offense is a discretionary finding that does not render a sentence illegal. State v. Thomas, 459 N.J. Super. 426, 434-35 (App. Div. 2019). Thus, the State may not challenge the decision on appeal. Id. at 435.

5. Overcoming the Presumption of Non-Imprisonment. To overcome the presumption of non-imprisonment, "the sentencing court must be persuaded by a standard that is higher than 'clear and convincing' evidence that incarceration is necessary." State v. Gardner, 113 N.J. 510, 517-18 (1989). An element of the crime cannot be an aggravating factor, and general deterrence alone is insufficient to overcome the presumption. Id. at 517-20.

6. Enhanced Ordinary Terms and the Eighth Amendment.

(a) **Leader of a Drug Trafficking Network Life Imprisonment.** The requirement that a leader of a narcotics trafficking network serve an ordinary term of life imprisonment with twenty-five years of parole ineligibility (N.J.S.A. 2C:35-3) does not constitute cruel and unusual punishment. State v. Kadonsky, 288 N.J. Super. 41, 45 (App. Div. 1996).

(b) **Carjacking.** The enhanced imprisonment range of ten to thirty years with a five-year period of parole ineligibility for carjacking (N.J.S.A. 2C:15-2) does not constitute cruel and unusual punishment. State v. Zadoyan, 290 N.J. Super. 280, 286 (App. Div. 1996); State v. Williams, 289 N.J. Super. 611, 617-18 (App. Div. 1996).

(c) **Terrorism.** The enhanced ordinary terms of imprisonment under the Anti-Terrorism Act (N.J.S.A. 2C:38-1 to -5) do not violate the prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment. State v. Dalal, 467 N.J. Super. 261, 288-90 (App. Div. 2021).

7. Juvenile Tried as an Adult and the Eighth Amendment.

(a) **Mandatory Life without Parole.** "[T]he Eighth Amendment forbids a sentencing scheme that mandates life in prison without possibility of parole for juvenile offenders." Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 479 (2012). Accord Jones v. Mississippi, 593 U.S. ___, ___, 141 S. Ct. 1307 (2021) (slip op. at 2, 5). See also Montgomery v. Louisiana, 577 U.S. 190, 208 (2016) (ruling that Miller v. Alabama applies retroactively). As the Miller Court

explained, mandatory life without parole for a juvenile convicted of homicide:

[1] precludes consideration of [the juvenile's] chronological age and its hallmark features--among them, immaturity, impetuosity, and failure to appreciate risks and consequences.

[2] It prevents taking into account the family and home environment that surrounds him--and from which he cannot usually extricate himself--no matter how brutal or dysfunctional.

[3] It neglects the circumstances of the homicide offense, including the extent of his participation in the conduct and the way familial and peer pressures may have affected him.

[4] Indeed, it ignores that he might have been charged and convicted of a lesser offense if not for incompetencies associated with youth--for example, his inability to deal with police officers or prosecutors (including on a plea agreement) or his incapacity to assist his own attorneys.

[5] And finally, this mandatory punishment disregards the possibility of rehabilitation even when the circumstances most suggest it.

[Miller, 567 U.S. at 477.]

These five considerations are known as the Miller factors.

(1) Factor One. "On rare occasions, the State might be able to present expert psychiatric evidence as proof that a particular juvenile offender possessed unusual maturity beyond his years. If unrefuted, the first factor would not weigh in the defendant's favor. But a juvenile offender has no burden to produce evidence that his brain has not fully developed in order for the first factor to be considered in mitigation." State v. Comer, 249 N.J. 359, 407 (2022). Intelligence and a well-organized allocution do not establish maturity at the time of the offense. Id. at 59-60. Post-offense improved grades or educational accomplishments may establish maturation or rehabilitation over time. Id. at 60.

(2) Factor Four. "[S]trategic decisions by counsel . . . cannot be attributed to a juvenile or factor into the Miller analysis, absent evidence that the juvenile controlled counsel's choice." State v. Comer, 249 N.J. 359, 407 (2022). "Nor should a client's request that counsel file certain motions or make certain objections carry much, if any, weight." Ibid.

(b) Lengthy Terms that Are the Functional Equivalent of Life Imprisonment. The holding in Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 479 (2012) "applies with equal strength to a sentence that is the practical equivalent of life without parole." State v. Zuber, 227 N.J. 422, 447 (2017). "The focus at a juvenile's sentencing hearing belongs on the real-time consequences of the aggregate sentence. To that end, judges must evaluate the Miller factors when they sentence a juvenile to a lengthy period of parole ineligibility for a single offense." Id. at 447. Additionally, a defendant who shows rehabilitation may receive a resentencing hearing where he or she has served the functional equivalent of life not because of a lengthy parole bar but because of numerous parole denials that do not appear to be supported by the record and that are not the result of an adversarial hearing where the defendant can present and challenge evidence. State v. Thomas, 470 N.J. Super. 167, 193-98 (App. Div. 2022).

(c) The Murder Statute's Mandatory Thirty-Year Minimum. The murder statute's mandatory thirty-year minimum period of imprisonment as applied to juveniles contravenes Article I, Paragraph 12 of the New Jersey Constitution because it does not allow the court to exercise discretion and does not provide a mechanism for review at a later time after relevant information develops and that could not have been known to the sentencer. State v. Comer, 249 N.J. 359, 401 (2022). To save the statute, the defendant may petition the court for a resentencing after serving twenty years of the original sentence. Id. at 401-02. At the resentencing, the court will consider the Miller factors, including whether the defendant: has matured or been rehabilitated; still fails to appreciate risks and consequences; and poses a risk of reoffending. Id. at 403. The court may reduce the sentence so long as the new term includes a parole bar of at least twenty years. Ibid.

8. Presumption of Imprisonment and Split Sentences. Where the presumption of imprisonment applies and the facts present no basis to overcome the presumption, the court may not impose a "split sentence" (a probationary term with a jail term as a condition of probation, N.J.S.A. 2C:43-2(b)(2)). State v. O'Connor,

105 N.J. 399, 410-11 (1987). The jail term in a split sentence is a condition of probation and does not equate to imprisonment for purposes of the presumption of imprisonment. Ibid.

9. Presumption of Non-Imprisonment and Split Sentences. Where the presumption of non-imprisonment applies and the facts present no basis to overcome the presumption, the court may impose a split sentence of probation with a jail term. State v. Hartye, 105 N.J. 411, 418-19 (1987).

10. Periodic Service of a Repeat DWI Offender Mandatory Term. "[A] third or subsequent DWI offender is ineligible for periodic service of the mandatory 180-day sentence" required by N.J.S.A. 39:4-50(a)(3). State v. Anicama, 455 N.J. Super. 365, 368 (App. Div. 2018).

11. Prior Record. When considering a defendant's prior record, an "offense" includes disorderly persons and petty disorderly persons offenses. State v. Battle, 256 N.J. Super. 268, 285 (App. Div. 1992); State v. Kates, 185 N.J. Super. 226, 227-28 (Law Div. 1982). A prior uncounseled conviction for a nonindictable offense is not an offense for purposes of enhanced sentencing. State v. Garcia, 186 N.J. Super. 386, 389 (Law Div. 1982).

V. PROBATION, SPLIT SENTENCES AND SUSPENDED SENTENCES

In certain cases, the sentencing court may impose a sentence of probation, a split sentence, or a suspended sentence (see sections A and C). If the defendant violates a term of the sentence, the court must resentence the defendant on the original charge and must impose a sentence for any violation that constitutes an offense (see sections B and C).

A. Probation, Split Sentences and Suspended Sentences: Statutory Provisions

1. Statutory Authority for Probation. N.J.S.A. 2C:43-2(b)(2) provides that a court may impose a sentence of probation, except as provided in N.J.S.A. 2C:43-2(g). N.J.S.A. 2C:43-2(g) prohibits the court from imposing probation for any of the offenses enumerated in N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6.4(a) (parole supervision for life) (**Note** that pursuant to L. 2017 c. 141 and L. 2017 c. 333, N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6.4(a) includes N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4(b)(5)(a), N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4(b)(5)(b)(i), (ii) and (iii) (child endangerment) and N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4.1 (leader of a child pornography network):

- Aggravated sexual assault (N.J.S.A. 2C:14-2(a));
- Sexual assault (N.J.S.A. 2C:14-2(b) or (c));
- Aggravated criminal sexual contact (N.J.S.A. 2C:14-3(a));
- Kidnapping (N.J.S.A. 2C:13-1(c)(2));
- Endangering the welfare of a child (N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4(a), N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4(b)(3) and N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4(b)(5)(b)(i) or (ii) (N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4(b)(4), N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4(b)(5)(a) and N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4(b)(5)(b)(iii) on motion by the State);
- Leader of a child pornography network (N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4.1 on motion by the States);
- Luring (N.J.S.A. 2C:13-6); or

- A violation of a special sentence of community supervision for life (N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6.4(d)).

2. Duration of Probation. A period of probation shall be "not less than 1 year nor more than 5 years." N.J.S.A. 2C:45-2(a).

3. Statutory Authority for a Split Sentence. N.J.S.A. 2C:43-2(b)(2) provides that the court may impose as a condition of probation a term of incarceration. This type of probation is commonly referred to as a split sentence. If the defendant was convicted of a crime, the jail term may not exceed 364 days. N.J.S.A. 2C:43-2(b)(2). If the defendant was convicted of a disorderly persons offense, the jail term may not exceed 90 days. Ibid.

4. Statutory Authority for a Suspended Sentence. N.J.S.A. 2C:43-2(b) authorizes the court to suspend a sentence.

Duration of a Suspended Sentence. Pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:45-2(a), a suspended sentence shall not "exceed the maximum term which could have been imposed or more than 5 years whichever is lesser."

5. Offenses that Preclude Suspension of Sentence and Noncustodial Terms.

(a) Luring or Enticing a Child. N.J.S.A. 2C:13-6(f) prohibits the court from suspending a sentence and from imposing a noncustodial term against anyone convicted of luring or enticing a child. N.J.S.A. 2C:13-6(d) and (e) have the same requirement for repeat offenders (subsection (d)) and persons with certain prior convictions (subsection (e)).

(b) Luring an Adult. N.J.S.A. 2C:13-7(f) prohibits the court from suspending a sentence and from imposing a noncustodial term for luring an adult. N.J.S.A. 2C:13-7(d) and (e) have the same requirement for repeat offenders (subsection (d)) and persons with certain prior convictions (subsection (e)).

(c) Sexual Assault or Criminal Sexual Contact. N.J.S.A. 2C:14-6 prohibits the court from suspending a sentence and imposing a noncustodial term if the defendant has a prior conviction for sexual assault or criminal sexual contact.

(d) Arson. N.J.S.A. 2C:17-1(e) prohibits the court from suspending a sentence or imposing a noncustodial term if the defendant committed aggravated arson of a health care facility or physician's office. N.J.S.A. 2C:17-1(g) prohibits a court from suspending sentence or imposing a noncustodial term if the targeted structure was a place of worship.

(e) Leader of a Cargo Theft Network. N.J.S.A. 2C:20-2.4(e) prohibits the court from imposing a noncustodial sentence and from suspending sentence for a second or subsequent offense of leader of a cargo theft network.

(f) Theft from a Cargo Carrier. N.J.S.A. 2C:20-2.6(c) prohibits the court from imposing a noncustodial sentence and from suspending sentence against a person convicted of a second or subsequent offense of theft from a cargo carrier.

(g) Child Endangerment. N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4(b)(5)(b) requires the court impose a term of imprisonment if the defendant possessed 100 or more items depicting the sexual exploitation or abuse of a child "unless, having regard to the character and condition of the defendant, it is of the opinion that imprisonment would be a serious injustice which overrides the need to deter such conduct by others."

(h) Drug Tampering. N.J.S.A. 2C:40-17(c) prohibits the court from suspending the sentence or imposing a noncustodial term on a health care professional or agent who "knowingly tampers with a cosmetic, drug or food product."

6. Authorized Conditions of Probation and Suspended Sentences. N.J.S.A. 2C:45-1(a) provides that the court may place "such reasonable conditions" on a probation sentence or a suspended sentence "as it deems necessary to insure that" the defendant "will lead a law-abiding life." Authorized conditions include, N.J.S.A. 2C:45-1(b) to (g):

- Supporting dependents;
- Continued employment;
- Medical or psychiatric treatment;
- Vocational training or course of study;

- Maintaining certain residence;
- Refraining from frequenting certain places;
- Refraining from possessing a weapon;
- Maintaining residence within the jurisdiction;
- Regularly reporting to a probation officer;
- Allowing access to the defendant's home;
- Payment of a fine, fee, assessment and restitution;
- Community service;
- Restricted internet access and computer examinations; and
- Any other condition reasonably related to rehabilitation.

7. Imposing Sentence in the Context of Multiple Offenses. The following rules apply when imposing sentence for multiple offenses or when the defendant is serving a sentence for another offense at the time of sentencing.

(a) Probation Prohibited in Certain Cases. N.J.S.A. 2C:44-5(f) instructs that when a court imposes sentence on a defendant who is already serving a sentence for an offense "committed prior to the former offense," the court may not impose a term of probation, "except as authorized by N.J.S.A. 2C:43-2(b)(2)" (the split sentence provision). N.J.S.A. 2C:44-5(f)(1).

(b) Concurrent and Consecutive Terms. "Multiple periods of suspension or probation shall run consecutively, unless the court" orders otherwise. N.J.S.A. 2C:44-5(f)(2).

(i) Sentence of One Year or More. "When a sentence of imprisonment in excess of one year is imposed, the service of such sentence shall satisfy a suspended sentence on another count or prior suspended sentence or sentence to probation, unless the suspended sentence or probation has been violated in which case any

imprisonment for the violation shall run consecutively." N.J.S.A. 2C:44-5(f)(3).

(ii) Sentence of One Year or Less. "When a sentence of imprisonment of one year or less is imposed, the period of a suspended sentence on another count or a prior suspended sentence or sentence to probation shall run during the period of such imprisonment, unless the suspended sentence or probation has been violated in which case any imprisonment for the violation shall run consecutively." N.J.S.A. 2C:44-5(f)(4).

8. Modifications of Probation and Suspended Sentence. On application of a probation officer or the defendant, or on its own initiative, the court may modify the terms of probation or a sentence suspension and may add conditions to the sentence. N.J.S.A. 2C:45-2(b). "The court shall eliminate any requirement that imposes an unreasonable burden on the defendant." Ibid.

9. Extension of Probation and Suspended Sentence. If the defendant has not satisfied a fine, penalty, or restitution at the end of the probationary or suspended sentence term, the court may extend the sentence for an additional period not to exceed a period authorized by N.J.S.A. 2C:45-2(a). N.J.S.A. 2C:45-2(c).

10. Discharge of Probation and Suspended Sentence. On application of the defendant or a probation officer, or on its own initiative, the court may discharge the defendant from probation or a suspended sentence "at any time." N.J.S.A. 2C:45-2(a).

B. Violation of a Term of Probation or of a Suspended Sentence: Statutory Provisions

1. Statutory Authority for Summons, Arrest and Detention. N.J.S.A. 2C:45-3(a)(1) provides that at any time during a term of sentence suspension or probation the court may summons the defendant to appear before it or issue a warrant for the defendant's arrest. N.J.S.A. 2C:45-3(a)(2) allows a probation officer or peace officer to arrest the defendant without a warrant upon probable cause that the defendant violated a term of sentence suspension or probation.

(a) Hearing. N.J.S.A. 2C:45-4 instructs that the defendant must receive written notice of the violation charges and must be provided a hearing at

which he or she "shall have the right to hear and controvert the evidence against him [or her], to offer evidence in his [or her] defense, and to be represented by counsel." The court may hold the defendant without bail pending decision on the charges. N.J.S.A. 2C:45-3(a)(3).

(b) Tolling Pending Disposition of the Charges. The probation or suspension period is tolled pending disposition of the violation charges. N.J.S.A. 2C:45-3(c). In the event the court finds no violation of probation, the period will be deemed not tolled. Ibid.

2. Revocation of Probation or Sentence Suspension. If the court finds "that the defendant has inexcusably failed to comply with a substantial requirement imposed as a condition of" probation or sentence suspension, or if the defendant is convicted of another offense, the court "may revoke the suspension or probation and sentence or resentence the defendant." N.J.S.A. 2C:45-3(a)(4). However, "[n]o revocation of suspension or probation shall be based on failure to pay a fine or make restitution, unless the failure was willful." Ibid.

3. Resentencing the Initial Offense. In resentencing the initial offense, the court may impose "any sentence that might have been imposed originally." N.J.S.A. 2C:45-3(b).

4. Credit for Time Served. Pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:45-1(e), if the court imposes a term of incarceration as a condition of probation or sentence suspension, "[t]he term of imprisonment . . . shall be treated as part of the sentence, and in the event of a sentence of imprisonment upon the revocation of probation, the term of imprisonment served hereunder shall be credited toward service of such subsequent sentence."

5. Sentencing on the New Offense Where the Court Does Not Revoke Probation or Sentence Suspension. N.J.S.A. 2C:44-5(g) provides: "When a defendant is convicted of an offense committed while under suspension of sentence or on probation and such suspension or probation is not revoked," the following rules apply.

(a) Imprisonment in Excess of One Year. Where the court imposes imprisonment in excess of one year, the new sentence "shall not satisfy the prior suspended sentence or sentence to probation, unless the court determines otherwise at the time of sentencing." N.J.S.A. 2C:44-5(g)(1).

(b) Imprisonment of One Year or Less. Where the court imposes a term of imprisonment of one year or less, "the period of the suspension or probation shall not run during the period of such imprisonment." N.J.S.A. 2C:44-5(g)(2).

(c) Imposition of another Term of Probation or Sentence Suspension. Where the court imposes another suspended term or period of probation, "the period of such suspension or probation shall run concurrently with or consecutively to the remainder of the prior periods, as the court determines at the time of sentence." N.J.S.A. 2C:44-5(g)(3).

C. Probation and Suspended Sentences: Case Law

1. The Difference between Probation and Suspended Sentence. "The difference between suspension and probation is that probation places the defendant under the supervision of the County Probation Office and normally carries a requirement to report to that office periodically whereas suspension is ordinarily without such supervision." State v. Malave, 249 N.J. Super. 559, 563-64 (App. Div. 1991). "In essence, suspension of imposition of sentence is tantamount to 'unsupervised' or 'non-reporting' probation. It is less onerous than probation." State v. Cullen, 351 N.J. Super. 505, 508 (App. Div. 2002).

2. Suspended Sentence. "A court may suspend the imposition of a sentence only after first determining that a non-custodial sentence is authorized and appropriate." State v. Rivera, 124 N.J. 122, 126 (1991).

3. Reasons for a Suspended Sentence. "As a practical matter, a sentencing court may postpone the imposition of sentence for certain reasons such as obtaining information about the defendant or to permit a defendant to comply with a plea agreement, for example, by cooperating with the prosecution and testifying in another matter. Sentence, however, 'shall be imposed without unreasonable delay.'" State v. Rivera, 124 N.J. 122, 126 (1991) (quoting R. 3:21-4(a)).

4. Aggravating and Mitigating Factors and Probation. The court must weigh the aggravating and mitigating factors set forth in N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(a) and (b) in deciding whether to impose a term of probation. State v. Baylass, 114 N.J. 169, 174 (1989).

5. Sentencing on Multiple Offenses, Probation and Imprisonment. "When a defendant is sentenced for more than one offense, . . . N.J.S.A. 2C:44-5(f)(1)

prohibits the court from imposing both a sentence of probation and a sentence of imprisonment, except as authorized by N.J.S.A. 2C:43-2(b)(2)" (split sentence). State v. Crawford, 379 N.J. Super. 250, 259 (App. Div. 2005). Pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:43-2(b)(2), the court may impose an aggregate sentence of 360 days in jail with a statutorily mandated parole bar of 360 days followed by a term of probation. State v. Chavarria, 464 N.J. Super. 1, 10 (App. Div. 2020).

6. Conditions of Probation. The court may impose as a condition of probation a requirement that is not expressly authorized by N.J.S.A. 2C:45-1(b) (conditions of probation), as long as the condition "substantially relate[s] to an appropriate penological and rehabilitative objective" and "is not unduly restrictive of" a defendant's liberty. State v. Krueger, 241 N.J. Super. 244, 256-57 (App. Div. 1990). The condition must end with the probationary term. Id. at 256.

7. Resentencing after a Violation of Probation or Suspended Sentence.

(a) Right of Allocution. The defendant has the right to speak on his or her own behalf at resentencing on a violation of probation. State v. Lavoy, 259 N.J. Super. 594, 598-99 (App. Div. 1992).

(b) Considerations in Resentencing, the Baylass Standard. When resentencing a defendant after a violation of probation or a suspended sentence, the court considers how the violation affects the weight accorded to the mitigating factors identified at the initial sentencing hearing. State v. Baylass, 114 N.J. 169, 178 (1989); State v. Molina, 114 N.J. 181, 184-85 (1989). State v. Hannigan, 408 N.J. Super. 388, 391 (App. Div. 2009) (applying the Baylass standard to a violation of a suspended sentence term). The court may not find any new aggravating factors, and it may not use the violation of probation as a basis to impose consecutive terms. State v. Baylass, 114 N.J. 169, 176-78 (1989). In weighing the mitigating factors, the court may consider the defendant's amenability to probation, including the ability to lead a law-abiding life and the likelihood that the defendant will respond to probationary treatment. Id. at 176-77.

(c) Downgrading. A downgrade to one degree lower, pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(f)(2), does not survive a violation of probation. State v. Frank, 280 N.J. Super. 26, 40 (App. Div. 1995). In resentencing, the court must reweigh the aggravating and mitigating factors found at the initial sentencing hearing in relation to the probation violation. Ibid.

(d) Sentence Modification and the No Early Release Act. Where the court modified, pursuant to Rule 3:21-10, a second-degree robbery conviction to probation, and the defendant subsequently violated probation, on resentencing the court had to impose a period of parole ineligibility mandated by the No Early Release Act. State v. Kearns, 393 N.J. Super. 107, 110-11 (App. Div. 2007).

(e) Generally Parole Ineligibility Should Not Be Imposed on Resentencing. A parole disqualifier should not ordinarily be imposed when resentencing a defendant after a probation violation since, at the original sentencing, the mitigating factors weighed in favor of probation. State v. Baylass, 114 N.J. 169, 178 (1989).

(f) Credit for Time Served. A defendant receives credit against a sentence for a probation violation for time served in jail as a condition of probation and for time served on parole following release from jail. State v. Rosado, 131 N.J. 423, 426-28 (1993) (explaining that parole is the legal equivalent of imprisonment for purposes of determining credit under N.J.S.A. 2C:45-1(e) (formerly N.J.S.A. 2C:45-1(d)); State v. Mercadante, 299 N.J. Super. 522, 533-32 (App. Div. 1997). "[T]he credit is to be applied against the aggregate term, and not against [a] Legislatively required parole ineligibility term of incarceration." State v. Mercadante, 299 N.J. Super. 522, 533 (App. Div. 1997). However, the Court said, "[w]e perceive a different result if, in fact, there was no ability to credit parole time against the base term because of the expiration of too great a portion of the aggregate term to permit full credit for the time served on parole." Id. at 534.

(g) Young Adult Offender Sentencing. The Baylass guidelines applicable to ordinary sentences "are not wholly applicable" to a young adult offender indeterminate sentence because unlike ordinary sentences, the purpose of a young adult offender sentence is to rehabilitate, not to punish. State v. Hannigan, 408 N.J. Super. 388, 393 (App. Div. 2009).

VI. AGGRAVATING AND MITIGATING FACTORS

In setting a term of imprisonment, the court must qualitatively weigh the aggravating and mitigating factors set forth in N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(a) and (b) (see section A). The term of imprisonment should be proportional to the weight assigned to the factors. Sections B through D discuss case law regarding the factors.

Please note, when imposing sentence on a juvenile tried as an adult, the court must consider the Miller factors in addition to the aggravating and mitigating factors (see Chapter IV, Section D).

A. The Aggravating and Mitigating Factors: Statutory Provisions

1. The Statute Listing Aggravating Factors. Pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(a), "the court shall consider the following aggravating circumstances" in imposing sentence:

- (1) The "nature and circumstances of the offense" and the defendant's role in the offense, including whether the defendant committed it "in an especially heinous, cruel, or depraved manner";
- (2) The "gravity and seriousness of harm" to the victim, "including whether or not the defendant knew or reasonably should have known that the victim of the offense was particularly vulnerable or incapable of resistance due to advanced age, ill-health, or extreme youth, or was for any other reason substantially incapable of exercising normal physical or mental power of resistance;
- (3) The risk of reoffending;
- (4) Whether the defendant violated public trust;
- (5) Whether the defendant was involved in organized crime;
- (6) The "defendant's prior criminal record and the seriousness of the offenses";
- (7) Whether the defendant committed the offense for payment;

- (8) Whether the defendant committed the offense against a law enforcement officer, a public servant, or a sports official;
- (9) The "need for deterring the defendant and others from violating the law";
- (10) Whether the offense involved fraud against the state or a state department;
- (11) Whether imposition of a fine, penalty or order of restitution alone would be perceived as a "cost of doing business";
- (12) Whether the defendant knew or should have known the victim was disabled or sixty years of age or older; and
- (13) Whether the defendant used a stolen vehicle during the crime;
- (14) Whether the offense involved an act of domestic violence, as defined in N.J.S.A. 2C:25-19(a), in the presence of a child under sixteen years of age; and
- (15) Whether the offense involved an act of domestic violence, as defined in N.J.S.A. 2C:25-19(a), "and the defendant committed at least one act of domestic violence on more than one occasion."

2. The Statute Listing Mitigating Factors. N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(b) provides that the court "may" consider the following mitigating factors in imposing sentence (**Note:** Mitigating factor fourteen was added by L. 2020, c. 110 (eff. Oct. 19, 2020)):

- (1) The defendant "neither caused nor threatened serious harm";
- (2) The defendant "did not contemplate that the defendant's conduct would cause or threaten serious harm";
- (3) The defendant "acted under a strong provocation";
- (4) "[S]ubstantial grounds" tend to "excuse or justify the defendant's conduct";

- (5) The victim "induced or facilitated" the crime;
- (6) The defendant compensated the victim or will participate in community service;
- (7) The defendant lacks a history of delinquency or criminal activity;
- (8) The defendant's conduct was the result of circumstances unlikely to recur;
- (9) The defendant's character and attitude indicate an unlikelihood of reoffending;
- (10) The defendant "is particularly likely to respond" to probation;
- (11) Imprisonment "would entail excessive hardship to" the defendant or his or her dependents;
- (12) The defendant cooperated with law enforcement;
- (13) The defendant is a youthful offender and "was substantially influenced by" a more mature person; and
- (14) The defendant was under age twenty-six at the time of the offense.

B. Aggravating Factors: Case Law

1. Nature of the Offense. "[A]ggravating factor one must be premised upon factors independent of the elements of the crime and firmly grounded in the record." State v. Fuentes, 217 N.J. 57, 63 (2014). See also State v. O'Donnell, 117 N.J. 210, 217-18 (1989) (factor one applied in a manslaughter case because the defendant intentionally inflicted pain and suffering in addition to causing death); State v. Locane, 454 N.J. Super. 98, 123-24 (App. Div. 2018) (the trial court erred in failing to find factor one in relation to a vehicular homicide where the defendant's reckless driving went beyond that required to prove the crime); State v. Soto, 340 N.J. Super. 47, 71-72 (App. Div. 2001) (factor one applied in an aggravated manslaughter and felony murder case where the defendant brutally and viciously attacked the victim); State v. Mara, 253 N.J. Super. 204, 214 (App. Div. 1992) (in an aggravated assault case, factor one applied based on the victim's serious and excessive injuries).

(a) Quantity Based Offenses. The court may find aggravating one for a quantity-based crime where the defendant exceedingly satisfied the quantity required for the crime. State v. Varona, 242 N.J. Super. 474, 490-91 (App. Div. 1990) (factor one applied in a drug case where the defendant possessed seven times the amount of cocaine needed to establish the crime); State v. Taylor, 226 N.J. Super. 441, 453 883 (App. Div. 1988) (factor one applied in a child sexual assault case where the victim was four years old because the crime only required the child to be less than thirteen); State v. Henry, 418 N.J. Super. 481, 485 (Law Div. 2010) (aggravating factor one applied in a drunk driving case where the defendant's blood alcohol concentration was .30).

(b) Harm to Non-Victims. As part of the nature and circumstances of the offense (aggravating factor one), the court may consider harm caused to a non-victim of the crime for which the defendant is being sentenced. State v. Lawless, 214 N.J. 594, 615 (2013). See also State v. Boyer, 221 N.J. Super. 387, 405-06 (App. Div. 1987) (where the defendant was convicted of murder, a weapons offense, and a number of other offenses, the murder victim's death established a basis to find factor one for the weapons offense because causing death was not an element of that offense).

(c) Child Pornography. Because a wide range of conduct qualifies as child pornography under N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4, the trial court correctly considered the extreme youth of the children depicted in the images the defendant possessed and distributed, as well as the "extraordinary brutality depicted" in the images. State v. Miller, 237 N.J. 15, 31 (2019).

2. Gravity and Seriousness of Harm. When considering the harm a defendant caused for purposes of aggravating factor two, N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(a)(2), a court should engage in a "pragmatic assessment of the totality of harm inflicted" to the victim of the crime for which the court is imposing sentence. State v. Carey, 168 N.J. 413, 426 (2001). Defendants who purposely or recklessly inflict substantial harm should receive more severe sentences. Id. at 426. See also State v. Locane, 454 N.J. Super. 98, 124 (App. Div. 2018) (the trial court erred in failing to find factor two in relation to an assault by auto where the victim's injuries exceeded those necessary to establish the crime).

Vulnerability. The "vulnerability" referred to in aggravating factor two, N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(a)(2), is not limited to the intrinsic condition of the victim;

it includes any reason that renders the victim substantially incapable of resistance. State v. O'Donnell, 117 N.J. 210, 218-19 (1989) (finding factor two in an official misconduct case where a police officer restrained the victim and rendered him unable to resist the officer's assault); State v. Kruse, 105 N.J. 354, 362-63 (1987) (finding factor two in a murder case where the defendant used a baseball bat to hit an unarmed victim in the head); State v. Faucette, 439 N.J. Super. 241, 272 (App. Div. 2015) (factor two applied in a robbery case where the victim was the sole employee of a gas station at night).

3. Risk of Reoffending. "A court's findings on the risk of re-offense should involve determinations that go beyond the simple finding of a criminal history and include an evaluation and judgment about the individual in light of his or her history." State v. Locane, 454 N.J. Super. 98, 125 (App. Div. 2018) (quoting State v. Thomas, 188 N.J. 137, 153 (2006)).

(a) Denial of Responsibility. The defendant's denial of responsibility supports a finding under aggravating factor three that the defendant is at risk of reoffending. State v. Carey, 168 N.J. 413, 427 (2001).

(b) Lack of Prior Record. The court may find that a defendant poses a risk of reoffending even though the defendant has no prior record. State v. Varona, 242 N.J. Super. 474, 491 (App. Div. 1990) (factor three applied in a drug distribution case because the defendant's possession of seven times the amount of cocaine needed to establish the crime "[c]learly" suggested that he "had access to large amounts of drugs and would distribute again").

(c) Conduct in Excess of that Required for the Crime. In a drug case, the court may find a risk of re-offense based on the defendant's possessing an amount of drugs that far exceeded the amount needed to establish the crime. State v. Thomas, 188 N.J. 137, 140-42 (2006); State v. Varona, 242 N.J. Super. 474, 491 (1990). Similarly, in a drunk driving case, the defendant's excessive drunkenness may support finding a risk of reoffending, even if the defendant has taken steps to rehabilitate herself or himself. State v. Locane, 454 N.J. Super. 98, 125 (App. Div. 2018).

(d) Failure to Appear at Sentencing. The defendant's failure to appear at the sentencing hearing may be relevant to the risk of reoffending and the need for deterrence. State v. Subin, 222 N.J. Super. 227, 237-40 (App. Div.), 111 N.J. 580 (1988).

(e) Rehabilitative Efforts. A defendant's post-arrest rehabilitative efforts "have to be weighed against the criminal history, and include, when possible, objective information in the record such as the offense circumstances." State v. Locane, 454 N.J. Super. 98, 125 (App. Div. 2018) (trial court erred in rejecting factor three on the basis of the defendant's rehabilitative efforts where the defendant drove with a blood alcohol level nearly three times the legal limit).

4. Seriousness of the Offense and Public Trust. "Depreciat[ing] the seriousness of the defendant's offense," N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(a)(4), deals only with violations of public trust under Chapters 27 and 30, or breaches of a position of trust or confidence. State v. Mosch, 214 N.J. Super. 457, 463 (App. Div. 1986). Further, "the 'position of trust or confidence' must relate to the victim, not to a minor" codefendant. State v. Morente-Dubon, 474 N.J. Super. 197, 214 (App. Div. 2022).

5. Organized Crime. The "organized criminal activity" aspect of aggravating factor five, N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(a)(5), applies if there is proof that the defendant is involved in such activity, even though the offenses for which he or she has been convicted have no relationship to that activity. State v. Merlino, 208 N.J. Super. 247, 259 (Law Div. 1984), aff'd in part, vacated in part on other grounds, 208 N.J. Super. 147 (App. Div. 1985).

6. Prior Criminal Record.

(a) Driving while under the Influence (DWI). Prior convictions for DWI may not be considered an aggravating factor under N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(a)(6) (prior criminal record), because DWI does not constitute an "offense" under N.J.S.A. 2C:1-14(k). However, they may be considered as part of the defendant's overall personal history. State v. Lawless, 423 N.J. Super. 293, 305 (App. Div. 2011), aff'd, 214 N.J. 594 (2013); State v. Radziwil, 235 N.J. Super. 557, 575-76 (App. Div. 1989), aff'd o.b., 121 N.J. 527 (1990).

(b) Juvenile and Driving Records. Although aggravating factor six refers to a defendant's "prior criminal record," the court may consider a defendant's juvenile record and driving record in assessing that factor. State v. Pindale, 249 N.J. Super. 266, 288 (App. Div. 1991). The court may also "consider a juvenile record even if the charges did not result in convictions." State v. Torres, 313 N.J. Super. 129, 162 (App. Div. 1998).

7. The Need to Deter.

(a) **Lack of Prior Record.** In an appropriate case, the court may find a need to deter (aggravating factor nine) even though the defendant has no prior record. State v. Fuentes, 217 N.J. 57, 80 (2014).

(b) **Degree of Crime.** "The need for public safety and deterrence increase proportionally with the degree of the offense." State v. Carey, 168 N.J. 413, 426 (2001).

(c) **Gravity and Harmfulness of the Crime.** "[D]emands for deterrence are strengthened in direct proportion to the gravity and harmfulness of the offense." State v. Fuentes, 217 N.J. 57, 78-79 (2014) (quoting State in Interest of C.A.H., 89 N.J. 326, 337 (1982)).

(d) **Lack of Remorse.** A defendant's lack of remorse and consistent denial of wrongdoing may establish a need to deter the defendant from similar conduct in the future, N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(a)(9). State v. Rivers, 252 N.J. Super. 142, 153-54 (App. Div. 1991).

(e) **Specific and General Deterrence.** Aggravating factor nine, N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(a)(9), includes specific and general deterrence. State v. Fuentes, 217 N.J. 57, 78 (2014). It requires a qualitative analysis of the risk of recidivism based not only on a prior record, but on an evaluation of the defendant as an individual. Ibid.

(f) **Lack of Personal Deterrence.** Generally, in the absence of a need for personal deterrence, the need for general deterrence is lessened. State v. Case, 220 N.J. 49, 68 (2014); State v. Jarbath, 114 N.J. 394, 405 (1989). See also State v. Gardner, 113 N.J. 510, 520 (1989) (providing that "general deterrence alone is insufficient to overcome the presumption against imprisonment"); State v. Powell, 294 N.J. Super. 557, 567 (App. Div. 1996) (explaining that the need for general deterrence alone is insufficient to prevent downgrading).

(g) **Drunk Driving and General Deterrence.** The need for general deterrence is particularly meaningful where a drunk driver kills one person and seriously injures another. State v. Locane, 454 N.J. Super. 98, 126-27 (App. Div. 2018).

8. Risk of Recidivism, Prior Record and Need to Deter. Implicit in the findings on a defendant's risk of reoffending, N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(a)(3), the seriousness and extent of a defendant's prior criminal record, N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(a)(6), and the need to deter defendant and others, N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(a)(9), are "determinations that go beyond the simple finding of a criminal history and include an evaluation and judgment about the individual in light of his or her history." State v. Thomas, 188 N.J. 137, 155 (2006).

9. Rehabilitative Efforts, Recidivism and Deterrence. While a defendant's post-crime rehabilitative efforts are relevant considerations in imposing sentence, they do not necessarily negate a risk of reoffending or a need to deter. State v. Towey, 244 N.J. Super. 582, 594-95 (App. Div. 1990).

10. Cost of Doing Business. Pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(a)(11), a finding that a fine or other monetary penalty would be perceived as a cost of doing business, applies only when the sentencing judge is balancing a noncustodial term against a prison sentence. State v. Dalziel, 182 N.J. 494, 502 (2005). Hence, unless the court is being asked to overcome the presumption of imprisonment, this factor should not be used when sentencing for first- and second-degree crimes. Ibid.

11. Aggravating Factors and Codefendants. "Although a defendant may be vicariously accountable for the crimes his accomplice commits, he is not vicariously accountable for aggravating factors that are not personal to him." State v. Rogers, 236 N.J. Super. 378, 387 (App. Div. 1989), aff'd, 124 N.J. 113 (1991).

12. Crimes for which the Jury Acquitted. Under the fundamental fairness protections afforded by New Jersey Constitution, the court may not base a finding of aggravating factors on facts that supported crimes for which the jury acquitted the defendant. State v. Melvin, 248 N.J. 321, 349, 352 (2021); State v. Morente-Dubon, 474 N.J. Super. 197, 211-13 (App. Div. 2022).

13. Crimes for which the Jury Deadlocked. "[C]ourts should not consider evidence offered on deadlocked charges at sentencing 'unless and until the defendant no longer faces the prospect of prosecution for those charges.'" State v. Paden-Battle, 464 N.J. Super. 125, 150 (App. Div. 2020), (quoting State v. Tillery, 238 N.J. 293, 327 (2019)), aff'd sub nom., State v. Melvin, 248 N.J. 321 (2021).

14. Dismissed Charges. "Prior dismissed charges may not be considered for any purpose." State v. K.S., 220 N.J. 190, 199 (2015). See also State v. Tillery, 238 N.J. 293, 326 (2019) (citing K.S. for the proposition that it is "improper" for the

sentencing court to "draw[] inferences from the mere fact that charges had been brought").

C. Mitigating Factors: Case Law

1. Drug Distribution and Serious Harm. Distribution of cocaine may constitute conduct that causes and threatens serious harm so as to render inapplicable mitigating factors one, N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(b)(1), (defendant did not cause serious harm), and two N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(b)(2) (defendant did not contemplate causing serious harm). State v. Tarver, 272 N.J. Super. 414, 434-35 (App. Div. 1994).

2. Drunk Driving and Failure to Contemplate Harm. A court may not base a finding of mitigating factor two (the defendant did not contemplate that his or her conduct would cause or threaten serious harm) on the defendant's drunken state. State v. Locane, 454 N.J. Super. 98, 127-28 (App. Div. 2018).

3. Strong Provocation. "Strong provocation" under N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(b)(3) refers to the conduct of the victim towards the actor, not to the defendant's own mental compulsions. State v. Jasuilewicz, 205 N.J. Super. 558, 576 (App. Div. 1985).

4. Addiction May Not Excuse Conduct. Drug or alcohol dependency or intoxication does not necessarily establish substantial grounds tending to excuse or justify the defendant's conduct (mitigating factor four). State v. Ghertler, 114 N.J. 383, 390 (1989); State v. Setzer, 268 N.J. Super. 553, 567-68 (App. Div. 1993).

5. History of Abuse Perpetrated by the Victim. A history of continuous physical, sexual, and psychological abuse perpetrated by the victim against the defendant may be highly relevant in determining whether the following mitigating factors apply: N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(b)(2) (defendant did not contemplate the conduct would cause or threaten serious harm); N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(b)(4) (substantial grounds tending to excuse or justify conduct); and N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(b)(5) (the victim induced or facilitated the commission of the crime). State v. Briggs, 349 N.J. Super. 496, 504 (App. Div. 2002).

6. The Victim's Conduct and Strict Liability Vehicular Homicide. While the strict liability vehicular homicide statute (N.J.S.A. 2C:11-5.3(d)) precludes the defendant from presenting the victim's reckless or negligent conduct as an affirmative defense in the prosecution of the crime, that statute does not preclude the court from considering whether the victim's conduct induced or facilitated the crime (mitigating factor five, N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(b)(5)) for purposes of sentencing.

State v. Pascucci, 463 N.J. Super. 203, 211-12 (App. Div. 2020), certif. denied, 251 N.J. 197 (2022).

7. Defendant Will Compensate the Victim. A court may not find mitigating factor six (defendant will compensate the victim) where an insurance policy pays the victim compensation. State v. Locane, 454 N.J. Super. 98, 128 (App. Div. 2018). This factor is generally limited to cases where the court orders the defendant to pay restitution. Ibid.

8. Lack of Prior Record. A court may give minimal weight to a defendant's lack of a prior record, N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(b)(7), so long as the finding is based on the record and is sufficiently explained by the court. State v. Soto, 340 N.J. Super. 47, 72 (App. Div. 2001).

9. Prior Arrests. A court does not abuse its discretion by finding mitigating factor seven (lack of prior record) when the defendant has prior arrests and no prior conviction. State v. Rice, 425 N.J. Super. 375, 382 (App. Div. 2012).

10. Specific Deterrence Negated. Where N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(b)(8) (conduct was result of circumstances unlikely to recur), N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(b)(9) (defendant is unlikely to commit another crime), and N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(b)(10) (defendant is likely to respond to probationary treatment) apply, the need for specific deterrence is essentially negated. State v. Briggs, 349 N.J. Super. 496, 505 (App. Div. 2002).

11. Medical Condition and Excessive Hardship. A defendant's medical condition, established by medical evidence, may support a finding that imprisonment would entail excessive hardship, N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(b)(11), if the condition is extraordinary, idiosyncratic or terminal. State v. M.A., 402 N.J. Super. 353, 371-72 (App. Div. 2008).

12. Hardship to the Defendant's Child. "Hardship to children may be a significant mitigating sentencing factor." State v. Mirakaj, 268 N.J. Super. 48, 51 (App. Div. 1993) (remanding for resentencing where the court failed to consider the defendant's claim that her children would suffer excessive hardship by her imprisonment). But see State v. Dalziel, 182 N.J. 494, 505 (2005) (the defendant's imprisonment would not create excessive hardship for his child where he did not live with the child or provide financial support). To afford the factor significant weight, the hardship to the child must be qualitatively different from the hardship all children suffer by a parent's incarceration. State v. Locane, 454 N.J. Super. 98, 129-30 (App. Div. 2018).

13. Confession and Cooperation with Law Enforcement. It is questionable whether a confession qualifies as cooperation under N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(b)(12), especially where the confession does not identify other perpetrators or assist in solving other crimes. State v. Read, 397 N.J. Super. 598, 613 (App. Div. 2008).

14. Youth and Substantial Influence. Youth may be considered a mitigating factor if the defendant was "substantially influenced by another person more mature than the defendant," N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(b)(13), but this factor may not apply where the juvenile participated in a premeditated, cold-blooded, execution-style murder. State v. Torres, 313 N.J. Super. 129, 162 (App. Div. 1998).

15. Mitigating Factor Fourteen and Retroactivity. The addition of defendant's youth to the list of mitigating factors provides no basis for a post-conviction relief petition because the weighing of aggravating and mitigating factors relates to a sentence's excessiveness, not its legality. State v. Tormasi, 466 N.J. Super. 51, 66 (App. Div. 2021), remanded on other grounds, 250 N.J. 6 (2022) (remanding for resentencing pursuant to State v. Comer, 249 N.J. 359 (2022)). But where an independent basis exists to remand for a resentencing, the new mitigating factor should be considered if evidence supports that factor at resentencing. State v. Bellamy, 468 N.J. Super. 29, 43-45 (App. Div. 2021). Accord State v. Canfield, 470 N.J. Super. 234, 342 (App. Div.), affirmed as modified, 252 N.J. 497 (2023). The factor is not entitled to retroactive effect because the Legislature conveyed its intent to afford the new law prospective application only by making it effective upon passage. State v. Lane, 251 N.J. 84, 87-88 (2022).

16. Mental Condition and Rejected Insanity Defense. A sentencing court may consider a defendant's mental condition in assessing mitigating factors, even if the jury rejected the defendant's insanity defense. State v. Nataluk, 316 N.J. Super. 336, 349 (App. Div. 1998).

17. Mitigating Factors Raised by Defendant Must Be Considered. The sentencing court must consider and issue findings on mitigating factors raised by the defendant. State v. Case, 220 N.J. 49, 68 (2014). "[M]itigating factors that are suggested in the record, or are called to the court's attention, ordinarily should be considered and either embraced or rejected on the record." State v. Blackmon, 202 N.J. 283, 297 (2010). Those that are "amply based in the record . . . , must be found." State v. Dalziel, 182 N.J. 494, 504 (2005). But see State v. Miller, 205 N.J. 109, 130 (2011) (agreeing with the Appellate Division's holding that a remand for clarification is not necessary when the judge's reasons for rejecting mitigating

factors can be deduced from the sentencing record); State v. Bieniek, 200 N.J. 601, 609 (2010) (holding that a trial court need not "explicitly reject each and every mitigating factor argued by a defendant").

D. Case Law Applicable to Both Types of Factors

1. Underlying Policy of the Factors. The purpose of the aggravating and mitigating factors is "to insure that sentencing is individualized without being arbitrary." State v. Sainz, 107 N.J. 283, 288 (1987). "Careful application" of the factors promotes uniformity in sentencing. State v. Cassady, 198 N.J. 165, 179-80 (2009).

2. Qualitative Weighing of All Relevant Factors. The sentencing court qualitatively, not quantitatively, weighs and analyzes all relevant aggravating and mitigating factors. State v. Case, 220 N.J. 49, 65 (2014); State v. Fuentes, 217 N.J. 57, 72 (2014). "The factors are not interchangeable on a one-to-one basis. The proper weight to be given to each is a function of its gravity in relation to the severity of the offense." State v. Roth, 95 N.J. 334, 368 (1984).

3. Proportionality. "[W]hen the mitigating factors preponderate, sentences will tend toward the lower end of the range, and when the aggravating factors preponderate, sentences will tend toward the higher end of the range." State v. Case, 220 N.J. 49, 64-65 (2014) (quoting State v. Natale II, 184 N.J. 458, 488 (2005)).

4. Factors in Equipose. Where the aggravating and mitigating factors are in equipose, a term in the middle of the sentencing range will be appropriate. State v. Fuentes, 217 N.J. 57, 73 (2014); State v. Natale II, 184 N.J. 458, 488 (2005).

5. Double Counting Prohibited. An element of the offense may not be cited as an aggravating factor to increase punishment. State v. Fuentes, 217 N.J. 57, 74-75 (2014); State v. Kromphold, 162 N.J. 345, 353 (2000); State v. Yarbough, 100 N.J. 627, 633 (1985), as amended by N.J.S.A. 2C:44-5a. The same prohibition applies to mitigating factors. State v. Teat, 233 N.J. Super. 368, 372-73 (App. Div. 1989) (holding that a trial judge may not consider "strong provocation" as a mitigating factor where the jury already considered it in reducing murder to manslaughter). State v. Kromphold, 162 N.J. 345, 356 (2000) (prohibiting the sentencing court from citing the defendant's level of intoxication as an aggravating factor when a jury considered the defendant's excessive intoxication in finding "recklessness" to convict the defendant of second-degree aggravated-assault).

(a) Nuanced Analysis. The sentencing court must provide a "nuanced analysis of the defendant's offense, clearly explained so that an appellate court may be certain that" the lower court did not double-count the elements of the offense. State v. Fuentes, 217 N.J. 57, 76 (2014). See also State v. Miller, 237 N.J. 15, 31-32 (2019) (affirming the trial court's nuanced analysis of the acts that supported the child endangerment conviction (N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4) in light of the wide range of conduct that establishes the offense).

(b) Multiple Charges. Where a court sentences on multiple charges, facts that establish elements of one charge may be used to establish aggravating factors for another charge without violating the rule against double counting. State v. Boyer, 221 N.J. Super. 387, 405-06 (App. Div. 1987).

(c) Multiple Deaths by Auto. In sentencing a defendant on multiple counts of death by automobile, the sentencing court may consider as an aggravating factor the number of deaths caused, State v. Travers, 229 N.J. Super. 144, 154 (App. Div. 1988), and whether surviving victims sustained injuries, State v. Carey, 168 N.J. 413, 425 (2001).

(d) Possession of an Excessive Amount of Drugs. The rule against double counting is not violated when a court cites as an aggravating circumstance the defendant's having possessed far more drugs than was required to constitute the crime. State v. Ascencio, 277 N.J. Super. 334, 336-37 (App. Div. 1994); State v. Varona, 242 N.J. Super. 474, 490-91 (App. Div. 1990).

(e) Multiple Injuries. Multiple life-threatening injuries to one victim may be considered an aggravating factor when only one life-threatening injury was required to satisfy an element of the crime. State v. Mara, 253 N.J. Super. 204, 214 (App. Div. 1992).

(f) Injury Inflicted and Not an Element of the Crime. Because a conviction for attempted murder does not require "injury" to the victim, a court may consider the extent of any injury as an aggravating factor. State v. Noble, 398 N.J. Super. 574, 599 (App. Div. 2008).

6. Inconsistent Findings. A court may find aggravating and mitigating factors that appear internally inconsistent, so long as the findings are "supported by a reasoned explanation" and "grounded in competent, credible evidence in the

record." State v. Case, 220 N.J. 49, 67 (2014) (holding that while aggravating factor three (risk defendant will reoffend) "stood as counterpoise" to mitigating factor seven (no prior record), the two factors could coexist in a case, so long as they were based on the evidence). See also State v. Fuentes, 217 N.J. 57, 63 (2014) (explaining that "any determination that aggravating factor nine and mitigating factor eight are applicable to the same case should be specifically explained"); State v. Morente-Dubon, 474 N.J. Super. 197, 214-15 (App. Div. 2022) (finding insufficient rationale for the trial court's application of aggravating factor three (risk of reoffending) and mitigating factor seven (lack of prior record)).

7. Requisite Findings. "[C]ritical to the sentencing process and appellate review is the need for the sentencing court to explain clearly why an aggravating or mitigating factor presented by the parties was found or rejected and how the factors were balanced to arrive at the sentence." State v. Case, 220 N.J. 49, 66 (2014) (citing State v. Fuentes, 217 N.J. 57, 73 (2014)). The findings "must be based on the evidence." State v. Case, 220 N.J. 49, 64 (2014) (concluding that the sentencing court based its finding of aggravating factor three "not on credible evidence in the record but apparently on the unfounded assumption that defendant had pursued minors through the Internet on previous occasions"). "Speculation and suspicion must not infect the sentencing process." State v. Case, 220 N.J. 49, 64 (2014). The court's "explanation should thoroughly address the factors at issue." State v. Fuentes, 217 N.J. 57, 73 (2014). Inconsistent and unclear findings on the factors will require a remand, even though a remand may not result in a lesser sentence than the one initially imposed. State v. Sene, 443 N.J. Super. 134, 145 (App. Div. 2015).

8. Emphasis on Certain Factors. The sentencing court must "sufficiently explain its reason for placing 'particular emphasis'" on an aggravating factor. State v. Case, 220 N.J. 49, 68 (2014). The court is also "required to explain the weight it assigned to the factors it found." Id. at 69.

9. Findings Restricted to Listed Factors. "[T]he sentencing court lacks the power to import aggravating factors not contained within the Criminal Code's sentencing guidelines." State v. Thomas, 356 N.J. Super. 299, 310 (App. Div. 2002). But see State v. Taylor, 226 N.J. Super. 441, 454 (App. Div. 1988) (N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(a) does not limit sentencing judges to the thirteen specified aggravating factors).

10. Juror Participation Prohibited. "The jury plays no role at sentencing in assisting the judge to identify aggravating and mitigating factors." State v. Mahoney, 444 N.J. Super. 253, 260 (App. Div. 2016). Jurors "have no information relevant to establishing aggravating and mitigating factors other than what they and the judge learned through the evidence adduced at the trial. The only other information they have is derived from their mental impressions developed during the deliberative process, which cannot be revealed." Id. at 260-61.

11. Considerations as of the Date of Sentencing. "[A] defendant should be assessed as he stands before the court on the day of sentencing"; thus, "the sentencing court must consider a defendant's relevant post-offense conduct in weighing aggravating and mitigating factors." State v. Jaffe, 220 N.J. 114, 116 (2014) (citing State v. Randolph, 210 N.J. 330, 354 (2012)). "The State, likewise, is not limited in its presentation. The only restriction placed on both parties is that the evidence presented be competent and relevant." State v. Case, 220 N.J. 49, 70 (2014).

12. Standard of Review for Findings on the Factors. A reviewing court will not disturb the sentencing court's findings on the aggravating and mitigating factors if the findings were supported by credible evidence in the record. State v. Kromphold, 162 N.J. 345, 355 (2000).

13. Resentencing after Appeal. "[W]hen 'reconsideration' of sentence or 'resentencing' is ordered after appeal, the trial court should view defendant as he stands before the court on that day unless the remand order specifies a different and more limited resentencing proceeding such as correction of a plainly technical error or a directive to the judge to view the particular sentencing issue from the vantage point of the original sentencing." State v. Randolph, 210 N.J. 330, 354 (2012).

14. Defendant's Youth and Aggravating Factors. The defendant's youth may only be a basis to find a mitigating factor; it may not be used as a basis to find an aggravative factor or to afford an aggravating factor significant weight. State v. Rivera, 249 N.J. 285, 302-03 (2021) (explaining that the court erred in affording aggravating factor three great weight and mitigating factor seven minimal weight based on a speculative finding that defendant, who had no criminal or juvenile record and showed remorse, would have engaged in a life of crime but had not been given the opportunity to do so because she was only eighteen at the time of the crime).

VII. PAROLE INELIGIBILITY

In setting a sentence, the court must consider whether the convictions warrant a period of parole ineligibility. Generally, the court may exercise its discretion to impose a parole disqualifier if the facts so warrant (see section A). However, if the offense falls under the No Early Release Act (see sections B and D), or if the Legislature has otherwise mandated a parole disqualifier in a criminal statute (see section C), the court has no choice but to impose the minimum term required by statute. More than one statute may mandate a parole disqualifier for an offense. Section E discusses case law on parole ineligibility.

A. Parole Ineligibility Imposed at the Court's Discretion: Statutory Provisions

Statutory Authority for Discretionary Parole Disqualifiers. N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6(b) instructs that "the court may fix a minimum term not to exceed one-half of" the sentence imposed when:

- "the court is clearly convinced that the aggravating factors substantially outweigh the mitigating factors," set forth in N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(a) and (b); or
- the court finds a substantial likelihood that the defendant was involved in organized criminal activity (aggravating factor five, N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(a)(5)).

B. Mandatory Parole Ineligibility under the No Early Release Act (NERA): Statutory Provisions

Note: In 2001 the Legislature substantially amended NERA, thus rendering moot a significant amount of case law interpreting the former version of the statute. See Cannel, New Jersey Criminal Code Annotated, cmts. 1 and 3 on N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.2 (2023); Pressler & Verniero, Current N.J. Court Rules, cmt. 1.3.5 on R. 3:21-4 (2023).

1. The NERA Mandatory Parole Disqualifier. N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.2(a) requires the court fix "a minimum term of 85% of the sentence imposed, during which the defendant shall not be eligible for parole," for the following first- and second-degree crimes:

- Murder (N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3);
- Aggravated manslaughter or manslaughter (N.J.S.A. 2C:11-4);
- Reckless vehicular homicide (N.J.S.A. 2C:11-5);
- Aggravated assault (N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1(b));
- Disarming a law enforcement officer (N.J.S.A. 2C:12-11(b));
- Kidnapping (N.J.S.A. 2C:13-1);
- Aggravated sexual assault (N.J.S.A. 2C:14-2(a));
- Sexual assault (N.J.S.A. 2C:14-2(b) and (c)(1));
- Robbery (N.J.S.A. 2C:15-1);
- Carjacking (N.J.S.A. 2C:15-2);
- Aggravated arson (N.J.S.A. 2C:17-1(a)(1));
- Burglary (N.J.S.A. 2C:18-2);
- Extortion (N.J.S.A. 2C:20-5(a));
- Booby traps in manufacturing or distributing a controlled dangerous substance (N.J.S.A. 2C:35-4.1(b));
- Drug induced deaths (N.J.S.A. 2C:35-9);
- Terrorism (N.J.S.A. 2C:38-2);
- Producing or possessing chemical, biological, nuclear, or radiological weapons (N.J.S.A. 2C:38-3);
- Racketeering in the first degree (N.J.S.A. 2C:41-2);

- Firearms trafficking (N.J.S.A. 2C:39-9(i)); and
- Endangering the welfare of a child (N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4(b)(3)).

(a) The Parole Disqualifier Applies to All Types of Terms. The NERA minimum term is required whether the sentence is imposed as an ordinary term of imprisonment (N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6), an extended term (N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7), a term for murder (N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3), or a term pursuant to "any other provision of law, and shall be calculated based upon the sentence of incarceration actually imposed." N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.2(b).

(b) Relation to other Parole Disqualifiers. In the event the NERA and another statute require two different periods of parole ineligibility, NERA "shall not be construed or applied to reduce the time that must be served." N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.2(b).

(c) A Life Sentence. "Solely for the purpose of calculating the minimum term of parole ineligibility . . . a sentence of life imprisonment shall be deemed to be 75 years." N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.2(b).

2. The NERA Mandatory Parole Supervision Period. In addition to the 85% period of parole ineligibility, the court must also impose a five-year term of parole supervision on a first-degree crime, and a three years of parole supervision for a second-degree crime, which shall commence upon the defendant's release from incarceration. N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.2(c).

(a) Supervision by the Bureau of Parole. During the term of parole supervision, the defendant remains in the legal custody of the Department of Corrections and is supervised by the Bureau of Parole, subject to the provisions of N.J.S.A. 30:4-123.51b. N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.2(c).

(b) Parole Violation. If the defendant violates a condition of parole, he or she can be re-incarcerated for the balance of the five-year or three-year parole term. N.J.S.A. 30:4-123.51b(a).

3. Notice. According to Rule 3:21-4(g), notice to impose a NERA sentence must be filed with the court and served on the defendant within fourteen days of entry of a plea or return of the verdict, but the court may extend the time for good cause.

C. Non-NERA Mandatory Parole Disqualifiers: Statutory Provisions

1. Murder. A murder conviction requires one of the following two sentences:

(a) Thirty-Year Minimum. A defendant must serve between thirty years to life imprisonment for first-degree murder with a thirty-year period of parole ineligibility. N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3(b)(1). The thirty-year minimum term also applies to a conviction for an attempt or conspiracy to murder five or more persons. N.J.S.A. 2C:5-4(a).

(b) Life without Parole. If the following circumstances apply and the defendant is not a juvenile, the defendant "shall be sentenced" to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole, N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3(b)(2) to (5):

(i) The victim was a law enforcement officer murdered while performing official duties or because of his or her official status, N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3(b)(2); or

(ii) The victim was less than eighteen years old and the murder was carried out during a sexual assault (N.J.S.A. 2C:14-2) or criminal sexual contact (N.J.S.A. 2C:14-3), N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3(b)(3)(a) (eff. July 21, 2017 **Note**: under the former version of N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3(b)(3)(a) the victim had to be less than fourteen years old); or

(iii) The defendant purposely or knowingly caused the death, or serious bodily injury resulting in death, "by his her own conduct," or procured the commission of the offense by the payment or promise of payment of something of pecuniary value, or solicited the commission of the offense as a leader of a narcotics trafficking network, or committed a crime of terrorism during which a murder occurred, and a jury finds beyond a reasonable doubt that any of the twelve aggravating factors listed in N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3(b)(4) are applicable.

2. Kidnapping of a Minor. N.J.S.A. 2C:13-1(c)(2) requires the court to impose a term between twenty-five years and life imprisonment with a parole ineligibility period of twenty-five years when (a) the victim was less than sixteen years old and was subjected to a sexual assault (N.J.S.A. 2C:14-2), a criminal sexual contact (N.J.S.A. 2C:14-3), or child endangerment (N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4(b)); or (b) the defendant sold or delivered the victim for pecuniary gain, and the sale did not lead

to the victim's return to a parent or guardian. The court must merge the underlying offenses into the kidnapping conviction. N.J.S.A. 2C:13-1(c)(2).

3. Luring or Enticing a Child (Repeat Offenders). N.J.S.A. 2C:13-6(d) requires a parole disqualifier of one-third to one-half of the sentence imposed, or three years, whichever is greater for a second or subsequent offense of luring or enticing a child into a motor vehicle, structure or isolated area with the purpose to commit a criminal offense with or against the child. If the court imposes an extended term, the term of parole ineligibility must be one-third to one-half of the sentence imposed, or five years, whichever is greater. N.J.S.A. 2C:13-6(d).

4. Luring or Enticing a Child (Certain Persons). N.J.S.A. 2C:13-6(e) requires a five-year parole ineligibility term for the crime of luring or enticing a child (N.J.S.A. 2C:13-6), when the defendant has a prior conviction for a violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:14-2 (sexual assault), N.J.S.A. 2C:14-3(a) (aggravated criminal sexual contact), or N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4 (endangering the welfare of a child). If the court imposes an extended term, then the parole disqualifier provision is inapplicable. N.J.S.A. 2C:13-6(e).

5. Luring or Enticing an Adult (Repeat Offenders). N.J.S.A. 2C:13-7(d) mandates a parole ineligibility period of one-third to one-half the sentence imposed, or one year, whichever is greater, for a second or subsequent offense of luring or enticing a person into a motor vehicle, structure or isolated area with the purpose to commit a criminal offense with or against the person or any other person. If the defendant is sentenced to an extended term, the period of parole ineligibility shall be one-third to one-half the sentence imposed, or five years, whichever is greater. N.J.S.A. 2C:13-7(d).

6. Luring or Enticing an Adult (Certain Persons). N.J.S.A. 2C:13-7(e) requires a parole ineligibility period of three years for luring or enticing an adult if the defendant has a prior conviction for a violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:14-2 (sexual assault), N.J.S.A. 2C:14-3(a) (aggravated criminal sexual contact), or N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4 (endangering the welfare of a child). If the court imposes an extended term, then the parole ineligibility provision is inapplicable. N.J.S.A. 2C:13-7(e).

7. Human Trafficking. N.J.S.A. 2C:13-8(d) mandates a twenty-year term of parole ineligibility.

8. Assisting in Human Trafficking. N.J.S.A. 2C:13-9(c)(1) requires a period of parole ineligibility of one-third to one-half of the term of imprisonment, or three years, whichever is greater.

9. Aggravated Sexual Assault of a Child. N.J.S.A. 2C:14-2(a) requires a twenty-five-year period of parole ineligibility be imposed on a defendant convicted of aggravated sexual assault of a child under age thirteen. However, N.J.S.A. 2C:14-2(d) allows the prosecutor to negotiate a prison term and parole bar of at least fifteen years, in the interest of the victim. N.J.S.A. 2C:14-2.1 provides that "the victim of the sexual assault shall be provided an opportunity to consult with the prosecuting authority prior to the conclusion of any plea negotiations." For the Attorney General's guidelines on plea negotiations under this statute, see the Uniform Plea Negotiation Guidelines to Implement the Jessica Lunsford Act (May 29, 2014), available at www.nj.gov/oag/dcj/agguide/lunsford_act.pdf.

10. Sexual Assault or Aggravated Criminal Sexual Contact (Repeat Offender). N.J.S.A. 2C:14-6 requires the court impose on a second or subsequent offender of N.J.S.A. 2C:14-2 (sexual assault) or N.J.S.A. 2C:14-3(a) (aggravated criminal sexual contact), a minimum period of parole ineligibility of at least five years on an ordinary sentence (i.e., a non-extended term sentence).

11. Carjacking. N.J.S.A. 2C:15-2(b) requires a five-year period of parole ineligibility.

12. Arson against a Place of Worship. N.J.S.A. 2C:17-1(g) requires a fifteen-year period of parole ineligibility if the targeted structure was a place of public worship.

13. Leader of a Cargo Theft Network (Repeat Offender). N.J.S.A. 2C:20-2.4(e) requires a mandatory minimum term of one-third-to-one-half of the sentence imposed for a subsequent offense under N.J.S.A. 2C:20-2.4 (leader of cargo theft network).

14. Theft from a Cargo Carrier (Repeat Offender). N.J.S.A. 2C:20-2.6(c) mandates a period of parole ineligibility of one-third to one-half of the sentence imposed.

15. First-Degree Computer-Theft. N.J.S.A. 2C:20-25(g) requires a period of parole ineligibility of one-third to one-half of the sentence imposed. N.J.S.A.

2C:20-25(h) provides that the court shall consider it an aggravating circumstance if the victim was eighteen years old or younger.

16. Computer Theft against the Government. N.J.S.A. 2C:20-25(h) mandates a parole disqualifier of one-third to one-half of the sentence imposed.

17. Unauthorized Access of Computer Data. N.J.S.A. 2C:20-31(b) mandates a parole ineligibility term of one-third to one-half of the sentence imposed.

18. Financial Facilitation of Criminal Activity. N.J.S.A. 2C:21-27(a) mandates a parole ineligibility term of one-third to one-half of the sentence imposed.

19. Endangering the Welfare of a Child. N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4(b)(5)(a), amended by, L. 2017, c. 141 (eff. Feb. 1, 2018) requires a parole disqualifier of one-third to one-half of the sentence imposed, or five years, whichever is greater, for distributing, possessing, storing or maintaining by way of a file-share program, at least twenty-five but less than 1000 items of child pornography. The minimum parole bar increases to ten years if the defendant possessed more than 1000 items of child pornography. N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4(b)(5)(a).

20. Third-Degree Hindering Apprehension or Prosecution. N.J.S.A. 2C:29-3(a) requires at least a one-year term of imprisonment with a one-year parole disqualifier when the defendant hindered apprehension or prosecution of a violation of Title 39 or Chapter 33A of Title 17 by giving false information or concealing evidence, knowing that the conduct violated N.J.S.A. 2C:11-5.1 (leaving the scene of a motor vehicle accident that results in the death of another). N.J.S.A. 2C:29-3(a) (hindering apprehension or prosecution of another); N.J.S.A. 2C:29-3(b) (hindering apprehension or prosecution of one's self).

21. Harm to a Law Enforcement Animal. N.J.S.A. 2C:29-3.1(a) requires a five-year period of parole ineligibility.

22. Escape from an Institution. N.J.S.A. 2C:29-6(a)(1) and (2) require a period of parole ineligibility of three years.

23. Leader of a Narcotics Trafficking Network. N.J.S.A. 2C:35-3 requires the court impose a life sentence with a twenty-five-year period of parole ineligibility. **Note:** This statute is subject to the N.J.S.A. 2C:35-12 waiver provision and Attorney General Law Enforcement Directive No. 2021-4, "Directive Revising Statewide Guidelines Concerning the Waiver of Mandatory Minimum Sentences in

Non-Violent Drug Cases Pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:35-12 (April 19, 2021) (eff. May 19, 2021) discussed further in Chapter XIV on drug offender sentencing.

24. Maintaining or Operating a Controlled Dangerous Substance Production Facility. N.J.S.A. 2C:35-4 requires a period of parole ineligibility between one-third and one-half of the sentence imposed. **Note:** This statute is subject to the N.J.S.A. 2C:35-12 waiver provision and Attorney General Directive # 2021-4, discussed further in Chapter XIV on drug offender sentencing.

25. First-Degree Manufacturing, Distributing or Dispensing Certain Controlled Dangerous Substances. N.J.S.A. 2C:35-5(b)(1) and (6) require a period of parole ineligibility between one-third and one-half of the sentence imposed. **Note:** This statute is subject to the N.J.S.A. 2C:35-12 waiver provision and Attorney General Law Enforcement Directive No. 2021-4, "Directive Revising Statewide Guidelines Concerning the Waiver of Mandatory Minimum Sentences in Non-Violent Drug Cases Pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:35-12 (April 19, 2021) (eff. May 19, 2021) discussed further in Chapter XIV on drug offender sentencing.

26. Employing a Juvenile in a Drug Distribution Scheme. N.J.S.A. 2C:35-6 mandates a period of parole ineligibility at or between one-third and one-half of the sentence imposed, or five years, whichever is greater. **Note:** This statute is subject to the N.J.S.A. 2C:35-12 waiver provision and Attorney General Law Enforcement Directive No. 2021-4, "Directive Revising Statewide Guidelines Concerning the Waiver of Mandatory Minimum Sentences in Non-Violent Drug Cases Pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:35-12 (April 19, 2021) (eff. May 19, 2021) discussed further in Chapter XIV on drug offender sentencing.

27. Manufacturing, Distributing or Dispensing a Controlled Dangerous Substance on or Near School Property. N.J.S.A. 2C:35-7(a) provides that if the offense involved less than one ounce of marijuana, then the period of parole ineligibility must be between one-third and one-half of the sentence imposed, or one year, whichever is greater, and in all other cases the period of parole ineligibility must be at or between one-third and one-half of the sentence imposed, or three years, whichever is greater. **Note:** This statute is subject to the N.J.S.A. 2C:35-12 waiver provision and Attorney General Law Enforcement Directive No. 2021-4, "Directive Revising Statewide Guidelines Concerning the Waiver of Mandatory Minimum Sentences in Non-Violent Drug Cases Pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:35-12 (April 19, 2021) (eff. May 19, 2021) discussed further in Chapter XIV on drug offender sentencing.

28. Drug Distribution to a Minor or a Pregnant Female. N.J.S.A. 2C:35-8 requires the court impose, upon application of the prosecutor, "twice the term of imprisonment, fine and penalty, including twice the term of parole ineligibility, if any, authorized or required to be imposed by" N.J.S.A. 2C:35-5(b) (drug distribution) or N.J.S.A. 2C:35-7 (distribution within a school zone) "or any other provision of this title." If the defendant is convicted of more than one offense, the court must impose one enhanced sentence on the most serious offense. *Ibid.* The prosecutor must establish the basis for the enhanced sentence by a preponderance of the evidence, and the court must hold a hearing on the matter. *Ibid.* **Note:** This statute is subject to the N.J.S.A. 2C:35-12 waiver provision and Attorney General Law Enforcement Directive No. 2021-4, Directive Revising Statewide Guidelines Concerning the Waiver of Mandatory Minimum Sentences in Non-Violent Drug Cases Pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:35-12 (April 19, 2021) (eff. May 19, 2021) discussed further in Chapter XIV on drug offender sentencing.

29. Terrorism. N.J.S.A. 2C:38-2(b)(2) requires a term of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole if the terrorism resulted in death. If death did not occur, then the court must impose a thirty-year period of parole ineligibility. N.J.S.A. 2C:38-2(b)(1).

30. Producing or Processing Chemical, Nuclear, Biological or Radiological Weapons. N.J.S.A. 2C:38-3(a)(2) requires a term of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole if the crime resulted in death. If death did not occur, then the court must impose a thirty-year period of parole ineligibility. N.J.S.A. 2C:38-3(a)(1).

31. Certain Gun Crimes and Crimes Committed while in Possession of a Gun: N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6(c) (the Graves Act) and N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6(g) (assault weapons sentencing) mandate a period of parole ineligibility for certain gun crimes and crimes committed while in possession of certain guns. See Chapter XIII on the Graves Act and assault weapons sentencing for further discussion.

32. Possession of a "Community Gun" for an Unlawful Purpose. N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4(a)(2) requires a period of parole ineligibility of one-half of the sentence imposed, or three years, whichever is longer.

33. Certain Persons Prohibited from Possessing a Firearm. N.J.S.A. 2C:39-7(b)(1) requires the sentence include a five-year parole-disqualifier if the defendant purchased, owned, possessed or controlled a firearm and has a prior conviction for any of the following crimes or an attempt or conspiracy to commit any of the

following crimes (Please note that this statute was amended effective July 16, 2019, to add some offenses to the following list. L. 2019, c. 165.):

- Aggravated assault (N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1(b));
- Arson (N.J.S.A. 2C:17-1);
- Burglary (N.J.S.A. 2C:18-2);
- Escape (N.J.S.A. 2C:29-5);
- Extortion (N.J.S.A. 2C:20-5);
- Homicide (N.J.S.A. 2C:11-2);
- Kidnapping (N.J.S.A. 2C:13-1);
- Robbery (N.J.S.A. 2C:15-1);
- Aggravated sexual assault (N.J.S.A. 2C:14-2(a));
- Sexual assault (N.J.S.A. 2C:14-2(b));
- Bias intimidation (N.J.S.A. 2C:16-1);
- Carjacking (N.J.S.A. 2C:15-2);
- Gang Criminality (N.J.S.A. 2C:33-29);
- Racketeering (N.J.S.A. 2C:41-2);
- Terroristic threats (N.J.S.A. 2C:12-3);
- Unlawful possession of a machine gun (N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(a));
- Unlawful possession of a handgun (N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(b)(1));
- Unlawful possession of an assault firearm (N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(f));

- Leader of a firearms trafficking network (N.J.S.A. 2C:39-16);
- Endangering the welfare of a child (N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4);
- Stalking (N.J.S.A. 2C:12-10);
- A crime or an attempt or conspiracy to commit a crime involving domestic violence (N.J.S.A. 2C:25-19);
- Certain controlled dangerous substance crimes (N.J.S.A. 2C:35-3 through N.J.S.A. 2C:35-6, N.J.S.A. 2C:35-7, or N.J.S.A. 2C:35-11) or an attempt or conspiracy to commit any of those crimes;
- Possession of certain weapons and devices (N.J.S.A. 2C:39-3) or an attempt or conspiracy to commit the crime;
- Unlawful possession of a firearm, community gun, explosive, or destructive device (N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4) or an attempt or conspiracy to commit the crime; and
- Manufacturing, transporting, disposing of, and defacing certain weapons and dangerous instruments (N.J.S.A. 2C:39-9) or an attempt or conspiracy to commit the crime.

If the court imposes an extended term pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7, then the parole disqualifier "shall be fixed at, or between, one-third and one-half of the sentence imposed by the court or five years, whichever is greater." N.J.S.A. 2C:39-7(b)(1).

34. Certain Persons Prohibited from Transferring a Firearm. N.J.S.A. 2C:39-10(a)(4) requires a period of parole ineligibility of eighteen months be imposed against a licensed dealer who sold or transferred a firearm to a person knowing that person intended to transfer the firearm to a person who was disqualified from possessing a firearm under State or federal law. If the firearm was used in the commission of a crime, the parole disqualifier must be three years, rather than eighteen months. N.J.S.A. 2C:39-10(a)(4).

35. Transferring a Firearm to a Minor. N.J.S.A. 2C:39-10(e) requires a five-year period of parole ineligibility be imposed on anyone "who knowingly sells,

gives, transfers, assigns or otherwise disposes of a firearm to a person who is under the age of eighteen years." However, N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6.2 provides that upon request by the State, or at the sentencing court's request with the State's approval, the assignment judge shall place the defendant on probation or reduce the parole ineligibility term to one year if the interest of justice would not be served by imposition of a parole disqualifier, and the defendant has no prior conviction for a Chapter 39 weapons offense.

36. Operating a Motor Vehicle with a Suspended License. N.J.S.A. 2C:40-26(c) requires the court to impose a parole disqualifier of 180 days against a defendant convicted of operating a motor vehicle with a suspended license if (1) the license suspension resulted from a first violations of N.J.S.A. 39:4-50 (driving while intoxicated) or N.J.S.A. 39:4-50.4(a) (revocation for refusal to submit to a breath test) and the defendant "had previously been convicted of violating N.J.S.A. 39:3-40" (driving while license was suspended, revoked or refused), N.J.S.A. 2C:40-26(a); or (2) the defendant's "license was suspended or revoked for a second or subsequent violation of" N.J.S.A. 39:4-50 or N.J.S.A. 39:4-50.4(a). N.J.S.A. 2C:40-26(b).

37. Assault While Fleeing Police. N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6(i) mandates a period of parole ineligibility between one-third and one-half of the sentence imposed.

38. Public Officers Convicted of Certain Crimes. N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6.5(a) requires the following terms of parole ineligibility be imposed against a public officer or employee convicted of a crime set forth in N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6.5(b): ten years (first-degree crimes); five years (second-degree crimes); two years (third-degree crimes); one year (fourth-degree crimes).

(a) Exception. Under circumstances discussed in N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6.5(c)(1) and (2) the court may waive or reduce the mandatory minimum term of imprisonment. The sentence does not become final for ten days in order to permit the State to appeal. N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6.5(c)(3).

(b) Guidelines. N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6.5(e) requires the Attorney General develop guidelines to ensure the uniform exercise of discretion in making waiver and reduction determinations. The guidelines are dated May 31, 2007, and can be found at www.nj.gov/oag/dcj/pdfs/guidelines-pros-pub-officials.pdf.

D. NERA: Case Law

1. Purpose. The purpose of NERA is to protect society from the risks associated with violent offenders by increasing prison for the most serious offenders. State v. Friedman, 209 N.J. 102, 119-20 (2012). See also State v. Drake, 444 N.J. Super. 265, 278 (App. Div. 2016) (quoting State v. Thomas, 166 N.J. 560, 569 (2001), for the proposition: "NERA was enacted primarily because of New Jersey's alarmingly high rate of parolee recidivism").

2. Crimes Subject to NERA. NERA applies to all crimes listed in N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.2(d), including sexual assault under N.J.S.A. 2C:14-2(b) or (c)(1). State v. Drake, 444 N.J. Super. 265, 283 (App. Div. 2016).

3. NERA Is Mandatory. Failure to apply NERA to an enumerated crime renders the sentence illegal and requires a remand for resentencing. State v. Ramsey, 415 N.J. Super. 257, 271-72 (App. Div. 2010).

4. Parole Supervision. "Under our jurisprudence, parole is 'in legal effect imprisonment' and therefore punishment." State v. Njango, 247 N.J. 533, 547 (2021) (quoting Riley v. State Parole Bd., 219 N.J. 270, 288 (2014)). During the period of NERA parole supervision, the defendant remains in the custody of the Department of Corrections. Ibid.

5. Real-Time Consequences. Sentencing courts must consider the real-time consequences that NERA will have on a sentence. State v. Marinez, 370 N.J. Super. 49, 57-58 (App. Div. 2004). A reviewing court will "consider the judge's evaluation of the aggravating and mitigating factors in that light." Id. at 58.

6. Real-Time Consequences and Plea Agreements. Under NERA's mandatory period of parole supervision, "the fixed period of a defendant's supervision may extend beyond the term of the original sentence." State v. Johnson, 182 N.J. 232, 240 (2005). A violation of probation "could subject [the] defendant to additional incarceration . . . that could make the custodial sentence, in the aggregate, far exceed the original sentence imposed." Ibid. A defendant must be informed of the consequences of being subject to this extended parole supervision when pleading guilty to a NERA offense. Id. at 241. See Cannel, New Jersey Criminal Code Annotated, cmt. 3 on N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.2 (2023) (explain that unlike other sentencing decisions that focus on the minimum term a defendant must serve, NERA's 85% parole ineligibility term and violation-of-parole provision turn the focus to the maximum term a defendant could serve).

7. Downgrading. Although a first-degree offense may be downgraded to the second degree for sentencing under N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(f)(2), the defendant remains "sentenced for a crime of the first degree" for purposes of parole supervision under NERA. State v. Cheung, 328 N.J. Super. 368, 371 (App. Div. 2000). See also State v. L.V., 410 N.J. Super. 90, 113 (App. Div. 2009) (explaining that while the court downgraded the offenses to third-degree crimes for purposes of sentencing, the court nonetheless had to sentence the defendant to a term of incarceration because she had pleaded guilty to second-degree crimes that were subject to NERA).

8. Credits. Gap-time credit (N.J.S.A. 2C:44-5(b)(2)) may not reduce the NERA 85% parole ineligibility term. Meyer v. N.J. State Parole Bd., 345 N.J. Super. 424, 426 (App. Div. 2001). Similarly, commutation and work credits may not reduce the NERA mandatory minimum. State v. Webster, 383 N.J. Super. 432, 436-37 (App. Div. 2006), aff'd o.b., 190 N.J. 305 (2007). They may be applied towards the remaining 15% of a defendant's prison sentence under NERA. Ibid.

9. Accomplices and Co-Conspirators. NERA applies to accomplices, State v. Rumblin, 166 N.J. 550, 553-56 (2001), and co-conspirator, State v. Natale, 348 N.J. Super. 625, 628 n.2 (App. Div. 2002), aff'd o.b., 178 N.J. 51 (2003). The statute is not limited to principals. State v. Rumblin, 166 N.J. 550, 553-56 (2001) (finding NERA applicable to an armed robbery conviction even though the defendant did not hold the weapon during the robbery).

10. Application to a Murder Sentence. The court computes the 85% NERA parole-ineligibility period for a murder sentence on the whole term imposed for the murder conviction. State v. Rambo, 401 N.J. Super. 506, 522 (App. Div. 2008). The court does not base the NERA parole ineligibility period on the part of the murder sentence that exceeds the thirty-year parole disqualifier required by the murder statute (N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3(b)(1)). Thus, if the court imposes a fifty-year term on a murder conviction, N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3(b)(1) would require the defendant serve at least thirty of those fifty years, but NERA would require the defendant serve forty-two-and-one-half years' imprisonment ($50 \times .85 = 42.5$).

11. Young Adult Offender. A young adult offender sentence (N.J.S.A. 2C:43-5) cannot be imposed on a conviction for any crime to which NERA applies. State v. Corriero, 357 N.J. Super. 214, 217-18 (App. Div. 2003).

12. Specifying the Length of the NERA Term. Trial judges should specifically state the length of the "NERA ineligibility term in terms of years, months and days to avoid any problem long after the time of sentencing." State v. Hernandez, 338 N.J. Super. 317, 319 n.1 (2001).

13. Violation of Probation. If, for a crime subject to NERA, a defendant obtained a reduced sentence of probation pursuant to Rule 3:21-10, then on resentencing after the probation violation, the court must impose an 85% period of parole ineligibility for the offense subject to NERA. State v. Kearns, 393 N.J. Super. 107, 111 (App. Div. 2007).

14. Application for Reconsideration. A defendant sentenced under NERA may not apply for reconsideration of his or her sentence pursuant to Rule 3:21-10(b) until the mandatory term of parole ineligibility has been served. State v. Le, 354 N.J. Super. 91, 96 (Law Div. 2002).

15. Cruel and Unusual Punishment. NERA does not violate the Federal or State constitutional prohibitions against cruel and unusual punishment. State v. Johnson, 166 N.J. 523, 548-49 (2001). This is so even when the act is applied to accomplices. State v. Rumblin, 166 N.J. 550, 557 (2001).

16. The Graves Act and NERA. The 85% parole disqualifier under NERA subsumes a Graves Act parole disqualifier. See State v. Garron, 177 N.J. 147, 163 (2003). However, a court should state in the judgment that the Graves Act applied to the NERA offense to avoid confusion in the future if the defendant commits an offense that would subject him or her to the Graves Act repeat offender extended term. State v. Cheung, 328 N.J. Super. 368, 371 (App. Div. 2000).

17. Prior Service Credit and the Fundamental Fairness Doctrine. In the unlikely event that a defendant spends more time in prison than his NERA sentence required, the fundamental fairness doctrine requires the court to award the defendant prior service credit in the excess amount and reduce the defendant's NERA parole term by that amount. State v. Njango, 247 N.J. 533, 548 (2021).

E. Parole Ineligibility, Non-NERA Offenses: Case Law

1. Sixth Amendment Requirement. In accordance with Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000), which provides that to comply with the Sixth Amendment, the jury, not the court, must find a fact that subjects a defendant to an extended term, the Sixth Amendment similarly requires that a fact that increases

the mandatory minimum term must be found by the jury, not a judge. "When a finding of fact alters the legally prescribed punishment so as to aggravate it, the fact necessarily forms a constituent part of a new offense and must be submitted to the jury" and found beyond a reasonable doubt. Alleyne, 570 U.S. at 114-15 (2013). Accord State v. Grate, 220 N.J. 317, 335 (2015) (finding unconstitutional under Alleyne the N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(i) requirement that the court must impose a period of parole ineligibility if it finds a substantial likelihood that the defendant was involved in organized criminal activity).

(a) Title 2C Offenses. Statutes in Title 2C that provide for a parole bar do not violate the Sixth Amendment. State v. Kiriakakis, 235 N.J. 420, 442-43 (2018); State v. Abdullah, 184 N.J. 497, 499 (2005).

(b) Discretionary Parole Bars. Imposition of a discretionary parole bar based on the court's weighing of aggravating and mitigating sentencing factors does not offend the Sixth Amendment requirement that the jury, not the court, make factual findings that mandate an increase to the floor or ceiling of a sentence. State v. Kiriakakis, 235 N.J. 420, 442-43 (2018).

2. Balancing the Aggravating and Mitigating Factors. Although the court considers the same aggravating and mitigating factors in setting a prison term and a period of parole ineligibility, the standard for balancing the factors is different. State v. Case, 220 N.J. 49, 66 (2014). In determining the prison term, the court decides whether "there is a preponderance of aggravating or mitigating factors." Ibid. (quoting State v. Kruse, 105 N.J. 354, 359 (1987)). In determining parole ineligibility, the court must be "clearly convinced that the aggravating factors substantially outweigh the mitigating factors." Ibid. (quoting State v. Kruse, 105 N.J. 354, 359 (1987)).

3. Requisite Findings. "To facilitate meaningful appellate review, trial judges must explain how they arrived at a particular sentence." State v. Case, 220 N.J. 49, 65 (2014). "[C]ritical to the sentencing process and appellate review is the need for the sentencing court to explain clearly why an aggravating or mitigating factor presented by the parties was found or rejected and how the factors were balanced to arrive at the sentence." Id. at 66. But see State v. McBride, 211 N.J. Super. 699, 705 (App. Div. 1986) (sustaining a parole disqualifier in the absence of express findings because the record clearly established that the aggravating factors substantially predominated the nonexistent mitigating factors), and State v. Morris, 242 N.J. Super. 532, 546 (App. Div. 1990).

4. Prohibition against Double Counting. The prohibition against double counting applies whether the court is setting a prison term or deciding whether to impose a period of parole ineligibility. State v. C.H., 264 N.J. Super. 112, 140 (App. Div. 1993); State v. Link, 197 N.J. Super. 615, 620 (App. Div. 1984). Thus, where an element of the crime is a specific fact, that element may not be used as an aggravating factor to impose a parole disqualifier. State v. C.H., 264 N.J. Super. 112, 140 (App. Div. 1993).

5. Parole Ineligibility Is the Exception. Periods of parole ineligibility "are not to be treated as routine or commonplace." They are the exception, not the rule. State v. Case, 220 N.J. 49, 66 (2014) (quoting State v. Martelli, 201 N.J. Super. 378, 382-83 (App. Div. 1985)).

6. Proportionality. The need for uniformity in sentencing and the heightened standard for parole ineligibility suggest that a minimum term will rarely be imposed when the court sets a sentence within the middle of the sentencing range. State v. Kruse, 105 N.J. 354, 362 (1987); State v. Modell, 260 N.J. Super. 227, 254-55 (App. Div. 1992).

7. Aggregate Term. The court may not impose a parole ineligibility term on an aggregate sentence; rather, the parole disqualifier must be imposed on a specific count. State v. Orlando, 269 N.J. Super. 116, 141 (App. Div. 1993).

8. Imprisonment as a Condition of Probation and Discretionary Parole Disqualifiers. "[A] defendant sentenced to a prison term as a condition of probation may not be exposed to the parole ineligibility term authorized by N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6(b)" (a discretionary parole disqualifier). State v. Hartye, 105 N.J. 411, 419 (1987).

9. Mandatory Minimum Terms Must Be Served in Jail or Prison. When sentencing for a violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:40-26 (operating a motor vehicle during a period of license suspension), the court may not substitute the parole ineligibility term with time spent in a rehabilitation program, community service program, or in-home detention; the minimum term must be served in prison or jail. State v. Harris, 439 N.J. Super. 150, 159-60 (App. Div. 2015); State v. French, 437 N.J. Super. 333, 336-40 (App. Div. 2014).

10. Mandatory Minimum Terms May Not Be Served Intermittently. When sentencing for a violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:40-26 (operating a motor vehicle during a period of license suspension), the court may not authorize the defendant to serve

the 180-day mandatory minimum term intermittently. State v. Rodriguez, 238 N.J. 105, 116-17 (2019). The Legislature's requiring a "fixed minimum sentence . . . during which the defendant shall not be eligible for parole" conveys its intention to preclude the fixed term from being served intermittently. Id. at 115 (quoting N.J.S.A. 2C:40-26(c)). Further, "parole and intermittent sentencing are distinct concepts, the prohibition of parole necessarily dictates the prohibition of intermittent sentencing." Id. at 118.

11. Mandatory Parole Bars and Split Sentences. The court may impose an aggregate sentence of 360 days in jail with a statutorily mandated parole bar of 360 days followed by a term of probation. State v. Chavarria, 464 N.J. Super. 1, 10 (App. Div. 2020).

12. Operating a Vehicle with a Suspended License, Enhanced Sentencing.

a. Constitutionality. The 180-day parole bar mandated by N.J.S.A. 2C:40-26(c) does not constitute cruel and unusual punishment and does not violate principles of due process and equal protection. State v. Pimentel, 461 N.J. Super. 468, 481, 488-89 (App. Div. 2019). N.J.S.A. 2C:40-26(b) does not violate the Ex Post Facto Clauses of the federal and state constitutions. State v. Carrigan, 428 N.J. Super. 609, 622 (App. Div. 2012) ("There is nothing unconstitutional about treating . . . prior offenses as enhancement factors for wrongful conduct that post-dates the new law.").

b. Predicate Crimes. An uncounseled conviction for DWI or refusal to submit to a breath test may not be used as a predicate crime for purposes of the enhanced sentencing provisions set forth in N.J.S.A. 2C:40-26. State v. Konecny, 250 N.J. 321, 338 (2022). Similarly, a conviction vacated and dismissed through post-conviction relief cannot serve as a predicate offense. Id. at 344.

13. Ineligibility for the Intensive Supervision Program. A defendant serving a statutorily mandated period of parole ineligibility or a discretionary parole disqualifier may not obtain entry into an intensive supervision program until after the minimum term has been served. State v. McPhall, 270 N.J. Super. 454, 457 (App. Div. 1994).

14. Transfer to a Drug Treatment Program. A defendant serving a term that includes a Graves Act period of parole ineligibility may not obtain transfer to a

drug treatment program until he or she completes the mandatory parole ineligibility period. State v. Mendel, 212 N.J. Super. 110, 113 (App. Div. 1986).

15. Probation Violation. A parole disqualifier should not ordinarily be imposed when resentencing a defendant for a probation violation since, at the original sentencing, the mitigating factors weighed in favor of probation. State v. Baylass, 114 N.J. 169, 178 (1989). In reweighing the factors upon a probation violation, a court should consider the aggravating factors found to exist at the original hearing and the mitigating factors as affected by the probation violation. Ibid. State v. Molina, 114 N.J. 181, 184-85 (1989).

16. Repeat Sex Offender. The parole disqualifier set forth in N.J.S.A. 2C:14-6 applies equally to defendants sentenced to jail terms and to sex-offender treatment. State v. Chapman, 95 N.J. 582, 588-89 (1984).

17. Negotiated Term under N.J.S.A. 2C:14-2(d) and Separation of Powers. N.J.S.A. 2C:14-2(d), which allows a prosecutor to negotiate a prison term and parole bar of at least fifteen years, "does not violate the separation of powers doctrine, provided that the State presents a statement of reasons explaining its decision to depart from the twenty-five-year mandatory-minimum sentence specified in N.J.S.A. 2C:14-2(a), and the court reviews the prosecutor's exercise of discretion to determine whether it was arbitrary and capricious." State v. A.T.C., 239 N.J. 450, 476 (2019).

18. Waiver of the Parole Bar for Crimes Involving Public Employment. The court may waive the parole bar for a crime committed by a public employee if it finds "by clear and convincing evidence that extraordinary circumstances exist such that imposition of a mandatory minimum term would be a serious injustice which overrides the need to deter such conduct in others." State v. Trinidad, 241 N.J. 425, 456 (2020) (quoting N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6.5(c)(2)). The serious injustice standard "is higher than the showing necessary to downgrade an offense." Ibid.

19. Young Adult Offender Sentencing in Drug Cases. A defendant subject to the mandatory parole ineligibility provisions of N.J.S.A. 2C:35-5(b)(1) (drug distribution) and N.J.S.A. 2C:35-7 (distribution within a school zone) may not be sentenced to an indeterminate term as a young adult offender pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:43-5. State v. Luna, 278 N.J. Super. 433, 437-38 (App. Div. 1995). The drug offense "strategy of deterrence by mandatory incarceration for a fixed minimum period is inconsistent with the . . . strategy expressed in the Young Adult Offenders statute which offers an early release from an indeterminate sentence in return for

evidence of rehabilitation." State v. Luna, 278 N.J. Super. 433, 438 (App. Div. 1995).

20. First-Time Firearms Offenders, Constitutionality. N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6.2 (allowing the court to eliminate or limit the period of parole ineligibility for certain first-time offenders) has withstood constitutional challenge on separation-of-powers grounds. State v. Alvarez, 246 N.J. Super. 137, 145-47 (App. Div. 1991). The "interests of justice" standard avoids arbitrary, unreasonable and capricious decision-making by the prosecutor and poses no constitutional impediment to exercise of the legislative will. Ibid.

21. Murder Statute Parole Disqualifier and Cruel and Unusual Punishment. The thirty-year period of parole ineligibility mandated by the murder statute (N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3(b)(1)), does not constitute cruel and unusual punishment, as applied to adults, State v. McClain, 263 N.J. Super. 488, 497 (App. Div. 1993), and juveniles tried as adults. State v. Pratt, 226 N.J. Super. 307, 324-26 (App. Div. 1988).

22. Commutation and Work Credits Do Not Decrease a Parole Disqualifier. Commutation and work credits cannot reduce a statutorily or judicially imposed parole disqualifier. Curry v. N.J. State Parole Bd., 309 N.J. Super. 66, 70 (App. Div. 1998); Merola v. Dep't of Corr., 285 N.J. Super. 501, 509 (App. Div. 1995).

23. Computing the Aggregate Term. "[T]he mechanical function of aggregating sentences," including terms of parole eligibility, "is to be performed by the Parole Board, not the sentencing court." State v. Curry, 309 N.J. Super. 66, 71 (App. Div. 1998).

VIII. EXTENDED TERMS

An extended term of imprisonment exceeds the ordinary sentence range for the degree of crime committed. The sentencing court may impose an extended term upon application of the prosecutor (see section A) unless a statute mandates the imposition of an extended term (see section B). Section C discusses case law on extended terms.

A. Discretionary Extended Terms: Statutory Provisions

1. Statutory Authority for Discretionary Extended Terms. N.J.S.A. 2C:44-3 provides that upon application of the prosecutor the court may impose an extended term if the following situations in (a) or (b) apply:

(a) The defendant has been convicted of a crime of the first, second or third degree and:

- The defendant is a "persistent offender" (i.e., at least twenty-one years old at the time of the offense; previously convicted on two separate occasions of two crimes while at least eighteen years old; and either the latest crime or the defendant's release from confinement is within ten years of the crime being sentenced) (N.J.S.A. 2C:44-3(a)); or
- The defendant is a "professional criminal," (i.e., "a person who committed a crime as part of a continuing criminal activity in concert with two or more persons, and the circumstances of the crime show he has knowingly devoted himself to criminal activity as a major source of livelihood") (N.J.S.A. 2C:44-3(b)); or
- The defendant committed the crime for payment or pecuniary value (N.J.S.A. 2C:44-3(c)).

or

(b) The defendant used, or was in possession of, a stolen vehicle in the commission of any of the following crimes (N.J.S.A. 2C:44-3(f)):

- Manslaughter (N.J.S.A. 2C:11-4);

- Aggravated assault (N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1(b));
- Kidnapping (N.J.S.A. 2C:13-1);
- Aggravated sexual assault (N.J.S.A. 2C:14-2(a));
- Aggravated criminal sexual contact (N.J.S.A. 2C:14-3(a));
- Robbery (N.J.S.A. 2C:15-1);
- Burglary (N.J.S.A. 2C:18-2);
- Resisting arrest and eluding an officer (N.J.S.A. 2C:29-2(b));
- Escape (N.J.S.A. 2C:29-5); and
- Manufacturing, distributing, or dispensing a controlled dangerous substance (N.J.S.A. 2C:35-5).

2. Prior-Conviction Rules.

(a) "Prior Conviction" Defined. A prior conviction of an offense is "[a]n adjudication by a court of competent jurisdiction that the defendant committed an offense." N.J.S.A. 2C:44-4(a).

(i) Adjudication. For a prior crime, an adjudication is sufficient, even if the sentence has been suspended, as long as the time to appeal has expired and the defendant has not been pardoned. N.J.S.A. 2C:44-4(b).

(ii) Foreign Jurisdiction. A conviction in "another jurisdiction" constitutes a prior conviction if the law of that jurisdiction authorized a prison sentence in excess of one year. N.J.S.A. 2C:44-4(c) (L. 2021, c. 298 (eff. Nov. 8, 2021)).

(b) Proof of Prior Conviction. "Any prior conviction may be proved by any evidence, including fingerprint records made in connection with arrest, conviction or imprisonment, that reasonably satisfies the court that the defendant was convicted." N.J.S.A. 2C:44-4(d).

3. Extended-Term Ranges. N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7(a)(1) to (7) provides the following extended-term ranges:

- Murder (N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3): thirty-five-years-to-life imprisonment with a thirty-five-year parole-disqualifier;
- Aggravated manslaughter (N.J.S.A. 2C:11-4), first-degree kidnapping (N.J.S.A. 2C:13-1(c)(1)), and aggravated sexual assault (N.J.S.A. 2C:14-2: thirty-years-to-life;
- First-degree kidnapping of a child age sixteen or less (N.J.S.A. 2C:13-1(c)(2)): thirty-years-to-life with a thirty-year parole-disqualifier;
- First-degree crimes (besides the five crimes listed above): twenty-years-to-life;
- Second-degree crime: ten-to-twenty years;
- Third-degree crime: five-to-ten years; and
- Fourth-degree crime: five years.

4. Multiple Extended Terms. N.J.S.A. 2C:44-5(a)(2) prohibits a court from imposing multiple extended terms. The case law discussed in section C of this chapter clarifies that a court must impose extended terms mandated by statute (see section B of this chapter), even if the result is multiple extended terms. The court may not impose a discretionary extended term in addition to a mandatory extended term.

(a) Sentencing at One Proceeding. When a court imposes sentence for multiple offenses in the same proceeding, "[n]ot more than one sentence for an extended term shall be imposed." N.J.S.A. 2C:44-5(a)(2).

(b) Sentencing at Different Times. "When a defendant who has previously been sentenced to imprisonment is subsequently sentenced to another term for an offense committed prior to the former sentence, other than an offense committed while in custody[, t]he multiple sentences imposed shall so far as possible conform to" N.J.S.A. 2C:44-5(a)(2). N.J.S.A. 2C:44-5(b)(1).

5. Notice and Hearing. The prosecutor must provide the defendant written notice of the basis for the extended term, and the court must provide the defendant an opportunity to respond at a hearing. N.J.S.A. 2C:44-6(e). The prosecutor must file a motion for an extended term within fourteen days of the verdict or guilty plea unless the court extends the time for "good cause shown." R. 3:21-4(e).

6. Mandatory Period of Parole Ineligibility. If the court imposes a discretionary extended term for kidnapping (N.J.S.A. 2C:13-1(c)(2)), or murder (N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3), then the court must also impose a period of parole ineligibility. N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7(a)(6) and (7). For murder the parole disqualifier must be thirty years. N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7(a)(6). For a violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:13-1(c)(2) (kidnapping), the parole disqualifier must be thirty years. N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7(a)(7).

7. Optional Period of Parole Ineligibility. With the exception of sentences for murder (N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3) and kidnapping (N.J.S.A. 2C:13-1(c)(2)), as part of a N.J.S.A. 2C:44-3(a) discretionary extended term "the court may fix a minimum term [of parole ineligibility] not to exceed one-half of the term" or, in the case of life imprisonment, twenty-five years. N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7(b).

B. Mandatory Extended Terms: Statutory Provisions

1. Persistent Offender Stolen Motor Vehicle. N.J.S.A. 2C:20-10.3 (eff. July 7, 2023) requires the court, upon request by the prosecutor, to impose an extended term for the crimes of motor vehicle theft (N.J.S.A. 2C:20-10.1), receiving a stolen vehicle (N.J.S.A. 2C:20-10.2), and carjacking (N.J.S.A. 2C:15-2) if the defendant has at least two prior and separate convictions within ten years for carjacking, theft of a motor vehicle, or receiving a stolen motor vehicle.

2. Child Endangerment. N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4(b)(5)(a) and N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4(b)(5)(b) require the court to impose an extended term on a person convicted of a second or subsequent offense of creating, possessing, receiving, viewing or having under his or her control child pornography.

3. Soliciting a Minor to Join a Street Gang. N.J.S.A. 2C:33-28(f) requires the court to impose an extended term for soliciting, recruiting, coercing or threatening a person under the age of eighteen to join a street gang.

4. Drug Distribution to a Minor or a Pregnant Female. N.J.S.A. 2C:35-8 requires the court to impose, upon application of the prosecutor, "twice the term of

imprisonment, fine and penalty, including twice the term of parole ineligibility, if any, authorized or required to be imposed by" N.J.S.A. 2C:35-5(b) (drug distribution) or N.J.S.A. 2C:35-7 (distribution within a school zone) "or any other provision of this title." If the defendant is convicted of more than one offense, the court shall impose one enhanced sentence on the most serious offense. Ibid. The prosecutor must establish the basis for the enhanced sentence by a preponderance of the evidence, and the court must hold a hearing on the matter. Ibid.

Note: This statute is subject to the N.J.S.A. 2C:35-12 waiver provision and Attorney General Law Enforcement Directive No. 2021-4, "Directive Revising Statewide Guidelines Concerning the Waiver of Mandatory Minimum Sentences in Non-Violent Drug Cases Pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:35-12 (April 19, 2021) (eff. May 19, 2021) discussed further in Chapter XIV on drug offender sentencing. Pursuant to the Directive, the prosecutor may request an extended term, but must waive the mandatory parole-bar.

5. State Taxes. N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6(e) provides that the court may impose an extended term for "a third or subsequent offense involving State taxes under N.J.S.A. 2C:20-9 [theft by failure to make required disposition of property received], N.J.S.A. 2C:21-15 [misapplication of entrusted property and property of government or financial institution], any other provision of this code, or under any of the provisions of Title 54 of the Revised Statutes [taxation], or Title 54A of the New Jersey Statutes [New Jersey Gross Income Tax Act]."

6. Repeat Drug Offender. N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6(f) provides that upon application of the prosecutor and after a hearing, the court must impose an extended term with a parole disqualifier on anyone convicted of the following crimes if the person also has a prior conviction of "manufacturing, distributing, dispensing or possessing with intent to distribute a controlled dangerous substance or controlled substance analog":

- Manufacturing, distributing, dispensing or possessing with intent to distribute any dangerous substance or controlled substance analog (N.J.S.A. 2C:35-5);
- Maintaining or operating a controlled dangerous substance production facility (N.J.S.A. 2C:35-4);
- Employing a juvenile in a drug distribution scheme (N.J.S.A. 2C:35-6);

- Being a leader of a narcotics trafficking network (N.J.S.A. 2C:35-3); or
- Distributing, dispensing or possessing with intent to distribute within a school zone (N.J.S.A. 2C:35-7).

Note: This statute is subject to the N.J.S.A. 2C:35-12 waiver provision and Attorney General Law Enforcement Directive No. 2021-4, "Directive Revising Statewide Guidelines Concerning the Waiver of Mandatory Minimum Sentences in Non-Violent Drug Cases Pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:35-12" (April 19, 2021) (eff. May 19, 2021) discussed further in Chapter XIV on drug offender sentencing. Pursuant to the Directive, the prosecutor may request an extended term, but must waive the mandatory parole-bar. Where the prosecutor does not request an extended term, the reasons for that decision must be placed on the record. R. 3:21-4(f) (eff. Sept. 1, 2021).

7. The Graves Act and Assault Weapons. N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6(c) and N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6(g) require an extended term when the defendant has previously been convicted of a crime involving the use or possession of a firearm and then commits an enumerated offense. See Chapter XIII on Graves Act and assault weapons sentencing for additional discussion.

8. Sex Offender Violation of Parole Supervision for Life. N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6.4(e) provides that if a defendant commits any of the following offenses while serving parole supervision for life, the court must impose an extended term, and the defendant must serve the entire term before returning to parole supervision for life (**Note** that N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6.4(e), amended by, L. 2017, c. 141 (eff. Feb. 1, 2018) now includes N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4.1 (leader of a child pornography network)):

- Murder (N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3);
- Manslaughter (N.J.S.A. 2C:11-4);
- Reckless vehicular homicide (N.J.S.A. 2C:11-5);
- Aggravated assault (N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1(b));
- Kidnapping (N.J.S.A. 2C:13-1);
- Luring a child (N.J.S.A. 2C:13-6);

- Sexual assault (N.J.S.A. 2C:14-2);
- Criminal sexual contact (N.J.S.A. 2C:14-3);
- Endangering the welfare of a child (N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4);
- Leader of a child pornography network (N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4.1);
- Second-degree burglary (N.J.S.A. 2C:18-2); or
- Possession of a weapon for an unlawful purpose (N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4(a)).

9. Persistent Violent Offenders (also known as the "Persistent Offenders Accountability Act" and the "Three Strikes and You're In" Law). N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.1 requires the court to impose either a life sentence without parole or an extended term, depending on the crime committed, and after a hearing.

(a) Life without Parole. N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.1(a) provides that a person convicted of any of the following crimes, or their substantial equivalent under any similar statute, "who has been convicted of two or more crimes that were committed on prior and separate occasions, regardless of the dates of the convictions," shall be sentenced to a term of life imprisonment without parole:

- Murder (N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3);
- Aggravated manslaughter (N.J.S.A. 2C:11-4(a));
- First-degree kidnapping (N.J.S.A. 2C:13-1);
- Sexual assault (N.J.S.A. 2C:14-2(a)(3) to (6));
- First-degree robbery (N.J.S.A. 2C:15-1); or
- Carjacking (N.J.S.A. 2C:15-2).

Note: Pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.1(e), a defendant sentenced to life without parole under N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.1(a) may be released on parole if the

defendant "is at least 70 years of age" and "has served at least 35 years in prison pursuant to" N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.1, and "the full Parole Board determines that the defendant is not a danger to the safety of any other person or the community."

(b) Extended Term. N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.1(b) requires the court to impose an extended term if the circumstances in subsection (1) or (2) exist:

(1) the defendant is being sentenced for any of the following crimes and has two or more convictions for any of those crimes or the crimes enumerated in N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.1(a) (listed above), "regardless of the dates of the convictions":

- Second-degree manslaughter (N.J.S.A. 2C:11-4);
- Second- or third-degree assault (N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1(b));
- Second-degree kidnapping (N.J.S.A. 2C:13-1);
- Aggravated criminal sexual contact under any circumstances set forth in N.J.S.A. 2C:14-2(a)(3) to (6) (N.J.S.A. 2C:14-3);
- Second-degree robbery (N.J.S.A. 2C:15-1);
- Second-degree burglary (N.J.S.A. 2C:18-2); or
- Second-degree possession of weapons for unlawful purposes (N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4).

or

(2) The defendant: (1) is convicted of a crime enumerated in N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.1(a) (listed above); (2) "does not have two or more prior convictions that require sentencing under" N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.1(a); and (3) has two or more prior convictions that would require sentencing under" N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.1(b)(1) if the defendant "had been convicted of a crime enumerated in" N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.1(b)(1).

(c) Timing of Convictions. N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.1(c) provides: "The provisions of this section shall not apply unless the prior convictions are for

crimes committed on separate occasions and unless the crime for which the defendant is being sentenced was committed either within 10 years of the date of the defendant's last release from confinement for commission of any crime or within 10 years of the date of the commission of the most recent of the crimes for which the defendant has a prior conviction."

(d) Notice and Hearing. Within fourteen days of entry of a guilty plea or return of a verdict, the State must serve notice upon defendant of the intention to impose sentence pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.1(d). See also R. 3:21-4(g). The court may not impose a sentence pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.1 unless the ground for the sentence has been established at a hearing.

10. Sexual Assault or Aggravated Criminal Sexual Contact with a Minor. N.J.S.A. 2C:44-3(g) requires that a defendant convicted of sexual assault (N.J.S.A. 2C:14-2) or criminal sexual contact (N.J.S.A. 2C:14-3) be sentenced to an extended term of imprisonment upon application of the prosecutor, if the crime involved violence or the threat of violence and the victim was sixteen years of age or less. See Chapter XV on sex offender sentencing for further discussion.

11. Crimes Committed while Released on Bail. N.J.S.A. 2C:44-5.1(a) requires the court to impose an extended term and double the fine authorized for the offense if the defendant committed any of the following offenses and "at the time of the commission of the crime, the defendant was released on bail or on his own recognizance for one of the enumerated crimes and was convicted of that crime":

- Possession of a firearm with intent to use it unlawfully against the person of another (N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4);
- Murder (N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3);
- Manslaughter (N.J.S.A. 2C:11-4);
- Kidnapping (N.J.S.A. 2C:13-1);
- Aggravated sexual assault (N.J.S.A. 2C:14-2(a));
- Aggravated criminal sexual contact (N.J.S.A. 2C:14-3(a));
- Robbery (N.J.S.A. 2C:15-1);

- Second-degree burglary, or burglary of a structure adapted for overnight accommodations (N.J.S.A. 2C:18-2); or
- First-, second- or third-degree assault (N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1(b)).

Notice and Hearing. Notice to impose a sentence pursuant to this statute must be filed with the court and served upon the defendant by the prosecutor within fourteen days of entry of the defendant's guilty plea or return of the verdict. R. 3:21-4(g). The court must provide the defendant an opportunity to challenge the basis for the extended term at a hearing. N.J.S.A. 2C:44-5.1(b).

C. Extended Terms: Case Law

1. Sixth Amendment Requirement. Pursuant to the Sixth Amendment, "[o]ther than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt," Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000). Stated another way, "the Sixth Amendment does not permit a defendant to be 'exposed . . . to a penalty exceeding the maximum he [or she] would receive if punished according to the facts reflected in the jury verdict alone.'" Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 602 (2002) (quoting Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 483 (2000)). In the case of a guilty plea, the maximum sentence authorized by statute is the maximum sentence supported by the defendant's admissions. State v. Franklin, 184 N.J. 516, 537-38 (2005) (interpreting Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 309-11 (2004)). The defendant may also "consent to judicial factfinding as to sentence enhancements." State v. Franklin, 184 N.J. 516, 538 (2005) (quoting Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 309-11 (2004)).

2. Imposing a Discretionary Extended Term.

(a) Setting a Term, the Dunbar Factors. After finding the defendant meets the statutory requirements for a discretionary extended term, the court must assess the aggravating and mitigating factors, including the need to protect the public, and set a term within the bottom of the ordinary term and top of the extended term range. State v. Pierce, 188 N.J. 155, 168-169 (2006) (modifying the prior rule set forth in State v. Dunbar, 108 N.J. 80, 89 (1987) to eliminate judicial factfinding, as required by the Sixth Amendment).

(b) Parole Ineligibility. To impose a period of parole ineligibility, the court must be "clearly convinced that the aggravating factors substantially outweigh the mitigating factors." State v. Dunbar, 108 N.J. 80, 89 (1987).

(c) Deference to the Prosecutor's Request. "Because it is the prosecutor's choice whether to seek an extended term . . . the trial judge should give weight to the prosecutor's determination." State v. Thomas, 195 N.J. 436, 436 (2008).

(d) Sentencing Range. The range of sentence that a persistent offender is subject to "starts at the minimum of the ordinary-term range and ends at the maximum of the extended-term range." State v. Pierce, 188 N.J. 155, 169 (2006).

(e) Specificity in the Motion for an Extended Term. When the defendant faces multiple charges, the prosecutor's notice of motion should identify the offense for which the prosecutor seeks an extended term. State v. Thomas, 195 N.J. 431, 436 (2008). If the court imposes an extended term on a crime different from the one requested, the court must explain its reason for doing so. Id. at 437.

2. Discretionary Extended Terms and "Prior Crimes."

(a) Foreign Jurisdiction. Absent a showing of fundamental unfairness, a conviction for a prior crime in a foreign country is presumed appropriate where the jurisdiction had a judicial system with protections similar to our own. State v. Williams, 309 N.J. Super. 117, 123 (App. Div. 1998). One criterion for fundamental fairness is that the defendant had legal counsel in the prior proceeding. Id. at 124.

(b) Constitutionality and Factual Findings. There is no Sixth Amendment violation in the sentencing court's consideration of a defendant's prior conviction and the facts that form the basis for the prior conviction in order to determine whether the defendant qualifies as a "persistent offender" because such findings fall within the "prior conviction" exception of Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 301 (2004), and Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 488 (2000). State v. Pierce, 188 N.J. 155, 163 (2006). The sentencing court may also rely on a defendant's concession that he or she is

eligible for an extended term as a persistent offender. State v. Clarity, 461 N.J. Super. 320, 328-29 (App. Div. 2019).

(c) Prior Conviction Pending Appeal. The sentencing court may consider a conviction for a prior crime, even if an appeal challenging the conviction is pending. State v. Cook, 330 N.J. Super. 395, 422 (App. Div. 2000). If the prior conviction is reversed on appeal, then the extended term would have to be vacated. Ibid.

(d) Timing of Offenses. Under N.J.S.A. 2C:44-3(a), a defendant may not be sentenced as a persistent offender if the "latest in time" prior crime and the "last release from confinement" both occurred more than ten years before the crime for which the defendant is being sentenced, even if the latest prior conviction was entered within the ten-year period. State v. Clarity, 454 N.J. Super. 603, 606 (App. Div. 2018); State v. Henderson, 375 N.J. Super. 265, 266, 270 (Law Div. 2004).

(e) Prior Crimes Considered Previously by a Court. A court is not precluded from considering prior crimes that a prior court used as a basis for an extended term. State v. Reldan, 231 N.J. Super. 232, 237-38 (App. Div. 1989).

(f) Chronology of Crimes and Convictions. The sentencing judge may consider crimes committed after the crime for which the court is imposing a sentence, so long as the defendant was convicted of the subsequent crime prior to sentencing. State v. Cook, 330 N.J. Super. 395, 421-22 (App. Div. 2000). Compare this approach to the following methods used to calculate persistent-offender status for other purposes:

(i) Sex Offenders: Under N.J.S.A. 2C:14-6, a second or subsequent sex offender conviction is subject to mandatory parole ineligibility (unless given an extended sentence under N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7), if the person has been convicted of a sexually oriented offense "at any time." The "first" or "earlier" crime had to result in a conviction by the time the later offense was committed. State v. Anderson, 186 N.J. Super. 174, 176 (App. Div. 1982), aff'd o.b., 93 N.J. 14 (1983).

(ii) The Graves Act: The Graves Act does not limit the chronological sequence of crimes subject to its extended term provision; the only requirement is that there be a prior conviction. State v. Hawks, 114

N.J. 359, 365-67 (1989). It has been postulated, but not decided, that a Graves Act extended term cannot be imposed based upon convictions and sentences entered in the same proceeding. State v. Rountree, 388 N.J. Super. 190, 207-09 (App. Div. 2006).

(iii) Repeat Drug Offenders: An extended term under N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6(f) does not depend on the chronological sequence of the offenses or convictions. The defendant must have been convicted "at any time." State v. Hill, 327 N.J. Super. 33, 41-42 (App. Div. 1999). However, the statute will not apply if the defendant enters guilty pleas to two different charges pursuant to one agreement, on the same day, at one proceeding. State v. Owens, 381 N.J. Super. 503, 512-13 (App. Div. 2005).

(iv) Domestic Violence Act: The enhanced penalty provisions of N.J.S.A. 2C:25-30 apply only to individuals who have been previously convicted of a domestic violence offense as of the date the subsequent offense was committed. Hence, these provisions do not apply to someone simultaneously convicted of offenses occurring on two separate occasions. State v. Bowser, 272 N.J. Super. 582, 588-89 (Law Div. 1993).

3. Discretionary Extended Terms and "Confinement."

(a) Probation Is Not "Confinement." Because probation is not "confinement," a prior sentence to probation may not be considered for purposes of determining whether the defendant had been released from confinement within ten years preceding the current offense. State v. Clarity, 454 N.J. Super. 603, 609 (App. Div. 2018).

(b) Brief Confinement Based on a Probation Violation. "[T]he persistent-offender statute applies to confinement for criminal behavior, not the mere incident of an individual being held briefly in custody." State v. Clarity, 454 N.J. Super. 603, 613 (App. Div. 2018). Thus, where the State claims that the defendant was confined within the preceding ten-year period because he was briefly detained after violating a term of probation, the sentencing court must determine whether the brief detention was the result of a crime or the "failure to adhere to a substantial requirement imposed as a condition of the probation," the latter of which is "considered part of the corrections process, [and] not a separate prosecution and conviction." Ibid.

4. Rules When Imposing Multiple Extended Terms.

(a) **Discretionary Extended Terms.** N.J.S.A. 2C:44-5(a)(2) prohibits a court from imposing multiple discretionary extended terms, even if the terms are to be served concurrently. State v. Mays, 321 N.J. Super. 619, 636 (App. Div. 1999).

(b) **Mandatory and Discretionary Extended Terms.** The prohibition against multiple extended terms is inapplicable to mandatory extended terms required by the Graves Act (N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6(c)), State v. Robinson, 217 N.J. 594, 597 (2014) (citing State v. Connell, 208 N.J. Super. 688, 697 (App. Div. 1986)), and the Comprehensive Drug Reform Act (N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6(f)), State v. Singleton, 326 N.J. Super. 351, 355 (App. Div. 1999). Thus, if the defendant is convicted of two Graves Act offenses and a drug offense, all of which are subject to mandatory extended terms, the court must impose three extended terms. The court may not, however, impose a discretionary extended term in addition to a mandatory extended term. State v. Robinson, 217 N.J. 594, 609-10 (2014).

(c) **Multiple Extended Terms.** N.J.S.A. 2C:44-5(a)(2) prohibits a court from imposing multiple discretionary extended terms in one sentencing proceeding; it "has no application . . . where extended terms are imposed by two different courts for different offenses at proceedings separated by a span of nine years." State v. Reldan, 231 N.J. Super. 232, 238 (App. Div. 1989) (affirming an extended term where the defendant was serving an extended term pursuant to a former persistent offender statute). Pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:44-5(b), a defendant serving an extended term cannot be sentenced to a discretionary extended term by a subsequent sentencing court for a crime committed before the crime for which he or she is already serving an extended term, unless the first offense occurred while the defendant was in custody. State v. Pennington, 418 N.J. Super. 548, 554-58 (App. Div. 2011).

(d) **Crime Committed While "In Custody."** A defendant who committed a subsequent offense while released on bail committed that offense while "in custody" for purposes of N.J.S.A. 2C:44-5(b), and thus, may be subject to a second discretionary extended term by a second sentencing court. State v. Boykins, 447 N.J. Super. 213, 221-23 (App. Div. 2016).

(e) **Probation Violation.** If a defendant commits a crime while serving probation on a suspended extended term, the court may revoke probation, reinstate the original extended term, and impose an extended term for the crime committed while on probation without violating N.J.S.A. 2C:44-5(a)(2). State v. Williams, 299 N.J. Super. 264, 272-73 (App. Div. 1997).

(f) **Severed Charges.** When charges in an indictment are severed, and the court imposes an extended term on a conviction from the first trial, N.J.S.A. 2C:44-5(b)(1) precludes the court from imposing an extended term on a conviction from the second trial. State v. Hudson, 209 N.J. 513, 531-33 (2012). The Hudson decision did not create new law, and therefore has retroactive effect. State v. Bull, 227 N.J. 555, 563 (2017).

(g) **Guilty Pleas at Different Times.** N.J.S.A. 2C:44-5(b)(1) precludes a sentencing court from imposing a second extended term for an offense that a defendant "pled to second in time but that was committed earlier than the imposition of the extended-term sentence she [the defendant] is serving." State v. McDonald, 209 N.J. 549, 555 (2012).

5. Repeat Drug Offenders.

(a) **Separation of Powers.** As written, N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6(f) (requiring the court to impose an extended term on a repeat drug offender upon application of the prosecutor) violates the doctrine of separation of powers by giving unfettered power to prosecutors in the sentencing determination. State v. Lagares, 127 N.J. 20, 31 (1992). To comply with the separation of powers doctrine, our Court has interpreted the statute as requiring the Attorney General to adopt guidelines to assist prosecutorial decision-making while reflecting the legislative intent that extended sentences for repeat drug offenders should be the norm. State v. Lagares, 127 N.J. 20, 32 (1992).

Guidelines. For the guidelines effective May 20, 1998, see Attorney General Guidelines for Negotiating Cases Under N.J.S.A. 2C:35-12, available at www.nj.gov/lps/dcj/pdfs/agguid.pdf. Effective for offenses committed on or after September 15, 2004, the Attorney General promulgated revised guidelines available at www.nj.gov/lps/dcj/agguide/directives/brimage_all.pdf. For a discussion of the statewide guidelines issued in response to Lagares, see State v. Kirk, 145 N.J. 159, 168-69 (1996).

(b) Arbitrary and Capricious Challenge. Prosecutors must state their reasons on the record for seeking an extended sentence under the repeat drug offender statute (N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6(f)), and the court may deny or vacate an extended term where a defendant clearly and convincingly establishes that the prosecutor's decision was arbitrary and capricious. State v. Lagares, 127 N.J. 20, 32-33 (1992).

(c) Sixth Amendment. The requirement that the court find the basis for a mandatory extended term falls within the "prior conviction" exception of Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 301 (2004), and thus does not offend the Sixth Amendment jury-finding requirement. State v. Thomas, 188 N.J. 137, 149-52 (2006).

(d) Chronology of Offenses and Convictions. Similar to the Graves Act repeat-offender provision, the chronological sequence of the offenses and convictions is irrelevant for purposes of N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6(f). State v. Hill, 327 N.J. Super. 33, 41-42 (App. Div. 1999). The only requirement is that there be a previous conviction "at any time." Ibid. But where a defendant enters guilty pleas to two different charges on the same day, in the same proceeding, and pursuant to one agreement, N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6(f), will apply. State v. Owens, 381 N.J. Super. 503, 512-13 (App. Div. 2005).

(e) The Dunbar Factors. The factors set forth in State v. Dunbar, 108 N.J. 80 (1987), as modified in State v. Jefimowicz, 119 N.J. 152 (1990), for setting an extended term apply when imposing a mandatory extended term under N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6(f). State v. Vasquez, 374 N.J. Super. 252, 267 (App. Div. 2005); State v. Williams, 310 N.J. Super. 92, 98-99 (App. Div. 1998).

6. Persistent Offenders Accountability Act (the Three Strikes and You're in Law).

(a) Robbery. The Persistent Offender Law's reference to N.J.S.A. 2C:15-1 (robbery) applies only to first-degree robbery. State v. Jordan, 378 N.J. Super. 254, 258-61 (App. Div. 2005).

(b) Hearing. The State must establish the basis for a term under the Three Strikes Law at a hearing where the defendant has the right to hear and controvert the evidence against him or her and to offer evidence in his or her own behalf. N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.1(d); R. 3:21-4(g). The standard of proving a

defendant's prior conviction under the statute is proof by a preponderance of the evidence. State v. Oliver, 162 N.J. 580, 590-92 (2000).

(c) Conviction in another Jurisdiction. A foreign conviction must be "substantially equivalent" to an enumerated offense. State v. Rhodes, 329 N.J. Super. 536, 544 (App. Div. 2000).

(d) Timing of Convictions and Punishments. The law is not limited to defendants who have been convicted and punished for the first two offenses before committing the third offense. State v. Galiano, 349 N.J. Super. 157, 164-65 (App. Div. 2002). "If two qualifying convictions precede the sentencing of the third offense and that offense was committed either within ten years of defendant's most recent release from confinement for commission of any crime or within ten years of the commission of the most recent of the crimes for which defendant has a prior conviction, then defendant is eligible for the enhanced punishment of N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.1(a), even though the present sentence is for an offense committed prior to the entry of the pre-qualifying convictions." Id. at 168.

(e) Timing of Crimes. To qualify as "strikes," the two other offenses must have occurred "on prior and separate occasions"; thus, the defendant must have committed them on different occasions and prior to the third offense. State v. Parks, 192 N.J. 483, 488 (2007).

(f) Constitutionality. As applied to adults, the Three Strikes Law does not violate the double jeopardy, ex post facto, due process, or equal protection clauses of the federal or state constitutions, does not violate the separation of powers doctrine, and does not constitute cruel and unusual punishment. State v. Oliver, 162 N.J. 580, 585-89 (2000).

(a) Eighth Amendment. Crimes committed as juveniles tried as adults may qualify as strikes for purposes of the Three Strikes law without offending the Eighth Amendment, as interpreted by Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 479 (2012) and State v. Zuber, 227 N.J. 422 (2017). State v. Ryan, 249 N.J. 581, 586-87 (2022) (affirming a sentence of life without parole issued under N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.1(a) where the defendant committed two first-degree robberies at age sixteen (strike one) and two additional first-degree robberies (strikes two and three) at age twenty-three).

7. Consecutive Terms of Life Imprisonment for Murder. Because life imprisonment is a sentencing option within the ordinary range for the crime of murder, N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3, and is not a discretionary extended term under N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7, a court may impose multiple consecutive discretionary life sentences for murder convictions without violating the N.J.S.A. 2C:44-5 prohibition against the imposition of multiple discretionary extended terms. State v. Chavies, 185 N.J. Super. 429, 432 (App. Div. 1982).

IX. CONCURRENT AND CONSECUTIVE SENTENCES

When a defendant is subject to multiple terms of imprisonment, the sentencing court must decide whether the terms will run concurrently or consecutively. A few statutes require imposition of consecutive terms (see section B). In all other cases the decision is left to the sentencing court's discretion (see section A). Section C discusses case law on concurrent and consecutive terms.

A. Consecutive Terms within the Court's Discretion: Statutory Provisions

1. Statutory Authority for Discretionary Consecutive Terms. N.J.S.A. 2C:44-5(a) provides that where a defendant receives multiple sentences of imprisonment "for more than one offense, including an offense for which a previous suspended sentence or sentence of probation has been revoked, such multiple sentences shall run concurrently or consecutively as the court determines at the time of sentence." "There shall be no overall outer limit on the cumulation of consecutive sentences for multiple offenses"; however, the aggregate of consecutive terms to county jail may not exceed eighteen months. Ibid.

2. Sentences Imposed at Different Times. N.J.S.A. 2C:44-5(b) instructs the court to decide whether to run terms consecutively or concurrently when a defendant, previously sentenced to imprisonment, is later sentenced for an offense committed prior to the former sentence. See also N.J.S.A. 2C:44-5(d) (instructing that multiple terms of imprisonment shall run concurrently or consecutively when a second or subsequent sentence is imposed).

3. Offense Committed while Released Pending Disposition of Charges. N.J.S.A. 2C:44-5(h) limits the court's discretion in imposing concurrent terms where the defendant committed the offense while released, with or without bail, pending disposition of charges. The court may impose concurrent terms only if, after considering "the character and conditions of the defendant," the court "finds that imposition of consecutive sentences would be a serious injustice which overrides the need to deter such conduct by others." Ibid.

4. The Yarbough Guidelines. N.J.S.A. 2C:44-5 does not specify when consecutive or concurrent sentences are appropriate. In State v. Yarbough, 100 N.J. 627, 643-44 (1985), the Supreme Court set forth the following guidelines for sentencing courts when the offender "has engaged in a pattern of behavior

constituting a series of separate offenses" or "multiple offenses in separate, unrelated episodes":

- (1) there can be no free crimes in a system for which the punishment shall fit the crime;
- (2) the reasons for imposing either a consecutive or concurrent sentence should be separately stated in the sentencing decision;
- (3) some reasons to be considered by the sentencing court should include facts relating to the crimes, including whether or not:
 - (a) the crimes and their objectives were predominantly independent of each other;
 - (b) the crimes involved separate acts of violence or threats of violence;
 - (c) the crimes were committed at different times or separate places, rather than being committed so closely in time and place as to indicate a single period of aberrant behavior;
 - (d) any of the crimes involved multiple victims;
 - (e) the convictions for which the sentences are to be imposed are numerous;
- (4) there should be no double counting of aggravating factors;
- (5) successive terms for the same offense should not ordinarily be equal to the punishment for the first offense; and
- (6) there should be an overall outer limit on the cumulation of consecutive sentences for multiple offenses not to exceed the sum of the longest terms (including an extended term, if eligible) that could be imposed for the two most serious offenses.

[State v. Yarbough, 100 N.J. 627, 643-44 (1985).]

Note: Yarbough guideline number six has been superseded by a 1993 amendment to N.J.S.A. 2C:44-5(a), which provides that there "shall be no overall outer limit on the cumulation of consecutive sentences for multiple offenses."

5. Calculation of the Terms. N.J.S.A. 2C:44-5(e)(1) instructs that when terms run concurrently, "the shorter terms merge in, and are satisfied by discharge of the longest term." When the terms run consecutively, they "are added to arrive at an aggregate term to be served equal to the sum of all terms." N.J.S.A. 2C:44-5(e)(2).

B. Mandatory Consecutive Terms: Statutory Provisions

1. Leaving a Motor Vehicle Accident Resulting in Death. N.J.S.A. 2C:11-5.1 instructs that "when the court imposes multiple sentences of imprisonment for more than one offense, those sentences shall run consecutively."

2. Second- or Third-Degree Leaving the Scene of a Boating Accident. N.J.S.A. 2C:11-5.2(d) instructs that "when the court imposes multiple sentences of imprisonment for more than one offense, those sentences shall run consecutively."

3. Leaving a Motor Vehicle Accident Resulting in Serious Bodily Injury. N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1.1 provides that "whenever in the case of such multiple convictions the court imposes multiple sentences of imprisonment for more than one offense, those sentences shall run consecutively."

4. Third-Degree Endangering an Injured Victim. N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1.2(d) requires the sentence "be served consecutively to that imposed for any conviction of the crime that rendered the person physically helpless or mentally incapacitated."

5. Third-Degree Reckless Endangerment. N.J.S.A. 2C:12-2(b)(2) provides that the sentence "shall be ordered to be served consecutively to that imposed for a conviction of the offense that the defendant intended to commit or facilitate when the defendant violated the provisions of this subsection." **Note:** As of January 11, 2016, this statute was repealed and replaced by N.J.S.A. 2C:24-7.1 (endangering another person), which does not require a consecutive term.

6. Throwing Bodily Fluid at a Department of Corrections Employee. N.J.S.A. 2C:12-13 provides: "A term of imprisonment imposed for this offense shall run consecutively to any term of imprisonment currently being served and to any other term imposed for another offense committed at the time of the assault."

7. Kidnapping a Minor and Homicide. N.J.S.A. 2C:13-1(c)(2) provides that if the kidnapped victim is killed, the kidnapping conviction must "be served consecutively to any sentence imposed pursuant to" Chapter 11 (criminal homicide).

8. Financial Facilitation of Criminal Activity. N.J.S.A. 2C:21-27(c) requires the conviction "be served consecutively to that imposed for a conviction of any offense constituting the criminal activity involved or from which the property was derived."

9. Witness Tampering. N.J.S.A. 2C:28-5(e) requires the sentence be served consecutively to the sentence for "an offense that was the subject of the official proceeding or investigation."

10. Violation of a Protective Order Prohibiting Witness Tampering. N.J.S.A. 2C:28-5.2(b) authorizes the court to impose a consecutive sentence to the sentence on the underlying offense. In the event the court does not impose a consecutive term, it must state its rationale on the record. Ibid.

11. Solicitation of Street Gang Members. N.J.S.A. 2C:33-28(e) instructs that if the defendant solicited another to join a criminal street gang while under official detention, the sentence must be served consecutively to the sentence the defendant was serving when the defendant solicited gang members. Additionally, the sentence under this statute must be served consecutively to a sentence "imposed upon any other such conviction."

12. Gang Criminality. N.J.S.A. 2C:33-29(b) requires the sentence imposed for the crime of gang criminality be served consecutively to the sentence on any of the following underlying offenses: "any crime specified in chapters 11 through 18, 20, 33, 35 or 37 of Title 2C"; prostitution (N.J.S.A. 2C:34-1); possession of prohibited weapons and devices (N.J.S.A. 2C:39-3); possession of a weapon for an unlawful purpose (N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4); possession of a firearm while committing certain offenses (N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4.1); unlawful possession of a weapon (N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5); or manufacturing weapons (N.J.S.A. 2C:39-9).

13. Promoting Organized Street Crime. N.J.S.A. 2C:33-30(b) requires the sentence be served consecutively to the sentence imposed on an underlying offense pursuant to Chapters 11 through 18, 20, 33, 35, or 37 of Title 2C, or a conviction under N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4.1 (possession of a firearm while committing certain

offenses); N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5 (unlawful possession of a weapon); or N.J.S.A. 2C:39-9 (manufacturing weapons).

14. Booby Traps in the Manufacturing or Distribution of Drugs. N.J.S.A. 2C:35-4.1(e) requires the sentence be served consecutively to the sentence for a conviction of any offense in Chapter 35 (drug offenses), or a conspiracy or attempt to commit an offense under Chapter 35, "unless the court, in consideration of the character and circumstances of the defendant, finds that imposition of consecutive sentences would be a serious injustice which overrides the need to deter such conduct by others. If the court does not impose a consecutive sentence, the sentence shall not become final for 10 days in order to permit the appeal of such sentence by the prosecution."

15. Possession of a Bump Stock or Trigger Crank. N.J.S.A. 2C:39-3(l) amended by, L. 2017, c. 323 (eff. Jan. 16, 2018) requires the sentence for knowing possession of a bump stock or trigger crank to run consecutively to the sentence for unlawful possession of an assault firearm (N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(f)).

16. Possession of a Weapon during a Drug or Bias Crime. N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4.1(d) requires the sentence run consecutively to the sentence for any of the following offenses:

- Leader of a narcotics trafficking network (N.J.S.A. 2C:35-3);
- Maintaining or operating a drug production facility (N.J.S.A. 2C:35-4);
- Manufacturing or distributing drugs (N.J.S.A. 2C:35-5);
- Manufacturing and dispensing Gamma Hydroxybutyrate (N.J.S.A. 2C:35-5.2);
- Manufacturing and dispensing Flunitrazepam (N.J.S.A. 2C:35-5.3);
- Employing a juvenile in a drug distribution scheme (N.J.S.A. 2C:35-6);
- Possession of drugs on or near school property (N.J.S.A. 2C:35-7);
- Distribution or possession of drugs on public property (N.J.S.A. 2C:35-7.1);

- Possession, distribution, or manufacturing imitation drugs (N.J.S.A. 2C:35-11); and
- Bias intimidation (N.J.S.A. 2C:16-1).

17. Assault by an Inmate of a Correctional Employee, Sheriff's Department Employee, or Law Enforcement Officer. N.J.S.A. 2C:44-5(i) requires the court impose a term of incarceration on an inmate for assault on an employee of a correction facility, juvenile facility, county sheriff's department, or law enforcement officer. The sentence must "run consecutively to any term of imprisonment currently being served and to any other term imposed for any other offense committed at the time of the assault." Ibid.

C. Consecutive and Concurrent Terms: Case Law

1. Aggravating and Mitigating Factors. "[F]or each crime in a series the court should impose a sentence, taking into account the appropriate aggravating and mitigating circumstances set forth in N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(a) and -1(b), before considering whether the sentences should run consecutively or concurrently." State v. Rogers, 124 N.J. 113, 119 (1991).

2. Expired Sentences. The court may not run a sentence concurrently to a sentence that has fully expired. State v. Mercadante, 299 N.J. Super. 522, 532 (App. Div. 1997).

3. Sentences in Foreign Jurisdictions. The consecutive term provisions of the Code do not allow a court to impose a sentence to run consecutive to a sentence in a foreign jurisdiction. Breeden v. N.J. Dep't of Corr., 132 N.J. 457, 465-66 (1993). However, if supported by adequate reasons, a court may impose a sentence consecutive to another jurisdiction's sentence that a defendant is currently serving. State v. Walters, 279 N.J. Super. 626, 634-37 (App. Div. 1995). See also Setser v. United States, 566 U.S. 231, 236-39 (2012) (providing that a federal court may order its sentence to run consecutive to a state sentence that has not yet been imposed).

4. Requisite Findings. The court must state separately its reasons for imposing consecutive sentences. State v. Miller, 205 N.J. 109, 129 (2011) (remanding for resentencing where the court failed to address the Yarbough factors). However, a reviewing court may uphold a sentence that lacks a specific statement of reasons

and findings "where the sentencing transcript makes it possible to 'readily deduce' the judge's reasoning." Id. at 129-30 (quoting State v. Bieneck, 200 N.J. 601, 609 (2010)). Accord State v. Vanderee, 476 N.J. Super. 214, 240 (App. Div.), certif. denied, ___ N.J. ___ (2023) ("Given the court's detailed and considered analysis, we are satisfied that the trial court considered the Yarbough factors despite not referring to those factors explicitly.").

5. The Yarbough Guidelines on Procedural Matters. "The second, fourth, fifth, and sixth guidelines do not assist a court in making the threshold decision whether to impose concurrent or consecutive sentences; rather, they establish certain procedural requirements." State v. Carey, 168 N.J. 413, 423 (2001).

6. Yarbough Guideline Three. The guideline that provides the "clearest guidance" to sentencing courts is the third one, which sets forth five factors that focus on the facts relating to the crime. State v. Carey, 168 N.J. 413, 423 (2001).

7. Qualitative Weighing. The court should qualitatively, not quantitatively, weigh the factors set forth in guideline three. State v. Carey, 168 N.J. 413, 427 (2001). A court may impose consecutive sentences "even though a majority of the Yarbough factors support concurrent sentences." Id. at 427-28. See State v. Swint, 328 N.J. Super. 236, 264 (App. Div. 2000) (explaining that even when offenses are connected by "unity of specific purpose," are somewhat interdependent of one another, and are committed within a short period of time, the court may impose consecutive terms). But see State v. Copling, 326 N.J. Super. 417, 441-42 (App. Div. 1999) (finding that the court erred in imposing consecutive terms for murder and unlawful possession of a weapon because only two Yarbough factors (purposes and victims of the crimes) weighed in favor of consecutive terms).

8. Severity of the Circumstances. When deciding whether to impose concurrent or consecutive sentences, the court should determine whether the Yarbough factor under consideration "renders the collective group of offenses distinctively worse than the group of offenses would be were that circumstance not present." State v. Carey, 168 N.J. 413, 428 (2001).

9. Multiple Victims and Harms. "Crimes involving multiple deaths or victims who have sustained serious bodily injuries represent especially suitable circumstances for the imposition of consecutive sentences." State v. Carey, 168 N.J. 413, 428 (2001). Accord State v. Roach, 146 N.J. 208, 230-31 (1996); State v. Johnson, 309 N.J. Super. 237, 271-72 (App. Div. 1998). This is because the "total impact of singular offenses against different victims will generally exceed the total

impact on a single individual who is victimized multiple times." This is true even when the defendant did not intend to harm multiple victims, but it was foreseeable that his or her reckless conduct would have that effect. State v. Carey, 168 N.J. 413, 429 (2001).

10. Multiple Victims of Vehicular Homicide. "[I]n vehicular homicide cases, the multiple-victims factor is entitled to great weight and should ordinarily result in the imposition of at least two consecutive terms when multiple deaths or serious bodily injuries have been inflicted upon multiple victims." State v. Carey, 168 N.J. 413, 429-30 (2001). This does not create a presumption in favor of consecutive terms, however. State v. Liepe, 239 N.J. 359, 377 (2019). "Like any Yarbough analysis, the sentencing court's determination regarding consecutive and concurrent terms in the vehicular homicide setting turns on a careful evaluation of the specific case." Ibid.

11. Need to Protect Society. Consecutive sentences are especially appropriate where society must be protected from those who are unwilling to lead productive lives and who resort to criminal activities. State v. Taccetta, 301 N.J. Super. 227, 261 (App. Div. 1997).

12. Maximum Terms and Double Counting. "[F]actors relied on to sentence a defendant to the maximum term for each offense should not be used again to justify imposing those sentences consecutively. Where the offenses are closely related, it would ordinarily be inappropriate to sentence a defendant to the maximum term for each offense and also require that those sentences be served consecutively, especially where the second offense did not pose an additional risk to the victim. The focus should be on the fairness of the overall sentence." State v. Miller, 108 N.J. 112, 122 (1987).

13. Explicit Statement on Overall Fairness of the Sentence. The sentencing court must provide "[a]n explicit statement, explaining the overall fairness of a sentence imposed on a defendant for multiple offenses in a single proceeding or in multiple sentencing proceedings[; this] is essential to a proper Yarbough sentencing assessment." State v. Torres, 246 N.J. 246, 268 (2021) (citing State v. Miller, 108 N.J. 112, 122 (1987)).

Age and Overall Fairness of the Sentence. "[A]ge alone cannot drive the outcome [of an aggregate term]. An older defendant who commits a serious crime, for example, cannot rely on age to avoid an otherwise appropriate sentence." State v. Torres, 246 N.J. 246, 273 (2021).

14. Deviation from the Yarbough Guidelines. Some cases are so extreme and extraordinary that deviation from the guidelines is appropriate. State v. Yarbough, 100 N.J. 627, 647 (1985); State v. Hammond, 231 N.J. Super. 535, 544 (App. Div. 1989) (affirming three consecutive terms due to the extreme nature of the crimes); State v. Lewis, 223 N.J. Super. 145, 154 (App. Div. 1988) (affirming four consecutive terms).

15. Excessive Sentences. For examples of cases where consecutive terms were found excessive, see State v. Louis, 117 N.J. 250, 256-58 (1989) (aggregate term of 130 years with a 65 year parole disqualifier excessive); State v. Candelaria, 311 N.J. Super. 437, 454 (App. Div. 1998) (six consecutive sentences totaling 105 years plus a life sentence); State v. Rodgers, 230 N.J. Super. 593, 604 (App. Div. 1989) (reversing three consecutive terms for theft offenses). However, whether a sentence is excessive does not depend on whether the sentence is in accord with sentences for similar crimes. State v. Liepe, 239 N.J. 359, 379 (2019) ("This Court . . . has never imposed on a trial court the obligation to demonstrate that a sentence comports with sentences imposed by other courts in similar cases").

16. Sentence Must Be Based on the Verdict. A judge may not impose consecutive sentences to compensate for what he or she believes was an unjust verdict in the defendant's favor. State v. Tindell, 417 N.J. Super. 530, 568-72 (App. Div. 2011) (imposing five maximum consecutive terms totaling thirty years' imprisonment on the basis that the defendant committed murder and the jury erroneously found him guilty of reckless manslaughter). Similarly, the court may not base its sentence on facts rejected by the jury. State v. Melvin, 248 N.J. 321, 349, 352 (2021).

17. Split Sentencing. A judge may not impose sentences that are partially consecutive and partially concurrent. State v. Rogers, 124 N.J. 113, 118 (1991). Such a split-sentencing scheme would contravene the Code's paramount goal of uniformity. Ibid.

18. No Free Crimes. The "no free crimes" guideline "tilts in the direction of consecutive sentences because the Code focuses on the crime, not the criminal." State v. Carey, 168 N.J. 413, 423 (2001). However, this guideline does not eliminate concurrent sentences from a court's sentencing options because not every additional crime in a series must carry its own increment of punishment. State v. Rogers, 124 N.J. 113, 119 (1991).

19. Plea Agreements. The court may appropriately consider and weigh a plea agreement in deciding whether to impose consecutive sentences. State v. S.C., 289 N.J. Super. 61, 71 (App. Div. 1996).

20. Order of Terms. Neither Yarbough nor any statutory provision precludes a sentencing judge from requiring that the less restrictive term of a consecutive sentence be served first. State v. Ellis, 346 N.J. Super. 583, 594 (App. Div.), aff'd o.b., 174 N.J. 535 (2002). Although such a requirement does not render the sentence illegal, it may constitute an abuse of discretion since it effectively extends the real time the defendant must serve in prison. Id. at 597.

21. Young Adult Offenders. Because the Yarbough guidelines focus on punishment and young adult offender sentencing is premised on rehabilitation, a court should not apply the Yarbough guidelines in deciding whether to impose consecutive indeterminate sentences on young adult offenders. State v. Hannigan, 408 N.J. Super. 388, 398-400 (App. Div. 2009). Rather, the court should consider "offender-based criteria centered on rehabilitation." Id. at 400.

22. Juvenile Tried as an Adult. In weighing the Yarbough factors, the court must "exercise a heightened level of care before imposing multiple consecutive sentences on juveniles" tried in the Law Division. State v. Zuber, 227 N.J. 422, 450 (2017). "[A] sentencing court must consider not only the factors in Yarbough but also the ones in Miller when it decides whether to impose consecutive sentences on a juvenile which may result in a lengthy period of parole ineligibility." Ibid. (referring to the five factors set forth in Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 477-78 (2012)).

23. Offenses Committed while Released from Custody. Whenever a defendant commits an offense while released on probation, parole, or bail, N.J.S.A. 2C:44-5, presumes the terms will run consecutively. State v. Sutton, 132 N.J. 471, 484 (1993). The Yarbough standards should guide the court's decision. Id. at 485.

24. Sentences for Crimes Committed while on Parole, a Suspended Sentence, Probation or Bail. N.J.S.A. 2C:44-5(c), (f), (g) and (h), create a presumption that sentences for these offenses will run consecutively. State v. Sutton, 132 N.J. 471, 484 (1993).

25. Weapons Offenses and No Free Crimes. The court is not required to impose a consecutive term for a weapons offense committed during a criminal episode

with other crimes in order to comply with the principle that there shall be no free crimes. State v. Cuff, 239 N.J. 321, 350-51 (2019).

26. Consecutive Terms of Life Imprisonment for Murder. Because life imprisonment is a sentencing option within the ordinary range for the crime of murder, N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3, and is not a discretionary extended term under N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7, a court may impose multiple consecutive discretionary life sentences for murder convictions without violating the N.J.S.A. 2C:44-5 prohibition against the imposition of multiple discretionary extended terms. State v. Chavies, 185 N.J. Super. 429, 432 (App. Div. 1982).

27. Appeal by the State and Double Jeopardy. Double jeopardy protections prohibit the State from appealing the court's refusal to impose a consecutive term. State v. Locane, 454 N.J. Super. 98, 131 (App. Div. 2018). A challenge to a concurrent term is a challenge to a discretionary court decision, not to an illegally imposed sentence. State v. Ellis, 346 N.J. Super. 583, 596 (App. Div.), aff'd o.b., 174 N.J. 535, 536 (2002).

X. FINES

Imposition of a fine is within the court's discretion (see section A) unless a statute requires a fine (see section B). Section C discusses case law on fines.

A. Fines in General: Statutory Provisions

1. Statutory Authority for Imposing a Fine. N.J.S.A. 2C:43-2(b)(1) and (4) provide that the court may order the defendant to pay a fine alone or in conjunction with imprisonment or probation.

2. Criteria for Imposing a Fine. Pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:44-2(a), the court may impose a fine if:

- the defendant derived a pecuniary gain from the offense or the court believes that "a fine is specially adapted to deterrence of the type of offense involved or to the correction of the offender"; and
- the defendant is able, or will be able, to pay the fine; and
- the fine will not prevent the defendant from complying with a restitution order.

The court must consider the defendant's financial resources and the burden a fine will impose on those resources. N.J.S.A. 2C:44-2(c)(1).

3. Fine Amounts. N.J.S.A. 2C:43-3(a) to (h) provide the maximum fines as follows:

- (a)(1) First-degree crime: \$200,000;
- (a)(2) Second-degree crime: \$150,000;
- (b)(1) Third-degree crime: \$15,000;
- (b)(2) Fourth-degree crime: \$10,000;
- (c) Disorderly persons offense: \$1000;

(d) Petty disorderly persons offense: \$500;

(e) "Any higher amount equal to double the pecuniary gain to the offender or loss to the victim";

(f) "Any higher amount specifically authorized by another section of this code or any other statute";

(g) "Up to twice the amounts authorized in subsection a., b., c. or d. of this section, in the case of a second or subsequent conviction of any tax offense defined in Title 54 of the Revised Statutes or Title 54A of the New Jersey Statutes, as amended and supplemented, or of any offense defined in chapter 20 or 21 of this code"; and

(h) Three times the street value of a controlled dangerous substance for drug crimes under Chapter 35. See N.J.S.A. 2C:44-2(e) (setting forth the procedure to determine street value and the standard of appellate review).

4. Timing of Payment. N.J.S.A. 2C:46-1(a) provides that the fine shall be "payable forthwith" unless the court granted "permission for the payment to be made within a specified period of time or in specified installments." "[T]he court shall file a copy of the judgment of conviction with the Clerk of the Superior Court." Ibid. See also N.J.S.A. 2C:46-1(d); N.J.S.A. 2C:46-1.1 (imposing transactional fees on fines).

(a) Probation. The court may order continued payments a condition of probation. N.J.S.A. 2C:46-1(b)(1).

(b) Installments and Imprisonment. Where the defendant is sentenced to a term of imprisonment, the court may order the defendant to pay installments. N.J.S.A. 2C:46-1(b)(2).

5. Nonpayment. N.J.S.A. 2C:46-2, as amended by, L. 2019, c. 276 (eff. Jan. 1, 2021), sets forth the rules regarding failure to pay. The State or person entitled to payment may file an action to collect payment. N.J.S.A. 2C:46-2(a) and (b). If the default is without good cause, the court may order the suspension of the defendant's driver's license, prohibit the defendant from obtaining a license, or take "such other actions as may be authorized by law." N.J.S.A. 2C:46-2(a)(1)(a) to (c). If the defendant's default was without good cause and was willful, the court may, in addition to the actions authorized by N.J.S.A. 2C:46-2(a)(1)(a) to (c), order

imprisonment, participation in a labor assistance program or community service. N.J.S.A. 2C:46-2(a)(2).

6. Petition to Revoke a Fine. N.J.S.A. 2C:46-3 provides that a defendant may petition the court "for a revocation of the fine or of any unpaid portion thereof." The court may grant the request if it finds that "the circumstances which warranted the imposition of the fine have changed, or that it would otherwise be unjust to require payment."

B. Specific Fines Authorized, or Required, by Law: Statutory Provisions

1. Human Trafficking. N.J.S.A. 2C:13-8(d) requires a fine not less than \$25,000 for a first-degree crime. N.J.S.A. 2C:13-9(c)(1) requires a fine not less than \$15,000 for a second-degree crime.

2. Assisting in Human Trafficking. N.J.S.A. 2C:13-9(c)(1) mandates a fine of at least \$15,000.

3. Commercial Sexual Abuse of a Minor. N.J.S.A. 2C:13-10(c) provides that a person who commits the offense of advertising commercial sexual abuse of a minor, contrary to N.J.S.A. 2C:13-10(b), shall be ordered to pay a fine of at least \$25,000, which shall be deposited in the Human Trafficking Survivor's Assistance Fund.

4. Pornography. N.J.S.A. 2C:14-9(c) authorizes "a fine not to exceed \$30,000" for a third-degree pornography offense.

5. Trespass. N.J.S.A. 2C:18-6(b) requires a fine of at least \$500 for third-degree burglary, \$200 for fourth-degree burglary, and \$100 for a disorderly persons offense of trespass under N.J.S.A. 2C:18-14 or 15.

6. Auto Theft. N.J.S.A. 2C:20-2.2 provides that where the value of the stolen auto exceeds \$7500 and the auto is not recovered, the court may award a fine equal to the value of the vehicle.

7. Removal of Headstones and Markers from Gravesites. N.J.S.A. 2C:20-2.3(b) allows a fine up to \$1000 for each stolen marker.

8. Leader of a Cargo Theft Network. N.J.S.A. 2C:20-2.4(a)(2) provides that for first-degree leader of a cargo theft network, the court may impose a fine of up to

\$500,000, or five times the retail value of the property seized, whichever is great. If the crime is one of the second degree, the fine shall not exceed \$250,000, or five times the retail value of the property seized, whichever is greater. N.J.S.A. 2C:20-2.4(a)(1).

9. Theft from a Cargo Carrier. N.J.S.A. 2C:20-2.6(b) authorizes a fine up to \$250,000, or five times the retail value of the stolen property, whichever is greater, for theft from a cargo carrier.

10. Theft of Services. N.J.S.A. 2C:20-8(k) requires a \$500 minimum fine for each theft of services offense.

11. Leader of Organized Retail Theft Enterprise. N.J.S.A. 2C:20-11.2 provides that "the court may impose a fine not to exceed \$250,000 or five times the retail value of the merchandise seized at the time of the arrest, whichever is greater."

12. Leader of Auto Theft Trafficking Network. N.J.S.A. 2C:20-18 authorizes "a fine not to exceed \$250,000 or five times the retail value of the automobiles seized at the time of the arrest, whichever is greater."

13. Theft of Electronic Vehicle Identification System Transponder. N.J.S.A. 2C:20-38 requires "a fine of not less than \$500 nor more than \$10,000" for theft of an electronic vehicle identification system transponder.

14. Health Care Claims Fraud. N.J.S.A. 2C:21-4.3(a) and (b) authorize "a fine of up to five times the pecuniary benefit obtained or sought to be obtained" for a practitioner convicted of second- and third-degree health care claims fraud. The court must impose on a non-practitioner convicted of a second-, third- or fourth-degree offense, "a fine of up to five times the pecuniary benefit obtained or sought to be obtained." N.J.S.A. 2C:21-4.3(c) and (d).

15. Business of Criminal Usury. N.J.S.A. 2C:21-19(b) mandates a fine not to exceed \$250,000 for business of criminal usury.

16. Pirating Recordings. N.J.S.A. 2C:21-21(d) allows for the following fines:

- Up to \$250,000 if the offense involved "at least 1000 unlawful sound recordings or at least 65 audiovisual works within any 180-day period";

- Up to \$150,000 if the offense involved "more than 100 but less than 1000 unlawful sound recordings or more than 7 but less than 65 unlawful audiovisual works within any 180-day period";
- If the offense is not covered by the foregoing provisions, then up to \$25,000 for a first offense, up to \$50,000 for a second offense, and up to \$100,000 for a third and subsequent offense.

17. Money Laundering. N.J.S.A. 2C:21-27(a) allows the court to impose a fine not to exceed \$500,000 for money laundering.

18. Trademark Counterfeiting. N.J.S.A. 2C:21-32(d) requires the court to impose a fine "up to threefold the retail value of the items or services involved, providing that the fine imposed shall not exceed the following amounts: for a crime of the fourth degree, \$100,000; for a crime of the third degree, \$250,000; and for a crime of the second degree, \$500,000."

19. Unlawful Disposition of Human Body Parts. N.J.S.A. 2C:22-2(a) and (b) authorize a fine not to exceed \$50,000 for unlawful disposition of human body parts.

20. Harm to a Law Enforcement Animal. N.J.S.A. 2C:29-3.1(a) requires a \$15,000 fine for the purposeful killing of a law enforcement animal. N.J.S.A. 2C:29-3.1(d) requires a \$1000 fine for interfering with the use of a law enforcement animal.

21. False Public Alarms. N.J.S.A. 2C:33-3.2(a) provides that the defendant "shall be liable for a civil penalty of not less than \$2000 or actual costs incurred by or resulting from the law enforcement and emergency services response to the false alarm, whichever is higher."

22. Parent or Guardian's Failure to Comply with an Order Regarding Cyber Harassment. N.J.S.A. 2C:33-4.1(d) provides that "[a] parent or guardian who fails to comply with a condition imposed by the court pursuant to subsection c. of this section" (applicable to parents and guardians of minors age sixteen and under who were adjudicated delinquent for cyber harassment) "shall be fined not more than \$25 for a first offense and not more than \$100 for each subsequent offense."

23. Smoking in Public. N.J.S.A. 2C:33-13(b) provides a \$200 maximum fine for smoking in a prohibited public place.

24. Sale of Cigarettes to a Person under Age Twenty-One. N.J.S.A. 2C:33-13.1(a) requires the court to impose a fine as provided for a petty disorderly persons offense (i.e. a fine up to \$500) if the defendant sold or otherwise provided tobacco to a person under age twenty-one. The court may impose a fine of twice that applicable to a petty disorderly persons offense for a person convicted of a subsequent offense.

25. Leader of Narcotics Trafficking Network. N.J.S.A. 2C:35-3 provides that the court may "impose a fine not to exceed \$750,000 or five times the street value of the controlled dangerous substance, controlled substance analog, gamma hydroxybutyrate or flunitrazepam involved, whichever is greater."

26. Maintaining or Operating a Drug Production Facility. N.J.S.A. 2C:35-4 allows "a fine not to exceed \$750,000 or five times the street value of all controlled dangerous substances, controlled substance analogs, gamma hydroxybutyrate or flunitrazepam at any time manufactured or stored at such premises, place or facility, whichever is greater."

27. Manufacturing and Distributing a Controlled Dangerous Substance. N.J.S.A. 2C:35-5(b) authorizes a fine up to \$300,000 or \$500,000, depending on the offense, for first-degree drug manufacturing and distribution; \$25,000 or \$75,000 for a third-degree crime (depending on the offense); and \$25,000 for certain fourth-degree crimes.

28. Manufacturing and Dispensing Gamma Hydroxybutyrate. N.J.S.A. 2C:35-5.2(b) authorizes a fine up to \$150,000 for manufacturing and dispensing gamma hydroxybutyrate.

29. Manufacturing and Dispensing Flunitrazepam. N.J.S.A. 2C:35-5.3(b) and (c) allows a fine not to exceed \$250,000 for first-degree manufacturing and dispensing flunitrazepam, and \$150,000 for a second-degree offense.

30. Employing a Juvenile in a Drug Distribution Scheme. N.J.S.A. 2C:35-6 allows "a fine not to exceed \$500,000 or five times the street value of the controlled dangerous substance or controlled substance analog involved, whichever is greater," for employing a juvenile in a drug distribution scheme.

31. Manufacturing, or Dispensing Drugs on or Near School Property. N.J.S.A. 2C:35-7(a) authorizes a fine not to exceed \$150,000 for manufacturing and distributing drugs on or near school property.

32. Drug Distribution to a Minor or a Pregnant Female. N.J.S.A. 2C:35-8 requires the court to impose, upon application of the prosecutor, "twice the term of imprisonment, fine and penalty, including twice the term of parole ineligibility, if any." If the defendant is convicted of more than one offense, the court must impose one enhanced sentence on the most serious offense. Ibid. The prosecutor must establish the basis for the enhanced sentence by a preponderance of the evidence, and the court must hold a hearing on the matter. Ibid.

Note: The enhanced sentencing provisions of N.J.S.A. 2C:35-8 are subject to waiver under N.J.S.A. 2C:35-12. See Chapter XIV on drug offender sentencing for additional discussion.

33. Possession of a Controlled Dangerous Substance or Analog. N.J.S.A. 2C:35-10(a)(1) to (3) authorize a fine not to exceed \$35,000 for third-degree drug possession, and \$15,000, or \$25,000 for a fourth-degree crime, depending on the circumstances.

34. Possession of Gamma Hydroxybutyrate. N.J.S.A. 2C:35-10.2(b) authorizes a fine up to \$100,000 for possession of gamma hydroxybutyrate.

35. Possession of Flunitrazepam. N.J.S.A. 2C:35-10.3(b) allows a fine up to \$100,000 for possession of flunitrazepam.

36. Distribution of a Prescription Legend Drug. N.J.S.A. 2C:35-10.5(a)(3) and (4) authorize a fine of up to \$200,000 or \$300,000, depending on the circumstances, for distribution of a prescription legend drug.

37. Possession or Distribution of an Imitation Controlled Dangerous Substance. N.J.S.A. 2C:35-11(d) authorizes a fine not to exceed \$200,000 for possession or distribution of an imitation drug.

38. Obtaining a Controlled Dangerous Substance by Fraud. N.J.S.A. 2C:35-13 allows a fine up to \$50,000 for fraudulently obtaining a drug.

39. Promoting Gambling. N.J.S.A. 2C:37-2(b)(2) requires a fine not to exceed \$35,000 for third-degree promoting gambling, \$25,000 for a fourth-degree crime, and \$10,000 for a disorderly persons offense.

40. Possession of Gambling Records. N.J.S.A. 2C:37-3(b)(2) requires a fine not to exceed \$35,000 for third-degree possession of gambling records, \$20,000 for fourth-degree crime, and \$10,000 for a disorderly person offense.

41. Maintenance of a Gambling Resort. N.J.S.A. 2C:37-4(a) and (b) mandate a fine not to exceed \$25,000 for maintaining a gambling resort.

42. Producing or Possessing Chemical, Biological or Radioactive Agents. N.J.S.A. 2C:38-3(b) requires a "fine of up to \$250,000 for each violation" for possession or production of chemical, biological, or radioactive agents.

43. Leader of Firearms Trafficking Network. N.J.S.A. 2C:39-16 provides that the court may also impose on the leader of a firearms trafficking network "a fine not to exceed \$500,000 or five times the value of the firearms involved, whichever is greater."

44. Production, Delivery of Ignition Key, Documentation Required. N.J.S.A. 2C:40-23(d) authorizes a fine not to exceed \$2000 for delivering a motor vehicle key without proper identification of the recipient.

45. Unlawfully Dispensing of Contact Lenses. N.J.S.A. 2C:40-25(b)(1) to (3) require the following fines for unlawfully dispensing contact lenses: at least \$1000 for a first offense; not less than \$5000 and 40 hours of community service for a second offense; and at least \$10,000 and 100 hours of community service for a third and each subsequent offense.

46. Crimes Committed while Released on Bail or on One's Recognizance. N.J.S.A. 2C:44-5.1(a) requires the court impose an extended term of imprisonment and double the fine required for the underlying crime, for any of the following offenses if the defendant committed the offense while released on bail or on his or her own recognizance:

- Possession of a firearm with intent to use it unlawfully against the person or property of another (N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4(a));
- Murder (N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3);

- Manslaughter (N.J.S.A. 2C:11-4);
- Kidnapping (N.J.S.A. 2C:13-1);
- Aggravated sexual assault (N.J.S.A. 2C:14-2(a));
- Aggravated criminal sexual contact (N.J.S.A. 2C:14-3(a));
- Robbery (N.J.S.A. 2C:15-1);
- Second-degree burglary, or burglary of a structure adapted for overnight accommodations (N.J.S.A. 2C:18-2); or
- First-, second-, or third-degree assault (N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1(b)).

Notice and Hearing. The prosecutor must provide the defendant notice of intent to request a sentence under N.J.S.A. 2C:44-5.1 within fourteen days of a guilty plea or verdict. R. 3:21-4(g); N.J.S.A. 2C:44-5.1(b). The prosecutor must establish the basis for the sentence at a hearing. N.J.S.A. 2C:44-5.1(b).

C. Standards Regarding Fines: Case Law

1. Sixth Amendment Requirement. The Sixth Amendment requires that "[o]ther than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt." Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000). This rule applies to fines. Southern Union Co. v. United States, 567 U.S. 343, 349-50 (2012). In the case of a guilty plea, the maximum sentence authorized by statute is the maximum sentence supported by the defendant's admissions. State v. Franklin, 184 N.J. 516, 537-38 (2005) (interpreting Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 309-11 (2004)). The defendant may also "consent to judicial factfinding as to sentence enhancements." State v. Franklin, 184 N.J. 516, 538 (2005) (quoting Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 309-11 (2004)).

2. Purpose of a Fine. Unlike restitution, a court imposes a fine to punish the defendant and to deter conduct that causes social harm. State v. Newman, 132 N.J. 159, 177 (1993).

3. Future Earnings. While N.J.S.A. 2C:44-2(c) "focus[es] on defendant's present financial condition," in determining the amount of a fine, the statute "does not exclude consideration of defendant's future financial circumstances." State v. Newman, 132 N.J. 159, 179 (1993).

4. Findings. The court must state on the record its reasons for imposing a fine. State v. Newman, 132 N.J. 159, 170 (1993); State v. Ferguson, 273 N.J. Super. 486, 499 (App. Div. 1994).

5. Drug Offender Fines.

(a) Drug-Buy Money. The court may consider money the defendant received in selling drugs when determining the defendant's ability to pay a fine. State v. Newman, 132 N.J. 159, 177-79 (1993).

(b) Order of Payment. A defendant convicted of a drug offense must pay the Victims of Crime Compensation Board (N.J.S.A. 2C:43-3.1), laboratory fee (N.J.S.A. 2C:35-20), and the drug enforcement and demand reduction penalty (N.J.S.A. 2C:35-15) before paying a fine. State v. Newman, 132 N.J. 159, 178 (1993). For further discussion, see Chapter XII on penalties, fees and assessments, and Chapter XIV on drug offender sentencing.

6. Excessive Fines. The Eighth Amendment's Excessive Fines Clause is applicable to the State by way of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Timbs v. Indiana, ___ U.S. ___, ___, 139 S. Ct. 682, 686-87 (2019) (applying the Excessive Fines Clause protection to Indiana's civil in rem forfeiture statute).

XI. RESTITUTION

The court may exercise its discretion to require the defendant to make restitution to the victim (see section A), unless a statute requires restitution (see section B). Section C discusses case law on restitution.

A. Restitution in General: Statutory Provisions

1. General Statutory Authority for Imposing Restitution. N.J.S.A. 2C:44-2(b)(1) and (2) provide that a court "shall" order a defendant to make restitution if the victim "suffered a loss" and "[t]he defendant is able to pay or, given a fair opportunity, will be able to pay." See also N.J.S.A. 2C:43-2(b)(1) and (4) (authorizing a restitution award in addition to any fine or other sentence); N.J.S.A. 2C:45-1(c) (providing for restitution as a condition of probation or sentence suspension); N.J.S.A. 2C:46-1(a) and (b)(2) (providing for restitution installment payments); N.J.S.A. 2C:1-2(b)(8) (stating that restitution to victims is one purpose of the sentencing laws).

2. Amount of Restitution. N.J.S.A. 2C:43-3(h) provides that the restitution amount "shall not exceed the victim's loss." In cases involving the failure to pay a State tax, the amount of restitution shall be the full amount of the tax plus civil penalties and interest. N.J.S.A. 2C:43-3(h).

3. Restitution Is Conditioned upon Loss to a Victim and Defendant's Ability to Pay. N.J.S.A. 2C:44-2(b)(1) and (2) condition a restitution award on the victim's suffering a loss and the defendant's ability to pay.

4. Restitution Is Unaffected by the Victim's Recovery from the Violent Crimes Compensation Board. N.J.S.A. 2C:44-2(c)(2) instructs: "The court shall not reduce a restitution award by any amount that the victim has received from the Violent Crimes Compensation Board, but shall order the defendant to pay any restitution ordered for a loss previously compensated by the Board to the Violent Crimes Compensation Board."

5. Multiple Victims. N.J.S.A. 2C:44-2(c)(2) requires the court to set priorities of payment if it orders restitution to more than one victim.

6. Findings. N.J.S.A. 2C:43-2(e) requires the court to place on the record its rationale for imposing the sentence.

7. Timing of Payment. N.J.S.A. 2C:46-1(a) provides that restitution shall be "payable forthwith" unless the court granted "permission for the payment to be made within a specified period of time or in specified installments." "[T]he court shall file a copy of the judgment of conviction with the Clerk of the Superior Court." Ibid. See also N.J.S.A. 2C:46-1.1 (imposing transactional fees on restitution payments).

(a) Probation. The court may order continued payments as a condition of probation. N.J.S.A. 2C:46-1(b)(1).

(b) Installments and Imprisonment. Where the defendant is sentenced to a term of imprisonment, the court may order the defendant to make restitution installment payments. N.J.S.A. 2C:46-1(b)(2).

8. Nonpayment. N.J.S.A. 2C:46-2, as amended by, L. 2019, c. 276 (eff. Jan. 1, 2021), sets forth the rules regarding failure to pay. The State or person entitled to payment may file an action to collect payment. N.J.S.A. 2C:46-2(a) and (b). If the default is without good cause, the court may order the suspension of the defendant's driver's license, prohibit the defendant from obtaining a license, or take "such other actions as may be authorized by law." N.J.S.A. 2C:46-2(a)(1)(a) to (c). If the defendant's default was without good cause and was willful, the court may, in addition to the actions authorized by N.J.S.A. 2C:46-2(a)(1)(a) to (c), order imprisonment, participation in a labor assistance program or community service. N.J.S.A. 2C:46-2(a)(2).

B. Mandatory and Specific Restitution: Statutory Provisions

1. Murder. N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3c requires the defendant to "pay restitution to the nearest surviving relative of the victim."

2. Interference with Custody. N.J.S.A. 2C:13-4(f)(1) requires the court to order restitution "of all reasonable expenses and costs, including reasonable counsel fees, incurred by the other parent in securing the child's return. "

3. Human Trafficking. N.J.S.A. 2C:13-8(e)(1) and (2) require the court to award the victim restitution which is the greater of (1) "the gross income or value to the defendant of the victim's labor or services," or (2) "the value of the victim's labor or services as determined by" law.

4. Graffiti Offenses. The following statutes require a restitution award in the amount of the pecuniary damage the defendant caused: N.J.S.A. 2C:17-3(c) and (e), N.J.S.A. 2C:33-10, N.J.S.A. 2C:33-11, and N.J.S.A. 2C:33-14.1(b).

5. Trespass. N.J.S.A. 2C:18-6(b) requires the court to order restitution to the victim of a trespass.

6. Theft of Services. N.J.S.A. 2C:20-8(k) requires the defendant to make restitution to the vendor. "In determining the amount of restitution, the court shall consider the costs expended by the vendor, including but not limited to the repair and replacement of damaged equipment, the cost of the services unlawfully obtained, investigation expenses, and attorney fees." Ibid.

7. Theft of Personal Identifying Information. N.J.S.A. 2C:21-17.1 authorizes the restitution award to include costs incurred by the victim in clearing credit.

8. Forgery. N.J.S.A. 2C:21-17.4(c) requires the court, upon request by the prosecutor, to impose restitution, which may include reimbursement for expenses incurred in clearing credit history or rating and pursuing civil or administrative proceedings to satisfy a debt.

9. Violation of Minimum Wage Provisions for Employees Engaged in Public Works. N.J.S.A. 2C:21-34(c) requires restitution in the amount owed to the employee.

10. Interfering with a Law Enforcement Officer and Animal. N.J.S.A. 2C:29-3.1(d) requires the court to impose restitution where the defendant interfered with the use of a law enforcement animal.

11. Offenses against Service Animals. N.J.S.A. 2C:29-3.2(d) requires restitution "for all damages that arise out of or are related to the offense, including incidental and consequential damages incurred by the handler of the service animal or guide dog."

12. Dog Fighting. N.J.S.A. 2C:33-31(b)(1)(b) requires restitution for the seized animal's food, shelter and care.

13. Leader of a Dog Fighting Network. N.J.S.A. 2C:33-32(b)(1)(b) requires restitution for the seized animal's food, shelter and care.

14. Auto Theft. N.J.S.A. 2C:43-2.1 requires a restitution award to be paid to the owner of the stolen car to compensate for expenses and damages incurred as a result of the auto theft.

15. State as Victim. N.J.S.A. 2C:43-3(h) requires the court to order restitution where the State is the victim of the crime.

16. Extradition Costs. N.J.S.A. 2C:43-3.4 provides that the court may order restitution "for costs incurred by any law enforcement entity in extraditing the defendant from another jurisdiction if the court finds that, at the time of the extradition, the defendant was located in the other jurisdiction in order to avoid prosecution for a crime committed in this State or service of a criminal sentence imposed by a court of this State."

17. Probation or Suspension of Sentence. N.J.S.A. 2C:45-1(c) provides that the court shall order the defendant to pay restitution where the court imposes probation or suspends the defendant's sentence.

C. Standards Regarding Restitution: Case Law

1. Purpose of a Restitution Award. "Our Criminal Code contemplates two goals from a restitution order: restoration of the victim and rehabilitation of the offender." State v. Scribner, 298 N.J. Super. 366, 371 (App. Div. 1997). Restitution is predominantly non-penal in nature, though it may serve a rehabilitative purpose by deterring criminal conduct. State v. Harris, 70 N.J. 586, 593 (1976); State v. DeAngelis, 329 N.J. Super. 178, 186-88 (App. Div. 2000); State v. Krueger, 241 N.J. Super. 244, 253 (App. Div. 1990). See also State v. Newman, 132 N.J. 159, 164-69 (1993) (discussing the historical distinction between fines and restitution). "Imposing a sentence of restitution that requires payment of more than a defendant can afford would frustrate the goal of rehabilitation." State v. Newman, 132 N.J. 159, 173 (1993).

2. Burden of Proof. The State bears the burden of establishing the victim's loss by a preponderance of the evidence. State v. Martinez, 392 N.J. Super. 307, 320 (App. Div. 2007). The court may accept a reasonable estimate of the victim's loss when the State cannot calculate it with precision. Ibid. The presentence report should address and explain the victim's losses and the defendant's ability to pay. State in the Interest of D.G.W., 70 N.J. 488, 503-05 (1976).

3. Hearing. Ordinarily, the court should conduct a hearing to determine the defendant's ability to pay and the value of the victim's loss. State v. Newman, 132 N.J. 159, 169 (1993); State v. Martinez, 392 N.J. Super. 307, 321-22 (App. Div. 2007). But if neither party disputes the victim's loss and the defendant's ability to pay, a hearing may be futile. State v. Pessolano, 343 N.J. Super. 464, 479 (App. Div. 2001); State in Interest of R.V., 280 N.J. Super. 118, 122-24 (App. Div. 1995); State v. Orji, 277 N.J. Super. 582, 589-90 (App. Div. 1994).

Evidence. Strict rules of evidence do not apply to a restitution hearing. State v. Harris, 70 N.J. 586, 598 (1976). The defendant may cross-examine witnesses, present evidence, and challenge the presentence report. Ibid.; State in the Interest of D.G.W., 70 N.J. 488, 506 (1976).

4. Fixed Amount. A restitution award should be a fixed amount. State v. Pessolano, 343 N.J. Super. 464, 479 (App. Div. 2001). It should not be conditioned upon an "unknown credit" in the amount that a codefendant might pay. Ibid.

5. Present Inability to Pay. The court may order restitution if the defendant is presently unable to pay but will likely be able to pay in the future. State in the Interest of R.V., 280 N.J. Super. 118, 121-22 (App. Div. 1995). In this case, the court should reduce the restitution award to a civil judgment, subject to future enforcement. Id. at 123.

6. Pension Income. In setting a restitution amount, the court may consider the defendant's pension income. State v. Pulasty, 136 N.J. 356, 361 (1994) (holding that the non-alienability clause of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA) does not prevent the State from requiring a defendant to make restitution after pension funds have been distributed).

7. Pecuniary Gain Unnecessary. In order to impose restitution, the court need not find that the defendant derived a pecuniary gain from the crime. State v. Martinez, 392 N.J. Super. 307, 320 (App. Div. 2007).

8. Multiple Defendants.

(a) Proportionality. Where a defendant was one of multiple defendants who committed the crime, there is "a rebuttable presumption of proportionate liability against the" defendant. State in the Interest of D.G.W., 70 N.J. 488, 508 (1976).

(b) **Joint and Several Liability.** The court may impose joint and several liability where the facts justify it. Id. at 508 n.5 (1976); State v. Pessolano, 343 N.J. Super. 464, 479 n.10 (App. Div. 2001); State v. Scribner, 298 N.J. Super. 366, 371 (App. Div. 1997).

9. Crimes against the State.

(a) **Corporate Officers and Taxes.** N.J.S.A. 2C:43-3, "reveals a strong legislative intention to require full restitution from those who defraud the public," including corporate officers who fail to remit taxes on behalf of their corporations. State v. Paone, 290 N.J. Super. 494, 496-97 (App. Div. 1996).

(b) **Drug-Buy Money.** The State is not a "victim" when the prosecutor's office purchases drugs from a defendant as part of an undercover investigation. Thus, the court may not impose restitution as a sanction to recover drug-buy money. State v. Newman, 132 N.J. 159, 176-77 (1993).

10. Third-Party Recovery. The court may order the defendant to pay restitution to a third party, such as an insurance company, health provider or employer who reimbursed a victim for losses suffered as a result of the defendant's criminal conduct. State v. Jones, 347 N.J. Super. 150, 153-54 (App. Div. 2002) (interpreting N.J.S.A. 2C:43-2.1).

11. Plea Agreements.

(a) **Disclosure.** When accepting a plea, a court should advise the defendant on the restitution implications of the guilty plea. State v. Kennedy, 152 N.J. 413, 425-26 (1998); State v. Krueger, 241 N.J. Super. 244, 255 (App. Div. 1990); State v. Saperstein, 202 N.J. Super. 478, 482 (App. Div. 1985).

(b) **Dismissed Charges.** A court may not impose restitution for a crime that the State dismissed in a plea agreement, unless there is (1) "a relationship between the restitution and the goal of rehabilitation with respect to the offense for which the defendant is being sentenced," and (2) "an adequate factual basis supportive of the restitution." State v. Krueger, 241 N.J. Super. 244, 252 (App. Div. 1990) (quoting State v. Bausch, 83 N.J. 425, 435 (1980)); State v. Corpi, 297 N.J. Super. 86, 91-92 (App. Div. 1997).

12. Pretrial Intervention Program. The court may impose restitution as a condition of the pretrial intervention program. State v. Jamiolkoski, 272 N.J. Super. 326, 329 (App. Div. 1994) (analogizing the pretrial intervention program with probation).

13. Appellate Review. Restitution is within the court's discretion and thus will not be reversed on appeal unless it amounts to an abuse of discretion. State v. Harris, 70 N.J. 586, 598-99 (1976); State v. Martinez, 392 N.J. Super. 307, 318-19 (App. Div. 2007).

14. Resentencing after a Probation Violation. If the defendant violated a term of probation and the court revokes probation and imposes a term of imprisonment, the court may reconsider its initial restitution award, but need not do so. State v. Zeliff, 236 N.J. Super. 166, 171 (App. Div. 1989).

15. Double Jeopardy. A restitution award may be increased on resentencing after remand without offending double jeopardy principles. State v. Rhoda, 206 N.J. Super. 584, 590 (App. Div. 1986).

16. Cruel and Unusual Punishment. A restitution order does not violate the Federal or State constitutional prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment, even if the defendant entered a civil settlement agreement with the victim. State v. DeAngelis, 329 N.J. Super. 178, 189-90 (App. Div. 2000).

17. Payment Collection. The procedure for collecting restitution is governed by the Model Collection Process by the Chief Probation Officers, approved by the Administrative Office of the Courts as of September 22, 1997. Felicioni v. Admin. Office of the Courts, 404 N.J. Super. 382, 389-90 (App. Div. 2008). See also Cannel, New Jersey Criminal Code Annotated, cmt. 7 on N.J.S.A. 2C:44-2 (2023).

18. Order of Payments. According to the guidelines, "where there are multiple convictions, assessments are to be paid off chronologically, by the date of the restitution order. All assessments for the earliest conviction are to be collected and disbursed first, before moving on to the next-in-time judgment of conviction." Felicioni v. Admin. Office of the Courts, 404 N.J. Super. 382, 390 (App. Div. 2008).

(a) Victim's Rights. The first-in-time policy does not violate a victim's rights under the New Jersey Civil Rights Act or the federal or State due

process or equal protection clauses. Felicioni v. Admin. Office of the Courts, 404 N.J. Super. 382, 397-401 (App. Div. 2008).

(b) Multiple Orders in One Day. "[W]hen multiple restitution orders are issued against a criminal defendant on the same day, . . . the restitution orders are processed based on the date of the indictment with which each is associated, with the earliest indictment being entered first." Felicioni v. Admin. Office of the Courts, 404 N.J. Super. 382, 391 (App. Div. 2008). Restitution payments will be distributed on a pro-rated basis "only when a court specifically so orders, or there are multiple victims listed on the same restitution order." Ibid.

(c) Court's Discretion. In the exercise of discretion, a sentencing judge "may order a different priority based on the amount of restitution owed to, or the financial circumstances of, the requesting recipient, or may even order that restitution payments be disbursed regardless of the recipient's individual circumstances on a pro-rata basis." Felicioni v. Admin. Office of the Courts, 404 N.J. Super. 382, 395 (App. Div. 2008).

19. Civil Damages. A restitution order does not preclude a victim from obtaining civil damages against the defendant. State v. Harris, 70 N.J. 586, 597-98 (1976). However, if the victim obtains a civil judgment, the award must be reduced by any restitution the victim received to avoid a double recovery. State v. DeAngelis, 329 N.J. Super. 178, 184 (App. Div. 2000).

20. Civil Consent Judgment. A sentencing court has no authority to enter a civil consent judgment for restitution due the victims of the defendant's theft. State v. Masce, 452 N.J. Super. 347, 353 (2017). Thus, if the State negotiates in a plea agreement that in addition to ordering restitution as part of the sentence, the court should also enter a civil judgment in favor of the victims for the restitution amount, the sentencing court will have no authority to enter the civil judgment. Id. at 349-50.

21. Bankruptcy. Where a restitution order is converted to a civil judgment in favor of the State, the debt may not be discharged in a bankruptcy proceeding. State v. Kemprowski, 265 N.J. Super. 471, 472-74 (App. Div. 1993).

XII. PENALTIES, FEES, ASSESSMENTS AND REGISTRATIONS

Penalties, fees, assessments, and registrations are required by statute (see section A). Unless the court authorizes otherwise, with respect to a monetary penalty, a fee, or an assessment, a defendant is expected to make payment in full following sentencing (see section B). Section C discusses relevant case law.

A. Penalties, Fees, Assessments and Registrations: Statutory Provisions

1. Registration Requirements and Penalties for "Sex Offenders" (also known as Megan's Law).

(a) Megan's Law Registration Requirements. N.J.S.A. 2C:7-1 to -23 sets forth registration and public notification requirements for a person who committed a "sex offense." Pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:7-2(b), a sex offense includes the following crimes (**Note** that N.J.S.A. 2C:7-2(b), **amended by**, L. 2017, c. 141 (eff. Feb. 1, 2018) now includes N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4(b)(5)(b)(i) and (ii) (child endangerment) and N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4.1 (leader of a child pornography network):

- Aggravated sexual assault (N.J.S.A. 2C:14-2(a));
- Sexual assault (N.J.S.A. 2C:14-1));
- Aggravated criminal sexual contact (N.J.S.A. 2C:14-3(a));
- Kidnapping (N.J.S.A. 2C:13-1(c)(2));
- Endangering the welfare of a child (N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4(a), N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4(b)(3) and (4), N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4(b)(5)(a), and N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4(b)(5)(b)(i) or (ii));
- Leader of a child pornography network (N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4.1);
- Luring or enticing a child (N.J.S.A. 2C:13-6);
- Criminal sexual contact with a minor (N.J.S.A. 2C:14-3(b));

- Kidnapping (N.J.S.A. 2C:13-1);
- Criminal restraint (N.J.S.A. 2C:13-2);
- False imprisonment "if the victim is a minor and the offender is not the parent of the victim" (N.J.S.A. 2C:13-3; and
- Knowingly promoting prostitution of a child (N.J.S.A. 2C:34-1(b)(3) or (4)).

Failure to comply with Megan's Law registration requirements is a third-degree crime. N.J.S.A. 2C:7-2(d)(1) and (2).

(b) Megan's Law Penalties. N.J.S.A. 2C:14-10(a) provides that in addition to any other fine, fee, assessment or penalty authorized by Title 2C, a person convicted of a sex offense, as defined by N.J.S.A. 2C:7-2(b), "shall be assessed a penalty for each such offense not to exceed:"

- \$2000 for a first-degree crime;
- \$1000 for a second-degree crime;
- \$750 for a third-degree crime; and
- \$500 for a fourth-degree crime.

2. Reckless Vehicular Homicide. N.J.S.A. 2C:11-5(b)(4) requires the court to impose a suspension to operate a motor vehicle for a period between five years to life, to commence upon the expiration of any prison term, if the defendant committed the homicide while operating a vehicle in violation of N.J.S.A. 39:4-50 (driving while intoxicated) or N.J.S.A. 39:4-50.4(a) (revocation for refusal to submit to breath test). N.J.S.A. 2C:11-5(e) provides that if the defendant committed first-degree reckless vehicular homicide (N.J.S.A. 2C:11-5(b)(3)), the defendant shall forfeit the auto or vessel, unless the defendant can establish by a preponderance of evidence that forfeiture would constitute a serious hardship to the family of the defendant, which outweighs the need to deter.

3. Stalking. N.J.S.A. 2C:12-10.1(a) provides that "[a] judgment of conviction for stalking shall operate as an application for a permanent restraining order limiting

the contact of the defendant and the victim who was stalked." Unless the victim requests otherwise, the court must hold the hearing on the restraining order at the time of the guilty plea or verdict. N.J.S.A. 2C:12-10.1(b).

4. Assisting in Human Trafficking. N.J.S.A. 2C:13-9(c)(2) provides that "the court shall direct any issuing State, county, or municipal governmental agency to revoke any license, permit, certificate, approval, registration, charter, or similar form of business or professional authorization required by law concerning the operation of that person's business or profession, if that business or profession was used in the course of the crime."

5. Bias Intimidation. N.J.S.A. 2C:16-1(f)(1) to (3) allows the court to order a person convicted of bias intimidation to (1) complete a sensitivity class or program, (2) participate in counseling to reduce violent or antisocial behavior, or (3) make payments or other compensation to a community-based program or local agency that provides services to victims of bias intimidation.

6. Graffiti. N.J.S.A. 2C:17-3(c) provides that if the court imposes community service, the service must be at least twenty days in length or the time it takes to remove the graffiti.

7. Trespass. N.J.S.A. 2C:18-6(c) provides that a defendant who committed a trespass under N.J.S.A. 2C:18-15 "shall be liable to the owner, occupant, lessee, or licensee of the lands or of the tangible property for any reasonable and necessary expenses, including reasonable attorney fees . . . to ensure that the lands or the tangible property are restored to their condition prior to commission of the offense."

8. Auto Theft. N.J.S.A. 2C:20-2.1(a)(1) to (3), as amended by, L. 2019, c. 276 (eff. Jan. 1, 2021) requires a penalty of \$500 and permits the court in its discretion to impose up to a one-year suspension or postponement of the person's driver's license for a first offense of auto theft, a \$750 penalty and up to a two-year license suspension for a second offense, and a \$1000 penalty and up to a ten-year license suspension for a third or subsequent offense.

9. Removal of Headstones and Markers from Gravesites. N.J.S.A. 2C:20-2.3(c) requires the court to impose up to thirty days of community service for the unlawful removal of a headstone or gravesite marker.

10. Theft by a Fiduciary, Leader of a Cargo Theft Network or Cargo Theft Sales. N.J.S.A. 2C:20-2.5(a)(1) to (3) requires the court to impose: (1) a \$5000 penalty for first-degree theft by a fiduciary or cargo theft; (2) a \$2500 penalty for a second-degree crime; and (3) a \$500 penalty for a third-degree crime.

11. Shoplifting. N.J.S.A. 2C:20-11(c) provides that any person convicted of shoplifting shall be sentenced to perform at least ten days of community service for a first offense, at least fifteen days of community service for a second offense, and a maximum of twenty-five days of community service plus at least ninety days imprisonment for third or subsequent offense.

12. Operation of a Facility for Sale of Stolen Automobile Parts. N.J.S.A. 2C:20-16(b) requires forfeiture of one's driver's license for a period between three and five years.

13. Offenses Involving False Government Documents. N.J.S.A. 2C:21-2.1(e), as amended by, L. 2019, c. 276 (eff. Jan. 1, 2021), permits a suspension of the defendant's driver's license for a period not to exceed two years.

14. Pirating Recordings. N.J.S.A. 2C:21-21(e) provides that all recordings and equipment used in the crime shall be subject to forfeiture.

15. Money Laundering and Illegal Investment. N.J.S.A. 2C:21-27.1 and N.J.S.A. 2C:21-27.2(a) to (c) requires the court to impose, upon application of the prosecutor, a penalty of \$500,000 for first-degree money laundering, \$250,000 for a second-degree crime, \$75,000 for a third-degree crime, or three times the value of any property involved in a money laundering activity. If the prosecutor requests the penalty of three times the value of property involved, the prosecutor must establish the basis for the penalty by a preponderance of the evidence. N.J.S.A. 2C:21-27.2(c). N.J.S.A. 2C:21-27.3 prohibits the court from reducing or revoking the penalty. N.J.S.A. 2C:21-27.4 allows the court to create a payment schedule for good cause shown. N.J.S.A. 2C:21-27.5 requires the penalty be imposed "in addition to and not in lieu of any forfeiture or other cause of action instituted pursuant to chapter 41 or 64 of Title 2C of the New Jersey Statutes."

16. Fleeing Arrest while in a Motor Vehicle or Vessel. N.J.S.A. 2C:29-2(b) requires a driver's license suspension between six months and two years for fleeing arrest while in a motor vehicle or vessel.

17. Domestic Violence Offenses. N.J.S.A. 2C:25-27 provides that the court may enter a restraining order and may require the defendant to receive counseling for a crime or offense involving domestic violence. N.J.S.A. 2C:25-30 and -31 address the consequences of violating a restraining order. N.J.S.A. 2C:25-29.4 requires a \$100 surcharge to fund grants for domestic violence prevention, training, and assessment.

18. Public Corruption Profiteering. N.J.S.A. 2C:30-8(c)(1) to (5) requires the court, upon application of the prosecutor, to impose a penalty "when a person is convicted of a crime or an attempt or conspiracy to commit a crime involving the negotiation, award, performance or payment of a local, county or State contract, including, but not limited to" violations of any provision in Chapters 21 or 27 to 30 of Title 2C. N.J.S.A. 2C:30-8(d)(1) and (2) provides the following penalty values: \$500,000 for a first-degree crime; \$250,000 for a second-degree crime; \$75,000 for a third-degree crime; or "an amount equal to three times the value of any property involved in" an included offense. N.J.S.A. 2C:30-8(g) authorizes a payment schedule for good cause shown.

19. False Public Alarm Offense. N.J.S.A. 2C:33-3.1, repealed by, L. 2019, c. 276 (eff. Jan. 1, 2021) required the court to suspend or postpone for six months the juvenile's license to operate a motor vehicle.

20. Graffiti that Implies Threats or Violence. N.J.S.A. 2C:33-10 requires that if the court orders the defendant to community service, the service must include removal of the graffiti, "if appropriate," and must be "not less than twenty days nor less than the number of days necessary to remove the graffiti."

21. Desecrating Religious or Sectarian Premises. N.J.S.A. 2C:33-11 provides that if the court orders community service, the service must include removal of the graffiti, "if appropriate," and must be "not less than twenty days or not less than the number of days necessary to remove the graffiti."

22. Vandalizing a Railroad Crossing Device. N.J.S.A. 2C:33-14.1(b) provides that if the court orders community service, the service must include removal of the graffiti, "if appropriate," and must be "not less than twenty days or not less than the number of days necessary to remove the graffiti."

23. Dog Fighting. N.J.S.A. 2C:33-31(b)(1)(a) requires the seizure of any animal used in the crime and allows for the forfeiture of any animal in the defendant's

possession or property related to the crime. N.J.S.A. 2C:33-31(b)(2) permits the court to prohibit future possession of any animal.

24. Leader of a Dog Fighting Network. N.J.S.A. 2C:33-32(b)(1)(a) requires the seizure of any animal used in the crime and allows for the forfeiture of any animal in the defendant's possession or property related to the crime. N.J.S.A. 2C:33-32(b)(2) allows the court to prohibit future possession of any animal.

25. Prostitution Driver's License Suspension for Certain Patrons. N.J.S.A. 2C:34-1(c)(5) provides that the court must suspend the defendant's driver's license for six months if the defendant used a vehicle during the crime.

26. Prostitution Penalties for Certain Patrons. N.J.S.A. 2C:34-1(f)(2) requires the court to impose on a defendant convicted of promoting prostitution a penalty of at least \$10,000 but not more than \$50,000, except if the offense involved promotion of child prostitution, then the penalty shall be at least \$25,000.

27. Prostitution Offender Program. Pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:34-1.2(a), a person convicted of a disorderly persons offense of engaging in prostitution as a patron must participate in the Prostitution Offender Program, unless the prosecutor waives participation. If the court orders a person convicted of engaging in prostitution as a patron to participate in the Prostitution Offender Program, the person must contribute \$500 to the cost of the program. N.J.S.A. 2C:34-1.2(b).

28. Drug Offender Restraining Orders. N.J.S.A. 2C:35-5.7(h) provides that after conviction "for any criminal offense, the court, upon application of a law enforcement officer or prosecuting attorney pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:35-5.9 [certification of offense location] and except as provided in subsection e. of this section, shall, by separate order or within the judgment of conviction, issue an order prohibiting the person from entering" the place where the offense occurred. Continuing compliance with the terms of the restraining order shall be a condition of probation, participation in the Intensive Supervision Program, and post-confinement release. N.J.S.A. 2C:35-5.7(j).

(a) Exception. N.J.S.A. 2C:35-5.7(e) provides: "The court may forego issuing a restraining order . . . only if the defendant establishes by clear and convincing evidence that":

(1) "the defendant lawfully resides at or has legitimate business on or near the place, or otherwise legitimately needs to enter the place. In

such an event, the court shall not issue" a restraining order "unless the court is clearly convinced that the need to bar the person from the place in order to protect the public safety and the rights, safety and health of the residents and persons working in the place outweighs the person's interest in returning to the place." The court may also impose an order permitting entry with conditions; or

(2) imposition of a restraining order "would cause undue hardship to innocent persons and would constitute a serious injustice which overrides the need to protect the rights, safety and health of persons residing in or having business in the place."

(b) Duration of the Order. The order "shall remain in effect for such period of time as shall be fixed by the court but not longer than the maximum term of imprisonment or incarceration allowed by law for the underlying offense or offenses." N.J.S.A. 2C:35-5.7(j).

(c) Appeal by the State. If the court denies a request to impose a restraining order, the sentence shall not be final for ten days to allow the State time to file an appeal. N.J.S.A. 2C:35-5.7(k).

(d) Applications to Stay or Modify the Order. Applications to stay or modify an order "including an order originally issued in municipal court, shall be made in the Superior Court. The court shall immediately notify the county prosecutor in writing whenever an application is made." N.J.S.A. 2C:35-5.7(k).

(e) Violation of the Order. Pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:35-5.8, violation of an order "shall subject the person to civil contempt, criminal contempt, revocation of bail, probation or parole, or any combination of these sanctions and any other sanctions authorized by law. A law enforcement officer may arrest an adult . . . when an officer has probable cause to believe that the person has violated the terms of any removal and restraining order issued pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:35-5.7."

29. Drug Enforcement and Demand Reduction Penalty for Certain Offenses. N.J.S.A. 2C:35-5.11 provides: "Any person who possesses, distributes, dispenses or has under his control with intent to distribute or dispense 3,4-methylenedioxymeth-amphetamine, 3,4-methylenedioxyamphetamine, gammabutyrolactone, gamma hydroxybutyrate or flunitrazepam, or a controlled

substance analog of any of these substances, shall, . . . be subject to a drug enforcement and demand reduction penalty of twice the amount otherwise applicable to the offense."

30. Drug Distribution to a Minor or a Pregnant Female. N.J.S.A. 2C:35-8 requires the court to impose, upon application of the prosecutor, "twice the term of imprisonment, fine and penalty, including twice the term of parole ineligibility, if any, authorized or required to be imposed by" N.J.S.A. 2C:35-5(b) (drug distribution) or N.J.S.A. 2C:35-7 (distribution within a school zone) "or any other provision of this title." If the defendant is convicted of more than one offense, the court must impose one enhanced sentence on the most serious offense. Ibid. The prosecutor must establish the basis for the enhanced sentence by a preponderance of the evidence, and the court must hold a hearing on the matter. Ibid.

Note: The enhanced sentencing provisions of N.J.S.A. 2C:35-8 are subject to waiver under N.J.S.A. 2C:35-12. See Chapter XIV on drug offender sentencing for additional discussion.

31. Possession of a Controlled Dangerous Substance or Analog. N.J.S.A. 2C:35-10(a) requires the defendant to "perform not less than 100 hours of community service" if the court does not impose a prison term and the defendant committed the crime while inside a school bus or within 1000 feet of school property.

32. Counterfeit Drugs and Medical Devices. N.J.S.A. 2C:35-11.1 (eff. July 11, 2020) requires a penalty between \$1000 and \$10,000 for each violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:35-11.1(a), which prohibits knowing possession of a counterfeit drug or medical device with intent to distribute. N.J.S.A. 2C:35-11.2 (eff. July 11, 2020) provides that anyone convicted of an offense under N.J.S.A. 2C:35-11.1 shall be ineligible to submit a bid to the State.

33. Drug Enforcement and Demand Reduction Penalty. N.J.S.A. 2C:35-15(a)(1) requires the court to impose the following drug enforcement and demand reduction (DEDR) penalties on a person convicted of a Chapter 35 or 36 drug offense:

- \$3000 for a first-degree crime;
- \$2000 for a second-degree crime;

- \$1000 for a third-degree crime;
- \$750 for a fourth-degree crime; and
- \$500 for a disorderly persons or petty disorderly persons offense.

(a) Multiple Offenses. N.J.S.A. 2C:35-15(a)(2)(a) and (b) provide that the court may, in its discretion, impose one penalty based on the highest degree offense if: (1) the defendant was not placed in supervisory treatment or ordered to perform reformatory service; (2) "multiple penalties would constitute a serious hardship that outweighs the need to deter the defendant from future criminal activity"; and (3) "imposition of a single penalty would foster the defendant's rehabilitation."

(b) Treatment Program in Lieu of Payment. N.J.S.A. 2C:35-15(e) authorizes the court to suspend collection of the penalty "provided the person is ordered by the court to participate in a drug or alcohol rehabilitation program," and the defendant "agrees to pay for all or some portion of the costs associated with the rehabilitation." Upon proof of successful completion of the program the defendant may request the court reduce the penalty by any amount the defendant paid for participation in the program. Ibid.

(c) Service in Lieu of Payment. N.J.S.A. 2C:35-15(f) provides that the defendant "may propose to the court and the prosecutor a plan to perform reformatory service in lieu of payment of up to one-half of the penalty amount imposed."

34. Drug Offenses and License Forfeiture. N.J.S.A. 2C:35-16(a) requires forfeiture of a defendant's driver's license for a period between six months and two years absent compelling circumstances and upon conviction of a drug offense under Chapter 35 or 36 of Title 2C. "[C]ompelling circumstances warranting an exception exist if the forfeiture . . . will result in extreme hardship and alternative means of transportation are not available."

Post-Sentencing Motion to Revoke the License Suspension. N.J.S.A. 2C:35-16(d) allows the defendant to request the court revoke a remaining license suspension term based on compelling circumstances.

35. Controlled Dangerous Substance Lab Fee. N.J.S.A. 2C:35-20(a) and (b) require that a \$50 criminal laboratory analysis fee be imposed on anyone convicted of a Chapter 35 drug offense; a \$50 criminal laboratory fee be imposed on anyone placed in supervisory treatment pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:36A-1 or N.J.S.A. 2C:43-12; and a \$25 laboratory analysis fee be imposed on anyone adjudicated delinquent for a Chapter 35 offense.

36. Anti-Drug Profiteering Penalty. N.J.S.A. 2C:35A-4(a)(1) to (3) requires the court impose the following penalties for certain drug offenders in accordance with the criteria set forth in N.J.S.A. 2C:35A-3:

- \$200,000 for a first-degree crime; \$100,000 for a second-degree crime; \$50,000 for a third-degree crime; and \$25,000 for a fourth-degree crime; or
- "three times the street value of all controlled dangerous substances or controlled substance analogs involved, or three times the market value of all drug paraphernalia involved, if this amount is greater than that provided" above; or
- "an amount equal to three times the value of any benefit illegally obtained by the actor for himself or another, or any injury to or benefit deprived of another."

Note: This statute is subject to the N.J.S.A. 2C:35-12 waiver provision, discussed further in Chapter XIV on drug offender sentencing.

37. Unlawful Possession of a Machine Gun, Assault Firearm and Certain Handguns. N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(h) provides that a person convicted of unlawful possession of a machine gun, assault firearm and certain handguns is "ineligible for participation in any program of intensive supervision."

38. Unlawful Transfer of a Firearm. N.J.S.A. 2C:39-10(a)(3) and (4) require the court to revoke a dealer's license for the unlawful transfer of firearms in certain situations.

39. Causing Death or Injury while Driving with a Suspended License or without a License. N.J.S.A. 2C:40-22(a) and (b) require the court to suspend the defendant's driver's license for one year where the defendant caused death while

driving without a valid license. The license shall run consecutively to any current driver's license suspension. N.J.S.A. 2C:40-22(a) and (b).

40. Unauthorized Use of a Traffic Control Preemption Device. N.J.S.A. 2C:40-24(d) requires the court to impose a civil penalty not to exceed \$5000 for unauthorized use of a traffic control preemption device.

41. Crimes with Automobiles. N.J.S.A. 2C:43-2(c) authorizes the court to suspend, postpone or revoke a defendant's driver's license for a period not to exceed two years where the defendant used a motor vehicle in the course of a crime, disorderly persons offense, or petty disorderly persons offense.

42. Serological Testing. N.J.S.A. 2C:43-2.2(a) provides for the serological testing of the defendant "for acquired immune deficiency syndrome (AIDS) or infection with the human immunodeficiency virus (HIV) or any other related virus identified as a probable causative agent of AIDS" in certain cases where a person suffered a prick from a hypodermic needle or the defendant's bodily fluids were transmitted. The court may order the defendant to pay the cost of the testing. N.J.S.A. 2C:43-2.3(c).

43. Victims of Crime Compensation Board (VCCB) Assessments.

(a) Certain Crimes Resulting in Injury or Death. N.J.S.A. 2C:43-3.1(a)(1) requires the court to assess at least \$100 and not more than \$10,000 for each of the following offenses if the defendant injured or killed the victim:

- "[A] crime of violence"; or
- Theft of an automobile (N.J.S.A. 2C:20-2); or
- Eluding a law enforcement officer (N.J.S.A. 2C:29-2(b)); or
- Unlawful taking of a motor vehicle (N.J.S.A. 2C:20-10(b), (c) or (d)).

In imposing an assessment under N.J.S.A. 2C:43-3.1(a)(1), "the court shall consider factors such as the severity of the crime, the defendant's criminal record, defendant's ability to pay and the economic impact of the assessment on the defendant's dependents."

(b) Offenses Not Resulting in Injury. N.J.S.A. 2C:43-3.1(a)(2)(a) mandates a \$50 assessment be imposed for each crime, disorderly person offense, or petty disorderly person offense the defendant committed that did not result in injury.

(c) Driving or Operating a Vessel while Impaired. N.J.S.A. 2C:43-3.1(a)(2)(c) provides that any person convicted of operating a motor vehicle or vessel while under the influence of alcohol or drugs "shall" be assessed \$50 payable to the VCCB.

(d) Supervisory Treatment and Conditional Discharge. N.J.S.A. 2C:43-3.1(a)(2)(d) provides: "In addition to any term or condition that may be included in an agreement for supervisory treatment pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:43-13, or imposed as a term or condition of conditional discharge pursuant to N.J.S.A. 36A-1, a participant in either program shall be required to pay an assessment of \$50."

44. Safe Neighborhoods Services Assessment. N.J.S.A. 2C:43-3.2(a) requires any person convicted of a crime, a disorderly persons or petty disorderly persons offense, or a drunk driving offense to be assessed \$75 per conviction to be deposited into the Safe Neighborhoods Services Fund (SNSF).

45. Law Enforcement Officers Training and Equipment Assessment. N.J.S.A. 2C:43-3.3(a) requires the court to impose a \$30 penalty on any adult convicted of a crime, for deposit into the Law Enforcement Officers Training and Equipment Fund.

46. Drug Abuse Education Assessment. N.J.S.A. 2C:43-3.5(a) requires the court to impose a \$50 assessment for each drug offense under Chapter 35 or 36 of Title 2C.

47. Sexual Assault Nurse Examiner Program Assessment. N.J.S.A. 2C:43-3.6(a) requires an \$800 assessment for any sex offense defined in N.J.S.A. 2C:7-2.

48. Surcharge Applicable to Certain Sex Offenders. N.J.S.A. 2C:43-3.7 requires any person convicted of aggravated sexual assault (N.J.S.A. 2C:14-2(a)), sexual assault (N.J.S.A. 2C:14-2(b)), aggravated criminal sexual contact (N.J.S.A. 2C:14-3(a)), or criminal sexual contact (N.J.S.A. 2C:14-3(b)), to pay a \$100

surcharge to fund programs and grants for the prevention of violence against women.

49. Computer Crime Prevention Penalty. N.J.S.A. 2C:43-3.8(a) provides that any person convicted of: endangering the welfare of a child, pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4(b)(3), (4) or (5); leader of a child pornography network, pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4.1; child obscenity, pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:34-3; or an offense involving computer criminal activity contrary to any provision within Chapter 20 of Title 2C (theft offenses), shall be assessed the following penalties to be deposited in the Computer Crime Prevention Fund (**Note** that N.J.S.A. 2C:43-3.8(a) was amended effective February 1, 2018, to add N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4(b)(3) and (4) (child endangerment) and N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4.1 (leader of a child pornography network)):

- \$2000 for a first-degree crime;
- \$1000 for a second-degree crime;
- \$750 for a third-degree crime;
- \$500 for a fourth-degree crime; and
- \$250 for a disorderly persons offense.

50. Restricted Internet Access. N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6.6(a)(1) to (4) provides that any person who (1) committed a sex offense as defined in N.J.S.A. 2C:7-2(b) and is required to register under Megan's Law (N.J.S.A. 2C:7-2); or (2) is serving a special sentence of parole supervision under N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6.4, or has been convicted of promoting or providing obscene materials to a minor (N.J.S.A. 2C:34-3), "shall" be subject to the following Internet access conditions "where the trier of fact makes a finding that a computer or any other device with Internet capability was used to facilitate the commission of the crime":

- (1) Prohibited access of "a computer or any other device with Internet capability without the prior written approval of the court," with the exception that a person on probation or parole "may use a computer or any other device with Internet capability in connection with that person's employment" or to "search for employment with the prior approval of the person's probation or parole officer";

(2) "[P]eriodic unannounced examinations of the person's computer . . . including the retrieval and copying of all data . . . and removal of such information, equipment or device to conduct a more thorough inspection";

(3) Installation, "at the person's expense, [of] one or more hardware or software systems to monitor the Internet use"; and

(4) "[A]ny other appropriate restrictions concerning the person's use or access of a computer or any other device with Internet capability."

A violation of the Internet access restrictions constitutes a fourth-degree crime. N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6.6(b).

51. Sex Offender Restraining Order. N.J.S.A. 2C:44-8 authorizes the court to enter an order restraining a sex offender from contact with the victim or the victim's family and from entering certain locations.

52. Probation or Suspension of Sentence. N.J.S.A. 2C:45-1(c) requires the defendant to pay a victims of crime compensation board assessment (N.J.S.A. 2C:43-3.1), where the court imposes probation or suspends the defendant's sentence.

B. Payment of Penalties, Fees and Assessments: Statutory Provisions

1. Statutory Authority for Timing of Payment. N.J.S.A. 2C:46-1(a) provides that a penalty, fee and assessment shall be "payable forthwith" unless the court grants "permission for the payment to be made within a specified period of time or in specified installments." "[T]he court shall file a copy of the judgment of conviction with the Clerk of the Superior Court." *Ibid.* N.J.S.A. 2C:46-1(d)(1) and N.J.S.A. 2C:46-1.1(a) also impose transactional fees.

2. Payments while on Probation. The court may order continued payments as a condition of probation. N.J.S.A. 2C:46-1(b)(1).

3. Installment Payments while Incarcerated. Where the defendant is sentenced to a term of imprisonment, the court may order the defendant to make installment payments. N.J.S.A. 2C:46-1(b)(2).

4. Nonpayment. N.J.S.A. 2C:46-2, as amended by, L. 2019, c. 276 (eff. Jan. 1, 2021), sets forth the rules regarding failure to pay. The State or person entitled to payment may file an action to collect payment. N.J.S.A. 2C:46-2(a) and (b). If the default is without good cause, the court may order the suspension of the defendant's driver's license, prohibit the defendant from obtaining a license, or take "such other actions as may be authorized by law." N.J.S.A. 2C:46-2(a)(1)(a) to (c). If the defendant's default was without good cause and was willful, the court may, in addition to the actions authorized by N.J.S.A. 2C:46-2(a)(1)(a) to (c), order imprisonment, participation in a labor assistance program or community service. N.J.S.A. 2C:46-2(a)(2).

C. Penalties, Fees and Assessments: Case Law

1. Merger. The court may not impose penalties and assessments on a merged conviction. State v. Francis, 341 N.J. Super. 67, 69 (App. Div. 2001).

2. Sex Crime Victims Treatment, Setting the Penalty Amount. The sex offender penalty amounts listed in N.J.S.A. 2C:14-10(a) are the maximum penalties the court may impose. State v. Bolvito, 217 N.J. 221, 224 (2014). In fixing the penalty amount, the court should consider the nature of the offense and the defendant's ability to pay. Id. at 233-35.

3. Megan's Law Offenses. While Megan's Law requires registration for "sex offenses," the N.J.S.A. 2C:7-2(b) offenses that define a sex offense encompass more than just sex offenses; they include non-sex crimes against children. In re T.T., 188 N.J. 321, 333 (2006).

4. Victims of Crime Compensation Board (VCCB) Assessment.

(a) Mandatory Assessments. The N.J.S.A. 2C:43-3.1 VCCB assessments are mandatory and may not be withheld, even if the defendant has limited financial resources. State v. Malia, 287 N.J. Super. 198, 208 (App. Div. 1996).

(b) Defendant's Ability to Pay. A court may not impose the maximum assessment on the ground that the defendant "might come into a substantial amount of money in the future. . . . There must be some relationship between defendant's ability to pay over the course of his incarceration and parole, and the actual VCCB penalty imposed." State v. Gallagher, 286 N.J. Super. 1, 23 (App. Div. 1995).

(c) Injury to the Victim. "Mental or nervous shock" constitutes injury for purposes of the victim of crime compensation board assessment. State v. Diaz, 188 N.J. Super. 504, 508 (App. Div. 1983). Thus, when a robber threatens a victim "as if he had a gun," one may infer that the victim suffered an injury, "no matter how transitory." Ibid.

(d) Lack of Injury. If there is no proof of injury to the victim, the court may not impose an assessment greater than the minimum penalty. State v. Thompson, 199 N.J. Super. 142, 144-45 (App. Div. 1985).

(e) Refusal to Submit to a Breathalyzer. The court may not impose an assessment for refusing to submit to a breathalyzer test. State v. Tekel, 281 N.J. Super. 502, 510-11 (App. Div. 1995).

(f) Standard of Review. A court reviews the amount of the VCCB penalty under the abuse of discretion standard. State v. Diaz, 188 N.J. Super. 504, 507-08 (App. Div. 1983).

5. Domestic Violence Surcharge, Attempt Excluded. The court may not order a defendant convicted of attempted murder to pay a domestic violence surcharge. State v. Lee, 411 N.J. Super. 349, 353 (App. Div. 2010).

6. Offenses with Automobiles. In order to suspend, postpone or revoke a driver's license under N.J.S.A. 2C:43-2(c), the defendant must have committed the offense with an automobile. State v. Gross, 225 N.J. Super. 28, 31 (App. Div. 1988). The court may not revoke a license under N.J.S.A. 2C:43-2(c) for possession of a vehicle knowing that the vehicle identification number had been removed. Ibid.

7. Drug Offense Penalties.

(a) Conspiracy. "[T]he mere conviction under N.J.S.A. 2C:5-2 for the 'ordinary' crime of conspiracy, does not render a person subject to the mandatory penalties of the Comprehensive Drug Reform Act, even if the object of that conspiracy constitutes a Chapter 35 offense." State in the Interest of W.M., 237 N.J. Super. 111, 118 (App. Div. 1989).

(b) Accomplices. A defendant convicted of a drug offense as an accomplice is subject to the mandatory drug offense penalties. State v. Bram, 246 N.J. Super. 200, 208 (Law Div. 1990).

8. Drug Offender Restraining Orders. Where the court denies a N.J.S.A. 2C:35-5.7(h) request to impose a drug offender restraining order, N.J.S.A. 2C:35-5.7(k) imposes a ten-day limitation period on the State's right to appeal. State v. Fitzpatrick, 443 N.J. Super. 316, 320 (App. Div. 2015).

9. Drug Offense License Suspension.

(a) Multiple Offenses. Where a court imposes sentence for multiple drug offenses subject to the mandatory forfeitures of one's driver's license, pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:35-16, the license suspension terms may vary in duration, but must run concurrently. State in the Interest of T.B., 134 N.J. 382, 387 (1993).

(b) Timing. License suspension under N.J.S.A. 2C:35-16 begins on the day of sentencing; the court has no discretion to postpone or delay it. State v. Hudson, 286 N.J. Super. 149, 154-55 (App. Div. 1995). In the case of a juvenile, license suspension begins the day after the defendant turns seventeen. State in the Interest of T.B., 134 N.J. 382, 388 (1993); State in the Interest of J.R., 244 N.J. Super. 630, 641 (App. Div. 1990). If the defendant's license is under suspension at the time of sentencing, then the new license suspension will begin on the final day of the current suspension. State in the Interest of T.B., 134 N.J. 382, 388 (1993).

(c) License Forfeiture Exception. In determining whether compelling circumstances exist to justify not revoking a defendant's driving privileges under N.J.S.A. 2C:35-16(a), the court should consider whether revocation will result in the defendant's loss of employment or extreme hardship. State v. Bendix, 396 N.J. Super. 91, 95-96 (App. Div. 2007). Where a defendant "has occasioned the loss of his employment through his unauthorized and criminal use of his employer's vehicle," the court should not find compelling circumstances to justify not revoking the defendant's license. State v. Carrero, 399 N.J. Super. 419, 425-26 (Law Div. 2007).

9. The Drug Enforcement and Demand Reduction (DEDR) Penalty.

(a) Policy. "As its name suggests, the penalty is designed to reduce the demand for drugs by providing a source for helping convicted defendants to reduce their demand for illegal substances." State v. Monzon, 300 N.J. Super. 173, 177 (App. Div. 1997).

(b) Treatment Program in Lieu of Payment and Wages. In reducing a penalty pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:35-15(e) by the amount actually paid for participation in a treatment program, the court should consider the amount withheld from a defendant's pay for work completed at the treatment program. N.J.S.A. 2C:35-15(e). State v. Monzon, 300 N.J. Super. 173, 177-78 (App. Div. 1997).

(c) Constitutionality. The drug enforcement and demand reduction penalty does not constitute cruel and unusual punishment under the Federal or State Constitution, and does not violate the equal protection clauses, substantive or procedural due process rights, or the State Constitution prohibition against amendment by reference. State v. Lagares, 127 N.J. 20, 36-37 (1992); State in the Interest of L.M., 229 N.J. Super. 88, 94-102 (App. Div. 1988).

(d) Merger and Conspiracy. "Since the principle of merger involves the avoidance of double penalties for the same crime, Chapter 35 DEDR penalties may not be imposed on a conviction for both conspiracy to possess a controlled dangerous substance, N.J.S.A. 2C:5-2, and for the actual possession under N.J.S.A. 2C:35-10." State in the Interest of M.A., 227 N.J. Super. 393, 395 (Ch. Div. 1988).

(e) Pretrial Intervention Program. The court may impose a drug enforcement and demand reduction penalty as a condition of entry into a pretrial intervention program. State v. Bulu, 234 N.J. Super. 331, 342, 346-48 (App. Div. 1989).

(f) The DEDR Penalty Is Mandatory. The DEDR penalty is mandatory and must be set in accordance with the degree of crime of which the defendant was convicted. State v. Malia, 287 N.J. Super. 198, 208 (App. Div. 1996); State v. Williams, 225 N.J. Super. 462, 464 (Law Div. 1988). The court may not revoke the penalty after sentencing. State v. Gardner, 252 N.J. Super. 462, 465-66 (Law Div. 1991).

10. Plea Agreements May Not Alter a Mandatory Penalty. Where a defendant pleads guilty to a second-degree drug offense with the understanding that the court will impose a sentence for a third-degree crime, the court may not honor the agreement in relation to the mandatory DEDR penalty. State v. Williams, 225 N.J. Super. 462, 464 (Law Div. 1988). The court must impose a penalty for a second-degree crime. Ibid.

11. Auto Theft Penalties. While N.J.S.A. 2C:20-2.2(a) provides that the defendant "shall be subject" to the enumerated penalties and driving privilege suspensions, the Court has interpreted that language to require imposition of the penalties and license suspension. State v. Rama, 298 N.J. Super. 339, 345 (App. Div. 1997), aff'd o.b., 153 N.J. 162 (1998).

12. Shoplifting Penalties: Determining Gradation. In determining the gradation of a shoplifting offense, the court considers the retail value of the merchandise without sales tax added. State v. Burnham, 474 N.J. Super. 226, 230-31 (App. Div. 2022).

XIII. THE GRAVES ACT AND ASSAULT WEAPONS SENTENCING

N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6(c) and (d) (commonly called the Graves Act), and N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6(g) and (h), require enhanced sentences for certain gun crimes and for certain crimes committed with firearms (N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6(c) and (d)), and with assault weapons or machine guns (N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6(g) and (h)).¹ See N.J.S.A. 2C:39-1(f), (i) and (w) for the definitions of firearm, machine gun, and assault firearm, respectively.

Both laws require the court to impose: (1) a parole disqualifier, and (2) an extended term with a parole disqualifier for certain repeat offenders. Unlike the assault weapons statute, the Graves Act also has a parole disqualifier exception for first-time offenders. Sections A and C, respectively, discuss statutory provisions and case law on the Graves Act. Sections B and D, respectively, discuss statutory provisions and case law on assault weapons sentencing.

A. Graves Act Sentencing: Statutory Provisions

1. Graves Act Enumerated Offenses. The Graves Act (N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6(c)) requires enhanced sentencing where the defendant:

(a) Committed any of the following offenses:

- Possession of a sawed-off shotgun or defaced firearm (N.J.S.A. 2C:39-3(b) or (d));
- Possession of a firearm with purpose to use it unlawfully against a person or property of another (N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4(a));

¹ It is unclear whether N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6(g) and (h), covering crimes committed with assault weapons, may appropriately be called part of "the Graves Act." Subsections (g) and (h) were enacted eleven years after the Graves Act (N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6(c) and (d)), and while the subsections are similar to the Graves Act, the two provisions differ in certain respects. No published New Jersey decision that mentions N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6(g) or (h), refers to either subsection as the Graves Act. Presumably, even if those sections are not part of the Graves Act, a significant amount of case law on the Graves Act would apply by analogy to assault-weapons sentencing.

- Possession of a firearm while committing certain drug-related offenses or bias intimidation (N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4.1(a));
- Possession of a machine gun, handgun, rifle, shotgun, or assault firearm without the required license, permit, or identification card, or possession of a loaded rifle or shotgun (N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(a), (b), (c) or (f));
- Possession of a weapon by a certain person prohibited from such possession (N.J.S.A. 2C:39-7(a), (b)(2) or (b)(3)); or
- Manufacturing, transporting and disposing a machine gun, sawed-off shotgun, defaced firearm, or assault firearm (N.J.S.A. 2C:39-9(a), (b), (e) or (g));

or

(b) Committed any of the following offenses and used, or was in possession of, a firearm (defined at N.J.S.A. 2C:39-1(f)), while committing or attempting to commit the crime, including the immediate flight therefrom:

- Murder (N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3);
- Manslaughter (N.J.S.A. 2C:11-4);
- Aggravated assault (N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1(b));
- Kidnapping (N.J.S.A. 2C:13-1);
- Aggravated sexual assault (N.J.S.A. 2C:14-2(a));
- Aggravated criminal sexual contact (N.J.S.A. 2C:14-3(a));
- Robbery (N.J.S.A. 2C:15-1);
- Burglary (N.J.S.A. 2C:18-2); or
- Escape (N.J.S.A. 2C:29-5).

2. Graves Act Parole Disqualifier. N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6(c) provides that if the defendant committed any of the enumerated offenses (see section A(1) above), the court must impose a period of parole ineligibility that is either one-half of the sentence imposed or forty-two months, whichever is greater, or, in the case of a fourth-degree crime, eighteen months.

Note: Effective August 8, 2013, the Legislature amended N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6(c) to provide fixed mandatory minimum terms for the enumerated crimes (listed in section A(1) above). Prior to this amendment, the statute required a mandatory minimum term within a specified range.

3. Graves Act Extended Term with Parole Disqualifier for Certain Repeat Offenders. N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6(c) provides that the court must impose an extended term if the defendant committed or attempted to commit an enumerated offense (see section A(1) above) while possessing a firearm; is at least eighteen years old; and has a prior conviction for committing with a firearm any of the following offenses set forth in N.J.S.A. 2C:44-3(d):

- Murder (N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3);
- Manslaughter (N.J.S.A. 2C:11-4);
- Aggravated assault (N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1(b));
- Kidnapping (N.J.S.A. 2C:13-1);
- Aggravated sexual assault (N.J.S.A. 2C:14-2(a));
- Aggravated criminal sexual contact (N.J.S.A. 2C:14-3(a));
- Robbery (N.J.S.A. 2C:15-1);
- Burglary (N.J.S.A. 2C:18-2);
- Escape (N.J.S.A. 2C:29-5);
- Possession of a firearm for an unlawful purpose (N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4(a)); or
- Any offense in Title 2A (Administration of Civil and Criminal Justice).

N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6(c) instructs the court to impose the extended term in accordance with N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7(c), which requires that the extended term include a parole disqualifier at or between one-third and one-half the sentence imposed, or five years, whichever is greater. If the sentence is life imprisonment, the parole disqualifier must be twenty-five years, unless the sentence is for a violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:35-3 (leader of a narcotics organization); then the parole disqualifier must be thirty years. N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7(c).

4. Hearing and Required Findings to Support a Graves Act Sentence.

N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6(d) provides that the court shall not impose a Graves Act enhanced sentence unless the prosecutor establishes, and the court finds, by a preponderance of the evidence at a hearing, which may occur at the time of sentencing, "that the weapon used or possessed was a firearm. In making its finding, the court shall take judicial notice of any evidence, testimony or information adduced at the trial, plea hearing, or other court proceedings and shall also consider the presentence report and any other relevant information."

(a) Sixth Amendment and Graves Act Extended Terms. Sixth Amendment jurisprudence renders invalid the Graves Act requirement (N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6(d)) that the court find the facts, other than proof of a prior conviction, that subjects a defendant to a Graves Act extended term. State v. Franklin, 184 N.J. 516, 533-34 (2005) (applying the holding in Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000)). To impose a Graves Act extended term, the jury must have found that the defendant used or possessed a firearm during the crime. State v. Franklin, 184 N.J. 516, 533-34 (2005). In the case of a guilty plea, the maximum sentence authorized by statute is the maximum sentence supported by the defendant's admissions. State v. Franklin, 184 N.J. 516, 537-38 (2005) (interpreting Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 309-11 (2004)). The defendant may also "consent to judicial factfinding as to sentence enhancements." State v. Franklin, 184 N.J. 516, 538 (2005) (quoting Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 309-11 (2004)).

(b) The Sixth Amendment and the Graves Act Parole Disqualifiers. In accordance with the decision in Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000), that to comply with the Sixth Amendment, the jury, not the court, must find a fact that subjects a defendant to an extended term, the Sixth Amendment similarly requires that a fact that increases the mandatory minimum term must be found by the jury, not a judge. Alleyne v. United States, 570 U.S. 99, 103 (2013).

Our Court has yet to address the Alleyne decision in relation to the Graves Act parole disqualifier, but it has found that a mandatory parole disqualifier based on the court's finding that the defendant was involved in organized crime was invalid under Alleyne. State v. Grate, 220 N.J. 317, 335 n.2 (2015) (refusing to issue an advisory opinion on whether the Graves Act mandatory parole disqualifier was also invalid).

Though no United States Supreme Court or published New Jersey decision has so held, presumably the Apprendi prior-conviction exception will apply to mandatory minimum terms, just as it applies to extended terms. See Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000) (holding that "[o]ther than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt").

5. Certain Offenses Excluded from Graves Act Enhanced Sentencing. N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6(d)(2) provides that the court shall not impose a Graves Act enhanced sentence for the following crimes:

- Unlawful possession of a handgun in which the propelling force is air or similar force (N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(b)(2));
- Unlawful possession of a rifle or shotgun in which the propelling force is air or similar force (N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(c)(2)); and
- Possession of a rifle or shotgun without a firearms purchaser identification card (N.J.S.A. 2C:39:5(c)(1)).

6. Parole Disqualifier Exception for First-Time Offenders (the Graves Act Escape Valve). N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6.2 provides that upon request of the State, or at the sentencing court's request with the State's approval, the assignment judge shall place the defendant on probation or reduce the parole ineligibility term to one year if the interest of justice would not be served by imposition of a parole disqualifier, and the defendant has no prior conviction for an enumerated offense (listed in section A(1) above). See also Guidelines for Downgrades/Dismissals under the Graves Act: Strict Enforcement of Mandatory Minimum Custodial Terms for Offenses Involving Firearms, Directive # 09-18 (July 2, 2018), www.njcourts.gov/notices/2018/n180703c.pdf (requiring strict adherence to the

requirements of N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6.2 and the procedure set forth in State v. Nance, 228 N.J. 378 (2017)).

B. Assault Weapons Sentencing: Statutory Provisions

1. Assault Weapons Enumerated Offenses. N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6(g) requires enhanced sentencing if the defendant used or was in possession of a machine gun (defined in N.J.S.A. 2C:39-1(i)) or assault firearm (defined in N.J.S.A. 2C:39-1(w)) while committing, or attempting to commit, any of the following enumerated offenses, including the immediate flight therefrom:

- Possession of a firearm for an unlawful purpose (N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4(a));
- Murder (N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3);
- Manslaughter (N.J.S.A. 2C:11-4);
- Aggravated assault (N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1(b));
- Kidnapping (N.J.S.A. 2C:13-1);
- Aggravated sexual assault (N.J.S.A. 2C:14-2(a));
- Aggravated criminal sexual contact (N.J.S.A. 2C:14-3(a));
- Robbery (N.J.S.A. 2C:15-1);
- Burglary (N.J.S.A. 2C:18-2);
- Escape (N.J.S.A. 2C:29-5); or
- Manufacture, distribute or dispense a controlled dangerous substance (N.J.S.A. 2C:35-5).

2. Assault Weapons Parole Disqualifier. If the defendant committed an enumerated offense (see section B(1) above) while possessing a machine gun or assault weapon, the court must impose a term of parole ineligibility of (a) ten years for a first- or second-degree crime, (b) five years for a third-degree crime, or (c) eighteen months for a fourth-degree crime. N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6(g).

3. Extended Term with Parole Disqualifier for Certain Assault Weapons Repeat Offenders. N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6(g) provides that the court must impose an extended term if the defendant committed an enumerated offense (see section B(1) above) while possessing a machine gun or assault weapon, is at least eighteen years old, and has a prior conviction for committing with a firearm any of the following offenses set forth in N.J.S.A. 2C:44-3(d):

- Murder (N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3);
- Manslaughter (N.J.S.A. 2C:11-4);
- Aggravated assault (N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1(b));
- Kidnapping (N.J.S.A. 2C:13-1);
- Aggravated sexual assault (N.J.S.A. 2C:14-2(a));
- Aggravated criminal sexual contact (N.J.S.A. 2C:14-3(a));
- Robbery (N.J.S.A. 2C:15-1);
- Burglary (N.J.S.A. 2C:18-2);
- Escape (N.J.S.A. 2C:29-5);
- Possession of a firearm for an unlawful purpose (N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4(a); or
- Any offense in Title 2A (Administration of Civil and Criminal Justice).

N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6(g) instructs the court to impose the extended term in accordance with N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7(d), which requires that the extended term include a parole disqualifier as follows:

- First- and second-degree crimes: fifteen years, unless:
 - The sentence is one of life imprisonment, then the parole disqualifier must be twenty-five years or thirty years if the

defendant violated N.J.S.A. 2C:35-3 (leader of a narcotics trafficking network);

- Third-degree crime: eight years; and
- Fourth-degree crime: five years.

4. Hearing and Findings Required to Support an Assault Weapons Sentence.

N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6(h) requires the prosecutor to establish, and the court to find, by a preponderance of the evidence at a hearing, which may occur at the time of sentencing, "that the weapon used or possessed was a machine gun or assault firearm. In making its finding, the court shall take judicial notice of any evidence, testimony or information adduced at the trial, plea hearing, or other court proceedings and shall also consider the presentence report and any other relevant information."

(a) Note on the Parole Disqualifier as Applied to Second-, Third- and Fourth-Degree Crimes: Because N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6(g) effectively imposes a 100% period of parole ineligibility on second-, third- and fourth-degree offenses, the jury, not the court, must find beyond a reasonable doubt that the weapon used was an assault firearm or machine gun and that the defendant possessed it to use it against another. State v. Petrucci (II), 365 N.J. Super. 454, 462-63 (App. Div. 2004).

(b) The Sixth Amendment and Assault Weapons Extended Terms. The Sixth Amendment requires the jury, not the court, find a fact, other than proof of a prior conviction, that subjects a defendant to a mandatory extended term. Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000). Though no published New Jersey decision applies this rule to the assault weapons sentencing statute (N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6(h)), the Court has declared unconstitutional under Apprendi the parallel Graves Act extended term provision (N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6(d)). State v. Franklin, 184 N.J. 516, 533-34 (2005).

(c) The Sixth Amendment and Assault Weapons Parole Disqualifiers. In accordance with the decision in Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000), that to comply with the Sixth Amendment, the jury, not the court, must find a fact that subjects a defendant to a mandatory extended term, the Sixth Amendment similarly requires that a fact that requires a mandatory minimum term must be found by the jury, not a judge. Alleyne

v. United States, 570 U.S. 99, 103 (2013). Though no United States Supreme Court or published New Jersey decision has so held, presumably the Apprendi prior-conviction exception will apply to mandatory minimum terms, just as it applies to extended terms. See Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000) (holding that "[o]ther than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt").

Our Court has yet to address the Alleyne decision in relation to the assault weapons parole disqualifier, but it has found that a mandatory parole disqualifier based on the court's finding that the defendant was involved in organized crime was invalid under Alleyne. State v. Grate, 220 N.J. 317, 334-35 (2015). The Grate Court declined to issue an advisory opinion on whether the Graves Act mandatory parole disqualifier, which is similar to the assault weapons parole disqualifier, was invalid under Alleyne. State v. Grate, 220 N.J. 317, 335 n.2 (2015).

C. Graves Act Sentencing: Case Law

1. Policy. The focus of the Graves Act is deterrence, not rehabilitation. State v. Haliski, 140 N.J. 1, 9 (1995). See also State v. Rodriguez, 466 N.J. Super. 71, 94-111 (App. Div. 2021) (discussing the policy and history of the Graves Act and the escape valve).

2. Proportionality and a Parole Disqualifier. The length of a parole ineligibility term under the Graves Act "must ordinarily be consistent with the length of the base term" and "the court's evaluation of the relevant aggravating and mitigating factors." State v. Towey, 114 N.J. 69, 81 (1989). Since, however, "the weight of the aggravating and mitigating factors is irrelevant to the imposition of a minimum term in Graves Act cases, . . . there may be less correlation than in non-Graves Act cases between the length of the base term and the severity of the parole ineligibility term." Id. at 81-82. See also State v. Benjamin, 228 N.J. 358, 368 (2017) (explaining that the court must impose the minimum jail term even if it finds that the mitigating factors of N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(a) outweigh the aggravating factors listed in subsection (b)).

3. Merger. "[W]hen a Graves Act crime merges with a non-Graves Act crime, the sentence must be at least equal in length to the mandatory sentence required for the Graves Act crime. If the sentencing guidelines for the non-Graves Act crime do not

permit that long a sentence, the Graves Act crime survives the merger." State v. Connell, 208 N.J. Super. 688, 696 (App. Div. 1986).

4. Operability and Design of the Firearm. "The Graves Act contemplates a 'firearm' not in terms of a device's present operability, but in terms of its original design." State v. Gantt, 101 N.J. 573, 584 (1986). The weapon must have been designed to deliver a potentially lethal projectile; it need not be operable as well. Id. at 585. Inoperability is relevant only when substantial evidence tends to show that the weapon has changed to such a degree that it has permanently lost the characteristics of a real gun. Id. at 589. State v. Orlando, 269 N.J. Super. 116, 130-33 (App. Div. 1993).

5. Accomplice. An accomplice who had the purpose to promote or facilitate the crime with the use of a firearm is guilty of that crime even though he or she did not personally possess or use the firearm. State v. White, 98 N.J. 122, 130 (1984). Even where the accomplice is found guilty only of an unarmed offense, if he or she knew or had reason to know before the crime was committed that his or her cohort would possess or use a firearm during the crime or immediate flight therefrom, the Graves Act applies to the accomplice. Id. at 131. Accomplice liability depends on proof of a shared purpose. State v. Wooters, 228 N.J. Super. 171, 175, 178-79 n.1 (App. Div. 1988).

6. The Graves Act and the No Early Release Act (NERA). Where a defendant is subject to a NERA and a Graves Act parole disqualifier, the NERA parole disqualifier will require a longer mandatory minimum term, and thus, will subsume the Graves Act parole disqualifier. See State v. Garron, 177 N.J. 147, 163 (2003). In this situation the court should state in the judgment of conviction the crime or crimes subject to the NERA and the Graves Act to avoid confusion in the future if the defendant commits an offense that would subject him or her to the Graves Act repeat offender extended term. State v. Cheung, 328 N.J. Super. 368, 371 (App. Div. 2000).

7. Application for Transfer to a Drug Treatment Program. A defendant cannot seek relief under Rule 3:21-10(b)(1) (application to enter drug treatment program), until the Graves Act mandatory term has been served. State v. Mendel, 212 N.J. Super. 110, 113 (App. Div. 1986).

8. Extended Terms.

(a) Notice and Hearing. "[N]otice and hearing are required before a mandatory extended term may be imposed based on a prior Graves Act conviction." State v. Martin, 110 N.J. 10, 14 (1988).

(b) Burden of Proof. The burden is on the State to prove to the sentencing judge that the defendant has a prior conviction that qualifies him or her for a Graves Act extended term. State v. Robinson, 253 N.J. Super. 346, 358 (App. Div. 1992). Note that the Sixth Amendment is not violated by the court's finding the existence of a prior conviction as a basis to impose a sentence enhancer. State v. Franklin, 184 N.J. 516, 521 (2005); Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000).

(c) Timing of Prior Conviction. To impose a Graves Act extended term, the State must establish that the defendant had a prior conviction for an enumerated offense with a firearm. State v. Hawks, 114 N.J. 359, 361, 365 (1989). Conviction for the first crime need not precede the commission of the second crime. Ibid.

(d) Prior Conviction Pending Appeal. The court may sentence a defendant to a Graves Act extended term while the prior Graves Act conviction is pending appeal, or before the time for such an appeal has expired. State v. Haliski, 140 N.J. 1, 17-18 (1995). If the prior Graves Act conviction is reversed on appeal, the extended term must be vacated upon the defendant's motion, pursuant to Rule 3:21-10(b)(6). State v. Haliski, 140 N.J. 1, 18-20 (1995).

(e) Convictions in the Same Proceeding. It is an open question whether an extended Graves Act sentence may be imposed based upon convictions and sentences entered in the same proceeding. State v. Rountree, 388 N.J. Super. 190, 207-09 (App. Div. 2006).

(f) Defense Challenge to the State's Proof. The defendant may challenge the State's proof as insufficient, but if the defendant's challenge would invalidate a prior conviction, the defendant "must proceed by an appropriate application for post-conviction relief. R. 3:22. In the absence of such an application, the sentencing court is entitled to rely on the record of the prior conviction to satisfy itself that the prior conviction constitutes a Graves Act offense." State v. Jefimowicz, 119 N.J. 152, 160-61 (1990).

(g) Multiple Graves Act Extended Terms. When sentencing more than one Graves Act offense, the judge must impose a Graves Act extended term on each conviction. State v. Robinson, 217 N.J. 594, 597 (2014) (citing State v. Connell, 208 N.J. Super. 688, 697 (App. Div. 1986)). An extended Graves Act term is not subject to the limitation in N.J.S.A. 2C:44-5(a)(2), which prohibits more than one extended term sentence, because a Graves Act extended term is the "ordinary sentence" for the crime. State v. Connell, 208 N.J. Super. 688, 691 (App. Div. 1986).

9. Mandatory Terms, State Appeals and Double Jeopardy. The State may appeal a sentencing court's refusal to impose a Graves Act mandatory extended term based on a finding that the proof did not establish the requisite prior offenses. State v. Robinson, 253 N.J. Super. 346, 358-59 (App. Div. 1992). On remand, the State may present additional proofs of the prior offenses only if the sentencing court first finds that to do so would not violate due process or double jeopardy. Id. at 359. See Monge v. California, 524 U.S. 721, 734 (1998) (double jeopardy clause does not preclude retrial on a prior conviction allegation in a noncapital sentencing case).

10. Remand and Original Jurisdiction. Where a sentencing court illegally imposes a Graves Act period of parole ineligibility, the appellate court should not impose a discretionary term of parole ineligibility to correct the sentence, but rather, should remand for reconsideration of the sentence. State v. Wooters, 228 N.J. Super. 171, 174 (App. Div. 1988). However, if the reviewing court reverses a discretionary parole disqualifier and finds that the court should have imposed a Graves Act mandatory parole disqualifier, then the appellate court may amend the judgment of conviction to reflect the mandatory minimum term under the Graves Act. State v. Copeman, 197 N.J. Super. 261, 265 (App. Div. 1984).

11. Graves Act Parole Disqualifier Exception for First-Time Offenders (the Escape Valve).

(a) Constitutionality. The Graves Act parole disqualifier exception for first-time offenders, N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6.2, which allows the assignment judge to eliminate or decrease to one year the parole disqualifier in the interest of justice, has withstood constitutional challenge on separation-of-powers grounds. State v. Alvarez, 246 N.J. Super. 137, 145-47 (App. Div. 1991). The "interests of justice" standard avoids arbitrary, unreasonable and capricious decision-making by the prosecutor and poses no constitutional impediment to the legislative will. Ibid.

(b) Arbitrariness Challenge by the Defense. A defendant has the right to move before the assignment judge for a hearing to determine whether the prosecutor arbitrarily or unconstitutionally discriminated against him or her in determining whether the interests of justice warranted consent or referral for leniency pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6.2. State v. Watson, 346 N.J. Super. 521, 535 (App. Div. 2002); State v. Alvarez, 246 N.J. Super. 137, 147-49 (App. Div. 1991); State v. Miller, 321 N.J. Super. 550, 555-56 (Law Div. 1999). "[T]he prosecutor must provide written reasons for withholding consent to a waiver in order to promote procedural fairness and to ensure meaningful judicial review." State v. Benjamin, 442 N.J. Super. 258, 266 (App. Div. 2015), aff'd as modified, 228 N.J. 358 (2017). But the defendant is "not entitled to discovery of a prosecutor's case-specific memorializations and cumulative files when challenging the denial of a Graves Act waiver . . . because there are sufficient procedural safeguards in place for meaningful judicial review" State v. Benjamin, 228 N.J. 358, 375 (2017). The assignment judge may also maintain a file of waiver cases to assess the prosecutor's decisions for arbitrariness and discrimination. State v. Andrews, 464 N.J. Super. 111, 123 (App. Div. 2020). For a discussion of the standard of review and considerations applicable to an escape valve decision see State v. Rodriguez, 466 N.J. Super. 71, 94-111 (App. Div. 2021).

(c) Defense Request for Referral. A defendant may also request the sentencing judge refer the matter to the assignment judge for leniency. State v. Alvarez, 246 N.J. Super. 137, 141 n.2 (App. Div. 1991).

(d) Assignment Judge Discretion. "When an application for a waiver under section 6.2 is made by motion of a prosecutor, the assignment judge or his or her designee has the authority to choose one of two sentences: he or she 'shall place the defendant on probation pursuant to [N.J.S.A. 2C:43-2(b)(2)] or reduce to one year the mandatory minimum term of imprisonment during which the defendant will be ineligible for parole.'" State v. Nance, 228 N.J. 378, 394 (2017) (quoting N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6.2). While the prosecutor may argue for a certain sentence, "nothing in the statute suggests that the assignment judge or designee must accept the prosecutor's recommendation." Ibid.

(e) Presumption of Incarceration. N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6.2 does not exempt a defendant convicted of a first-degree or second-degree Graves Act offense

from the N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(d) presumption of incarceration. State v. Nance, 228 N.J. 378, 396 (2017).

(f) Remand to Seek Leniency. Where a defendant argues at sentencing only that the Graves Act does not apply, and where that argument is rejected on appeal, the interests of justice may nevertheless militate in favor of remanding to the trial court so that the defendant can be afforded the opportunity to seek the prosecutor's consent and move for leniency under N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6.2. State v. Mello, 297 N.J. Super. 452, 467-68 (App. Div. 1997).

12. Cruel and Unusual Punishment. Ordinarily, a Graves Act sentence will not constitute cruel and unusual punishment, even if the defendant is a youthful offender, State v. Des Marets, 92 N.J. 62, 81-82 (1983), or a law enforcement officer who needs solitary or segregated confinement, State v. Muessig, 198 N.J. Super. 197, 203-04 (App. Div. 1985).

D. Assault Weapons Sentencing: Case Law

1. 100% Parole Ineligibility. In effect, N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6(g) does not allow any possibility of parole for second-, third- and fourth-degree offenses because the mandatory parole ineligibility terms are equal to the top of the ordinary sentencing ranges for crimes of those degrees (the ordinary ranges are: second-degree crimes--five to ten years; third-degree crimes--three to five years; and fourth-degree crimes--a term not to exceed eighteen months). State v. Petrucci (II), 365 N.J. Super. 454, 460 n.2, 462-63 (App. Div. 2004).

XIV. DRUG OFFENDER SENTENCING

In sentencing drug offenders, the court may impose a term of special probation, which is intended to treat a defendant's substance abuse problem and is managed by Recovery Court (formerly Drug Court) personnel. If the court does not impose special probation, the defendant must be sentenced in accordance with Title 2C. Sections A and B of this chapter discuss special probation and recovery court. Sections C through K discuss enhanced sentencing provisions specific to drug offenders.

A. Special Probation: Statutory Provisions

1. Statutory Authority for Special Probation. N.J.S.A. 2C:35-14(a) provides that on its own initiative, or at the defendant's request, after considering all relevant information, the court may sentence a drug or alcohol dependent offender, as defined in N.J.S.A. 2C:35-2, to a five-year period of special probation if the offender is not eligible for regular probation (N.J.S.A. 2C:45-1) because the conviction carries a presumption of imprisonment or requires a period of parole ineligibility, and the court makes the following findings on the record:

- (1) The defendant underwent a professional diagnostic assessment (N.J.S.A. 2C:35-14.1) to determine whether and to what extent the defendant is drug or alcohol dependent (N.J.S.A. 2C:35-2) and whether the defendant would benefit from treatment; and
- (2) The defendant is dependent upon drugs or alcohol within the meaning of N.J.S.A. 2C:35-2, and was drug or alcohol dependent at the time of the offense; and
- (3) The defendant committed the offense while under the influence of drugs or alcohol, or to acquire property or money to support drug or alcohol dependency; and
- (4) The defendant will benefit from substance abuse treatment and monitoring, thereby reducing recidivism; and
- (5) The defendant did not possess a firearm at the time of the offense or at the time of any pending criminal charge; and

(6) The defendant has not been convicted on two or more separate occasions of: (i) first- or second-degree crimes other than those listed in the following subsection (7); or (ii) a first- or second-degree crime and a third-degree crime, other than N.J.S.A. 2C:35-10 drug possession crimes; and

(7) The defendant does not have pending charges or a prior conviction or delinquency adjudication for murder, aggravated manslaughter, manslaughter, kidnapping, aggravated assault, aggravated sexual assault, or sexual assault; and

(8) A suitable treatment facility licensed and approved by the Division of Addiction Services is able and has agreed to provide the defendant appropriate treatment; and

(9) A sentence of special probation will not pose a danger to the community.

Note: In 2012 the Legislature amended N.J.S.A. 2C:35-14(a)(7) to remove robbery from the list of pending charges that made a defendant ineligible for special probation. L. 2012, c. 23.

2. "Drug or Alcohol Dependent Persons" Defined. Pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:35-2, a drug or alcohol dependent person is a person who "has been in a state of psychic or physical dependence, or both, arising from the use of" drugs or alcohol "on a continuous or repetitive basis. . . . [D]ependence is characterized by behavioral and other responses, including but not limited to a strong compulsion to take the substance on a recurring basis in order to experience its psychic effects, or to avoid the discomfort of its absence."

3. Diagnostic Assessment Requirement. N.J.S.A. 2C:35-14.1(a) provides that the court shall require a defendant to submit to a professional diagnostic assessment if the following circumstances exist:

(1) The court has a reasonable basis to believe that the defendant may be drug dependent, as defined in N.J.S.A. 2C:35-2; and

(2) The crime the defendant committed is:

(a) Subject to a presumption of imprisonment pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(d); or

(b) A third-degree crime and the defendant has previously been convicted of a crime subject to the presumption of imprisonment or that resulted in a term of imprisonment; and

(3) The defendant is eligible for consideration of special probation pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:35-14.

Exception to the Diagnostic Assessment Requirement. The court need not order diagnostic testing if "it is clearly convinced that such assessment will not serve any useful purpose. If the court does not order a diagnostic assessment, the court shall place on the record the reasons for its decision." N.J.S.A. 2C:35-14.1(c).

4. Reasonable Basis to Believe a Person Is Drug or Alcohol Dependent. Pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:35-14.1(b), any of the following circumstances constitute a reasonable basis to believe that a person may be drug or alcohol dependent:

(1) The offense involved a controlled dangerous substance;

(2) The defendant has previously been convicted of a drug offense, or "was admitted to pretrial intervention or supervisory treatment, or received a conditional discharge for a charge involving a controlled dangerous substance";

(3) The defendant has a pending controlled dangerous substance charge in this State or another jurisdiction;

(4) The defendant received drug treatment or counseling in the past;

(5) "[T]he defendant appears to have been under the influence of a controlled dangerous substance during the commission of the present offense, or it reasonably appears that the present offense may have been committed to acquire property or monies to purchase" drugs for the defendant;

(6) "[T]he defendant admits to the unlawful use of a controlled dangerous substance within the year preceding the arrest for the present offense";

(7) "[T]he defendant has had a positive drug test within the last 12 months";
or

(8) "[T]here is information, other than the circumstances enumerated in paragraphs (1) through (7) of this subsection, which indicates that the defendant may be a drug dependent person or would otherwise benefit by undergoing a professional diagnostic assessment within the meaning of" N.J.S.A. 2C:35-14(a)(1).

5. Special Probation Ineligibility. Pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:35-14(b), a defendant is not eligible for special probation if the defendant is convicted of or adjudicated delinquent for:

(1) A first-degree crime; or

(2) Any of the following first- or second-degree offenses, which are subject to the No Early Release Act (N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.2) (NERA), "other than a crime of the second degree involving N.J.S.A. 2C:15-1 (robbery) or N.J.S.A. 2C:18-2 (burglary)":

- Murder (N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3);
- Aggravated manslaughter or manslaughter (N.J.S.A. 2C:11-4);
- Vehicular homicide (N.J.S.A. 2C:11-5);
- Aggravated assault (N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1(b));
- Disarming a law enforcement officer (N.J.S.A. 2C:12-11(b));
- Kidnapping (N.J.S.A. 2C:13-1);
- Aggravated sexual assault (N.J.S.A. 2C:14-2(a));
- Sexual assault (N.J.S.A. 2C:14-2(b) and (c)(1));
- Robbery (N.J.S.A. 2C:15-1);
- Carjacking (N.J.S.A. 2C:15-2);

- Aggravated arson (N.J.S.A. 2C:17-1(a)(1));
- Burglary (N.J.S.A. 2C:18-2);
- Extortion (N.J.S.A. 2C:20-5(a));
- Booby traps in manufacturing or distributing a controlled dangerous substance (N.J.S.A. 2C:35-4.1(b));
- Drug induced deaths (N.J.S.A. 2C:35-9);
- Terrorism (N.J.S.A. 2C:38-2);
- Producing or possessing chemical, biological, nuclear, or radiological weapons (N.J.S.A. 2C:38-3);
- Racketeering in the first degree (N.J.S.A. 2C:41-2);
- Firearms trafficking (N.J.S.A. 2C:39-9(i)); and
- Child endangerment (N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4(b)(3)).

(3) A crime, except drug distribution within 1000 feet of school property (N.J.S.A. 2C:35-7) "for which a mandatory minimum period of incarceration is prescribed under" Chapter 35 of Title 2C "or any other law"; or

(4) "[A]n offense that involved the distribution or the conspiracy or attempt to distribute a controlled dangerous substance or controlled substance analog to a juvenile near or on school property."

6. Presumption of Special Probation for Certain Drug Offenders. N.J.S.A. 2C:35-14.2(b) instructs that the court shall sentence a defendant to special probation, regardless of whether the defendant requests it or consents to it, if diagnostic testing concludes that the defendant is a drug dependent person, as that term is defined in N.J.S.A. 2C:35-2, and the court concludes that the defendant is a person in need of treatment, as defined in N.J.S.A. 2C:35-14.2(f), unless:

(1) "[T]he court finds that a sentence of imprisonment must be imposed consistent with the provisions of chapters 43 and 44 of Title 2C"; or

(2) The court is clearly convinced that:

(a) The treatment, monitoring and supervision services afforded by regular probation (N.J.S.A. 2C:45-1) adequately address the defendant's clinical needs; and

(b) "[T]he defendant's treatment needs would not be better addressed by sentencing the defendant to special probation pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:35-14"; and

(c) "[N]o danger to the community would result from placing the person on regular probation"; and

(d) A sentence of regular probation would be consistent with the provisions of chapters 43 and 44 of Title 2C.

7. "Person in Need of Treatment" Defined. N.J.S.A. 2C:35-14.2(f) provides that a "person in need of treatment" means a defendant who:

(1) Is a drug dependent person as defined in N.J.S.A. 2C:35-2; and

(2) Has been convicted of:

(a) A crime subject to a presumption of imprisonment, pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(d); or

(b) A third-degree crime "if the person has previously been convicted of a crime subject to a presumption of imprisonment or a crime that resulted in the imposition of a State prison term"; and

(3) "[I]s eligible to be considered for a sentence to special probation," pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:35-14.

Appeal by the State. If the court imposes a sentence of regular probation (N.J.S.A. 2C:45-1) instead of special probation under N.J.S.A. 2C:35-14.2, the sentence shall not be final for ten days to allow the prosecutor time to file an appeal. N.J.S.A. 2C:35-14.2(d).

8. Presumption of Inpatient Treatment for Certain Defendants. Unless the court suspends inpatient treatment and imposes outpatient treatment pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:35-14(j) (discussed below), N.J.S.A. 2C:35-14(d) requires the court to order the defendant to treatment at a residential facility if the defendant: (i) is convicted of or adjudicated delinquent for a second-degree crime or for drug distribution within 1000 feet of school property (N.J.S.A. 2C:35-7); or (ii) was previously convicted of or adjudicated delinquent for manufacturing, distributing or dispensing drugs (N.J.S.A. 2C:35-5). N.J.S.A. 2C:35-14(d). If the facility cannot house the defendant immediately, then the defendant shall be incarcerated until he or she can be transferred. Ibid.

(a) Duration of Residential Treatment. The defendant must serve a minimum of six months at the treatment facility. N.J.S.A. 2C:35-14(d). The term shall end upon successful completion of the treatment program, and shall not exceed five years. Ibid. "Upon successful completion of the required residential treatment program, the person shall complete the period of special probation . . . with credit for time served for any imprisonment served as a condition of probation and credit for each day during which the person satisfactorily complied with the terms and conditions of special probation while committed pursuant to this section to a residential treatment facility." Ibid.

(b) Reporting Requirements. N.J.S.A. 2C:35-14(e) provides that the probation department, or other appropriate agency designated by the court, shall periodically provide reports to the court on the defendant's progress and shall immediately notify the court of a refusal to submit to a drug or alcohol test. Ibid. The treatment facility must "promptly report" to the probation department or designated agency all "significant failures" by the defendant and must immediately notify the prosecutor and the court of any action that would constitute an escape. Ibid.

9. Outpatient Treatment as a Condition of Suspended Inpatient Treatment. N.J.S.A. 2C:35-14(j) provides that if the defendant meets the criteria for inpatient treatment set forth in N.J.S.A. 2C:35-14(d), "the court may temporarily suspend imposition of all or any portion of the term of commitment . . . and may instead order the person to enter a nonresidential treatment program, provided that the court finds on the record that":

(1) The diagnostic assessment recommends that "the proposed course of nonresidential treatment services is clinically appropriate and adequate to address the person's treatment needs"; and

(2) The defendant's participation in outpatient treatment will not danger the community; and

(3) "[A] suitable treatment provider is able and has agreed to provide clinically appropriate nonresidential treatment services."

(a) Special Conditions of Outpatient Treatment in Lieu of Inpatient Treatment. A defendant sentenced to nonresidential treatment in lieu of residential treatment pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:35-14(j) must undergo urine testing at least once a week. N.J.S.A. 2C:35-14(k)(1). Additionally, "the court shall impose appropriate curfews or other restrictions on the person's movements, and may order the person to wear electronic monitoring devices to enforce such curfews or other restrictions." Ibid.

(b) Appeal by the State. If the court imposes nonresidential treatment over the prosecutor's objection, the sentence shall not become final for ten days to permit the State to file an appeal. N.J.S.A. 2C:35-14(j).

(c) Permanent Suspension of Inpatient Treatment Based on Defendant's Progress. If the defendant successfully progresses in outpatient treatment for six months and there is a substantial likelihood that he or she will successfully complete the program, the court may permanently suspend residential treatment, in which case the N.J.S.A. 2C:35-14(k) special monitoring provisions will no longer apply. N.J.S.A. 2C:35-14(j).

10. Mandatory Conditions of Special Probation. As conditions of special probation the defendant must:

- "[E]nter a residential treatment program at a facility licensed and approved by the Division of Addiction Services" or participate in a nonresidential treatment program offered by a licensed and approved treatment provider, N.J.S.A. 2C:35-14(a); and
- Comply with the treatment program rules and with the requirements of treatment, N.J.S.A. 2C:35-14(a); and

- Submit to periodic urine testing for drugs or alcohol, N.J.S.A. 2C:35-14(a); and
- Comply with any other reasonable terms and conditions that the court may impose pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:45-1 (the regular probation statute), N.J.S.A. 2C:35-14(a); and
- Contribute to the cost of treatment, N.J.S.A. 2C:35-14(h); and
- Pay any applicable fine, penalty, fee and restitution award, N.J.S.A. 2C:35-14(i).

11. Modifications of Special Probation. At any time during the special probation term the court may change a defendant's treatment to provide inpatient or outpatient services if the modification "is clinically appropriate and necessary to address the person's present treatment needs." N.J.S.A. 2C:35-14(j).

12. Early Discharge from Special Probation. N.J.S.A. 2C:35-14(l) provides that if the defendant "has made exemplary progress in the course of treatment, the court may, upon recommendation of the person's supervising probation officer or on the court's own motion, and upon notice to the prosecutor, grant early discharge from a term of special probation provided that the person: (1) has satisfactorily completed the treatment program ordered by the court; (2) has served at least two years of special probation; (3) did not commit a substantial violation of any term or condition of special probation, including but not limited to a positive urine test, within the preceding 12 months; and (4) is not likely to relapse or commit an offense if probation supervision and related services are discontinued."

13. Refusal to Give a Urine Sample. If the defendant refuses to undergo urine testing for drug or alcohol usage the court shall permanently revoke special probation unless the court imposes a brief jail term followed by continued special probation, pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:35-14(g). N.J.S.A. 2C:35-14(f)(6).

14. Failure to Complete or Comply with a Treatment Program. "Failure to complete successfully the required treatment program shall constitute a violation of the person's special probation." N.J.S.A. 2C:35-14(f)(7).

15. Escape from Inpatient Treatment. If the defendant commits an act that would constitute an escape from a residential treatment facility "the court shall

forthwith permanently revoke the person's special probation." N.J.S.A. 2C:35-14(f)(6).

16. Violation of Special Probation. In the event the defendant violates a term of special probation, a probation officer or prosecutor may bring an action to revoke special probation, or the court may initiate the action on its own. N.J.S.A. 2C:35-14(f)(7). In deciding whether to revoke special probation the court "shall consider the nature and seriousness of the present infraction and any past infractions in relation to the person's overall progress in the course of treatment, and shall also consider the recommendations of the treatment provider," giving "added weight" to the provider's opinion that the defendant is not amenable to treatment, is unlikely to successfully complete treatment, or should be resentenced to punishment other than special probation. N.J.S.A. 2C:35-14(f)(3).

(a) First Violation. The court may revoke special probation upon a first violation of any term. N.J.S.A. 2C:35-14(f)(1).

(b) Subsequent Violation. The court shall revoke special probation upon a second or subsequent violation unless the court (1) imposes a brief term of incarceration, pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:35-14(g), or (2) "the court finds on the record that there is a substantial likelihood that the person will successfully complete the treatment program if permitted to continue . . . and the court is clearly convinced, considering the nature and seriousness of the violations, that no danger to the community will result." N.J.S.A. 2C:35-14(f)(2). The prosecutor may appeal a decision to allow the defendant to continue special probation. Ibid.

(c) Brief Incarceration in Lieu of Revocation. When the defendant is subject to the presumption of revocation on a second or subsequent violation (N.J.S.A. 2C:35-14(f)(2)), "or when the person refuses to undergo drug or alcohol testing" (N.J.S.A. 2C:35-14(f)(6)), "the court may, in lieu of permanently revoking the person's special probation, impose a term of incarceration for a period of not less than 30 days nor more than six months," followed by continued special probation. N.J.S.A. 2C:35-14(g). "[T]he court shall consider the recommendations of the treatment provider with respect to the likelihood that such confinement would serve to motivate the person to make satisfactory progress in treatment once special probation is reinstated." Ibid. The court may impose a brief term of imprisonment in lieu of revocation only once, "unless the court is clearly convinced that there are compelling and extraordinary reasons to justify reimposing this

disposition." The prosecutor may appeal the decision to impose a subsequent term of imprisonment in lieu of revocation. N.J.S.A. 2C:35-14(g).

(d) Additional Terms of Special Probation in Lieu of Revocation. In the event the court continues special probation after a violation, the court "shall order the person to comply with such additional terms and conditions, including but not limited to more frequent drug or alcohol testing, as are necessary to deter and promptly detect any further violation." N.J.S.A. 2C:35-14(f)(5).

17. Resentencing on the Original Offense after Revocation of Special Probation. If the court revokes special probation, the court shall "conduct a de novo review of any aggravating and mitigating factors present at the time of both original sentencing and resentencing," and "impose any sentence that might have been imposed, or that would have been required to be imposed, originally for the offense." N.J.S.A. 2C:35-14(f)(4). In the event the court imposes incarceration, the defendant shall receive credit for time served in custody or in a residential treatment facility. N.J.S.A. 2C:35-14(f)(4). A defendant who is sentenced to imprisonment for failure to comply with the terms of special probation shall be ineligible for transfer to the Intensive Supervision Program (N.J.S.A. 2C:43-11). N.J.S.A. 2C:35-14(f)(7).

B. Special Probation and Drug Court (renamed Recovery Court): Case Law

1. Purpose of Special Probation. "Special probation is designed to divert otherwise prison-bound offenders into an intensive and highly specialized form of probation designed to 'address in a new and innovative way the problem of drug-dependent offenders caught in a never-ending cycle of involvement in the criminal justice system.'" State v. Bishop, 429 N.J. Super. 533, 540 (App. Div.) (quoting State v. Meyer, 192 N.J. 421, 434-35 (2007)), aff'd o.b., 223 N.J. 290 (2015).

2. Drug Court (renamed Recovery Court) Described. Drug Courts (now called Recovery Courts) are "a highly specialized team process that function within the existing Superior Court structure to address non-violent drug-related cases." Admin. Office of the Courts, Manual for Operation of Adult Drug Courts In New Jersey, Directive #02-02, at 3 (July 2002) (Drug Court Manual), www.njcourts.gov/attorneys/assets/directives/dir_02_02.pdf. The team comprises drug court judges, prosecutors, defense attorneys and drug treatment professionals who closely monitor drug-dependent offenders sentenced to special probation or to regular probation with mandatory drug treatment. Ibid.

Drug courts are not creatures of statute and are not mentioned in Title 2C. State v. Meyer, 192 N.J. 421, 434-35 (2007).

"Although Drug Courts are involved in the implementation of the 'special probation' disposition contained in N.J.S.A. 2C:35-14, they are primarily the creation of our Supreme Court under the Court's 'ultimate constitutional authority to administer our court system, including the drug court program,' and are governed by the Drug Court Manual." State v. Stalter, 440 N.J. Super. 548, 554 (App. Div. 2015) (quoting State v. Meyer, 192 N.J. 421, 424 (2007)).

"What distinguishes Drug Courts from other courts is the 'oversight and personal involvement of the drug court judge in the treatment process.' A team approach is a distinctive feature of Drug Court. The judge leads court staff, probation officers, treatment counselors, substance abuse evaluators, and the prosecutor and defense attorney to monitor a participant's recovery." State v. Meyer, 192 N.J. 421, 428 (2007) (quoting Drug Court Manual at 3).

3. Drug Court (renamed Recovery Court) Tracks. The Drug Court Manual provides for two tracks.

(a) Track One. The first track encompasses defendants who are subject to a presumption of imprisonment or a mandatory term of parole ineligibility and are sentenced to special probation. State v. Harris, 466 N.J. Super. 502, 523 (App. Div. 2021); State v. Stalter, 440 N.J. Super. 548, 554 (App. Div. 2015); Drug Court Manual at 16.

The Presumption of Imprisonment and Mandatory Term of Parole Ineligibility. The presumption of imprisonment and a mandatory term of parole ineligibility applies to the crime for which the defendant is being sentenced, not to any previous crime. State v. Harris, 466 N.J. Super. 502, 536-37, 544-45 (App. Div. 2021).

(b) Track Two. The second track covers drug-dependent nonviolent offenders who do not qualify for special probation but would likely benefit from participation in Drug Court. Drug Court Manual at 16. Offenders within the second track are sentenced to regular probation with the condition that they participate in drug treatment. Id. at 16-17. See also State v. Figaro, 462 N.J. Super. 564, 573 (App. Div. 2020) (explaining that the N.J.S.A. 2C:35-14 criteria for Track One Drug Court does not apply to

Track Two applicants who seek admission to Drug Court as a condition of regular probation). Accord State v. Harris, 466 N.J. Super. 502, 510-11 (App. Div. 2021).

Note: The Drug Court Manual has not been amended to reflect the L. 2012, c. 23, changes to N.J.S.A. 2C:35-14(b). State v. Maurer, 438 N.J. Super. 402, 414 (App. Div. 2014). Those changes removed from the list of offenses that rendered a defendant ineligible for special probation the crimes of second-degree burglary (N.J.S.A. 2C:18-2) and robbery (N.J.S.A. 2C:15-1). L. 2012, c. 23.

4. Drug Dependency at Sentencing Not Required. To be eligible for admission to Drug Court (renamed Recovery Court), a defendant need not be dependent on drugs at the time of sentencing. State v. Clarke, 203 N.J. 166, 181 (2010).

5. Drug Court (renamed Recovery Court) Statute and Manual, De Novo Review. "[A] trial court's application of the Drug Court Statute and Manual . . . involves a question of law," and thus is subject to de novo review. State v. Maurer, 438 N.J. Super. 402, 411 (App. Div. 2014).

6. Merged Offenses and Drug Court (renamed Recovery Court) Eligibility. An offense that precludes a sentence of special probation, pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:35-14(b), survives merger and renders a defendant ineligible for special probation. State v. Ancrum, 449 N.J. Super. 526, 540 (App. Div. 2017) (reversing a sentence of special probation because the defendant committed an aggravated assault). The merged offense is not extinguished for purposes of determining special-probation eligibility. Ibid.

7. Appeal by the State. The State does not have the right to appeal admission to drug court (renamed recovery court) based on a claim that the court erroneously assessed the factors set forth in N.J.S.A. 2C:35-14(a)(2), (3), (4), (5) and (9), as those factors require discretionary factual findings. State v. Hyland, 238 N.J. 135, 139, 147-48 (2019). The State may appeal a drug court sentence based on an erroneous legal determination regarding factors N.J.S.A. 2C:35-14(a)(1), (6), (7) and (8). Id. at 147-48.

8. Violation of Drug Court (renamed Recovery Court) and Jail Credits. Pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:35-14(f)(4), a defendant who violated a term of special probation is entitled to receive jail credit against the violation of special probation sentence for the time the defendant spent in compliance with a residential

treatment program. State v. Stalter, 440 N.J. Super. 548, 554 (App. Div. 2015). The same is not true for a defendant who violated a term of regular probation under Track Two of Drug Court because the treatment that a defendant receives under Track Two is not custodial for purposes of jail credits. Ibid.

Note: Rule 3:21-8(b), which became effective September 1, 2017, now requires jail credit for time spent in a residential treatment facility pursuant to Track One or Two of Drug Court.

9. Resentencing the Original Charge Following Revocation of Special Probation.

(a) Applicable Sentencing Range. Pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:35-14(f)(4), when a defendant violates special probation, the court may resentence to any term it could have imposed at the original sentencing. State v. Hawkins, 461 N.J. Super. 556, 563-64 (App. Div.) (rejecting the argument that the resentencing court must consider time served on special probation (outside of a residential treatment facility) as the equivalent of incarceration in setting a prison term that does not exceed the statutory maximum), certif. denied, 240 N.J. 199 (2019). N.J.S.A. 2C:35-14(f)(4) does not violate the Sixth Amendment prohibition against judicial fact finding to increase the maximum term authorized by the verdict or the defendant's admissions at a plea hearing. State v. Dunlap, 462 N.J. Super. 274, 284 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 244 N.J. 392 (2020).

(b) Mandatory Terms Applicable to Original Charge. In the event the court permanently revokes special probation, "mandatory periods of parole ineligibility and mandatory extended term provisions that existed at the time of original sentencing survive during the term of special probation and remain applicable at the time of resentencing" on the parole violation. State v. Bishop, 429 N.J. Super. 533, 536 (App. Div.), aff'd o.b., 223 N.J. 290 (2015).

(c) De Novo Review of Aggravating and Mitigating Factors. Pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:35-14(f), in resentencing after a violation of special probation, the court conducts a de novo review of the aggravating and mitigating factors, which is different from the Baylass standard applicable to violations of regular probation. State v. Bishop, 429 N.J. Super. 533, 546 (App. Div.), aff'd o.b., 223 N.J. 290 (2015). See the chapter on probation for a discussion of the Baylass standard.

C. Fines Specific to Drug Offenses: Statutory Provisions

The following statutes provide specific fines for certain drug offenses. The fines apply to all drug offender sentences, including special probation. N.J.S.A. 2C:35-14(i).

1. Leader of Narcotics Trafficking Network. N.J.S.A. 2C:35-3 provides that the court may "impose a fine not to exceed \$750,000 or five times the street value of the controlled dangerous substance, controlled substance analog, gamma hydroxybutyrate or flunitrazepam involved, whichever is greater."

2. Maintaining or Operating a Drug Production Facility. N.J.S.A. 2C:35-4 allows "a fine not to exceed \$750,000 or five times the street value of all controlled dangerous substances, controlled substance analogs, gamma hydroxybutyrate or flunitrazepam at any time manufactured or stored at such premises, place or facility, whichever is greater."

3. Manufacturing and Distributing a Controlled Dangerous Substance. N.J.S.A. 2C:35-5(b) authorizes a fine up to \$300,000 or \$500,000, depending on the offense, for first-degree drug manufacturing and distribution; \$25,000 or \$75,000 for a third-degree crime (depending on the offense); and \$25,000 for certain fourth-degree crimes.

4. Manufacturing and Dispensing Gamma Hydroxybutyrate. N.J.S.A. 2C:35-5.2(b) authorizes a fine up to \$150,000 for manufacturing and dispensing gamma hydroxybutyrate.

5. Manufacturing and Dispensing Flunitrazepam. N.J.S.A. 2C:35-5.3(b) and (c) allows a fine not to exceed \$250,000 for first-degree manufacturing and dispensing flunitrazepam, and \$150,000 for a second-degree offense.

6. Employing a Juvenile in a Drug Distribution Scheme. N.J.S.A. 2C:35-6 allows "a fine not to exceed \$500,000 or five times the street value of the controlled dangerous substance or controlled substance analog involved, whichever is greater," for employing a juvenile in a drug distribution scheme.

7. Manufacturing, or Dispensing Drugs on or Near School Property. N.J.S.A. 2C:35-7(a) authorizes a fine not to exceed \$150,000 for manufacturing and distributing drugs on or near school property.

8. Drug Distribution to a Minor or a Pregnant Female. N.J.S.A. 2C:35-8 requires the court to impose, upon application of the prosecutor, "twice the term of imprisonment, fine and penalty, including twice the term of parole ineligibility, if any." If the defendant is convicted of more than one offense, the court must impose one enhanced sentence on the most serious offense. Ibid. The prosecutor must establish the basis for the enhanced sentence by a preponderance of the evidence, and the court must hold a hearing on the matter. Ibid.

Note: The enhanced sentencing provisions of N.J.S.A. 2C:35-8 are subject to waiver under N.J.S.A. 2C:35-12. See section J of this chapter for discussion on the waiver provisions.

9. Possession of a Controlled Dangerous Substance or Analog. N.J.S.A. 2C:35-10(a)(1) to (3) authorize a fine not to exceed \$35,000 for third-degree drug possession, and \$15,000, or \$25,000 for a fourth-degree crime, depending on the circumstances.

10. Possession of Gamma Hydroxybutyrate. N.J.S.A. 2C:35-10.2(b) authorizes a fine up to \$100,000 for possession of gamma hydroxybutyrate.

11. Possession of Flunitrazepam. N.J.S.A. 2C:35-10.3(b) allows a fine up to \$100,000 for possession of flunitrazepam.

12. Distribution of a Prescription Legend Drug. N.J.S.A. 2C:35-10.5(a)(3) and (4) authorize a fine of up to \$200,000 or \$300,000, depending on the circumstances, for distribution of a prescription legend drug.

13. Possession or Distribution of an Imitation Controlled Dangerous Substance. N.J.S.A. 2C:35-11(d) authorizes a fine not to exceed \$200,000 for possession or distribution of an imitation drug.

14. Obtaining a Controlled Dangerous Substance by Fraud. N.J.S.A. 2C:35-13 allows a fine up to \$50,000 for fraudulently obtaining a drug.

D. Penalties, Fees and Assessments Specific to Drug Offenses: Statutory Provisions

The following penalties, fees and assessments apply to all drug offender sentences, including special probation. N.J.S.A. 2C:35-14(i).

1. Drug Offender Restraining Orders. N.J.S.A. 2C:35-5.7(h) provides that after conviction "for any criminal offense, the court, upon application of a law enforcement officer or prosecuting attorney pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:35-5.9 [certification of offense location] and except as provided in subsection e. of this section, shall, by separate order or within the judgment of conviction, issue an order prohibiting the person from entering" the place where the offense occurred. Continuing compliance with the terms of the restraining order shall be a condition of probation, participation in the Intensive Supervision Program, and post-confinement release. N.J.S.A. 2C:35-5.7(j).

(a) Exception. N.J.S.A. 2C:35-5.7(e) provides: "The court may forego issuing a restraining order . . . only if the defendant establishes by clear and convincing evidence that":

(1) "the defendant lawfully resides at or has legitimate business on or near the place, or otherwise legitimately needs to enter the place. In such an event, the court shall not issue" a restraining order "unless the court is clearly convinced that the need to bar the person from the place in order to protect the public safety and the rights, safety and health of the residents and persons working in the place outweighs the person's interest in returning to the place." The court may also impose an order permitting entry with conditions; or

(2) imposition of a restraining order "would cause undue hardship to innocent persons and would constitute a serious injustice which overrides the need to protect the rights, safety and health of persons residing in or having business in the place."

(b) Duration of the Order. The order "shall remain in effect for such period of time as shall be fixed by the court but not longer than the maximum term of imprisonment or incarceration allowed by law for the underlying offense or offenses." N.J.S.A. 2C:35-5.7(j).

(c) **Appeal by the State.** If the court denies a request to impose a restraining order, the sentence shall not be final for ten days to allow the State time to file an appeal. N.J.S.A. 2C:35-5.7(k).

(d) **Applications to Stay or Modify the Order.** Applications to stay or modify an order "including an order originally issued in municipal court, shall be made in the Superior Court. The court shall immediately notify the county prosecutor in writing whenever an application is made." N.J.S.A. 2C:35-5.7(k).

(e) **Violation of the Order.** Pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:35-5.8, violation of an order "shall subject the person to civil contempt, criminal contempt, revocation of bail, probation or parole, or any combination of these sanctions and any other sanctions authorized by law. A law enforcement officer may arrest an adult . . . when an officer has probable cause to believe that the person has violated the terms of any removal and restraining order issued pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:35-5.7."

2. Drug Enforcement and Demand Reduction Penalty for Certain Offenses. N.J.S.A. 2C:35-5.11 provides: "Any person who possesses, distributes, dispenses or has under his control with intent to distribute or dispense 3,4-methylenedioxymeth-amphetamine, 3,4-methylenedioxyamphetamine, gammabutyrolactone, gamma hydroxybutyrate or flunitrazepam, or a controlled substance analog of any of these substances, shall, . . . be subject to a drug enforcement and demand reduction penalty of twice the amount otherwise applicable to the offense."

3. Drug Distribution to a Minor or a Pregnant Female. N.J.S.A. 2C:35-8 requires the court to impose, upon application of the prosecutor, "twice the term of imprisonment, fine and penalty, including twice the term of parole ineligibility, if any, authorized or required to be imposed by" N.J.S.A. 2C:35-5(b) (drug distribution) or N.J.S.A. 2C:35-7 (distribution within a school zone) "or any other provision of this title." If the defendant is convicted of more than one offense, the court must impose one enhanced sentence on the most serious offense. Ibid. The prosecutor must establish the basis for the enhanced sentence by a preponderance of the evidence, and the court must hold a hearing on the matter. Ibid.

Note: The enhanced sentencing provisions of N.J.S.A. 2C:35-8 are subject to waiver under N.J.S.A. 2C:35-12. See section J of this chapter for a discussion of the waiver provisions.

4. Possession of a Controlled Dangerous Substance or Analog. N.J.S.A. 2C:35-10(a) requires the defendant to "perform not less than 100 hours of community service" if the court does not impose a prison term and the defendant committed the crime while inside a school bus or within 1000 feet of school property.

5. Counterfeit Drugs and Medical Devices. N.J.S.A. 2C:35-11.1 (eff. July 11, 2020) requires a penalty between \$1000 and \$10,000 for each violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:35-11.1(a), which prohibits knowing possession of a counterfeit drug or medical device with intent to distribute. N.J.S.A. 2C:35-11.2 (eff. July 11, 2020) provides that anyone convicted of an offense under N.J.S.A. 2C:35-11.1 shall be ineligible to submit a bid to the State.

6. Drug Enforcement and Demand Reduction Penalty. N.J.S.A. 2C:35-15(a)(1) requires the court to impose the following drug enforcement and demand reduction (DEDR) penalties on a person convicted of a Chapter 35 or 36 drug offense:

- \$3000 for a first-degree crime;
- \$2000 for a second-degree crime;
- \$1000 for a third-degree crime;
- \$750 for a fourth-degree crime; and
- \$500 for a disorderly persons or petty disorderly persons offense.

(a) Multiple Offenses. N.J.S.A. 2C:35-15(a)(2)(a) and (b) provide that the court may, in its discretion, impose one penalty based on the highest degree offense if: (1) the defendant was not placed in supervisory treatment or ordered to perform reformatory service; (2) "multiple penalties would constitute a serious hardship that outweighs the need to deter the defendant from future criminal activity"; and (3) "imposition of a single penalty would foster the defendant's rehabilitation."

(b) Treatment Program in Lieu of Payment. N.J.S.A. 2C:35-15(e) authorizes the court to suspend collection of the penalty "provided the

person is ordered by the court to participate in a drug or alcohol rehabilitation program," and the defendant "agrees to pay for all or some portion of the costs associated with the rehabilitation." Upon proof of successful completion of the program the defendant may request the court reduce the penalty by any amount the defendant paid for participation in the program. Ibid.

(c) Service in Lieu of Payment. N.J.S.A. 2C:35-15(f) provides that the defendant "may propose to the court and the prosecutor a plan to perform reformatory service in lieu of payment of up to one-half of the penalty amount imposed."

7. Drug Offenses and License Forfeiture. N.J.S.A. 2C:35-16(a) requires forfeiture of a defendant's driver's license for a period between six months and two years absent compelling circumstances and upon conviction of a drug offense under Chapter 35 or 36 of Title 2C. "[C]ompelling circumstances warranting an exception exist if the forfeiture . . . will result in extreme hardship and alternative means of transportation are not available."

Post-Sentencing Motion to Revoke the License Suspension. N.J.S.A. 2C:35-16(d) allows the defendant to request the court revoke a remaining license suspension term based on compelling circumstances.

8. Controlled Dangerous Substance Lab Fee. N.J.S.A. 2C:35-20(a) and (b) require that: a \$50 criminal laboratory analysis fee be imposed on anyone convicted of a Chapter 35 drug offense; a \$50 criminal laboratory fee be imposed on anyone placed in supervisory treatment pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:36A-1 or N.J.S.A. 2C:43-12; and a \$25 laboratory analysis fee be imposed on anyone adjudicated delinquent for a Chapter 35 offense.

9. Anti-Drug Profiteering Penalty. N.J.S.A. 2C:35A-3 provides that where a person has been convicted of a Chapter 35 or 36 drug crime, any street gang crime, as defined by N.J.S.A. 2C:44-3(h), "or an attempt or conspiracy to commit such a crime, the court shall, upon the application of the prosecutor, sentence the person to pay a monetary penalty" "provided the court finds at a hearing, which may occur at the time of sentencing, that the prosecutor has established by a preponderance of the evidence one or more of" the following grounds:

- The defendant was convicted of violating N.J.S.A. 2C:35-3 (leader of a narcotics trafficking network), N.J.S.A. 2C:5-2(g) (leader of organized

- crime), or a Chapter 41 racketeering offense that involved the manufacture, distribution, possession with intent to distribute, or transportation of any controlled dangerous substance or analog, N.J.S.A. 2C:35A-(b)(1); or
- "A defendant is a drug profiteer when the conduct constituting the crime shows that the person has knowingly engaged in the illegal manufacture, distribution or transportation of any controlled dangerous substance, controlled substance analog or drug paraphernalia as a substantial source of livelihood," N.J.S.A. 2C:35A-3(b)(2); or
 - "A defendant is a wholesale drug distributor when the conduct constituting the crime involves the manufacture, distribution or intended or attempted distribution of a controlled dangerous substance or controlled substance analog to any other person for pecuniary gain, knowing, believing, or under circumstances where it reasonably could be assumed that such other person would in turn distribute the substance to another or others for pecuniary gain." N.J.S.A. 2C:35A-3(b)(3)(a). If the sole basis for the penalty is the defendant's status as a wholesale distributor, the court shall not impose the penalty "if the defendant establishes by a preponderance of the evidence . . . that his participation in the conduct constituting the crime was limited solely to operating a conveyance used to transport a controlled dangerous substance or controlled substance analog, or loading or unloading the substance into such a conveyance or storage facility," N.J.S.A. 2C:35A-3(b)(3)(b); or
 - "The defendant is a professional drug distributor," N.J.S.A. 2C:35A-3(b)(4); or
 - "The defendant was involved in criminal street gang related activity," N.J.S.A. 2C:35A-3(b)(5).

Penalty Amounts. N.J.S.A. 2C:35A-4 provides the following penalty amounts, which may be paid in installments, N.J.S.A. 2C:35A-6:

- \$200,000 (first-degree crime); \$100,000 (second-degree crime); \$50,000 (third-degree crime); \$25,000 (fourth-degree crime); or

- "[T]hree times the street value of all controlled dangerous substances or controlled substance analogs involved, or three times the market value of all drug paraphernalia involved, if this amount is greater than that provided" above; or
- "[A]n amount equal to three times the value of any benefit illegally obtained by the actor for himself or another, or any injury to or benefit deprived of another."

Note: This statute is subject to the N.J.S.A. 2C:35-12 waiver provision, discussed further in section J of this chapter.

10. Drug Abuse Education Assessment. N.J.S.A. 2C:43-3.5(a) requires the court to impose a \$50 assessment for each drug offense under Chapter 35 or 36 of Title 2C.

E. Merger of Certain Drug Offenses: Statutory Provisions

The following statutes prohibit certain drug offenses from merging into other offenses. For purposes of special probation, the court need not determine whether offenses merge because eligibility is based on the defendant's conviction and substance abuse.

1. Leader of a Narcotics Trafficking Network. N.J.S.A. 2C:35-3 precludes merger with any offense that is the object of the conspiracy.

2. Booby Traps in the Manufacturing or Distribution of Drugs. N.J.S.A. 2C:35-4.1(e) prohibits the conviction from merging with a conviction for any offense in Chapter 35, or for a conspiracy or attempt to commit an offense under Chapter 35.

3. Employing a Juvenile in a Drug Distribution Scheme. N.J.S.A. 2C:35-6 provides that the conviction shall not merge with a conviction for a violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:35-3 (leader of narcotics trafficking network), N.J.S.A. 2C:35-4 (maintaining or operating a CDS production facility), N.J.S.A. 2C:35-5 (manufacturing, distributing or dispensing), or N.J.S.A. 2C:35-9 (strict liability for drug induced death).

4. Manufacturing, Distributing or Dispensing a Controlled Dangerous Substance on School Property. N.J.S.A. 2C:35-7(c) precludes the conviction

from merging with a conviction under N.J.S.A. 2C:35-5 (manufacturing, distributing or dispensing) or N.J.S.A. 2C:35-6 (employing a juvenile in a drug distribution scheme).

5. Drug Distribution within 500 Feet of Public Property. N.J.S.A. 2C:35-7.1(c) precludes merger with a conviction under N.J.S.A. 2C:35-5 (manufacturing, distributing or dispensing), or N.J.S.A. 2C:35-6 (employing a juvenile in a drug distribution scheme).

6. Drug Induced Death. N.J.S.A. 2C:35-9(d) precludes merger "with a conviction for leader of narcotics trafficking network, maintaining or operating a controlled dangerous substance production facility, or for unlawfully manufacturing, distributing, dispensing or possessing with intent to manufacture, distribute or dispense the controlled dangerous substance or controlled substance analog which resulted in the death."

7. Possession of a Weapon during a Drug or Bias Crime. N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4.1(d) prohibits merger with any of the following offenses:

- Leader of a narcotics trafficking network (N.J.S.A. 2C:35-3);
- Maintaining or operating a drug production facility (N.J.S.A. 2C:35-4);
- Manufacturing or distributing drugs (N.J.S.A. 2C:35-5);
- Manufacturing and dispensing Gamma Hydroxybutyrate (N.J.S.A. 2C:35-5.2);
- Manufacturing and dispensing Flunitrazepam (N.J.S.A. 2C:35-5.3);
- Employing a juvenile in a drug distribution scheme (N.J.S.A. 2C:35-6);
- Possession of drugs on or near school property (N.J.S.A. 2C:35-7);
- Distribution or possession of drugs on public property (N.J.S.A. 2C:35-7.1);
- Possession, distribution or manufacturing imitation drugs (N.J.S.A. 2C:35-11); and

- Bias intimidation (N.J.S.A. 2C:16-1).

F. Standards Relating to Imprisonment: Statutory Provisions

1. Presumption of Non-Imprisonment Inapplicable to Distribution to a Minor or Pregnant Female. While third-degree crimes are usually subject to the presumption of non-imprisonment, N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(e), the crime of drug distribution to a minor or a pregnant female is not subject to the presumption of non-imprisonment. N.J.S.A. 2C:35-8.

2. Enhanced Ordinary Terms for Certain Offenses. The following offenses require enhanced ordinary terms.

(a) Leader of a Narcotics Trafficking Network: life imprisonment with a twenty-five-year period of parole ineligibility. N.J.S.A. 2C:35-3.

Note: This statute is subject to the N.J.S.A. 2C:35-12 waiver provision and Attorney General Law Enforcement Directive No. 2021-4, "Directive Revising Statewide Guidelines Concerning the Waiver of Mandatory Minimum Sentences in Non-Violent Drug Cases Pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:35-12" (April 19, 2021) (eff. May 19, 2021), discussed further in section J of this chapter.

(b) Drug Distribution to a Minor or a Pregnant Female: "twice the term of imprisonment, fine and penalty . . . authorized or required to be imposed by" any provision of Title 2. N.J.S.A. 2C:35-8.

Note: This statute is subject to the N.J.S.A. 2C:35-12 waiver provision and Attorney General Law Enforcement Directive No. 2021-4, "Directive Revising Statewide Guidelines Concerning the Waiver of Mandatory Minimum Sentences in Non-Violent Drug Cases Pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:35-12" (April 19, 2021) (eff. May 19, 2021) discussed further in section J of this chapter.

G. Parole Ineligibility: Statutory Provisions

The following statutes mandate parole disqualifiers for certain drug offenses. However, with the exception of the No Early Release Act (N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.2), all

have been effectively rendered unenforceable by Attorney General Law Enforcement Directive No. 2021-4, "Directive Revising Statewide Guidelines Concerning the Waiver of Mandatory Minimum Sentences in Non-Violent Drug Cases Pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:35-12" (April 19, 2021) (eff. May 19, 2021), which requires the prosecutor to waive the mandatory parole-bar in non-violent drug offenses. Section J of this chapter discusses the Directive.

1. Leader of a Narcotics Trafficking Network. N.J.S.A. 2C:35-3 requires the court to impose a life sentence with a twenty-five-year period of parole ineligibility.

2. Maintaining or Operating a Controlled Dangerous Substance Production Facility. N.J.S.A. 2C:35-4 requires a period of parole ineligibility between one-third and one-half of the sentence imposed.

3. First-Degree Manufacturing, Distributing or Dispensing Certain Controlled Dangerous Substances. N.J.S.A. 2C:35-5(b)(1) and (6) require a period of parole ineligibility between one-third and one-half of the sentence imposed.

4. Employing a Juvenile in a Drug Distribution Scheme. N.J.S.A. 2C:35-6 mandates a period of parole ineligibility at or between one-third and one-half of the sentence imposed, or five years, whichever is greater.

5. Manufacturing, Distributing or Dispensing a Controlled Dangerous Substance on or Near School Property. N.J.S.A. 2C:35-7(a) provides that if the offense involved less than one ounce of marijuana, the period of parole ineligibility must be between one-third and one-half of the sentence imposed, or one year, whichever is greater, and in all other cases the period of parole ineligibility must be at or between one-third and one-half of the sentence imposed, or three years, whichever is greater.

6. Drug Distribution to a Minor or a Pregnant Female. N.J.S.A. 2C:35-8 requires the court to impose "twice the term of parole ineligibility, if any, authorized or required to be imposed by" N.J.S.A. 2C:35-5(b) (drug distribution) or N.J.S.A. 2C:35-7 (distribution within a school zone) "or any other provision of this title," upon application of the prosecutor. If the defendant is convicted of more than one offense, the court must impose one enhanced sentence on the most serious offense. Ibid.

7. The No Early Release Act. N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.2 requires the court to fix "a minimum term of 85% of the sentence imposed, during which the defendant shall not be eligible for parole," and impose a five-year term of parole supervision (first-degree crime), or a three-year term of parole supervision (second-degree crime) for the following first- and second-degree drug crimes:

- Booby traps in manufacturing or distributing a controlled dangerous substance (N.J.S.A. 2C:35-4.1(b)); and
- Drug induced deaths (N.J.S.A. 2C:35-9).

H. Extended Terms: Statutory Provisions

The following offenses mandate extended terms for certain drug offenses. Extended terms are inapplicable to special probation, which may not exceed five years. N.J.S.A. 2C:35-14(a).

Note: The following statutes are subject to the N.J.S.A. 2C:35-12 waiver provision and Attorney General Law Enforcement Directive No. 2021-4, "Directive Revising Statewide Guidelines Concerning the Waiver of Mandatory Minimum Sentences in Non-Violent Drug Cases Pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:35-12 (April 19, 2021) (eff. May 19, 2021) discussed further in section J of this chapter.

1. Drug Distribution to a Minor or a Pregnant Female. N.J.S.A. 2C:35-8 requires the court to impose, upon application of the prosecutor, "twice the term of imprisonment, fine and penalty, including twice the term of parole ineligibility, if any, authorized or required to be imposed by" N.J.S.A. 2C:35-5(b) (drug distribution) or N.J.S.A. 2C:35-7 (distribution within a school zone) "or any other provision of this title." If the defendant is convicted of more than one offense, the court shall impose one enhanced sentence on the most serious offense. Ibid.

2. Repeat Drug Offender. N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6(f) provides that upon application of the prosecutor, the court must impose an extended term with a parole disqualifier against anyone convicted of the following crimes if the defendant also has a prior conviction of "manufacturing, distributing, dispensing or possessing with intent to distribute a controlled dangerous substance or controlled substance analog":

- Manufacturing, distributing, dispensing or possessing with intent to distribute any dangerous substance or controlled substance analog (N.J.S.A. 2C:35-5);

- Maintaining or operating a controlled dangerous substance production facility (N.J.S.A. 2C:35-4);
- Employing a juvenile in a drug distribution scheme (N.J.S.A. 2C:35-6);
- Being a leader of a narcotics trafficking network (N.J.S.A. 2C:35-3); or
- Distributing, dispensing or possessing with intent to distribute within a school zone (N.J.S.A. 2C:35-7).

(a) Hearing. The prosecutor must establish the ground for imposing sentence pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:35-6(f) at a hearing, which may occur at the time of sentencing. N.J.S.A. 2C:35-6(f).

(b) Separation of Powers. As written, N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6(f) violates the doctrine of separation of powers by giving unfettered power to prosecutors in the sentencing determination. State v. Lagares, 127 N.J. 20, 31 (1992). Hence, our Court has interpreted the statute as requiring guidelines to assist prosecutorial decision-making, while reflecting the legislative intent that extended sentences for repeat drug offenders should not be the exception. State v. Lagares, 127 N.J. 20, 32 (1992).

(c) Guidelines. For the guidelines effective May 20, 1998, see Attorney General Guidelines for Negotiating Cases Under N.J.S.A. 2C:35-12, available at www.nj.gov/lps/dcj/pdfs/agguid.pdf. Effective for offenses committed on or after September 15, 2004, the Attorney General promulgated revised guidelines available at www.nj.gov/lps/dcj/agguide/directives/brimage_all.pdf. For a discussion of the statewide guidelines issued in response to Lagares, see State v. Kirk, 145 N.J. 159, 168-69 (1996).

I. Consecutive Terms: Statutory Provisions

The following statutes mandate consecutive prison terms for certain drug offenses.

1. Booby Traps in the Manufacturing or Distribution of Drugs. N.J.S.A. 2C:35-4.1(e) requires the sentence be served consecutively to the sentence for a conviction of any offense in Chapter 35, or a conspiracy or attempt to commit an

offense under Chapter 35, "unless the court, in consideration of the character and circumstances of the defendant, finds that imposition of consecutive sentences would be a serious injustice which overrides the need to deter such conduct by others. If the court does not impose a consecutive sentence, the sentence shall not become final for 10 days in order to permit the appeal of such sentence by the prosecution."

2. Possession of a Weapon during a Drug or Bias Crime. N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4.1(d) requires the sentence run consecutively to the sentence for any of the following offenses:

- Leader of a narcotics trafficking network (N.J.S.A. 2C:35-3);
- Maintaining or operating a drug production facility (N.J.S.A. 2C:35-4);
- Manufacturing or distributing drugs (N.J.S.A. 2C:35-5);
- Manufacturing and dispensing Gamma Hydroxybutyrate (N.J.S.A. 2C:35-5.2);
- Manufacturing and dispensing Flunitrazepam (N.J.S.A. 2C:35-5.3);
- Employing a juvenile in a drug distribution scheme (N.J.S.A. 2C:35-6);
- Possession of drugs on or near school property (N.J.S.A. 2C:35-7);
- Distribution or possession of drugs on public property (N.J.S.A. 2C:35-7.1);
- Possession, distribution or manufacturing imitation drugs (N.J.S.A. 2C:35-11); and
- Bias intimidation (N.J.S.A. 2C:16-1).

J. N.J.S.A. 2C:35-12 Waiver of Drug Offender Sentencing Enhancements: Statutory Provisions and Directive # 2021-4

The N.J.S.A. 2C:35-12 waiver provisions apply to certain mandatory parole disqualifiers, extended terms, and drug offense penalties.

1. Statutory Authority. N.J.S.A. 2C:35-12 provides that when an offense in Chapter 35 of Title 2C (drug offenses) imposes a mandatory term of parole ineligibility, a mandatory extended term that includes a period of parole ineligibility, or an anti-drug profiteering penalty pursuant to Chapter 35A of Title 2C, the court "shall impose the mandatory sentence or anti-drug profiteering penalty unless the defendant has pleaded guilty pursuant to a negotiated agreement or, in cases resulting in trial, the defendant and the prosecution have entered into a post-conviction agreement, which provides for a lesser sentence, period of parole ineligibility or anti-drug profiteering penalty" (emphasis added). The agreement "may provide for a specified term of imprisonment within the range of ordinary or extended sentences authorized by law, a specified period of parole ineligibility, a specified fine, a specified anti-drug profiteering penalty, or other disposition." Ibid.

2. Constitutionality of N.J.S.A. 2C:35-12 and the Brimage Guidelines. To effectuate judicial review and avoid arbitrary and capricious decisions, the prosecutor must make N.J.S.A. 2C:35-12 decisions based on written standards. State v. Vasquez, 129 N.J. 189, 195-96 (1992). The Brimage guidelines contain a "Table of Authorized Plea Offers," which "sets forth presumptive plea offers based on a defendant's offense, his prior criminal history, and the timing of the plea offer." State v. Fowlkes, 169 N.J. 387, 394 (2001).

3. Directive # 2021-4, Waiver of Parole Bars for Non-Violent Drug Offenses. Attorney General Law Enforcement Directive No. 2021-4, Directive Revising Statewide Guidelines Concerning the Waiver of Mandatory Minimum Sentences in Non-Violent Drug Cases Pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:35-12 (April 19, 2021) (eff. May 19, 2021) (available at www.nj.gov/oag/newsreleases21/AG-Directive-2021-4_Mandatory-Minimum-Drug-Sentences.pdf) requires the prosecutor to waive the mandatory parole-bar required by the following statutes:

- N.J.S.A 2C:35-3 (leader of a narcotics trafficking network)
- N.J.S.A. 2C:35-4 (maintaining or operating a drug facility)
- N.J.S.A. 2C:35-5 (maintaining, distribution or dispensing drugs)
- N.J.S.A. 2C:35-6 (employing a juvenile in a drug distribution scheme)

- N.J.S.A. 2C:35-7 (drug distribution in a school zone)
- N.J.S.A. 2C:35-8 (drug distribution to a minor)

(a) **Broad Application.** The Directive applies broadly to plea negotiations and probation violation proceedings as well as post-conviction proceedings. Directive # 2021-4 at 5. For defendants serving sentences with a mandatory parole-bar imposed pursuant to the foregoing statutes, the defendant may request that the parole bar be eliminated. Ibid. Upon such a request, the prosecutor must file a joint application to modify the sentence. Ibid.

(b) **Discretionarily Imposed Parole Bars.** The prosecutor may still request a discretionary parole-bar for the foregoing crimes if the aggravating sentencing factors substantially outweigh the mitigating factors. Directive # 2021-4 at 7.

K. Drug Offender Sentencing Enhancements: Case Law

1. Drug Offense Penalties.

(a) **Conspiracy.** "[T]he mere conviction under N.J.S.A. 2C:5-2 for the 'ordinary' crime of conspiracy, does not render a person subject to the mandatory penalties of the Comprehensive Drug Reform Act, even if the object of that conspiracy constitutes a Chapter 35 offense." State in the Interest of W.M., 237 N.J. Super. 111, 118 (App. Div. 1989).

(b) **Accomplices.** A defendant convicted of a drug offense as an accomplice is subject to the mandatory drug offense penalties. State v. Bram, 246 N.J. Super. 200, 208 (Law Div. 1990).

2. Drug Offender Restraining Orders. Where the court denies a N.J.S.A. 2C:35-5.7(h) request to impose a drug offender restraining order, N.J.S.A. 2C:35-5.7(k) imposes a ten-day limitation period on the State's right to appeal. State v. Fitzpatrick, 443 N.J. Super. 316, 320 (App. Div. 2015).

3. Drug Offense License Suspension.

(a) **Multiple Offenses.** Where a court imposes sentence for multiple drug offenses subject to the mandatory forfeitures of one's driver's license,

pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:35-16, the license suspension terms must run concurrently. State in the Interest of T.B., 134 N.J. 382, 387 (1993).

(b) Timing. License suspension under N.J.S.A. 2C:35-16(a) begins on the day of sentencing; the court has no discretion to postpone or delay it. State v. Hudson, 286 N.J. Super. 149, 154-55 (App. Div. 1995). In the case of a juvenile, license suspension begins the day after the defendant's seventeenth birthday. State in the Interest of T.B., 134 N.J. 382, 388 (1993); State in the Interest of J.R., 244 N.J. Super. 630, 641 (App. Div. 1990). If the defendant's license is under suspension at the time of sentencing, then the new license suspension will begin on the final day of the current suspension. State in the Interest of T.B., 134 N.J. 382, 388 (1993).

(c) License Forfeiture Exception. In determining whether compelling circumstance exist to justify not revoking a defendant's driving privileges under N.J.S.A. 2C:35-16(a), the court should consider whether revocation will result in the defendant's loss of employment or extreme hardship. State v. Bendix, 396 N.J. Super. 91, 95-96 (App. Div. 2007). Where a defendant "has occasioned the loss of his employment through his unauthorized and criminal use of his employer's vehicle," the court should find no compelling circumstances to justify not revoking the defendant's license. State v. Carrero, 399 N.J. Super. 419, 425-26 (Law Div. 2007).

4. The Drug Enforcement and Demand Reduction (DEDR) Penalty.

(a) Policy. "As its name suggests, the penalty is designed to reduce the demand for drugs by providing a source for helping convicted defendants to reduce their demand for illegal substances." State v. Monzon, 300 N.J. Super. 173, 177 (App. Div. 1997).

(b) Treatment Program in Lieu of Payment and Wages. In reducing a penalty pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:35-15(e) by the amount actually paid for participation in a treatment program, the court should consider the amount withheld from a defendant's pay for work completed at the treatment program. State v. Monzon, 300 N.J. Super. 173, 177-78 (App. Div. 1997).

(c) Constitutionality. The drug enforcement and demand reduction penalty does not constitute cruel and unusual punishment under the Federal or State Constitution, and does not violate the equal protection clauses, substantive or procedural due process rights, or the State constitutional prohibition

against amendment by reference. State v. Lagares, 127 N.J. 20, 36-37 (1992); State in the Interest of L.M., 229 N.J. Super. 88, 94-102 (App. Div. 1988).

(d) Merger and Conspiracy. "Since the principle of merger involves the avoidance of double penalties for the same crime, Chapter 35 DEDR penalties may not be imposed on a conviction for both conspiracy to possess a controlled dangerous substance, N.J.S.A. 2C:5-2, and for the actual possession under N.J.S.A. 2C:35-10." State in the Interest of M.A., 227 N.J. Super. 393, 395 (Ch. Div. 1988).

(e) Pretrial Intervention Program. The court may impose a drug enforcement and demand reduction penalty as a condition of entry into a pretrial intervention program. State v. Bulu, 234 N.J. Super. 331, 342, 346-48 (App. Div. 1989).

(f) The DEDR Penalty Is Mandatory. The DEDR penalty is mandatory and must be set in accordance with the degree of crime of which the defendant was convicted. State v. Malia, 287 N.J. Super. 198, 208 (App. Div. 1996); State v. Williams, 225 N.J. Super. 462, 464 (Law Div. 1988). The court may not revoke the penalty after sentencing. State v. Gardner, 252 N.J. Super. 462, 465-66 (Law Div. 1991).

5. Drug Offender Fines.

(a) Drug-Buy Money. The court may consider money the defendant received in selling drugs when determining the defendant's ability to pay a fine. State v. Newman, 132 N.J. 159, 177-79 (1993).

(b) Order of Payment. A defendant convicted of a drug offense must pay the Victims of Crime Compensation Board assessment (N.J.S.A. 2C:43-3.1), laboratory fee (N.J.S.A. 2C:35-20), and the drug enforcement and demand reduction penalty (N.J.S.A. 2C:35-15) before paying a fine. State v. Newman, 132 N.J. 159, 178 (1993).

6. Merger

(a) Drug Distribution and Distribution in a School Zone. While N.J.S.A. 2C:35-7(c) precludes merger of distribution-within-a-school-zone with a N.J.S.A. 2C:35-5 distribution conviction, subjecting a defendant to

punishment under both statutes would violate principles of double jeopardy because N.J.S.A. 2C:35-5 does not require proof of any additional element. State v. Dillihay, 127 N.J. 42, 45, 51(1992); State v. Brana, 127 N.J. 64, 67 (1992). To comply with double jeopardy principles, a N.J.S.A. 2C:35-7 conviction must merge with a N.J.S.A. 2C:35-5 distribution conviction, but the N.J.S.A. 2C:35-7 period of parole ineligibility survives the merger. State v. Dillihay, 127 N.J. 42, 54 (1992); State v. Brana, 127 N.J. 64, 67 (1992).

(b) Drug Distribution and Distribution on Public Property. The same rationale applies to the anti-merger provision of N.J.S.A. 2C:35-7.1(c) (precluding merger of a conviction for distributing within 500 feet of a public housing facility, public park, or public building with a conviction under N.J.S.A. 2C:35-5 (drug distribution), or N.J.S.A. 2C:35-6 (employing a juvenile to distribute drugs)). State v. Gregory, 336 N.J. Super. 601, 607 (App. Div. 2001) (merging a third-degree conviction under N.J.S.A. 2C:35-5 into a second-degree conviction under N.J.S.A. 2C:35-7.1); State v. Parker, 335 N.J. Super. 415, 420 (App. Div. 2000) (holding that a "third-degree conviction under N.J.S.A. 2C:35-7 should have merged into" the defendant's N.J.S.A. 2C:35-7.1 second-degree conviction, with the mandatory minimum term's surviving merger).

(c) Drug Induced Death and Drug Distribution. Although the antimerger provision of N.J.S.A. 2C:35-9(d) (drug induced death) explicitly prohibits merger into a conviction under N.J.S.A. 2C:35-5(a) (drug distribution), a Section 5 offense will merge into a Section 9 offense if the crimes arise out of the same transaction. State v. Maldonado, 137 N.J. 536, 583 (1994).

(d) Constitutional Rights and Merger of Use of Booby Traps during Drug Distribution or Manufacturing. N.J.S.A. 2C:35- 4.1(e) (precluding merger of a conviction for using booby traps in connection with drug manufacturing or distribution with a drug offense) does not violate a defendant's right to due process or to protection against double jeopardy under either the federal or State Constitution. State v. Walker, 385 N.J. Super. 388, 408-11 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 187 N.J. 83 (2006).

7. Constitutionality of the Enhanced Ordinary Term for Leader of a Drug Trafficking Network. The requirement that a leader of a narcotics trafficking network serve an ordinary term of life imprisonment with twenty-five years of parole ineligibility (N.J.S.A. 2C:35-3) does not constitute cruel and unusual punishment. State v. Kadonsky, 288 N.J. Super. 41, 45 (App. Div. 1996).

8. Parole Ineligibility.

(a) Transfer to a Drug Treatment Program. A defendant serving a term that includes a period of parole ineligibility pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:35-7 (drug distribution within a school zone) may not obtain transfer to a drug treatment program until he or she completes the mandatory parole ineligibility period. State v. Diggs, 333 N.J. Super. 7, 10-11 (App. Div. 2000). Similarly, a defendant cannot obtain a transfer to a drug treatment program until any Graves Act mandatory term has been served. State v. Mendel, 212 N.J. Super. 110, 113 (App. Div. 1986).

(b) Day Care Facility Not "School" Under Statute on Drug Distribution within a School Zone. "The plain legislative intent [of N.J.S.A. 2C:35-7] to exclude day care providers, nursery schools, and preschool programs suggests that the statute was not meant to apply to a facility such as the Goddard School, a licensed day care provider," even though the Goddard School teaches a kindergarten class. State v. Shelley, 205 N.J. 320, 328-30 (2011).

(c) Indeterminate Terms in Young Adult Offender Drug Cases. A defendant subject to the mandatory parole ineligibility provisions of N.J.S.A. 2C:35-5(b)(1) (drug distribution) and N.J.S.A. 2C:35-7 (distribution within a school zone) may not be sentenced to an indeterminate term as a young adult offender pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:43-5. State v. Luna, 278 N.J. Super. 433, 437-38 (App. Div. 1995).

9. Repeat Drug Offender Extended Term.

(a) Arbitrary and Capricious Challenge. Prosecutors must state on the record their reasons for seeking an extended term with a parole disqualifier pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6(f), and the court may deny the request where a defendant clearly and convincingly establishes that the prosecutor's decision was arbitrary and capricious. State v. Lagares, 127 N.J. 20, 32-33 (1992).

(b) Sixth Amendment. The requirement that the court make findings on which to base a mandatory extended term with parole disqualifier falls within the "prior conviction" exception of Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 301 (2004), and thus does not offend the Sixth Amendment requirement

that a jury make such findings. State v. Thomas, 188 N.J. 137, 149-52 (2006).

(c) Chronology of Offenses and Convictions. The chronological sequence of the offenses and convictions is irrelevant for purposes of N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6(f). State v. Hill, 327 N.J. Super. 33, 41-42 (App. Div. 1999), certif. denied, 164 N.J. 188 (2000). The only requirement is that there be a previous conviction "at any time." Ibid. But where a defendant enters guilty pleas to two different charges on the same day, in the same proceeding, pursuant to one agreement, then N.J.S.A. 43-6(f) will not be applicable. State v. Owens, 381 N.J. Super. 503, 512-13 (App. Div. 2005).

(d) The Dunbar Factors. The factors set forth in State v. Dunbar, 108 N.J. 80 (1987), as modified in State v. Jefimowicz, 119 N.J. 152 (1990), for setting an extended term apply when imposing a mandatory extended term with parole ineligibility under N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6(f). State v. Vasquez, 374 N.J. Super. 252, 267 (App. Div. 2005); State v. Williams, 310 N.J. Super. 92, 98-99 (App. Div. 1998).

10. Museum as Public Property for Drug Distribution. A museum qualifies as a public building under N.J.S.A. 2C:35-7.1 (prohibiting drug distribution on public property), even if it does not have regular and consistent hours and is open to the public only upon request. State v. Chambers, 396 N.J. Super. 259, 263-66 (App. Div. 2007).

11. The N.J.S.A. 2C:35-12 Provision Allowing Waiver of Certain Drug Offender Sentencing Enhancements.

(a) Constitutionality of the N.J.S.A. 2C:35-12 Waiver Provision. Although N.J.S.A. 2C:35-12 vests sentencing discretion in the prosecutor, the statute does not violate separation of powers principles. State v. Vasquez, 129 N.J. 189, 195-97 (1992). To allow judicial oversight and to protect against arbitrary and capricious decisions, "the prosecutor should state on the record the reasons for the decision to waive or the refusal to waive the parole disqualifier" or extended term. Id. at 196. Accord State v. Murray, 338 N.J. Super. 80, 90 (App. Div. 2001); State v. Powell, 294 N.J. Super. 557, 568 (App. Div. 1996); State v. Leslie, 269 N.J. Super. 78, 83 (App. Div. 1993).

(b) Imposing Sentence after a N.J.S.A. 2C:35-12 Waiver. If the court accepts a plea agreement pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:35-12, the court must impose the negotiated sentence. State v. Thomas, 392 N.J. Super. 169, 180 (App. Div. 2007); State v. Lebra, 357 N.J. Super. 500, 512 (App. Div. 2003). The court "has no discretion to lower the custodial part of a section 12 plea agreement." State v. Thomas, 392 N.J. Super. 169, 180 (App. Div. 2007) (discussing the holding in State v. Bridges, 131 N.J. 402, 408-09 (1993)). If the court is inclined to impose a lesser sentence, then it must reject the plea. State v. Thomas, 392 N.J. Super. 169, 180 (App. Div. 2007). Note that if the plea agreement does not provide for a lesser sentence than one mandated by the drug laws, N.J.S.A. 2C:35-12 does not apply, and the court is free to impose a lesser prison term or period of parole ineligibility than that contemplated by the plea agreement. State v. Thomas, 253 N.J. Super. 368, 374-75 (App. Div. 1992).

(c) N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6(f) Extended Terms. When the defendant is subject to an N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6(f) mandatory extended term as a repeat offender and the State agrees in plea negotiations pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:35-12 to recommend a sentence within the ordinary range, the State need not file a formal application requesting waiver of the mandatory extended term. State v. Courtney, 243 N.J. 77, 81 (2020). But in accordance with Rule 3:21-4(f) (eff. Sept. 1, 2021), the State must place on the record that it is waiving the extended term.

(d) Illegal Sentence and N.J.S.A. 2C:35-12. "The parties cannot negotiate an illegal sentence, and N.J.S.A. 2C:35-12 does not suggest otherwise in providing that a negotiated sentence must be imposed in lieu of the otherwise mandatory sentence." State v. Smith, 372 N.J. Super. 539, 542 (App. Div. 2004). See also State v. Thomas, 392 N.J. Super. 169, 183 (App. Div. 2007) (explaining that an agreement to forego filing a motion to suppress does not render a sentence illegal).

(e) Defendant's Absence from Sentencing as Part of a Plea Agreement. A plea agreement may be valid and enforceable even though it allows a court to increase a defendant's sentence in the event he or she fails to appear for sentencing. State v. Shaw, 131 N.J. 1, 15 (1993) (allowing the State to condition waiver of a minimum term in a drug case on the defendant's appearance at sentencing). But see State v. Wilson, 206 N.J. Super. 182, 184 (App. Div. 1985) (extended sentence based entirely upon nonappearance

is illegal because it is unrelated to any of the sentencing criteria set forth in the Code).

If the defendant violates a N.J.S.A. 2C:35-12 agreement that contained a promise to appear at sentencing, the judge should not automatically void the waiver agreement, but rather, should determine whether the failure to appear was "material to the plea agreement and warrants revocation of the waiver." State v. Diggs, 333 N.J. Super. 7, 11 (App. Div. 2000) (discussing State v. Shaw, 131 N.J. 1, 17 (1993)). See also State v. Rolex, 329 N.J. Super. 220, 226 (App. Div. 2000), aff'd o.b., 167 N.J. 447 (2001).

(f) N.J.S.A. 2C:35-12 Waiver Survives a Probation Violation. Where the court imposed a term of probation after the State waived a minimum term pursuant to N.J.S.A.2C:35-12, and the defendant violated probation, the waiver will survive the probation violation. State v. Vasquez, 129 N.J. 189, 201-02 (1992). A prosecutor cannot overcome this rule by including in the plea agreement a term that if the defendant violates probation, the sentence will include a period of parole ineligibility. Id. at 208. However, the sentence for the probation violation may exceed the sentence initially imposed pursuant to the plea agreement. State v. Ervin, 241 N.J. Super. 458, 469 (App. Div. 1989).

12. The Brimage Guidelines.

(a) Sixth Amendment and the Brimage Guidelines. The Brimage guidelines do not violate the Sixth Amendment principles established in Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 301 (2004), because the guidelines do not result in a sentence above the statutory maximum and because a defendant who negotiates a sentence waives the right to have a jury find the facts necessary to support the sentence. State v. Thomas, 392 N.J. Super. 169, 186-87 (App. Div. 2007).

(b) Motion to Suppress and Increased Punishment. The guidelines do not impermissibly burden a defendant's right to file a motion to suppress even though they provide for increased punishment if the defendant pleads guilty after filing a motion to suppress. State v. Thomas, 392 N.J. Super. 169, 179 (App. Div. 2007).

(c) Post-Conviction Agreements and Plea Offers. The Brimage guidelines apply to post-conviction sentencing agreements in addition to plea offers. State v. Castaing, 321 N.J. Super. 292, 296 (App. Div. 1999).

(d) Objections on the Record. To provide an adequate record for review, a defendant should raise objections at the trial level. State v. Coulter, 326 N.J. Super. 584, 589 (App. Div. 1999). "Where a defendant objects to a prosecutor's assignment of certain aggravating factors to the plea offer, or the prosecutor's failure to credit a defendant with a mitigating factor," the court should hold a "non-plenary type hearing" where the prosecutor must "show that the decision being challenged was made on a 'good faith basis' and 'based upon the information available to the prosecutor and reasonable inferences that can be drawn from such information.'" Ibid. (quoting State v. Brimage, 153 N.J. 1, 5 (1998)).

(e) State's Mistake Regarding the Brimage Guidelines. "[I]f a judge is satisfied that the State has made an honest mistake in determining the terms of a plea offer" pursuant to the Brimage Guidelines, the State should be allowed to withdraw the offer before the date of sentence. State v. Veney, 327 N.J. Super. 458, 461 (App. Div. 2000).

(f) Standard of Review. The Brimage guidelines anticipate review under the "gross and patent abuse of prosecutorial discretion" standard. State v. Coulter, 326 N.J. Super. 584, 588-89 (App. Div. 1999). If the prosecutor failed to consider the guidelines in negotiating a plea, the defendant is entitled to a remand. State v. Hammer, 346 N.J. Super. 359, 371-72 (App. Div. 2001).

13. Cruel and Unusual Punishment.

(a) Drug Crimes Penalties. The mandatory drug enforcement and demand reduction (DEDR) penalties of the Comprehensive Drug Reform Act do not constitute cruel and unusual punishment. State v. Lagares, 127 N.J. 20, 36-37 (1992).

(b) Leader of a Drug Trafficking Network Life Imprisonment. The requirement that a leader of a narcotics trafficking network serve an ordinary term of life imprisonment with twenty-five years of parole ineligibility (N.J.S.A. 2C:35-3) does not constitute cruel and unusual punishment even

when the drug involved was marijuana, as opposed to heroin or cocaine. State v. Kadonsky, 288 N.J. Super. 41, 45 (App. Div. 1996).

(c) **Drug Induced Death, Strict Liability.** The statute imposing strict liability for a drug induced death (N.J.S.A. 2C:35-9) does not violate the Federal or State constitutional prohibitions against cruel and unusual punishment. State v. Maldonado, 137 N.J. 536, 556-60 (1994).

XV. SEX OFFENDER SENTENCING

This chapter discusses the Title 2C provisions that provide for or require enhanced sentencing for sex crimes and offenses that often accompany sex crimes (see Sections A, B, and E through I). In some cases, the court may not impose a sentence of probation and must impose parole supervision for life (see sections C and D). Depending on the nature of the defendant's conduct and ability to be rehabilitated, the court may require the defendant to receive inpatient or outpatient sex offender treatment (see section J). Following completion of the sentence, the defendant will be subject to reporting requirements and may be civilly committed for treatment (see Section I). Section K discusses case law on sex offender sentencing.

A. Merger of Certain Offenses Prohibited: Statutory Provisions

- 1. Luring or Enticing a Child.** N.J.S.A. 2C:13-6(f) precludes merger "with any other criminal offense."
- 2. Luring or Enticing an Adult.** N.J.S.A. 2C:13-7(f) precludes merger "with any other criminal offense."
- 3. Third-Degree Recording and Third-Degree Disclosing Images of Sexual Contact.** N.J.S.A. 2C:14-9(h) precludes one offense from merger into the other.
- 4. Leader of a Child Pornography Network.** Effective February 1, 2018, N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4.1(d) provides that "a conviction of leader of a child pornography network shall not merge with the conviction for any offense which is the object of the conspiracy." L. 2017, c. 141.

B. Enhanced Ordinary Terms of Imprisonment for Certain Offenses: Statutory Provisions

The ordinary terms of imprisonment for the following offenses exceed the generally applicable ordinary terms set forth in N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6(a) (i.e., ten to twenty years for a first-degree crime, five to ten years for a second-degree crime, three to five years for a third-degree crime, and a period not to exceed eighteen months for a fourth-degree crime).

1. Kidnapping in the First Degree:

(a) Victim Is Sixteen Years of Age or Older: between fifteen and thirty years. N.J.S.A. 2C:13-1(c)(1).

(b) Victim Is Less than Sixteen Years Old: twenty-five years without parole eligibility, or a term between twenty-five years and life imprisonment with a parole ineligibility period of twenty-five years, if: (a) the defendant subjected the victim to a sexual assault (N.J.S.A. 2C:14-2), a criminal sexual contact (N.J.S.A. 2C:14-3), or child endangerment (N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4(b)) or (b) the defendant sold or delivered the victim for pecuniary gain, and the sale did not lead to the victim's return to a parent or guardian. N.J.S.A. 2C:13-1(c)(2).

2. Human Trafficking: twenty years without parole eligibility, or a prison term between twenty years and life with a parole ineligibility period of twenty years. N.J.S.A. 2C:13-8(d).

C. Restrictions on Noncustodial Terms: Statutory Provisions

1. Probation Prohibited. N.J.S.A. 2C:43-2(g) instructs that the court may not sentence a defendant to probation for any of the following offenses set forth in N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6.4(a) (parole supervision for life) (**Note** that pursuant to L. 2017 c. 141 and L. 2017 c. 333, N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6.4(a) includes N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4(b)(5)(a), N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4(b)(5)(b)(i), (ii) and (iii) (child endangerment) and N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4.1 (leader of a child pornography network)):

- Aggravated sexual assault (N.J.S.A. 2C:14-2(a));
- Sexual assault (N.J.S.A. 2C:14-2(b) or (c));
- Aggravated criminal sexual contact (N.J.S.A. 2C:14-3(a));
- Kidnapping (N.J.S.A. 2C:13-1(c)(2));
- Endangering the welfare of a child (N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4(a), N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4(b)(3) and N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4(b)(5)(b)(i) or (ii) (N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4(b)(4) N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4(b)(5)(a) and N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4(b)(5)(b)(iii) on motion by the State);

- Leader of a child pornography network (N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4.1 on motion by the State);
- Luring (N.J.S.A. 2C:13-6); and
- A violation of a special sentence of community supervision for life (N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6.4(d)).

2. Offenses that Preclude Suspension of Sentence and Noncustodial Terms.

(a) Luring or Enticing a Child (Repeat Offender). N.J.S.A. 2C:13-6(d) prohibits the court from suspending a sentence and from imposing a noncustodial term against anyone convicted of a second or subsequent offense of luring or enticing a child.

(b) Luring an Adult. N.J.S.A. 2C:13-7(f) prohibits the court from suspending a sentence and from imposing a noncustodial term for luring an adult.

(c) Sexual Assault or Criminal Sexual Contact. N.J.S.A. 2C:14-6 prohibits the court from suspending a sentence and imposing a noncustodial term if the defendant has a prior conviction for sexual assault or criminal sexual contact.

(d) Child Endangerment. N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4(b)(5)(b) requires the court impose a term of imprisonment if the defendant possessed 100 or more items depicting the sexual exploitation or abuse of a child "unless, having regard to the character and condition of the defendant, it is of the opinion that imprisonment would be a serious injustice which overrides the need to deter such conduct by others."

D. Parole Supervision for Life: Statutory Provisions

1. Statutory Authority for Mandatory Parole Supervision for Life. N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6.4(a) requires the court to impose a sentence of parole supervision for life (previously community supervision for life) in addition to any other sentence authorized by Title 2C, for the following offenses, or an attempt to commit any of the following offenses (**Note** that N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6.4(a), amended by, L. 2017, c. 141 (eff. Feb. 1, 2018) added N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4(b)(5)(b)(i) and (ii) (child endangerment)):

- Aggravated sexual assault (N.J.S.A. 2C:14-2(a));
- Sexual assault (N.J.S.A. 2C:14-2(b) or (c));
- Aggravated criminal sexual contact (N.J.S.A. 2C:14-3(a));
- Kidnapping (N.J.S.A. 2C:13-1(c)(2));
- Endangering the welfare of a child (N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4(a), N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4(b)(3) and N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4(b)(5)(b)(i) or (ii));
- Luring (N.J.S.A. 2C:13-6); and
- A violation of a condition of a special sentence of community supervision for life pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6.4(d).

Note: Prior to 2003, N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6.4 spoke only of community supervision for life. In passing L. 2003, c. 267, § 1, the Legislature amended N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6.4 to replace community supervision for life with the harsher sentence of parole supervision for life. For a discussion of the ways in which the two sentences differ see State v. Perez, 220 N.J. 423, 436-42 (2015).

2. Parole Supervision for Life upon Motion by the Prosecutor. If the defendant is convicted of endangering the welfare of a child pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4(b)(4), N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4(b)(5)(a), N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4(b)(5)(b)(iii), or of being a leader of a child pornography network pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4.1, or an attempt to commit the offense, the court shall impose a sentence of parole supervision for life if the prosecutor so requests, unless the court finds that the sentence "is not needed to protect the community or deter the defendant." N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6.4(a).

Note that N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6.4(a), amended by, L. 2017, c. 141 (eff. Feb. 1, 2018) added N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4(b)(5)(b)(iii) and N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4.1 to the enumerated crimes. L. 2017 c. 141. In passing that amendment, the Legislature inadvertently omitted N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4(b)(5)(a) from the enumerated crimes and added it by subsequent amendment (L. 2017 c. 333) approved on January 16, 2018, and effective immediately.

3. Conditions of Parole Supervision for Life. Both the parole board and the court may impose conditions of parole that are "appropriate to protect the public and foster rehabilitation." N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6.4(b). Conditions may include restrictions on internet access, as stated in N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6.4(f).

4. Timing of Parole Supervision for Life. Parole supervision for life commences immediately upon the defendant's release from incarceration for any offense. N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6.4(b).

5. Suspended Sentence and Parole Supervision for Life. If the court suspends the imposition of sentence on a defendant who is convicted of any offense subject to parole supervision for life, the parole supervision for life will begin immediately. N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6.4(b).

6. Custody of the Defendant while Serving Parole Supervision for Life. Defendants serving the special sentence of parole supervision for life remain in the legal custody of the Commissioner of Corrections. N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6.4(b). They are supervised by the Division of Parole, subject to the provisions and conditions set forth in the statutes governing parole, and "subject to conditions appropriate to protect the public and foster rehabilitation." N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6.4(b).

7. Request to Terminate Parole Supervision for Life. The court may grant a release from parole supervision for life upon proof by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant has not committed a crime in fifteen years since the last conviction or release from incarceration, whichever is later, and that the defendant does not pose a threat to others. N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6.4(c).

8. Violation of Parole Supervision for Life (Third-Degree Crime). A violation of parole supervision for life without good cause is a third-degree offense. N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6.4(d). The person shall be sentenced to a term of imprisonment "unless the court is clearly convinced that the interests of justice so far outweigh the need to deter this conduct and the interest in public safety that a sentence to imprisonment would be a manifest injustice." *Ibid.* **Note:** L. 2013, c. 214 increased the punishment for a violation of parole supervision for life from a fourth-degree crime to a third-degree crime.

9. Violation of Parole Supervision for Life (Extended Term without Parole). N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6.4(e) provides that if the defendant committed any of the following offenses while serving parole supervision for life, the court must impose an extended term pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7, and the defendant must serve the

entire term before returning to parole supervision for life (**Note** that N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6.4(e) was amended effective February 1, 2018, to add N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4.1 (leader of a child pornography network). L. 2017, c. 141):

- Murder (N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3);
- Manslaughter (N.J.S.A. 2C:11-4);
- Reckless vehicular homicide (N.J.S.A. 2C:11-5);
- Aggravated assault (N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1(b));
- Kidnapping (N.J.S.A. 2C:13-1);
- Luring a child (N.J.S.A. 2C:13-6);
- Sexual assault (N.J.S.A. 2C:14-2);
- Criminal sexual contact (N.J.S.A. 2C:14-3);
- Endangering the welfare of a child (N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4);
- Leader of a child pornography network (N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4.1);
- Second-degree burglary (N.J.S.A. 2C:18-2); or
- Possession of a weapon for an unlawful purpose (N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4(a)).

E. Parole Ineligibility: Statutory Provisions

1. Kidnapping of a Minor. N.J.S.A. 2C:13-1(c)(2) requires the court to impose a term between twenty-five years and life imprisonment with a parole ineligibility period of twenty-five years when (a) the victim was less than sixteen years old and was subjected to a sexual assault (N.J.S.A. 2C:14-2), a criminal sexual contact (N.J.S.A. 2C:14-3), or child endangerment (N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4); or (b) the defendant sold or delivered the victim for pecuniary gain, and the sale did not lead to the victim's return to a parent or guardian. The court must merge the underlying offenses into the kidnapping conviction. N.J.S.A. 2C:13-1(c)(2).

2. Luring or Enticing a Child (Repeat Offenders). N.J.S.A. 2C:13-6(d) requires a parole disqualifier of one-third to one-half of the sentence imposed, or three years, whichever is greater for a second or subsequent offense of luring or enticing a child into a motor vehicle, structure or isolated area with the purpose to commit a criminal offense with or against the child. If the court imposes an extended term, the term of parole ineligibility must be one-third to one-half of the sentence imposed, or five years, whichever is greater. N.J.S.A. 2C:13-6(d).

3. Luring or Enticing a Child (Certain Persons). N.J.S.A. 2C:13-6(e) requires a five-year parole ineligibility term for the crime of luring or enticing a child (N.J.S.A. 2C:13-6) when the defendant has a prior conviction for a violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:14-2 (sexual assault), N.J.S.A. 2C:14-3(a) (aggravated criminal sexual contact), or N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4 (endangering the welfare of a child). If the court imposes an extended term, then the parole disqualifier provision is inapplicable. N.J.S.A. 2C:13-6(e).

4. Luring or Enticing an Adult (Repeat Offenders). N.J.S.A. 2C:13-7(d) mandates a parole ineligibility period of one-third to one-half the sentence imposed, or one year, whichever is greater, for a second or subsequent offense of luring or enticing a person into a motor vehicle, structure or isolated area with the purpose to commit a criminal offense with or against the person or any other person. If the defendant is sentenced to an extended term, the period of parole ineligibility shall be one-third to one-half the sentence imposed, or five years, whichever is greater. N.J.S.A. 2C:13-7(d).

5. Luring or Enticing an Adult (Certain Persons). N.J.S.A. 2C:13-7(e) requires a parole ineligibility period of three years for luring or enticing an adult if the defendant has a prior conviction for a violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:14-2 (sexual assault), N.J.S.A. 2C:14-3(a) (aggravated criminal sexual contact), or N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4 (endangering the welfare of a child). If the court imposes an extended term, then the parole ineligibility provision is inapplicable. N.J.S.A. 2C:13-7(e).

6. Human Trafficking. N.J.S.A. 2C:13-8(d) mandates a twenty-year term of parole ineligibility.

7. Assisting in Human Trafficking. N.J.S.A. 2C:13-9(c)(1) requires a period of parole ineligibility of one-third to one-half of the term of imprisonment, or three years, whichever is greater.

8. Aggravated Sexual Assault of a Child. N.J.S.A. 2C:14-2(a)(7) requires a twenty-five-year period of parole ineligibility be imposed on a defendant convicted of aggravated sexual assault of a child under age thirteen. However, N.J.S.A. 2C:14-2(d) allows the prosecutor to negotiate a prison term and parole bar of at least fifteen years, in the interest of the victim. N.J.S.A. 2C:14-2.1 provides that "the victim of the sexual assault shall be provided an opportunity to consult with the prosecuting authority prior to the conclusion of any plea negotiations." For the Attorney General's guidelines on plea negotiations under this statute, see the Uniform Plea Negotiation Guidelines to Implement the Jessica Lunsford Act (May 29, 2014), available at www.nj.gov/oag/dcj/agguide/lumsford_act.

9. Sexual Assault or Aggravated Criminal Sexual Contact (Repeat Offender). N.J.S.A. 2C:14-6 requires the court impose on a second or subsequent offender of N.J.S.A. 2C:14-2 (sexual assault) or N.J.S.A. 2C:14-3(a) (aggravated criminal sexual contact), a minimum period of parole ineligibility of at least five years on an ordinary sentence (i.e., a non-extended term sentence).

10. Endangering the Welfare of a Child. N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4(b)(5)(a) requires a parole disqualifier of one-third to one-half of the sentence imposed, or five years, whichever is greater, for distributing, possessing, storing or maintaining by way of a file-share program, at least twenty-five but less than 1000 items of child pornography. The minimum parole bar increases to ten years if the defendant possessed more than 1000 items of child pornography. N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4(b)(5)(a), amended by, L. 2017, c. 141 (eff. Feb. 1, 2018).

11. The No Early Release Act. N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.2 requires the court fix "a minimum term of 85% of the sentence imposed, during which the defendant shall not be eligible for parole," and impose a five-year term of parole supervision (first-degree crime), or a three-year term of parole supervision (second-degree crime) for the following first- and second-degree sex crimes:

- Kidnapping (N.J.S.A. 2C:13-1);
- Aggravated sexual assault (N.J.S.A. 2C:14-2(a));
- Sexual assault (N.J.S.A. 2C:14-2(b) and (c)(1)); and
- Endangering the welfare of a child (N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4(b)(3)).

F. Mandatory Extended Terms: Statutory Provisions

1. Child Endangerment. N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4(b)(5)(a) and N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4(b)(5)(b) requires the court to impose an extended term on a person convicted of a second or subsequent offense of creating, possessing, distributing, storing or maintaining child pornography.

2. Sex Offender Violation of Parole Supervision for Life. N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6.4(e) provides that if a defendant commits any of the following offenses while serving parole supervision for life the court must impose an extended term, and the defendant must serve the entire term before returning to parole supervision for life (**Note** that as of February 1, 2018, N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6.4(e) includes N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4.1 (leader of a child pornography network). L. 2017, c. 141.):

- Murder (N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3);
- Manslaughter (N.J.S.A. 2C:11-4);
- Reckless vehicular homicide (N.J.S.A. 2C:11-5);
- Aggravated assault (N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1(b));
- Kidnapping (N.J.S.A. 2C:13-1);
- Luring a child (N.J.S.A. 2C:13-6);
- Sexual assault (N.J.S.A. 2C:14-2);
- Criminal sexual contact (N.J.S.A. 2C:14-3);
- Endangering the welfare of a child (N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4);
- Leader of a child pornography network (N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4.1);
- Second-degree burglary (N.J.S.A. 2C:18-2); or
- Possession of a weapon for an unlawful purpose (N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4(a)).

3. Persistent Violent Offenders (also known as the "Persistent Offenders Accountability Act" and the "Three Strikes and You're In" Law). N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.1 requires the court to impose either a life sentence without parole or an extended term, depending on the crime committed and after a hearing.

(a) Life without Parole. N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.1(a) provides that a person convicted of any of the following crimes, or their substantial equivalent under any similar statute, "who has been convicted of two or more crimes that were committed on prior and separate occasions, regardless of the dates of the convictions," shall be sentenced to a term of life imprisonment without parole:

- Murder (N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3);
- Aggravated manslaughter (N.J.S.A. 2C:11-4(a));
- First-degree kidnapping (N.J.S.A. 2C:13-1);
- Sexual assault (N.J.S.A. 2C:14-2(a)(3) to (6));
- First-degree robbery (N.J.S.A. 2C:15-1); or
- Carjacking (N.J.S.A. 2C:15-2).

Note: Pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.1(e), a defendant sentenced to life without parole under section N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.1(a) may be released on parole if the defendant "is at least 70 years of age" and "has served at least 35 years in prison pursuant to" N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.1, and "the full Parole Board determines that the defendant is not a danger to the safety of any other person or the community."

(b) Extended Term. N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.1(b) requires the court to impose an extended term if the circumstances in subsection (1) or (2) exist:

(1) the defendant is being sentenced for any of the following crimes and has two or more convictions for any of those crimes or the crimes enumerated in N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.1(a), "regardless of the dates of the convictions":

- Second-degree manslaughter (N.J.S.A. 2C:11-4);
- Second- or third-degree assault (N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1(b));
- Second-degree kidnapping (N.J.S.A. 2C:13-1);
- Aggravated criminal sexual contact under any circumstances set forth in N.J.S.A. 2C:14-2(a)(3) to (6) (N.J.S.A. 2C:14-3);
- Second-degree robbery (N.J.S.A. 2C:15-1);
- Second-degree burglary (N.J.S.A. 2C:18-2); or
- Second-degree possession of weapons for an unlawful purposes (N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4).

or

(2) The defendant: (1) is convicted of a crime enumerated in N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.1(a); (2) "does not have two or more prior convictions that require sentencing under" N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.1(a); and (3) has two or more prior convictions that would require sentencing under" N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.1(b)(1) if the defendant "had been convicted of a crime enumerated in" N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.1(b)(1).

(c) Timing of Convictions. N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.1(c) provides: "The provisions of this section shall not apply unless the prior convictions are for crimes committed on separate occasions and unless the crime for which the defendant is being sentenced was committed either within 10 years of the date of the defendant's last release from confinement for commission of any crime or within 10 years of the date of the commission of the most recent of the crimes for which the defendant has a prior conviction."

(d) Notice and Hearing. Within fourteen days of entry of a guilty plea or return of a verdict, the State must serve notice upon defendant of the intention to impose sentence pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.1(d). See also R. 3:21-4(g). The court may not impose a sentence pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.1 unless the ground for the sentence has been established at a hearing.

4. Sexual Assault or Aggravated Criminal Sexual Contact against Minors. N.J.S.A. 2C:44-3(g) requires that a defendant convicted of sexual assault (N.J.S.A. 2C:14-2) or criminal sexual contact (N.J.S.A. 2C:14-3) be sentenced to an extended term of imprisonment upon application of the prosecutor, if the crime involved violence or the threat of violence and the victim was sixteen years of age or less.

G. Fines Authorized, or Required, by Law: Statutory Provisions

1. Human Trafficking. N.J.S.A. 2C:13-8(d) requires a fine not less than \$25,000 for a first-degree crime. N.J.S.A. 2C:13-9(c)(1) requires a fine not less than \$15,000 for a second-degree crime.

2. Assisting in Human Trafficking. N.J.S.A. 2C:13-9(c)(1) mandates a fine of at least \$15,000.

3. Commercial Sexual Abuse of a Minor. N.J.S.A. 2C:13-10(c) provides that a person who commits the offense of advertising commercial sexual abuse of a minor, contrary to N.J.S.A. 2C:13-10(b), shall be ordered to pay a fine of at least \$25,000, which shall be deposited in the Human Trafficking Survivor's Assistance Fund.

4. Pornography. N.J.S.A. 2C:14-9(c) authorizes "a fine not to exceed \$30,000" for a third-degree pornography offense.

H. Restitution: Statutory Provisions

Human Trafficking. N.J.S.A. 2C:13-8(e)(1) and (2) require the court to award the victim restitution which is the greater of (1) "the gross income or value to the defendant of the victim's labor or services," or (2) "the value of the victim's labor or services as determined by" law.

I. Registrations, Penalties, Fees, Assessments, Reporting and Monitoring Requirements, and Civil Commitment: Statutory Provisions

1. Megan's Law Registration Requirements. N.J.S.A. 2C:7-1 to -23 sets forth registration and public notification requirements for a person who committed a "sex offense." Pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:7-2(b), a sex offense includes the following crimes (**Note** that as of February 1, 2018, N.J.S.A. 2C:7-2(b) includes N.J.S.A.

2C:24-4(b)(5)(b)(i) and (ii) (child endangerment) and N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4.1 (leader of a child pornography network)):

- Aggravated sexual assault (N.J.S.A. 2C:14-2(a));
- Sexual assault (N.J.S.A. 2C:14-1));
- Aggravated criminal sexual contact (N.J.S.A. 2C:14-3(a));
- Kidnapping (N.J.S.A. 2C:13-1(c)(2));
- Endangering the welfare of a child (N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4(a), N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4(b)(3) and (4), N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4(b)(5)(a) and N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4(b)(5)(b)(i) or (ii));
- Leader of a child pornography network (N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4.1);
- Luring or enticing a child (N.J.S.A. 2C:13-6);
- Criminal sexual contact with a minor (N.J.S.A. 2C:14-3(b));
- Kidnapping (N.J.S.A. 2C:13-1);
- Criminal restraint (N.J.S.A. 2C:13-2);
- False imprisonment "if the victim is a minor and the offender is not the parent of the victim" (N.J.S.A. 2C:13-3; and
- Knowingly promoting prostitution of a child (N.J.S.A. 2C:34-1(b)(3) or (4)).

Failure to comply with Megan's Law registration requirements is a third-degree crime. N.J.S.A. 2C:7-2(d).

2. Megan's Law Penalties. N.J.S.A. 2C:14-10(a) provides that in addition to any other fine, fee, assessment or penalty authorized by Title 2C, a person convicted of a sex offense, as defined by N.J.S.A. 2C:7-2(b), "shall be assessed a penalty for each such offense not to exceed:"

- \$2000 for a first-degree crime;
- \$1000 for a second-degree crime;
- \$750 for a third-degree crime; and
- \$500 for a fourth-degree crime.

3. Assisting in Human Trafficking Business License Revocation. N.J.S.A. 2C:13-9(c)(2) provides that "the court shall direct any issuing State, county, or municipal governmental agency to revoke any license, permit, certificate, approval, registration, charter, or similar form of business or professional authorization required by law concerning the operation of that person's business or profession, if that business or profession was used in the course of the crime."

4. Serological Testing. N.J.S.A. 2C:43-2.2(a) requires a defendant convicted of aggravated sexual assault or sexual assault (N.J.S.A. 2C:14-2) "submit to an approved serological test for acquired immune deficiency syndrome (AIDS) or infection with the human immunodeficiency virus (HIV) or any other related virus identified as a probable causative agent of AIDS," upon request by the victim and prosecutor. The court may require the defendant to pay the cost of the test. N.J.S.A. 2C:43-2.3(c).

5. Sexual Assault Nurse Examiner Program Assessment. N.J.S.A. 2C:43-3.6(a) requires an \$800 assessment for any sex offense defined in N.J.S.A. 2C:7-2.

6. Surcharge Applicable to Certain Sex Offenders. N.J.S.A. 2C:43-3.7 requires any person convicted of aggravated sexual assault (N.J.S.A. 2C:14-2(a)), sexual assault (N.J.S.A. 2C:14-2(b)), aggravated criminal sexual contact (N.J.S.A. 2C:14-3(a)), or criminal sexual contact (N.J.S.A. 2C:14-3(b)), to pay a \$100 surcharge to fund programs and grants for the prevention of violence against women.

7. Computer Crime Prevention Penalty. N.J.S.A. 2C:43-3.8(a) provides that any person convicted of: endangering the welfare of a child, pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4(b)(3), (4) or (5); leader of a child pornography network, pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4.1; child obscenity, pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:34-3; or an offense involving computer criminal activity contrary to any provision within Chapter 20 of Title 2C (theft offenses), shall be assessed the following penalties to be deposited in the Computer Crime Prevention Fund (**Note** that as of February 1, 2018, N.J.S.A. 2C:43-3.8(a) includes N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4(b)(3) and (4) (child

endangerment) and N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4.1 (leader of a child pornography network). L. 2017, c. 141.):

- \$2000 for a first-degree crime;
- \$1000 for a second-degree crime;
- \$750 for a third-degree crime;
- \$500 for a fourth-degree crime; and
- \$250 for a disorderly persons offense.

8. Restricted Internet Access. N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6.6(a)(1) to (4) provides that any person who (1) committed a sex offense as defined in N.J.S.A. 2C:7-2(b) and is required to register under Megan's Law (N.J.S.A. 2C:7-2); or (2) is serving a special sentence of parole supervision under N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6.4, or has been convicted of promoting or providing obscene materials to a minor (N.J.S.A. 2C:34-3), "shall" be subject to the following Internet access conditions "where the trier of fact makes a finding that a computer or any other device with Internet capability was used to facilitate the commission of the crime":

(1) Prohibited access of "a computer or any other device with Internet capability without the prior written approval of the court," with the exception that a person on probation or parole "may use a computer or any other device with Internet capability in connection with that person's employment" or to "search for employment with the prior approval of the person's probation or parole officer"; and

(2) "[P]eriodic unannounced examinations of the person's computer . . . including the retrieval and copying of all data . . . and removal of such information, equipment or device to conduct a more thorough inspection"; and

(3) Installation, "at the person's expense, [of] one or more hardware or software systems to monitor the Internet use"; and

(4) "[A]ny other appropriate restrictions concerning the person's use or access of a computer or any other device with Internet capability."

A violation of the Internet access restrictions constitutes a fourth-degree crime. N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6.6(b).

9. Sex Offender Restraining Order. N.J.S.A. 2C:44-8 authorizes the court to enter an order restraining a sex offender from contact with the victim or the victim's family and from entering certain locations.

10. Involuntary Civil Commitment upon Completion of Sentence (the Sexually Violent Predator Act). N.J.S.A. 30:4-27.24 to -27.38 (the Sexually Violent Predator Act) provides for the civil commitment for specialized treatment of sex offenders who "suffer from a mental abnormality or personality disorder," which renders the person "likely to engage in acts of sexual violence if not confined in a secure facility for control, care and treatment." N.J.S.A. 30:4-27.26. The court may impose commitment over the defendant's objection if it finds "by clear and convincing evidence that the patient needs continued involuntary commitment to treatment." N.J.S.A. 30:4-27.32(a).

11. The Sex Offender Monitoring Act. N.J.S.A. 30:4-123.89 to 4-123.95 requires continuous satellite monitoring of sex offenders after release from prison. N.J.S.A. 30:4-123.92. A violation of a monitoring condition is a third-degree crime. N.J.S.A. 30:4-123.94.

J. Sex Offender Treatment: Statutory Provisions

1. Statutory Authority for Sex Offender Treatment. Pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:47-1, a defendant convicted of any of the following offenses, or an attempt to commit any of the following offenses, may be eligible for sex offender treatment, so long as the court does not impose a sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole (**Note** that as of February 1, 2018, N.J.S.A. 2C:47-1 includes N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4(b)(5) (child endangerment) and N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4.1 (leader of a child pornography network)):

- Aggravated sexual assault (N.J.S.A. 2C:14-2(a));
- Sexual assault (N.J.S.A. 2C:14-2(b), (c));
- Aggravated criminal sexual contact (N.J.S.A. 2C:14-3);
- Kidnapping (N.J.S.A. 2C:13-1(c)(2));

- Endangering the welfare of a child (N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4(a) and N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4(b)(4) or (5)); and
- Leader of a child pornography network (N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4.1).

2. Psychological Examination. N.J.S.A. 2C:47-1 provides that if a defendant is eligible for sex offender treatment the court must order the Department of Corrections to conduct a psychological examination of the defendant to determine whether the defendant's conduct was characterized by a pattern of repetitive, compulsive behavior and, if it was, whether the defendant is amenable to sex offender treatment and is willing to participate in the treatment. The Department of Corrections must conduct the examination within thirty days. N.J.S.A. 2C:47-2.

3. Judicial Findings Regarding the Psychological Examination. If the examination report concludes that the defendant's conduct was characterized by a pattern of repetitive, compulsive behavior, and that the defendant is amenable to sex offender treatment and is willing to participate in treatment, then the court must state on the judgment of conviction whether it agrees with these conclusions, and it must explain its basis for the findings. N.J.S.A. 2C:47-3(a).

4. Circumstances that Require Sex Offender Treatment. The court shall sentence a defendant to sex offender treatment if: (1) the psychological examination report concludes that the defendant's conduct was characterized by a pattern of repetitive, compulsive behavior, and that the defendant is amenable to sex offender treatment and is willing to participate in such treatment; (2) the Department of Corrections recommends the defendant receive sex offender treatment; and (3) the court makes its own findings that the defendant's conduct was characterized by a pattern of repetitive, compulsive behavior, and that the defendant is amenable to sex offender treatment and is willing to participate in such treatment. N.J.S.A. 2C:47-3(a) and (b).

(a) Inpatient Treatment. The court shall require the defendant to receive sex offender treatment at the Adult Diagnostic and Treatment Center for sex offender (ADTC or Avenel) if the court imposes a term of incarceration. N.J.S.A. 2C:47-3(b). If the term of incarceration is seven years or less, the defendant shall be detained in the Adult Diagnostic and Treatment Center, not in a prison. N.J.S.A. 2C:47-3(h)(1). If the sentence is greater than seven years, or if the sentence includes a period of parole ineligibility that is seven years or greater, the defendant shall be detained in a facility designated by

the Commissioner of the Department of Corrections until the last five years of the sentence, at which time the defendant must be transferred to the Adult Diagnostic and Treatment Center, so long as the defendant still is amenable to sex offender treatment and is willing to comply with treatment. N.J.S.A. 2C:47-3(h)(2) and (3).

(b) Outpatient Treatment. If the court imposes probation and sex offender treatment is warranted, the court shall require the defendant to receive outpatient treatment as a condition of probation. N.J.S.A. 2C:47-3(b).

5. Cases in which the Court May Not Impose Sex Offender Treatment. The court shall not impose sex offender treatment if:

- The defendant's conduct was not repetitive and compulsive, N.J.S.A. 2C:47-3(d); or
- The defendant is not amenable to sex offender treatment, N.J.S.A. 2C:47-3(d); or
- The defendant's conduct was repetitive and compulsive and the defendant is amenable to sex offender treatment, but the defendant is not willing to participate in sex offender treatment, N.J.S.A. 2C:47-3(f); or
- The court imposes a term of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. N.J.S.A. 2C:47-3(j).

6. Place of Incarceration of a Defendant Unwilling to Participate in Sex Offender Treatment. If the defendant's conduct was repetitive and compulsive and the defendant is amenable to sex offender treatment but unwilling to participate in sex offender treatment, then the defendant shall be detained at a facility designated by the Commissioner.

(a) Parole. After serving any mandatory minimum term of imprisonment, the defendant shall be eligible for parole in accordance with N.J.S.A. 2C:47-5. N.J.S.A. 2C:47-3(f).

(b) Request for Transfer to Inpatient Treatment. On a biennial basis the defendant may request transfer to the Adult Diagnostic and Treatment Center. N.J.S.A. 2C:47-3(f). The Commissioner shall grant the request if a

psychological evaluation reveals that the defendant is amenable to treatment and is willing to comply with its terms. Ibid.

7. Transfer Out of Inpatient Treatment. N.J.S.A. 2C:47-4.1(a) requires the Commissioner to transfer a defendant out of sex offender treatment if the defendant is (1) serving a life sentence without the possibility of parole, (2) not complying with the terms of treatment, or (3) no longer amenable to treatment.

8. Request for Return to Inpatient Treatment. On a biennial basis the defendant may request a transfer back to the Adult Diagnostic and Treatment Center. N.J.S.A. 2C:47-4.1(b). If a psychological examination concludes that the defendant is amenable to treatment and is willing to cooperate with the terms of treatment, the Commissioner shall grant the request. Ibid.

9. Credits Conditioned upon Compliance with Inpatient Treatment. The sentence shall not be reduced by good behavior or work credits for any period that the defendant was not amenable to treatment, was unwilling to comply with treatment, or was detained at a facility other than the Adult Diagnostic and Treatment Center. N.J.S.A. 2C:47-3(d), (i), (g); N.J.S.A. 2C:47-4.1(c).

10. Parole. A sex offender confined under Chapter 47 may not be paroled unless a special classification review board finds that the defendant has achieved a satisfactory level of progress in sex offender treatment. N.J.S.A. 2C:47-5(a). Upon recommendation from the special classification review board, the State Parole Board should release the defendant unless it concludes, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the defendant failed to cooperate in rehabilitation or that there is a reasonable expectation that the defendant will violate conditions of parole. Ibid.

11. Notice of a Defendant's Release after Denial of Parole. The Attorney General and local prosecutor must receive at least ninety days' notice of the defendant's release and must be advised as to whether the defendant may be "in need of involuntary commitment" or may be a "sexually violent predator," as those terms are defined in the Sexually Violent Predator Act, N.J.S.A. 30:4-27.24 to -27.38. N.J.S.A. 2C:47-5(d). (The Sexually Violent Predator Act, N.J.S.A. 30:4-27.24 to -27.38, provides for the civil commitment for specialized treatment of sex offenders who "suffer from a mental abnormality or personality disorder," which renders the person "likely to engage in acts of sexual violence if not confined in a secure facility for control, care and treatment." N.J.S.A. 30:4-27.26.)

12. Parole Revocation and Psychological Examination. In the event a sex offender's parole is revoked, the Department of Corrections shall, within ninety days of revocation, complete a psychological examination of the offender to determine whether the parole violation "reflects emotional or behavioral problems as a sex offender that cause the offender to be incapable of making any acceptable social adjustment in the community," and whether the offender is amenable to and willing to participate in sex offender treatment. N.J.S.A. 2C:47-5.1(a).

(a) Sentence to Inpatient Treatment. If the report concludes that the parole violation "reflects emotional or behavioral problems as a sex offender that cause the offender to be incapable of making any acceptable social adjustment in the community and further reveals that the offender is amenable to sex offender treatment and is willing to participate in such treatment," then the defendant shall be confined in the Adult Diagnostic and Treatment Center and shall be eligible for parole pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:47-5. N.J.S.A. 2C:47-5.1(b).

(b) Sentence to a Facility Designated by the Commissioner (Unwillingness to Comply). The defendant shall be detained in a facility designated by the Commissioner if a psychological examination report concludes that the defendant suffers from emotional or behavioral problems as a sex offender that cause him or her to be incapable of making any acceptable social adjustment in the community and that the defendant is amenable to treatment but not willing to participate in sex offender treatment. N.J.S.A. 2C:47-5.1(c). The defendant shall be eligible for parole in accordance with N.J.S.A. 2C:47-5. N.J.S.A. 2C:47-5.1(c). However, the sentence may not be reduced by work credits. N.J.S.A. 2C:47-5.1(e).

(c) Sentence to a Facility Designated by the Commissioner (No Emotional or Behavioral Problem as a Sex Offender). The defendant shall be confined in a facility designated by the Commissioner if the examination report concludes that the parole violation "does not reflect emotional or behavioral problems as a sex offender." N.J.S.A. 2C:47-5.1(d)(1)(a). The defendant shall be eligible for parole in accordance with Title 30, but the parole eligibility date shall not be reduced by work or good behavior credits. N.J.S.A. 2C:47-5.1(d)(2).

(d) Sentence to a Facility Designated by the Commissioner (Not Amenable to Treatment). The defendant shall be confined in a facility designated by the Commissioner if the offender's parole violation "reflects

emotional or behavioral problems as a sex offender that cause the offender to be incapable of making any acceptable social adjustment in the community and further reveals that the offender is not amenable to sex offender treatment." N.J.S.A. 2C:47-5.1(d)(1)(b). The defendant shall be eligible for parole in accordance with Title 30, but the parole eligibility date shall not be reduced by work or good behavior credit. N.J.S.A. 2C:47-5.1(d)(2).

(e) Request for Transfer to Inpatient Treatment. A defendant may request transfer to the Adult Diagnostic and Treatment Center on a biennial basis. N.J.S.A. 2C:47-5.1(f). If a psychological evaluation reveals that the defendant is amenable to treatment and is willing to comply with treatment, the Commissioner shall grant the request. Ibid. The defendant will be eligible for parole pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:47-50 and will earn work and good behavior credits. N.J.S.A. 2C:47-5.1(e).

K. Sex Offender Sentencing: Case Law

1. Notice and Plea Agreements. When a defendant pleads guilty to a sex offense, the court must notify the defendant of the parole consequences and potential sex offender treatment consequences of the guilty plea, State v. Luckey, 366 N.J. Super. 79, 89-90 (App. Div. 2004), as well as the penal consequence of parole supervision for life. State v. Perez, 220 N.J. 423, 440 (2015). See also State v. Jamgochian, 363 N.J. Super. 220, 224 (App. Div. 2003) (providing that counsel must advise a defendant prior to pleading guilty to a sex offense that the plea will result in community supervision for life, the precursor to parole supervision for life, as it is a penal consequence).

2. Plea Agreements and Involuntary Confinement. In negotiating a plea, the prosecutor may not bargain away the State's right to seek, upon completion of sentence, involuntary civil commitment under the Sexually Violent Predator Act. In re Commitment of P.C., 349 N.J. Super. 569, 572 (App. Div. 2002).

3. Negotiated Term under N.J.S.A. 2C:14-2(d) and Separation of Powers. N.J.S.A. 2C:14-2(d), which allows a prosecutor to negotiate a prison term and parole bar of at least fifteen years, "does not violate the separation of powers doctrine, provided that the State presents a statement of reasons explaining its decision to depart from the twenty-five-year mandatory-minimum sentence specified in N.J.S.A. 2C:14-2(a), and the court reviews the prosecutor's exercise of

discretion to determine whether it was arbitrary and capricious." State v. A.T.C., 239 N.J. 450, 476 (2019).

4. Sex Crime Victims Treatment Penalty. The sex offender penalty amounts listed in N.J.S.A. 2C:14-10(a) are the maximum penalties the court may impose. State v. Bolvito, 217 N.J. 221, 224 (2014). In fixing the penalty amount, the court should consider the nature of the offense and the defendant's ability to pay. Id. at 233-35.

5. Megan's Law Offenses. While Megan's Law requires registration for "sex offenses," the N.J.S.A. 2C:7-2(b) offenses that define a sex offense encompass more than just sex offenses; they include non-sex crimes against children. In re T.T., 188 N.J. 321, 333 (2006).

6. Sex Offender Treatment Examination and the Privilege against Self-Incrimination. The court may delay the N.J.S.A. 2C:47-1 psychological exam for sex offender treatment to protect the defendant's privilege against self-incrimination. State v. Marrero, 239 N.J. Super. 119, 122-23 (Law Div. 1989). The privilege continues until the defendant has exhausted all direct appellate remedies. Lewis v. Dep't of Corr., 365 N.J. Super. 503, 506 (App. Div. 2004).

7. Good Time Credits and the Privilege against Self-Incrimination. A defendant has a liberty interest in good time credits. Bender v. N.J. Dep't of Corr., 356 N.J. Super. 432, 443-44 (App. Div. 2003). Thus, good time credits cannot be denied when the defendant refuses to discuss conduct pursuant to the privilege against self-incrimination. Id. at 444.

8. "Repetitive" and "Compulsive" Behavior Defined. The Legislature did not define "repetitive" and "compulsive" in N.J.S.A. 2C:47-1 to -10. State v. N.G., 381 N.J. Super. 352, 361 (App. Div. 2005). Since they are words of common understanding, they should be given their ordinary and well-understood meanings. Ibid. "Repetitive" means "to do, experience, or produce again. Ibid. "Compulsive" means "caused by obsession or compulsion," with "compulsion" meaning "an irresistible impulse to act irrationally." Id. at 361-62.

(a) Constitutionality. "Because these definitions are not abstract and may be understood by a citizen of average intelligence, the statute is not unconstitutionally vague." Id. at 362.

(b) Thoughts as Behavior. "Repetitive" and "compulsive" behavior is not limited to repetitive physical sexual acts or physical urges, but includes psychological conduct and urges, such as sexual fantasies or thoughts. State v. Hass, 237 N.J. Super. 79, 85-86 (Law Div. 1988) (finding repetitive and compulsive behavior based on thought patterns).

9. Setting the Length of the Sentence. In sentencing a sex offender, the court must weigh the aggravating and mitigating factors and may impose a period of parole ineligibility, an extended term, and consecutive terms. Gerald v. Comm'r, N.J. Dep't of Corr., 102 N.J. 435, 438 (1986); State v. Chapman, 95 N.J. 582, 593 (1984). The court must impose a fixed term of years to the Adult Diagnostic Treatment Center. State v. Dittmar, 188 N.J. Super. 364, 366-67 (App. Div. 1982).

10. Sex Offender Treatment Required Only at the Adult Diagnostic Treatment Center. Pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:47-3(k), the Commissioner is not required to provide for the treatment of a sex offender who is not incarcerated in the Adult Diagnostic Treatment Center. In re Civil Commitment of W.X.C., 407 N.J. Super. 619, 636-38 (App. Div.), aff'd on other grounds, 204 N.J. 179 (2010). However, the defendant may qualify for mental health treatment pursuant to Department of Corrections regulations. Ibid.

11. Transfer to the Adult Diagnostic Treatment Center. In order to transfer an offender to the ADTC, the Commissioner must show that: (1) the offender's conduct was characterized by a pattern of repetitive and compulsive behavior; (2) the offender is amenable to treatment; and (3) the offender is willing to participate in the treatment. Williams v. N.J. Dep't of Corr., 423 N.J. Super. 176, 182-86 (App. Div. 2011). "[T]he Commissioner does not have the discretion [under N.J.S.A. 30:4-91.2] to assign offenders to the ADTC whom the Legislature has determined should not be treated there." See also W.B. v. N.J. Dep't of Corr., 434 N.J. Super. 340, 347-48 (App. Div. 2014) (holding that the Williams rationale applies to an inmate convicted in another state and transferred to a New Jersey prison).

12. Liberty Interest and Sex Offender Treatment. "[T]he actions of the trial court in sentencing the defendant to Avenel implicate a liberty interest," which "arise[s] from the expectation that ADTC parole standards and rehabilitative procedures will not be applied absent a finding of 'repetitive' and 'compulsive behavior.'" State v. Howard, 110 N.J. 113, 127-29 (1988) (quoting N.J.S.A. 2C:47-3(a)). Additionally, the liberty interest arises from the stigma created by classification as a repetitive and compulsive sex offender. Id. at 129.

13. Delay in Sex Offender Treatment and Cruel and Unusual Punishment. A nine-month delay in transferring a sex offender to the Adult Diagnostic Treatment Center, during which time the defendant was incarcerated in county jail, did not constitute cruel and unusual punishment. State v. Howard, 110 N.J. 113, 132-33 (1988).

14. Judicial Findings and Sex Offender Treatment. The prerequisite findings resulting in commitment to the Adult Diagnostic Treatment Center are made by a judge by a preponderance of the evidence. State v. Howard, 110 N.J. 113, 131 (1988); State v. Luckey, 366 N.J. Super. 79, 90-91 (App. Div. 2004).

15. Concurrent Terms and Sex Offender Treatment. When a defendant receives concurrent sentences to prison and the Adult Diagnostic Treatment Center, and the prison sentence is longer than the ADTC sentence, the defendant may be transferred to prison to serve the remainder of the sentence after completion of the ADTC term. State v. Chapman, 95 N.J. 582, 592 (1984).

16. Consecutive Terms and Sex Offender Treatment. The Code permits a sex offender to be sentenced to consecutive ADTC and prison terms for sex- and non-sex related offenses arising from one incident. State v. Chapman, 95 N.J. 582, 592 (1984).

17. Presumption of Imprisonment. When the N.J.S.A. 2C:47-1 examination report recommends probation with outpatient treatment for a first- or second-degree offense, the court must consider that recommendation in light of the presumption of imprisonment applicable to first- and second-degree crimes. State v. Hamm, 207 N.J. Super. 40, 44-45 (App. Div. 1986).

18. Parole Ineligibility. The parole disqualifier set forth in N.J.S.A. 2C:14-6 (applicable to a second or subsequent conviction for sexual assault or aggravated criminal sexual contact) applies to defendants sentenced to jail terms and to sex offender treatment. State v. Chapman, 95 N.J. 582, 588-89 (1984).

19. NERA and Sexual Assault. NERA applies to a sexual assault conviction under N.J.S.A. 2C:14-2(b) or (c)(1). State v. Drake, 444 N.J. Super. 265, 283 (App. Div. 2016).

20. Megan's Law, Civil Regulatory Scheme. The Megan's Law registration and notification requirements create a civil regulatory scheme that does not amount to punishment. Doe v. Poritz, 142 N.J. 1, 73 (1995).

21. Megan's Law Constitutionality. Our Court has generally upheld as constitutional the Megan's Law registration and notification requirements. Doe v. Poritz, 142 N.J. 1, 73-111 (1995). See also In re C.A., 146 N.J. 71, 80-110 (1996) (discussing Attorney General Guidelines on community notification and due process). However, the Court has declared the lifetime reporting requirement in N.J.S.A. 2C:7-2(g) unconstitutional as applied to juveniles. State in the Interest of C.K., 233 N.J. 44, 73 (2018).

22. Sex Offender Monitoring Act (SOMA), Penal in Nature. While the Legislature likely intended to create a civil, regulatory scheme in passing the SOMA, it created a form of punishment similar to parole. Riley v. N.J. State Parole Bd., 219 N.J. 270, 294-97 (2014) (comparing SOMA to the civil regulatory scheme of Megan's Law).

23. Sex Offender Monitoring Act (SOMA), Ex Post Facto. Because the SOMA monitoring provisions are penal, the Ex Post Facto Clauses of the New Jersey and United States Constitutions prohibit their application to a sex offender who completed his or her sentence prior to the adoption of the SOMA. Riley v. N.J. State Parole Bd., 219 N.J. 270, 297 (2014).

24. Parole Supervision for Life.

(a) **Ex Post Facto Concerns.** Parole supervision for life (PSL) is a harsher punishment than community supervision for life (CSL) (the sentence in effect until 2003, L. 2003, c. 267, § 1). State v. Perez, 220 N.J. 423, 436-42 (2015). Because the consequences of PSL are harsher than those of CSL, a defendant who violates a term of supervision while serving CSL may not be subject to the harsher PSL consequences. Id. at 442. Accord State v. Hester, 233 N.J. 381, 396 (2018) (finding that the defendant who violated CSL committed a fourth-degree crime, not a third-degree crime, as the harsher consequence applied to PSL, not CSL); State v. Jacobus, 469 N.J. Super. 136, 138 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 249 N.J. 57 (2021) (explaining that the ruling in Hester is consistent with the savings statute, N.J.S.A. 1:1-15).

(b) Double Jeopardy. Parole supervision for life is a penal consequence; thus, if the court omitted it from a sentence, double jeopardy protections preclude it from being added after the defendant has completed the sentence. State v. Schubert, 212 N.J. 295, 305-08 (2012).

(c) Vagueness and Separation of Powers. Because N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6.4(b) provides sufficient notice of illegal conduct, it is not unconstitutionally vague and does not violate the separation of powers doctrine. State v. Bond, 365 N.J. Super. 430, 438-43 (App. Div. 2003).

(d) Guilty Pleas. Defense counsel must adequately advise the defendant that a guilty plea will result in parole supervision for life, as the term is penal. See State v. Perez, 220 N.J. 423, 440 (2015) (providing that parole supervision for life is a penal consequence to a guilty plea); State v. Smullen, 437 N.J. Super. 102, 110 (App. Div. 2014) (requiring defense counsel to advise on community supervision for life, the precursor to parole supervision for life). Counsel's failure to do so may form the basis of an ineffective assistance of counsel claim. Smullen, 437 N.J. Super. at 110.

(e) Motion by Prosecutor. The requirement in N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6.4(a) that the Prosecutor must make a motion to impose parole supervision for life for certain crimes is satisfied by an oral motion. State v. Steingraber, 465 N.J. Super. 322, 328-29 (App. Div. 2020). The requirement is not satisfied by the defendant's acknowledgement at a plea hearing, in the absence of an oral or written motion, that a guilty plea will subject the defendant to parole supervision for life. Id. at 329. The court may not impose the condition without making findings in support of it. Ibid. Failure to make such findings does not render the sentence illegal but requires a remand for reconsideration of whether the condition should be imposed based, viewing the defendant as he or she stood on the date the condition was imposed, not on the date of the remand hearing). Id. at 329-30.

28. Constitutionality of Internet Restrictions. An offender has due process rights to challenge internet restrictions. J.I. v. N.J. Parole Bd., 228 N.J. 204, 227-30 (2017). The restrictions must be "reasonably tailored to advance the goals of rehabilitation or public safety." Id. at 229. "The parole authorities do not have unbridled discretion to impose unnecessary or oppressive Internet conditions that do not advance a rational penological policy." Id. at 230. A complete ban on social networking sites is unconstitutional on its face. State v. R.K., 463 N.J. Super. 386,

417-18 (App. Div. 2020) (rejecting the conclusion reached in J.B. v. N.J. Parole Bd., 433 N.J. Super. 327, 344 (App. Div. 2013) (J.B. I)).

29. Constitutionality of Polygraph Examinations. The Parole Board may use "'instant offense' and 'maintenance' polygraph examinations for therapeutic purposes in the treatment of sex offenders on PSL [parole supervision for life] or CSL [community supervision for life]." J.B. v. N.J. State Parole Bd., 444 N.J. Super. 115, 157 (App. Div.), aff'd as modified, 229 N.J. 21, 25 (2017) (J.B. II) (requiring supplementation of the polygraph regulations to buttress the Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination). The Board may not use "technical polygraph results in any evidential manner when making decisions to penalize PSL or CSL offenders or to curtail their activities." Ibid.

30. Constitutionality of the Child Erotica Provision of the Child Endangerment Statute. The child erotica amendment to the child endangerment statute (i.e., the L. 2017, c. 141 amendment which added "portrays a child in a sexually suggestive manner" to the list of unlawful conduct) is unconstitutionally vague and overbroad under the First Amendment because it "(1) expands the definition of child pornography to include images of children who are not engaged in sex acts or whose genitals are not lewdly displayed; and (2) regulates the private possession of child erotica, which, in addition to not qualifying as child pornography, is not defined using the terms of the Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 23-24 (1973) obscenity standard." State v. Higginbotham, 475 N.J. Super. 205, 233 (App. Div. 2023), certif. granted, 254 N.J. 515 (2023).

XVI. JAIL AND GAP-TIME CREDITS

A defendant is entitled to receive credit for any time served in jail between arrest and the time of sentencing (see sections A and C). This is known as "jail credit." Richardson v. Nickolopoulos, 110 N.J. 241, 242 (1988) (Richardson II). A defendant is also entitled to receive credit against a subsequent sentence for time spent incarcerated on a prior sentence (see sections B and D). This is known as "gap-time credit." Id. at 242.

A. Jail Credit: Court Rules and Statutory Provisions

1. Court Rule Authorizing Jail Credits in General. Rule 3:21-8(a) provides: "The defendant shall receive credit on the term of a custodial sentence for any time served in custody in jail or in a state hospital between arrest and the imposition of sentence." **Note:** Rule 3:21-8 was amended effective September 1, 2017, to include a subpart (b) (discussed below). Prior to the amendment, subpart (a) was the text of the rule.

2. Court Rule on Jail Credit for Time in Drug Treatment. Rule 3:21-8(b), which became effective on September 1, 2017, provides: "While committed to a residential treatment facility, the defendant shall receive credit on the term of a custodial sentence for each day during which the defendant satisfactorily complied with the terms and conditions of Drug Court (renamed Recovery Court) "special probation" pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:35-14 or Drug Court probation pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:45-1. The court, in determining the number of credits for time spent in a residential treatment facility, shall consider the recommendations of the treatment provider."

3. Jail Credits Included in the Judgment of Conviction. Rule 3:21-5 requires the court include in the judgment of conviction a statement of the jail credits awarded to the defendant.

4. Jail Credit Explained to the Defendant. N.J.S.A. 2C:43-2(f)(2) instructs the court to explain to the defendant the jail credits that apply to the sentence.

B. Gap-Time Credit: Statutory Provisions

Statutory Authority for Gap-Time Credit. N.J.S.A. 2C:44-5(b)(2) provides that when a defendant, previously sentenced to imprisonment, is subsequently

sentenced to another term for an offense committed prior to the former sentence (other than for an offense committed while in custody), the defendant shall be credited with time served on the prior sentence "in determining the permissible aggregate length of the term or terms remaining to be served." These gap-time credits apply regardless of whether the court imposes concurrent or consecutive terms. N.J.S.A. 2C:44-5(b)(2).

C. Jail Credit: Case Law

1. Policy. "Jail credits were conceived as a matter of equal protection or fundamental fairness and a means of avoiding the double punishment that would result if no such credits were granted." State v. Hernandez, 208 N.J. 24, 36 (2011). They are premised on the notion that a person who is financially unable to post bail should not serve more time than a person who can afford bail. State v. Joe, 228 N.J. 125, 131 (2017). Jail credits should be applied in such a way as to promote uniformity and "prevent[] the real time served from turning on 'happenstance,' such as whether the same charges are included in one indictment or spread over multiple indictments." Ibid.

2. Jail Credits Are Mandatory. The court must award jail credits for time served in custody prior to sentencing. State v. Hernandez, 208 N.J. 24, 37 (2011).

3. Credits Explained. A sentencing judge should give a statement of reasons explaining the basis for an award of jail credits, particularly when the issue is in dispute. State v. Alevras, 213 N.J. Super. 331, 339 (App. Div. 1986).

4. Day-for-Day Award. Jail credits are "day-for-day" credits, subtracted from the front end of the sentence. Buncie v. Dep't of Corr., 382 N.J. Super. 214, 217 (App. Div. 2005). "The practical effect of that allocation is that jail credits will 'reduce a[] [parole] ineligibility term as well as the sentence imposed.'" State v. Hernandez, 208 N.J. 24, 37 (2011) (quoting State v. Mastapeter, 290 N.J. Super. 56, 64, (App. Div. 1996)). This approach is different from the one used to compute gap-time credits. State v. Hernandez, 208 N.J. 24, 38 (2011). Gap-time credits are subtracted from the back end of a sentence; thus, they do not reduce a parole ineligibility period. Id. at 38-39.

5. Credits Are Based on Time Incarcerated. An award of jail credit is not dependent upon the date the State files a formal accusation or indictment, but rather, is based on the time spent confined while serving no valid sentence. State v. Garland, 226 N.J. Super. 356, 362 (App. Div. 1988).

6. Jail Credit and Commutation Credit. For a discussion of jail credits in relation to commutation credits awarded during incarceration, see Buncie v. Dep't of Corr., 382 N.J. Super. 214, 218 (App. Div. 2005).

7. "Custody" Defined. Custody under Rule 3:21-8 (now Rule 3:21-8(a) effective September 1, 2017), signifies an involuntary confinement imposed by the court in a penal or medical facility. State v. Towey, 114 N.J. 69, 86 (1989).

(a) Violations of Drug Court (renamed Recovery Court) and Probation. Special probation pursuant to Track One of Drug Court is custodial for purposes of the jail credit rule because a defendant who leaves the facility without authorization is subject to prosecution for escape. State v. Stalter, 440 N.J. Super. 548, 554 (App. Div. 2015). The same is not true for a defendant who violates a term of regular probation under Track Two of Drug Court. Id. at 555. Generally, probation is not custodial for purposes of jail credit. Ibid.; State v. Evers, 368 N.J. Super. 159, 172-73 (App. Div. 2004).

Note: Rule 3:21-8(b), which became effective September 1, 2017, requires jail credit for time spent in a residential treatment facility pursuant to Track One or Two of Drug Court.

(b) Bail Release. A defendant is not entitled to jail credit for time spent released on bail. State in the Interest of I.C., 447 N.J. Super. 247, 255 (App. Div. 2016); State v. Boykins, 447 N.J. Super. 213, 220 (App. Div. 2016).

(c) Voluntary Admission to a Hospital. Voluntary confinement in a psychiatric hospital is not custodial for purposes of jail credit, even if the confinement is a condition of bail. State v. Towey, 114 N.J. 69, 85-86 (1989).

(d) Sex Offender Diagnostic Treatment Center. Confinement in a diagnostic treatment center for sex offenders is custodial for purposes of jail credits. State v. Lee, 60 N.J. 53, 58 (1972).

(e) Religious Convent. Time spent in a religious convent awaiting trial need not be credited where the restrictions on liberty are not so severe as to be the equivalent of jail or a state hospital, even if residence at the covenant

was a condition of bail. State v. Mirakaj, 268 N.J. Super. 48, 52-53 (App. Div. 1993).

(f) Electronic Monitoring Program. A defendant is not entitled to jail credit for time spent participating in an electronic monitoring wristlet program as a condition of pretrial release. State v. Mastapeter, 290 N.J. Super. 56, 62-63 (App. Div. 1996).

(g) Intensive Supervision Program. Participation in the Intensive Supervision Program (ISP) is not custodial for purposes of computing jail credit. State v. Adams, 436 N.J. Super. 106, 113-15 (App. Div. 2014).

(h) Juvenile Community Home Program. Placement in a juvenile community home program as a condition of probation is not custodial for purposes of determining jail credits. State in the Interest of I.C., 447 N.J. Super. 247, 258 (App. Div. 2016).

(i) Juvenile Intensive Supervision Program. The Juvenile Intensive Supervision Program is not the equivalent of detention; thus, jail credits may not be awarded for time spent in the program. State in the Interest of I.C., 447 N.J. Super. 247, 258 (App. Div. 2016).

8. Multiple New Jersey Charges. When a defendant is facing (1) charges in more than one county, (2) multiple charges in more than one indictment, or (3) multiple charges in one indictment for crimes committed during multiple criminal episodes, the defendant is entitled to receive jail credit against each sentence for the time he or she was detained or arrested until the time that the first sentence is imposed. State v. Hernandez, 208 N.J. 24, 47-48 (2011); State v. Rippy, 431 N.J. Super. 338, 353-54 (App. Div. 2013). This holding is different from prior decisions that limited jail credits to the particular offense for which confinement was directly attributed. State v. Hernandez, 208 N.J. 24, 43 (2011) (discussing State v. Black, 153 N.J. 438, 456 (1998)).

9. Confinement in another Jurisdiction. A defendant is entitled to jail credit for time incarcerated in a foreign jurisdiction if the incarceration was due solely to the New Jersey charge. State v. Joe, 228 N.J. 125, 135 (2017) (denying credit for confinement in another State because the confinement was not based solely on New Jersey charges); State v. Hemphill, 391 N.J. Super. 67, 71 (App. Div. 2007) (awarding credit for confinement in a foreign country based solely on New Jersey charges); State v. Beatty, 128 N.J. Super. 488, 490-91 (App. Div. 1974) (awarding

credit for confinement in another State based on New Jersey charges). A defendant is also entitled to jail credit for confinement in a foreign jurisdiction if that confinement is the result of New Jersey's transferring custody to the foreign jurisdiction pursuant to the Interstate Agreement on Detainers, which provides that the transferring jurisdiction retains jurisdiction over the defendant while the defendant is confined in the receiving State. State v. S.A., 457 N.J. Super. 590, 596-97 (Law Div. 2018) (citing N.J.S.A. 2A:159-5(g)).

10. Offense Committed while Released on Bail. Where a defendant is arrested for a crime, is released on bail, is arrested on unrelated charges and serves 155 days in jail before pleading guilty to the first crime (in exchange for dismissal of the charges on the second offense), the defendant is entitled to receive 155 days jail credit against the sentence on the first crime. State v. Rawls, 219 N.J. 185, 197-98 (2014) (applying the holding in State v. Hernandez, 208 N.J. 24, 47-48 (2011)).

11. Parole Violation. A defendant who is charged with absconding for failure to report to a parole officer is not entitled to jail credit for the time spent returned to custody until sentenced for the new offense (i.e., absconding) because the return to custody was "attributable to the original offense on which the parole was granted and not to any offense or offenses committed during the parolee's release." State v. Hernandez, 208 N.J. 24, 43 (2011) (quoting State v. Black, 153 N.J. 438, 461 (1998)). See also State v. Bellamy, 462 N.J. Super. 107, 113 (App. Div. 2019) (finding that Hernandez, 208 N.J. 24 did not overrule the decision in Black, 153 N.J. 438 that a defendant is not entitled to jail credit for time spent returned to custody after a parole violation); State v. DiAngelo, 434 N.J. Super. 443, 456-57 (App. Div. 2014) (explaining the difference between a violation of probation and a violation of parole for purposes of jail credits).

12. Probation Violation. Serving an incarcerated defendant with a violation of probation (VOP) statement of charges for a first-, second-, third- or fourth-degree offense is the equivalent of arresting the defendant for purposes of jail credits, and thus "triggers the award of jail credits for the period of pre-adjudication confinement against the VOP sentence and the sentence for the new offense." State v. DiAngelo, 434 N.J. Super. 443, 461 (App. Div. 2014). Jail credits accrue as of the date the statement of charges was issued and apply to any custodial term imposed for the VOP and the offense committed while on probation. Id. at 447, 462.

13. Consecutive Terms and Multiple Indictments. Where the defendant was convicted of charges in two separate indictments and, at a joint sentencing hearing,

the court orders the sentences for the crimes charged in indictment one to run consecutive to the sentence for crimes charged in indictment two, jail credits apply to the front end of the aggregate term. State v. C.H., 228 N.J. 111, 120-21 (2017). To award jail credits against the sentence resulting from indictment one and the sentence resulting from indictment two would provide a defendant a "double award." Id. at 121.

14. Reversal of a Conviction on Appeal. When a defendant is incarcerated awaiting retrial after successfully challenging a conviction, and the defendant is not serving time for any other valid conviction, the court must award jail credit for time spent incarceration from the date of reversal to the date of resentencing. State v. Rippy, 431 N.J. Super. 338, 350-51 (App. Div. 2013). North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 718-19 (1969); State v. DeRosa, 332 N.J. Super. 426, 433-35 (App. Div. 2000). The defendant is also entitled to day-for-day credit for the time served on the reversed conviction (commonly called prior service credit). North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 718-19 (1969); State v. Sanders, 107 N.J. 609, 621 (1987); State v. Rippy, 431 N.J. Super. 338, 355 (App. Div. 2013). For additional discussion of prior service credit, see Chapter XVIII, Direct Appeal by a Defendant.

15. State Appeal of Jail Credits. "[T]he State may appeal an award of jail credits on the ground that they are not authorized by Rule 3:21-8" (now Rule 3:21-8(a) eff. September 1, 2017). State v. Rippy, 431 N.J. Super. 338, 343 (App. Div. 2013)).

16. Incarceration as a Condition of Probation. Time spent in jail awaiting sentencing must be applied to reduce a term of imprisonment imposed as a condition of probation. State v. Carlough, 183 N.J. Super. 234, 235-36 (App. Div. 1982).

17. Intensive Supervision Program Violation. A defendant who committed a crime while participating in the Intensive Supervision Program (N.J.S.A. 2C:43-11) is entitled to jail credits for any time between the date of arrest and either the date of sentencing for the offense or the date of sentencing for the violation of the Intensive Supervision Program. State v. Adams, 436 N.J. Super. 106, 113-15 (App. Div. 2014).

18. Plea Agreements and Jail Credits. "An incorrect calculation of a defendant's jail credits may impact the voluntariness of the guilty plea." State v. McNeal, 237 N.J. 494, 499 (2019). Where the sentencing court repeatedly and clearly informed the defendant "that the jail credits should not be relied upon to

assume his parole ineligibility period," a court will not find that an alleged misunderstanding of the jail credits warrants a plea withdrawal. Id. at 500.

D. Gap-Time Credit: Case Law

1. Gap-Time Credit Described. "The credit awarded under N.J.S.A. 2C:44-5(b) is referred to as 'gap-time credit' because it awards a defendant who is given two separate sentences on two different dates credit toward the second sentence for the time spent in custody since he or she began serving the first sentence." State v. Hernandez, 208 N.J. 24, 38 (2011). The "credits apply towards the defendant's aggregate sentence, which is calculated as the length of the defendant's longest term when he or she is ordered to serve multiple sentences concurrently and is equal to the sum of all terms when he or she is ordered to serve multiple sentences consecutively." Ibid. (internal quotations omitted).

2. Gap-Time Credits Reduce the "Back End" of a Sentence. "Unlike jail credits, gap-time credits are applied to the 'back end' of a sentence." State v. Hernandez, 208 N.J. 24, 38 (2011). If the court did not impose a parole ineligibility term, "gap-time credits will advance the date on which a defendant first becomes eligible for parole." State v. Rippy, 431 N.J. Super. 338, 348 (App. Div. 2013) (quoting State v. Hernandez, 208 N.J. 24, 38-39 (2011)). While the rule may result in a windfall to defendants in some cases, the gap-time statute provides a uniform, bright-line rule that avoids the need to explain any delay or the parties' motives. State v. Franklin, 175 N.J. 456, 463-64 (2003).

3. Policy of Gap-Time Credit. Gap-time credits counteract any dilatory tactics of the prosecutor in pursuing a conviction of an earlier offense after the defendant has been sentenced on another offense. State v. Hernandez, 208 N.J. 24, 37-38 (2011). The purpose is to avoid manipulation of trial dates to the disadvantage of defendants and to put defendants in the same position as if the two offenses had been tried at the same time. State v. Franklin, 175 N.J. 456, 462 (2003); State v. Carreker, 172 N.J. 100, 105 (2002). Additionally, the gap-time statute is intended to limit the accumulation of consecutive sentences. State v. L.H., 206 N.J. 528, 546 (2011) (Rivera-Soto, J., concurring with the per curiam decision and quoting Richardson v. Nickolopoulos, 110 N.J. 241, 243 (1988) (Richardson II) and Booker v. N.J. State Parole Bd., 136 N.J. 257, 260 (1994)).

4. Gap-Time Credits Are Mandatory. If the three elements of the gap-time statute are met (i.e., the defendant has been sentenced to prison, the defendant is

subsequently sentenced to another prison term, and the subsequent sentence is for an offense that occurred prior to the imposition of the first sentence and not while in custody) then the court must award gap-time credits for the time the defendant spent incarcerated from imposition of the first sentence until imposition of the subsequent sentence. State v. Franklin, 175 N.J. 456, 462 (2003); State v. Carreker, 172 N.J. 100, 105 (2002). "The only exceptions have been cases in which . . . there was little or no risk of manipulation by the prosecutor." State v. L.H., 206 N.J. 528, 532 (2011) (Long, J., concurring with the per curiam decision denying the defendant gap-time credit and explaining that "manipulation by the prosecutor was a veritable impossibility" because DNA testing that was not available until ten years after the crime showed that L.H.'s DNA matched DNA from the crime).

5. Jail Credit Is No Substitute for Gap-Time Credit. "[W]here gap-time credits are applicable, the judge has no discretion to award jail credits instead." State v. Rippy, 431 N.J. Super. 338 (App. Div. 2013) (citing to State v. Hernandez, 208 N.J. 24, 48-49 (2011)). See also State v. Edwards, 263 N.J. Super. 256, 258 (App. Div. 1993) (explaining that gap-time credits include only the period of incarceration between imposition of the first and second sentence, not time spent in jail pending imposition of the earlier sentence).

6. Consecutive Terms. Gap-time credits "reduce the aggregate of consecutive sentences" and concurrent sentences. Booker v. N.J. State Parole Bd., 136 N.J. 257, 266 (1994).

7. Parole Ineligibility Period Unaffected by Gap-Time Credit. Gap-time credits do not reduce a parole bar. State v. Hernandez, 208 N.J. 24, 39 (2011); Booker v. N.J. State Parole Bd., 136 N.J. 257, 263 (1994). This rule applies to the 85% period of parole ineligibility mandated by the No Early Release Act (NERA). State v. Hernandez, 208 N.J. 24, 38-39 (2011); Meyer v. N.J. State Parole Bd., 345 N.J. Super. 424, 429-30 (App. Div. 2001).

Equal Protection. This rule may result in similarly situated defendants reaching parole eligibility dates at different times. Richardson v. Nickolopoulos, 110 N.J. 241, 250-52 (1988) (Richardson II). But the rule does not violate a defendant's equal protection rights. Lorenzo v. Edmiston, 705 F. Supp. 209, 215 (D.N.J.), aff'd, 882 F.2d 511 (3d Cir. 1989).

8. First Sentence Complete. The plain language of the gap-time statute (N.J.S.A. 2C:44-5(b)(2)) does not require "that [a] defendant be serving the original sentence

when the later sentence is imposed." State v. L.H., 206 N.J. 528, 530-31 (Long, J., concurring). The majority of decisions have held that gap-time credit applies even when the defendant has completed the first sentence. State v. L.H., 206 N.J. 528, 530-31 (Long, J., concurring and referring to State v. Lawlor, 222 N.J. Super. 241, 245 (App. Div. 1988), State v. Ruiz, 355 N.J. Super. 237, 242 (Law Div. 2002), and State v. French, 313 N.J. Super. 457, 463 n.7 (Law Div. 1997)). But see State v. Garland, 226 N.J. Super. 356, 361 (App. Div. 1988) (stating in dictum that gap-time credit "relates to time spent in imprisonment as a result of a sentence previously imposed and has no application unless defendant, while incarcerated, is sentenced for an offense occurring before the prior sentence").

9. Violation of Probation. A defendant is entitled to gap-time credit when the offense for which sentence is imposed was a violation of probation that the defendant committed prior to the imposition of sentence on another violation of probation. State v. Ogletree, 435 N.J. Super. 11, 15-16 (App. Div. 2014); State v. Guaman, 271 N.J. Super. 130, 131 (App. Div. 1994).

10. Violation of Parole. A defendant is entitled to gap-time credit for the period served in custody following an arrest for a violation of parole until sentencing on the original underlying offense. State v. Franklin, 175 N.J. 456, 471-72 (2003). However, the defendant may not receive gap-time credit for any new offense committed while on parole. Ibid.; State v. Hunt, 272 N.J. Super. 182, 185 (App. Div. 1994).

11. Non-Indictable Offenses. Gap-time credit may be awarded for time served in State prison as a result of a sentence imposed by a municipal court on non-indictable offenses. State v. French, 313 N.J. Super. 457, 463-67 (Law Div. 1997).

12. Incarceration due to a Motor Vehicle Violation. Gap-time credit applies when the first incarceration was the result of a Title 39 driving while intoxicated violation. State v. Walters, 445 N.J. Super. 596, 600-02 (App. Div. 2016). The incarceration need not be the result of a Title 2 crime to entitle the defendant to a gap-time credit award. Ibid.

13. Actual Incarceration. Gap-time credits are not due where the defendant commits the second offense prior to the start of the defendant's actual incarceration. State v. Hall, 206 N.J. Super. 547, 550-51 (App. Div. 1985) (denying credit where the defendant committed the second offense while on bail during the pendency of an appeal challenging the conviction for the first offense).

14. Sentences in Foreign Jurisdictions. The gap-time provision does not apply to time served on a foreign sentence because the gap-time statute is directed at New Jersey sentencing authorities who have no jurisdiction to aggregate out-of-state sentences. State v. Carreker, 172 N.J. 100, 114 (2002). Further, the Interstate Agreement on Detainers protects defendants serving out-of-state sentences from prosecutorial delay. Ibid.

15. Young Adult Offender. When a young adult offender is sentenced to an indeterminate term pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:43-5, gap-time credit will reduce the maximum length of the aggregate indeterminate term. Mitnaul v. N.J. Parole Bd., 280 N.J. Super. 164, 166 (App. Div. 1995).

16. Credits Determined by the Court. As with other types of sentencing credits, gap-time credits must be awarded by the court at sentencing. The Parole Board is not responsible for awarding these credits; it computes the parole eligibility date on the basis of the reduced aggregate sentence. Booker v. N.J. State Parole Bd., 136 N.J. 257, 265-66 (1994).

XVII. MOTION TO CHANGE A SENTENCE

Within sixty days of the judgment of conviction the defendant may request the sentencing court to change the sentence imposed. After the sixty-day period has expired, the defendant may file a motion to change a sentence for limited reasons. Section A discusses court rules regarding a motion to change a sentence, and section B discusses relevant case law.

A. Motion to Change a Sentence: Court Rules

1. Court Rule Authorizing a Motion to Change a Sentence within Sixty Days. Rule 3:21-10(a) provides that "a motion to reduce or change a sentence shall be filed not later than 60 days after the date of the judgment of conviction. The court may reduce or change a sentence, either on motion or on its own initiative, by order entered within 75 days from the date of the judgment of conviction and not thereafter."

2. Court Rule Authorizing a Motion to Change a Sentence at any Time. Rule 3:21-10(b) provides that the trial court may hear a motion at any time to:

- (1) Permit entry of an incarcerated defendant "into a custodial or non-custodial treatment or rehabilitation program for drug or alcohol abuse";
- (2) Permit the release of an incarcerated defendant "because of illness or infirmity of the defendant";
- (3) Change a sentence "for good cause shown upon the joint application of the defendant and prosecuting attorney";
- (4) Change a sentence "as authorized by the Code of Criminal Justice";
- (5) Correct a sentence "not authorized by law";
- (6) Permit an incarcerated defendant to enter the Intensive Supervision Program (N.J.S.A. 2C:43-11); or
- (7) Change or reduce "a sentence when a prior conviction has been reversed on appeal or vacated by collateral attack."

Hearing Generally Not Required. The court need not hold a hearing on a motion to change a sentence pursuant to Rule 3:21-10(b) unless the "interest of justice" requires otherwise. R. 3:21-10(c). If the court holds a hearing, the defendant need not be present. R. 3:16(b).

3. Pending Appeal Does Not Preclude a Motion to Change a Sentence. Upon notice to the Appellate Division, the trial court may consider a motion to change a sentence while an appeal is pending. R. 3:21-10(d).

4. Sentence Changes Must Be Placed on the Record. "All changes of sentence shall be made in open court upon notice to the defendant and the prosecutor. An appropriate order setting forth the revised sentence and specifying the change made and the reasons therefor shall be entered on the record." R. 3:21-10(c).

B. Motion to Change a Sentence: Case Law

1. Double Jeopardy. Rule 3:21-10(b) authorizes a change in sentence "at any time." The Rule does not negate, however, the double jeopardy prohibition against adding a punitive term to a sentence that the defendant has completed. State v. Schubert, 212 N.J. 295, 309-10 (2012).

2. Transfer to a Drug or Alcohol Treatment Program. To obtain transfer to a treatment program pursuant to Rule 3:21-10(b)(1), the defendant must establish present addiction. State v. Davis, 68 N.J. 69, 85-86 (1975). The court must then determine whether the purposes of a custodial sentence "outweigh the interests sought to be served by transfer to" a treatment program. Ibid. Accord State v. McKinney, 140 N.J. Super. 160, 163 (App. Div. 1976); State v. Williams, 139 N.J. Super. 290, 299 (App. Div. 1976), aff'd o.b., 75 N.J. 1 (1977). The court should consider: "(a) the involved crime, its seriousness and attendant circumstances; (b) defendant's prior record -- criminal and addictive; (c) potential threat posed to society by defendant's release; (d) the bona fides of the application; (e) the likelihood or probability of successful treatment; (f) prior treatment record, and (g) the failure or success of prior treatment." State v. Williams, 139 N.J. Super. 290, 299-300 (App. Div. 1976), aff'd o.b., 75 N.J. 1 (1977).

(a) Minimum Terms. The court may not consider a request to transfer to a drug or alcohol treatment facility prior to the expiration of a parole ineligibility term mandated by statute, but the court may consider an application prior to the expiration of a parole ineligibility term that was imposed at the sentencing court's discretion. State v. Brown, 384 N.J. Super.

191, 194-96 (App. Div. 2006); State v. Mendel, 212 N.J. Super. 110, 113 (App. Div. 1986). Accord State v. Chavies, 247 N.J. 245, 250 (2021) (providing that a defendant may not file a motion under Rule 3:21-10(b)(2) until the defendant has completed a mandatory parole bar imposed pursuant to the No Early Release Act).

(b) Violation of Terms of a Treatment Program. If after transfer to a noncustodial treatment center the defendant violates a term of treatment, the court may reinstate the original sentence. State v. Williams, 299 N.J. Super. 264, 270 (App. Div. 1997).

3. Changed Circumstances. To obtain a transfer to a drug or alcohol treatment program pursuant to Rule 3:21-10(b)(1), or to obtain a change in sentence due to illness pursuant to Rule 3:21-10(b)(2), the defendant must show a change in circumstances since the date of sentencing. State v. Kent, 212 N.J. Super. 635, 641 (App. Div. 1986). "[T]he worldwide [COVID-19] pandemic that has afflicted New Jersey and its prison system amounts to a change in circumstances under the Rule." In the Matter of Request to Modify Prison Sentences, Expedite Parole Hearings, and Identify Vulnerable Prisoners, 242 N.J. 357, 379 (2020).

4. Change Authorized by the Code. Rule 3:21-10(b)(4), which allows a change of sentence "as authorized by the Code," does not apply where the Legislature creates a new offense with a more lenient sentence provision than the one the defendant was sentenced under. State v. James, 343 N.J. Super. 143, 147-48 (App. Div. 2001).

XVIII. DIRECT APPEAL BY A DEFENDANT

A criminal defendant may challenge the sentence on direct appeal (see sections A and D). Claims fall into two general categories: those that challenge the sentence as excessive and those that challenge the sentence as illegal (see sections B and C). If the defendant succeeds on appeal, principles of double jeopardy prohibit a court from imposing a harsher sentence on remand than the court initially imposed, unless the defendant had no expectation of finality in the initial sentence (see section E).

A. Direct Appeal by a Defendant of a Sentence: Court Rules and Statutory Provisions

1. Court Rule Authorizing Direct Appeal by a Criminal Defendant. Rule 2:3-2 provides: "In any criminal action, any defendant, the defendant's legal representative, or other person aggrieved by the final judgment of conviction entered by the Superior Court, including a judgment imposing a suspended sentence, . . . may appeal or, where appropriate, seek leave to appeal, to the appropriate appellate court."

2. Statutory Authority for the Appellate Division to Hear Appeals. N.J.S.A. 2C:44-7 vests the appellate courts with authority to review "[a]ny action taken by the court in imposing sentence." "The [appellate] court shall specifically have the authority to review findings of fact by the sentencing court in support of its finding of aggravating and mitigating circumstances and to modify the defendant's sentence upon his [or her] application where such findings are not fairly supported on the record." N.J.S.A. 2C:44-7.

3. Stay Pending Appeal, Requested by Defendant. Pursuant to Rule 2:9-3(a), a prison sentence shall not be stayed; however, the court may admit the defendant to bail pending appeal, in accordance with Rule 2:9-4, which permits bail only when "the case involves a substantial question that should be determined by the appellate court, that the safety of any person or of the community will not be seriously threatened if the defendant remains on bail, and that there is no significant risk of defendant's flight." Where the court imposes a fine or probation, Rule 2:9-3(b) provides that the sentence "may be stayed . . . on appropriate terms."

4. Court Rule Regarding Remand and Original Jurisdiction. Rule 2:10-3 provides: "If a judgment of conviction is reversed for error in or for excessiveness

or leniency of the sentence, the appellate court may impose such sentence as should have been imposed or may remand the matter to the trial court for proper sentencing."

B. Excessive Sentence Challenges: Case Law

Excessive Sentence Challenges Described. An excessive sentence claim challenges the harshness of a sentence that is "within the range permitted by the verdict or plea." State v. Hess, 207 N.J. 123, 145 (2011). An excessive sentence challenge must be asserted on direct appeal; it will not be heard in a post-conviction relief petition. Ibid.

C. Illegal Sentence Challenges: Case Law

1. Illegal Sentence Challenges Described. "There are two categories of illegal sentences: (1) those that exceed the penalties authorized by statute for a particular offense and (2) those that are not in accordance with the law, or stated differently, those that include a disposition that is not authorized by our criminal code." State v. Schubert, 212 N.J. 295, 308 (2012) (citing State v. Murray, 162 N.J. 240, 246-47 (2000)). Accord State v. Acevedo, 205 N.J. 40, 45 (2011) (quoting State v. Murray, 162 N.J. 240, 247 (2000)). An illegal sentence may be corrected at any time. State v. Tavares, 286 N.J. Super. 610, 619 (App. Div. 1996). A challenge that attacks the court's exercise of discretion does not fall within the illegal-sentence category and must be asserted on direct appeal. State v. Ellis, 346 N.J. Super. 583, 588 (App. Div.), aff'd o.b., 174 N.J. 535, 536 (2002).

2. Time in which to File an Illegal Sentence Challenge. A defendant may file a petition to correct an illegal sentence at any time before the defendant completes the sentence. R. 3:21-10(b)(5); State v. Zuber, 227 N.J. 422, 437 (2017); State v. Schubert, 212 N.J. 295, 313 (2012); State v. Crawford, 379 N.J. Super. 250, 257 (App. Div. 2005).

3. Illegal Sentence May Not Be Ignored. "[A] reviewing court is not free to ignore an illegal sentence." State v. Moore, 377 N.J. Super. 445 (App. Div. 2005). "[S]o long as the issue of defendant's sentence is properly before the court, the court may correct an illegal sentence, even by increasing the term." State v. Kirk, 243 N.J. Super. 636, 643 (App. Div. 1990). Accord State v. Tavares, 286 N.J. Super. 610, 619 (App. Div. 1996).

4. Merger Is a Matter of Legality. Failure to merge offenses results in an illegal sentence. State v. Romero, 191 N.J. 59, 80 (2007).

5. Legality of Sentence Based on an Unclear Verdict. Where the facts support a conviction for a third- and second-degree offense, and the verdict does not state which one the jury convicted the defendant of violating, it is a question of legality whether the court erred in imposing sentence for a second-degree crime. State v. Eure, 304 N.J. Super. 469, 473 (App. Div. 1997).

6. Illegal Sentence Based on Considerations beyond the Code. A sentence based on a fact unrelated to the Code's sentencing criteria is illegal. State v. Wilson, 206 N.J. Super. 182, 184 (App. Div. 1985) (finding illegal a sentence based "entirely" on the defendant's failure to appear at the sentencing hearing).

7. Failure to Provide a Rationale Does Not Make the Term Illegal. The court's failure to provide its rationale for a sentence does not render the sentence illegal. State v. Acevedo, 205 N.J. 40, 45-47 (2011).

8. A Plea Agreement May Not Provide for an Illegal Sentence. The court may not enforce a plea agreement that results in an illegal sentence. State v. Manzie, 335 N.J. Super. 267, 278 (App. Div. 2000); State v. Nemeth, 214 N.J. Super. 324, 327 (App. Div. 1986).

9. Lack of Factual Basis for a Plea Does Not Make a Sentence Illegal. "As long as a guilty plea is knowing and voluntary, . . . a court's failure to elicit a factual basis for the plea is not necessarily of constitutional dimension and thus does not render illegal a sentence imposed without such a basis. A factual basis is constitutionally required only when there are indicia, such as a contemporaneous claim of innocence, that the defendant does not understand enough about the nature of the law as it applies to the facts of the case to make a truly 'voluntary' decision on his [or her] own." State v. Mitchell, 126 N.J. 565, 577-78 (1992).

10. Failure to Advise a Sex Offender of a Parole Consequence Does Not Render a Sentence Illegal. Failure to inform a sex offender of the parole consequences of a sentence to the Adult Diagnostic and Treatment Center does not result in an illegal sentence. State v. Lark, 117 N.J. 331, 341 (1989).

11. An Indeterminate Term Is Generally Illegal. "Except for young adult offenders, who may be sentenced to an indeterminate term, N.J.S.A. 2C:43-5, and except for sentences of life imprisonment, Chapters 43 and 44 [of Title 2C] require

that a specific term of years be fixed for custodial sentences." State v. Dittmar, 188 N.J. Super. 364, 366-67 (App. Div. 1982). Thus, a sentence that requires sex offender treatment at the Adult Diagnostic and Treatment Center "for an indeterminate term not to exceed ten years" is an illegal sentence. Id. at 365.

12. Lawful and Unlawful Basis for a Sentence. If the court imposed an extended term on two alternative grounds, the extended term will not be vacated on appeal so long as one basis was lawful. State v. Guzman, 313 N.J. Super. 363, 384-85 (App. Div. 1998) (affirming an extended term based on the court's discretionary authority, even though the sentencing court erred in finding that the Graves Act mandated an extended term).

13. Order in which Sentences Must Be Served Is Not a Matter of Legality. "Although specification that the less restrictive sentence be served prior to the more restrictive sentence is not illegal, it may, on a particular occasion, constitute an abuse of discretion." State v. Ellis, 346 N.J. Super. 583, 597 (App. Div.), aff'd o.b., 174 N.J. 535, 536 (2002) (noting that "[i]n a very real sense, directing that a less restrictive sentence be served prior to the more restrictive sentence is akin to the discretionary imposition of an additional period of parole ineligibility").

14. Consecutive Term Challenges Do Not Relate to Legality of the Sentence. The claim that consecutive sentences are inconsistent with the Yarbough guidelines is a challenge to the court's exercise of discretion, not to the legality of the sentences. State v. Locane, 454 N.J. Super. 98, 131 (App. Div. 2018); State v. Ellis, 346 N.J. Super. 583, 596 (App. Div.), aff'd o.b., 174 N.J. 535, 536 (2002).

15. Sentence for a Violation of Probation May Be Illegal. A sentence that does not comply with the requirements set forth in Baylass and Molina, is a sentence not authorized by law. State v. Ervin, 241 N.J. Super. 458, 474-75 (App. Div. 1989). See State v. Molina, 114 N.J. 181, 182-83 (1989), and State v. Baylass, 114 N.J. 169, 170-71 (1989) (holding that when resentencing after a violation of probation (VOP), the court may not consider the VOP as an aggravating factor, but rather, must assess how the VOP affects the weight accorded to the mitigating factors identified at the initial sentencing hearing).

16. Denial of Gap-Time Credits Renders a Sentence Illegal. Challenges to gap-time credits "pertain to the legality of the sentence imposed." State v. Shabazz, 263 N.J. Super. 246, 251 (App. Div. 1993).

17. Conflict of Interest Is Not a Matter of Sentence Legality. "[A] potential conflict of interest by a defense attorney does not affect the legality of a sentence." State v. Murray, 162 N.J. 240, 243 (2000).

18. Creation of a New Offense Does Not Render Illegal the Sentence Imposed. Where the Legislature creates a new offense similar to the one that the defendant violated, but with a more lenient sentence, the defendant's harsher sentence is not rendered illegal. State v. James, 343 N.J. Super. 143, 147-48 (App. Div. 2001).

19. Enhanced DWI Sentence Based on a Prior Uncounseled Guilty Plea Is Erroneous, But Not Illegal. Under State constitutional law, and "[i]n the context of repeat DWI offenses, . . . the enhanced administrative penalties and fines may constitutionally be imposed but . . . the actual period of incarceration imposed may not exceed that for any counseled DWI convictions." State v. Hrycak, 184 N.J. 351, 362 (2005) (quoting and reaffirming State v. Laurick, 120 N.J. 1, 16 (1990); State v. Thomas, 401 N.J. Super. 180, 184 (Law Div. 2007). See also State v. Patel, 239 N.J. 424, 443 (2019) (providing the standard for indigent and non-indigent defendants who challenge a custodial enhanced sentence based on a prior uncounseled DWI conviction). See also State v. Konecny, 250 N.J. 321, 338 (2022) (an uncounseled conviction for DWI or refusal to submit to a breath test that is entitled to Laurick relief may not be used as a predicate crime for purposes of the enhanced sentencing provisions for driving with a suspended license). An enhanced jail term based on an uncounseled prior conviction is not an illegal sentence. State v. Bringhurst, 401 N.J. Super. 421, 431 (App. Div. 2008).

20. A Sentence Is Illegal if Based on an Erroneous Predicate Finding. Where the court errs in imposing a sentence that does not comply with the statutory mandates for a repeat DWI offender, a later court sentencing on a subsequent drunk driving offense must consider the sentence that the prior court should have imposed, not the erroneous sentence that the court actually imposed. State v. Nicolai, 287 N.J. Super. 528, 531-32 (App. Div. 1996). To find otherwise would result in another illegal sentence. Ibid.

21. Cruel and Unusual Punishment. The Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution circumscribes the criminal process in three ways: "it limits the kind of punishment that may be imposed on those convicted of crimes, . . . proscribes punishment that is grossly disproportionate to the severity of the crime," and "imposes substantive limits on what may be made criminal and punished as such." Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 667 (1977).

22. Cruel and Unusual Punishment, Federal Gross-Disproportionality Test. In determining whether a sentence for a term of years violates the Eighth Amendment, the United States Supreme Court has "not established a clear or consistent path for courts to follow." Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 72 (2003). However, the one governing legal principle has been that a "gross disproportionality" standard applies to such a sentence. Ibid. But see Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 965 (1991) (Scalia, J., with Rehnquist, C.J., joining) (stating that the Eighth Amendment contains no proportionality guarantee).

Factors Relating to Gross Disproportionality. The Court has "exhibit[ed] a lack of clarity regarding what factors may indicate gross disproportionality." Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. at 72. In Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 290-91 (1983), the Court proposed a three-prong analysis that requires a court to compare: (1) the gravity of the offense committed to the sentence imposed; (2) the sentence imposed to those imposed for similar offenses in the same jurisdiction; and (3) the sentence imposed to those imposed for similar offenses in other jurisdictions. But see Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. at 1005 (Kennedy, J., with O'Connor, J., and Souter, J.J., joining) (stating that only the second and third Solem factors need be applied, and only in the rare case when there may be a gross disproportionality between the crime committed and the sentence imposed); Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 23-24 (2003) (plurality opinion) (applying the proportionality principles distilled in Justice Kennedy's concurrence in Harmelin to a sentence imposed under a state's "Three Strikes" law).

24. Cruel and Unusual Punishment, New Jersey Three-Part Test. New Jersey courts consider the following three factors in assessing a claim of cruel and unusual punishment: "first, whether the punishment conforms with contemporary standards of decency; second, whether the punishment is grossly disproportionate to the offense; and third, whether the punishment goes beyond what is necessary to accomplish any legitimate penological objective." State v. Johnson, 166 N.J. 523, 548 (2001) (citing State v. Maldonado, 137 N.J. 536, 556-57 (1994)).

D. Standards Relating to Direct Appeal of a Sentence: Case Law

1. Standard of Review. In reviewing a sentence, the appellate court must make sure the lower court followed the sentencing guidelines and made findings consistent with the evidence. State v. Roth, 95 N.J. 334, 363-65 (1984). The reviewing court should defer to the sentencing court's factual findings and should not "second-guess" them. State v. Case, 220 N.J. 49, 65 (2014); State v. Gerstofer,

191 N.J. Super. 542, 545 (App. Div. 1983) (holding that the appellate court defers to the trial court's findings of fact regardless of which party files the appeal). If the sentencing court "follow[ed] the Code and the basic precepts that channel sentencing discretion," the reviewing court should affirm the sentence, so long as the sentence does not "shock the judicial conscience." State v. Case, 220 N.J. 49, 65 (2014). Accord State v. Lawless, 214 N.J. 594, 606 (2013); State v. Cassady, 198 N.J. 165, 180 (2009); State v. Roach, 146 N.J. 208, 230 (1996); State v. Roth, 95 N.J. 334, 363-65 (1984).

2. Aggregate Term. A reviewing court may find that while the sentence on each count standing alone was justified, the aggregate term of incarceration shocks the judicial conscience and requires a reversal. State v. Candelaria, 311 N.J. Super. 437, 454-55 (App. Div. 1998) (finding that an extended term of life imprisonment with a twenty-five-year parole disqualifier and six consecutive terms was excessive in the aggregate).

3. Real-Time Consequences and Parole Ineligibility. In reviewing a sentence, the court should consider the real-time consequence of a parole disqualifier. State v. Marinez, 370 N.J. Super. 49, 58-59 (App. Div. 2004).

4. Original Jurisdiction. The appellate court's jurisdiction to review sentences includes the power to make new findings of fact, to reach independent determinations of the facts, and to supplement the record on appeal. State v. Jarbath, 114 N.J. 394, 412 (1989); R. 2:10-3. However, the court should "frugally" exercise this power and must explain its reason for doing so and its basis for the newly imposed sentence. State v. Jarbath, 114 N.J. 394, 412 (1989).

5. Remand Is Preferred. "[T]he exercise of appellate original jurisdiction over sentencing should not occur regularly or routinely; . . . a remand to the trial court for resentencing is strongly to be preferred." State v. Jarbath, 114 N.J. 394, 411 (1989). Accord State v. Thomas, 195 N.J. 431, 437 (2008); State v. Abrams, 256 N.J. Super. 390, 403-04 (App. Div. 1992). When "a remand will work an injustice by continuing" the defendant's incarceration, then it is appropriate for an appellate court to exercise original jurisdiction and resentence the defendant. State v. L.V., 410 N.J. Super. 90, 113 (App. Div. 2009).

6. Absence of a Verbatim Record. The absence of a verbatim sentencing transcript does not, by itself, prohibit meaningful appellate review or require a remand for reconstruction of the record. State v. Vasquez, 265 N.J. Super. 528, 561 (App. Div. 1993).

7. Challenge to the Factual Basis of a Plea on Direct Appeal. "Challenges to the sufficiency of the factual basis for a guilty plea are most commonly brought by way of a motion to the trial court to withdraw that plea." State v. Urbina, 221 N.J. 509, 527 (2015). However, "a defendant may also challenge the sufficiency of the factual basis for his guilty plea on direct appeal." Id. at 527-28.

8. Rejected Pleas Are Irrelevant in Sentencing. "[T]he pre-trial plea proposal offered to, and rejected by, [a] defendant does not impugn the post-trial sentences. Rejected plea offers may not be considered as a factor in determining whether a sentence is excessive." State v. Pennington, 154 N.J. 344, 362-63 (1998).

9. Appeal by a Co-Defendant.

(a) **Law-of-the-Case Doctrine.** Where a co-defendant files a separate appeal first, the law-of-the-case doctrine does not preclude the appellate panel from hearing the second appeal. State v. K.P.S., 221 N.J. 266, 270 (2015). The doctrine "was not intended to deny a defendant the opportunity to be heard on his separate appeal, even if the co-defendant unsuccessfully raised the same issue on the same record." Ibid.

(b) **Real-Time Consequences and Disparity Claim.** In considering a co-defendant's claim that the court imposed disparate sentences, the reviewing court must consider the real-time consequences of the sentences. State v. Bessix, 309 N.J. Super. 126, 130-31 (App. Div. 1998); State v. Salentre, 275 N.J. Super. 410, 425 (App. Div. 1994).

(c) **Unequal Sentences among Co-Defendants.** When a comparison of co-defendant's sentences reveals "grievous inequities," the greater sentence may be deemed excessive. State v. Roach, 167 N.J. 565, 570 (2001) (Roach II); State v. Hicks, 54 N.J. 390, 391-92 (1969). A disparate sentence based solely on the reason that the defendants did not deserve similar sentences, even though the defendants were similar for sentencing purposes, is insufficient to justify disparate terms. State v. Roach, 146 N.J. 208, 232-33 (1996).

(d) **Cooperation of One Defendant.** A co-defendant's cooperation with law enforcement may explain a sentencing disparity. State v. Williams, 317 N.J. Super. 149, 159 (App. Div. 1998); State v. Gonzalez, 223 N.J. Super. 377, 393 (App. Div. 1988).

10. Conditional Plea. When a defendant enters a guilty plea and intends to appeal an issue, other than a search and seizure issue, the defendant must enter a conditional plea with the court's approval and consent of the prosecutor. State v. Benjamin, 442 N.J. Super. 258, 263 (App. Div. 2015) (explaining that "[o]rdinarily, the failure to enter a conditional plea would bar appellate review of other than search and seizure issues"), aff'd as modified, 228 N.J. 358 (2017). If the defendant failed to enter a conditional plea, the court may hear the appeal to avoid an injustice. Id. at 263-64.

E. Double Jeopardy Concerns on Remand: Case Law

1. Double Jeopardy General Rule. "The double jeopardy provisions of both the United States and New Jersey Constitutions protect against a second prosecution for the same offense after acquittal, against a second prosecution for the same offense after conviction, and against multiple punishments for the same offense." State v. Eigenmann, 280 N.J. Super. 331, 336-37 (App. Div. 1995); United States v. DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. 117, 129 (1980). See also N.J.S.A. 2C:1-9 to 12. For purposes of sentencing, double jeopardy generally "attaches once a defendant begins to serve a prison term or the sentence is partially executed." State v. Young, 379 N.J. Super. 498, 505 (App. Div. 2005), (referring to State v. Ryan, 86 N.J. 1 (1981), remanded on other grounds, 188 N.J. 349 (2006)).

2. No Expectation of Finality Rule. Double jeopardy does not prohibit a court from imposing a harsher sentence on remand when the defendant did not have an expectation of finality in the sentence originally imposed. State v. Roth, 95 N.J. 334, 344 (1984) (adopting the test in United States v. DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. 117, 133 (1980)). Accord State v. Sanders, 107 N.J. 609, 18-20 (1987); State v. Young, 379 N.J. Super. 498, 505 (App. Div. 2005), remanded on other grounds, 188 N.J. 349 (2006).

3. Examples of No Expectation of Finality. The following cases discuss situations in which the defendant does not have an expectation of finality in the sentence:

(a) **Appeal of Conviction and Sentence.** "[A] defendant who appeals his substantive conviction along with the corresponding sentence has no legitimate expectation of finality in either the underlying conviction or the corresponding sentence." State v. Haliski, 140 N.J. 1, 21 (1995).

(b) State's Right to Appeal. A defendant cannot expect a sentence to be final when pronounced if the State has a statutory right to appeal the sentence, as in the case of a term imposed pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(f)(2) (downgrading and non-custodial terms for first- and second-degree crimes). State v. Sanders, 107 N.J. 609, 619 (1987). If the State succeeds on appeal of a downgraded sentence, the court on remand may impose a sentence one degree higher than originally imposed without offending double jeopardy principles. Ibid. Accord State v. Locane, 454 N.J. Super. 98, 117-18 (App. Div. 2018).

(c) Illegal Sentence. "An illegal sentence that has not been completely served may be corrected at any time without impinging upon double-jeopardy principles." State v. Austin, 335 N.J. Super. 486, 494 (App. Div. 2000). A sentence that does not include a parole ineligibility term mandated by statute is an illegal sentence. Ibid. (finding error in a Graves Act sentence that did not include a mandatory parole ineligibility term). Accord State v. Robinson, 253 N.J. Super. 346, 358-59 (App. Div. 1992).

(d) State Appeal of a Judgment notwithstanding the Verdict. A defendant has no expectation of finality in the sentence imposed when the State appeals the entry of judgment notwithstanding the verdict pursuant to Rule 2:3-1(b)(3). State v. Cetnar, 341 N.J. Super. 257, 265 (App. Div. 2001).

4. Harsher Sentence on Remand. The court may not impose a "substantially harsher" sentence on remand if the increased sentence is not required by law or is not supported by "any evidence of intervening conduct or prior oversight to justify the new sentence." State v. Heisler, 192 N.J. Super. 586, 592-93 (App. Div. 1984). Accord State v. Pindale, 279 N.J. Super. 123, 128-30 (App. Div. 1995) (discussing North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 723 (1969)). To hold otherwise would effectively penalize a defendant for successfully challenging an illegal sentence. State v. Heisler, 192 N.J. Super. 586, 593 (App. Div. 1984). See also State v. Eigenmann, 280 N.J. Super. 331, 341 (App. Div. 1995) (holding that the court could not increase the part of a sentence based on a lawful, though mistaken, declaration that the defendant was a young adult offender, as that part of the sentence was not illegal). The court must specifically explain its rationale for imposing a harsher sentence. State v. Pindale, 279 N.J. Super. 123, 129-30 (App. Div. 1995).

The Aggregate Sentence. Notably, in considering whether the resentencing court imposed a harshness sentence than the sentence originally imposed, one compares the two sentences in the aggregate. State v. Kosch, 458 N.J. Super. 344, 351-52 (App. Div. 2019). So long as the aggregate new sentence does not exceed the original aggregate sentence, the new sentence will not offend the Double Jeopardy Clause. Id. (finding no constitutional error in the resentencing court's imposing an extended term on one count, which resulted in a new aggregate term that was the same as the original aggregate term). While the imposition of the same aggregate term does not offend the Double Jeopardy Clause, it may form the basis for a meritorious excessive sentence challenge, particularly if the resentencing applied to less than all of the counts in the original conviction. Id. at 353-54.

5. Credits Due after A Successful Appeal.

(a) Prior Service Credit. When a court reverses a conviction for which the defendant endured imprisonment, the Fifth Amendment prohibition against double jeopardy requires a court to award the defendant day-for-day credit against the new sentence for the time served on the reversed conviction. North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 718-19 (1969). This is commonly called prior service credit. State v. Rippy, 431 N.J. Super. 338, 354 (App. Div. 2013). Like jail credit, prior service credit is subtracted from the front end of a sentence. Id. at 355. Denial of prior service credit would effectively and erroneously penalize a defendant for exercising the State constitutional right to appeal. State v. DeRosa, 332 N.J. Super. 426, 432 (App. Div. 2000); Curry v. N.J. State Parole Bd., 309 N.J. Super. 66, 72 (App. Div. 1998).

Prior Service Credit, NERA Parole and the Fundamental Fairness Doctrine. In the unlikely event that a defendant spends more time in prison than his NERA sentence required, the fundamental fairness doctrine requires the court to award the defendant prior service credit in the excess amount and reduce the defendant's NERA parole term by that amount. State v. Njango, 247 N.J. 533, 548 (2021).

(b) Jail Credits. If the defendant remained incarcerated after successfully challenging a conviction and was not serving time for any other valid conviction, then the defendant must be awarded jail credit for time served between reversal of the conviction and imposition of a new sentence. State

v. Rippy, 431 N.J. Super. 338, 354 (App. Div. 2013). See Chapter XVI for further discuss on jail credits.

(c) **Gap-Time Credits.** If the defendant served time on a successfully challenged conviction, and during that term of incarceration had charges pending for another offense (second offense) that was committed prior to imposition of the sentence that was later reversed, then the defendant would receive against the sentence for the second offense gap-time credit for time served on the reversed conviction. State v. Rippy, 431 N.J. Super. 338, 351 (App. Div. 2013). See Chapter XVI for further discuss on gap-time credits.

6. Restructuring the Sentence on Remand and Parole Ineligibility. Because "the basic sentencing issue is always the real time defendant must serve," on resentencing the court may not restructure a sentence to impose a greater period of parole ineligibility than it imposed in the initial sentence. State v. Cooper, 402 N.J. Super. 110, 116-17 (App. Div. 2008) (quoting State v. Mosley, 335 N.J. Super. 144, 157 (App. Div. 2000)). See also State v. Towey (II), 244 N.J. Super. 582, 598 (App. Div. 1990) (explaining that where a defendant successfully challenges only the excessiveness of a parole disqualifier, the court on remand may not increase the base term).

7. Unmerged Offenses and the Aggregate Term. Where an appellate court finds that the sentencing court erroneously merged offenses, the court on remand may impose consecutive terms on the unmerged convictions, so long as the new sentence, in the aggregate, does not exceed the original aggregate term. State v. Crouch, 225 N.J. Super. 100, 107-08 (App. Div. 1988). But see State v. Loftin, 287 N.J. Super. 76, 113 (App. Div. 1996) (explaining that the defendant might face a longer aggregate term on remand because the sentencing court had erroneously merged a first-degree robbery conviction into a murder conviction, and on remand, the court had to impose sentence for the robbery conviction).

8. Merger and Reversal of the Greater Offense. "Because merger does not extinguish the merged offense, it follows that if the conviction on the greater offense is reversed and defendant is not retried on that offense, the State may request the trial court to unmerge the prior conviction of defendant on the lesser offense and proceed to sentence thereon." State v. Becheam, 399 N.J. Super. 268, 275 (Law Div. 2007). Accord State v. Harrington, 310 N.J. Super. 272, 280-81 (App. Div. 1998). This principle also applies where the State retries the defendant on the greater offense and the jury acquits the defendant of that offense. State v. Becheam, 399 N.J. Super. 268, 275-76 (Law Div. 2007).

9. Considerations at Resentencing. Unless the remand order specifies otherwise, the trial court should consider the defendant as he or she stands on the day of resentencing. State v. Jaffe, 220 N.J. 114, 116 (2014); State v. Randolph, 210 N.J. 330, 354 (2012). Thus, the court may consider an updated presentence report, a current institutional report if the defendant is in custody, and any changed circumstances that occurred between the time of the initial sentencing and the resentencing. State v. Randolph, 210 N.J. 330, 354 (2012); State v. Tavares, 286 N.J. Super. 610, 616 (App. Div. 1996).

10. A Completed Sentence May Not Be Increased. The court may not add a punitive term to a sentence that the defendant has completed, even if the punitive term was mandated by statute and absence of it rendered the sentence illegal. State v. Schubert, 212 N.J. 295, 311-12 (2012) (holding that the court could not correct a sentence that did not include community supervision for life by imposing that term on a defendant who had completed his sentence, even though the Violent Predator Incapacitation Act, N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6.4, required that term be included in a sentence).

11. Restitution. A restitution award may be increased on resentencing without offending double jeopardy principles. State v. Rhoda, 206 N.J. Super. 584, 590 (App. Div. 1986).

12. Discrepancy between the Sentencing Transcript and Judgment of Conviction. Where a defendant challenges a judgment of conviction as including a period of parole ineligibility that the sentencing court did not verbally impose at the sentencing hearing, the matter may be remanded without offending principles of double jeopardy to correct the judgment if "the record sufficiently indicates an expression of" the sentencing court's "intent to have imposed a discretionary parole ineligibility term at the time of sentencing." State v. Womack, 206 N.J. Super. 564, 571 (App. Div. 1985). Accord State v. Walker, 322 N.J. Super. 535, 556 (App. Div. 1999).

XIX. APPEAL BY THE STATE IN CRIMINAL CASES

Double jeopardy principles restrict the State's ability to challenge a defendant's sentence (see sections C and D). The State may file an appeal of a sentence in limited situations set forth in court rules and statutes (see sections A and B). If the State successfully challenges a sentence, on remand double jeopardy principles will usually prohibit a court from imposing a harsher sentence than the one initially imposed, unless the defendant had no expectation of finality in the initial sentence (see section D).

A. Appeal by the State: Court Rules

1. Court Rule Regarding State Appeals in a Criminal Case. Rule 2:3-1(b) authorizes the State to file an appeal "to the appropriate appellate court from" the following:

- (1) A judgment "dismiss[ing] an indictment, accusation or complaint, where not precluded by the constitution of the United States or of New Jersey";
- (2) A pretrial order entered in accordance with Rule 3:5 (search warrants);
- (3) A judgment of acquittal pursuant to Rule 3:18-2 following a guilty verdict;
- (4) "[A] judgment in a post-conviction proceeding collaterally attacking a conviction or sentence";
- (5) "[A]n interlocutory order entered before, during or after trial"; or
- (6) "[A]s otherwise provided by law."

2. Court Rule Authorizing Appeals to the Supreme Court. Rule 2:3-1(a) provides that the State may appeal "to the Supreme Court from a final judgment or from an order of the Appellate Division, pursuant to Rule 2:2-2 (a) [appeals the Supreme Court from interlocutory orders] or 2:2-3 [appeals to the Appellate Division from final judgments]."

B. Appeal by the State: Statutory Provisions

1. Statutes Authorizing Appeal by the State. The following statutes grant the State permission to appeal a sentence.

(a) Booby Traps in the Manufacturing or Distribution of Drugs. N.J.S.A. 2C:35-4.1(e) provides that if the court does not require the sentence for booby traps in the manufacturing or distribution of drugs to be served consecutive to a sentence for any drug offense in Chapter 35, or a conspiracy or attempt to commit an offense under Chapter 35, then the State may appeal the sentence within ten days.

(b) Manufacturing, Distributing or Dispensing a Controlled Dangerous Substance on or Near School Property. N.J.S.A. 2C:35-7(b)(2)(b) provides that within ten days the State may appeal the sentence for manufacturing, distributing or dispensing drugs on school property if the court did not impose a period of parole ineligibility pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:35-7(b)(1). See Chapter XIV on drug offender sentencing for further discussion.

(c) Violation of Special Probation in a Drug Case, or Drug Court (renamed Recovery Court). Where the defendant commits a second or subsequent violation of special probation, the prosecutor may appeal the court's decision to (i) continue special probation, N.J.S.A. 2C:35-14(f)(2); or (ii) impose a brief period of imprisonment followed by continued special probation, N.J.S.A. 2C:35-14(g). See Chapter XIV on drug offender sentencing for further discussion.

(d) Non-Residential Treatment for Certain Drug Offenders. N.J.S.A. 2C:35-14(j) provides that if the court finds that a defendant qualifies for residential drug treatment, the court may impose a term of non-residential treatment under certain circumstances. If the prosecutor objects to the sentence, the sentence shall not become final for ten days to permit the State to file an appeal. Ibid. See Chapter XIV on drug offender sentencing for further discussion.

(e) Mandatory Special Probation for Certain Drug Offenders. If the court imposes a sentence of regular probation instead of special probation on certain drug dependent defendants, the sentence shall not be final for ten

days to allow the prosecutor time to file an appeal. N.J.S.A. 2C:35-14.2(d). See Chapter XIV on drug offender sentencing for further discussion.

(f) Public Officers Convicted of Certain Crimes. N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6.5(c)(3) allows the State ten days to appeal a sentence imposed on certain public officers if the court did not include a period of parole ineligibility or if the court imposed a reduced period of parole ineligibility pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6.5(c)(1) or (2).

(g) Downgraded Sentences and Non-Custodial Terms for First- and Second-Degree Crime. Pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(f)(2), the State has ten days to file an appeal challenging a downgrade or a non-custodial term for a first- or second-degree crime.

Stay Pending Appeal. Unless the defendant elects to begin service of the sentence while the State's appeal is pending, "execution of sentence shall be stayed" pending the challenge. R. 2:9-3(c). If the defendant serves the sentence despite the stay, the defendant may not challenge a harsher sentence on remand based on double jeopardy grounds. Ibid.

C. Appeal by the State: Case Law

1. Double Jeopardy. Double jeopardy principles restrict a State's ability to file an appeal in a criminal action. State v. Hyland, 452 N.J. Super. 372, 380 (App. Div. 2017), aff'd as modified, 238 N.J. 135 (2019); State v. Lefkowitz, 335 N.J. Super. 352, 357 (App. Div. 2000). "[A]bsent explicit statutory authority, the State has no right to appeal a criminal sentence." State v. Veney, 327 N.J. Super. 458, 460 (App. Div. 2000). However, "the State may appeal an illegal sentence without express authorization in the criminal code or rules of court." State v. Chambers, 377 N.J. Super. 365, 370 (App. Div. 2005) (quoting State v. Parolin, 339 N.J. Super. 10, 13-14 (App. Div. 2001), rev'd on other grounds, 171 N.J. 223 (2002)).

2. Illegal Sentence Defined. "There are two categories of illegal sentences: (1) those that exceed the penalties authorized by statute for a particular offense and (2) those that are not in accordance with the law, or stated differently, those that include a disposition that is not authorized by our criminal code." State v. Schubert, 212 N.J. 295, 308 (2012) (citing State v. Murray, 162 N.J. 240, 246-47 (2000)). "[M]ere excessiveness of sentence otherwise within authorized limits, as

distinct from illegality by reason of being beyond or not in accordance with legal authorization,' does not render a sentence illegal." State v. Hyland, 452 N.J. Super. 372, 381 (App. Div. 2017) (quoting State v. Acevedo, 205 N.J. 40, 46 (2001)), aff'd as modified, 238 N.J. 135 (2019). "[E]ven sentences that disregard controlling case law or rest on an abuse of discretion by the sentencing court are legal so long as they impose penalties authorized by statute for a particular offense and include a disposition that is authorized by law." State v. Hyland, 238 N.J. 135, 146 (2019).

3. Illegal Sentence May Not Be Ignored. "[A] reviewing court is not free to ignore an illegal sentence." State v. Moore, 377 N.J. Super. 445 (App. Div. 2005). "[S]o long as the issue of defendant's sentence is properly before the court, the court may correct an illegal sentence, even by increasing the term." State v. Kirk, 243 N.J. Super. 636, 643 (App. Div. 1990). Accord State v. Tavares, 286 N.J. Super. 610, 619 (App. Div. 1996). An illegal sentence may be corrected at any time prior to the completion of the sentence. State v. Schubert, 212 N.J. 295, 309-11 (2012); State v. Tavares, 286 N.J. Super. 610, 619 (App. Div. 1996).

Time in which to File an Illegal Sentence Challenge. "While an 'illegal' sentence is 'correctable at any time,' the State has an obligation to move quickly when asserting an 'illegality' because the defendant has an expectation of finality of a sentence within the parameters of statutory limits (at least in the absence of some appeal or post-conviction proceeding pending on his or her application)." State v. Tavares, 286 N.J. Super. 610, 619 (App. Div. 1996). The State may file a petition to correct an illegal sentence at any time before the defendant completes the sentence. R. 3:21-10(b); State v. Schubert, 212 N.J. 295, 313 (2012); State v. Crawford, 379 N.J. Super. 250, 257 (App. Div. 2005).

4. Transfer to a Drug or Alcohol Treatment Program. The State may file an appeal challenging the trial court's grant of an application authorizing transfer from a custodial institution to a drug or alcohol treatment program pursuant to Rule 3:21-10(b)(1). State v. Williams, 139 N.J. Super. 290, 296 (App. Div. 1976), aff'd o.b., 75 N.J. 1 (1977).

5. Challenge to Jail Credits. "[T]he State may appeal an award of jail credits on the ground that they are not authorized by Rule 3:21-8" (now Rule 3:21-8(a) effective September 1, 2017). State v. Rippy, 431 N.J. Super. 338, 343 (App. Div. 2013).

6. Failure to Include Mandatory Graves Act Extended Term. The State may appeal a sentencing court's refusal to impose a Graves Act mandatory extended term based on a finding that the proof did not establish the requisite prior offenses. State v. Robinson, 253 N.J. Super. 346, 358-59 (App. Div. 1992).

7. Failure to Include Community Supervision for Life under Megan's Law. The State may appeal a trial court's failure to include community supervision for life as part of a sex offender's sentence because under Megan's Law, the supervision is mandatory, thus failure to include it renders the sentence illegal. State v. Schubert, 212 N.J. 295, 308-09 (2012). However, if the defendant has fully completed the sentence, then double jeopardy protections will preclude the court from increasing the sentence with community supervision for life, which is punitive and not remedial. Id. at 313-14.

8. Downgraded Sentence. A downgrade based on an erroneous analysis of the downgrade standard is not an illegal sentence per se because a downgraded term is an authorized disposition in the Code. State v. Locane, 454 N.J. Super. 98, 117 (App. Div. 2018). The State's authority to appeal a downgraded term derives from N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(f)(2), which authorizes the appeal within ten days. State v. Roth, 95 N.J. 334, 360 (1984).

(a) Double Jeopardy and the Ten-Day Period. Until the ten-day period ends, the defendant has no expectation of finality in the sentence, and double jeopardy protections do not attach. State v. Ryan, 86 N.J. 1, 10 (1981); State v. Johnson, 376 N.J. Super. 163, 171-72 (App. Div. 2005); State v. Evers, 368 N.J. Super. 159, 169 (App. Div. 2004). See also State v. Locane, 454 N.J. Super. 98, 119 (App. Div. 2018) (finding no double jeopardy issue where the State twice appealed the improper downgrade within the ten-day period). If the sentence is vacated, the court may impose a harsher term on remand. State v. Sanders, 107 N.J. 609, 620 (1987).

(b) Double Jeopardy and the Defendant's Waiver of a Stay Pending Appeal. A defendant waives a double jeopardy challenge where the defendant begins service of the sentence pending the State's appeal. State v. Locane, 445 N.J. Super. 98, 118 (App. Div. 2018).

(c) Computing the Ten-Day Period. The ten-day period begins the day after sentence is pronounced. State v. Johnson, 376 N.J. Super. 163, 173 (App. Div. 2005); R. 1:3-1. "[F]ailure to perfect an appeal within the ten-day period will result in dismissal of the State's appeal." State v. Johnson,

376 N.J. Super. 163, 170 (App. Div. 2005) (quoting State v. Sanders, 107 N.J. 609, 616 (1987)).

(d) Noncustodial Term. Any sentence other than imprisonment satisfies the "noncustodial" aspect of N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(f)(2), including suspended sentences and probation. State v. Cannon, 128 N.J. 546, 567 (1992).

(e) Plea Bargain and the State's Silence. If pursuant to a plea agreement the State remains silent at sentencing and does not object to the court's imposing a noncustodial term on a conviction for a second-degree crime, the State may not challenge the sentence on appeal. State v. Paterna, 195 N.J. Super. 124, 126 (App. Div. 1984).

9. Verdict on a Lesser Charge. Where a judge declines to accept a guilty verdict, and the jury re-deliberates and returns a verdict on a lesser charge, the State may not appeal the sentence imposed on the lesser charge. State v. Lefkowitz, 335 N.J. Super. 352, 358 (App. Div. 2000). Instructing the jury to continue deliberations did not equate to rejecting a verdict. Ibid.

10. Assessment of Statutory Sentencing Factors. "A court's assessment of statutory factors in imposing a sentence relates to the excessiveness of the sentence, 'rather than [its] legality.'" State v. Hyland, 452 N.J. Super. 372, 382 (App. Div. 2017) (quoting State v. Acevedo, 205 N.J. 40, 46 (2001)), aff'd as modified, 238 N.J. 135 (2019).

11. Admission to Drug Court (renamed Recovery Court). The State does not have the right to appeal admission to drug court based on a claim that the court erroneously assessed the factors set forth in N.J.S.A. 2C:35-14(a)(2), (3), (4), (5) and (9), as those factors require discretionary findings by the sentencing court. State v. Hyland, 238 N.J. 135, 147-48 (2019). The State may challenge the court's findings on the factors set forth in N.J.S.A. 2C:35-14(a)(1), (6), (7) and (8) because those factors require objective legal determinations. Ibid.

12. Concurrent Terms. Double jeopardy protections prohibit the State from appealing the court's refusal to impose a consecutive term. State v. Locane, 454 N.J. Super. 98, 131 (App. Div. 2018). A challenge to a concurrent term is a challenge to a discretionary court decision, not to an illegally imposed sentence. State v. Ellis, 346 N.J. Super. 583, 596 (App. Div.), aff'd o.b., 174 N.J. 535, 536 (2002).

13. Deference to Factual Findings. The appellate court defers to the trial court's findings of fact in reviewing a sentence, regardless of which party files the appeal. State v. Gerstofer, 191 N.J. Super. 542, 545 (App. Div. 1983).

D. Double Jeopardy Concerns on Remand: Case Law

1. Double Jeopardy, General Rule. "The double jeopardy provisions of both the United States and New Jersey Constitutions protect against a second prosecution for the same offense after acquittal, against a second prosecution for the same offense after conviction, and against multiple punishments for the same offense." State v. Eigenmann, 280 N.J. Super. 331, 336-37 (App. Div. 1995); United States v. DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. 117, 129 (1980). See also N.J.S.A. 2C:1-9 to -12. For purposes of sentencing, double jeopardy generally "attaches once a defendant begins to serve a prison term or the sentence is partially executed." State v. Young, 379 N.J. Super. 498, 505 (App. Div. 2005), (referring to State v. Ryan, 86 N.J. 1 (1981)), remanded on other grounds, 188 N.J. 349 (2006)).

2. No Expectation of Finality Rule. Double jeopardy does not prohibit a court from imposing a harsher sentence on remand when the defendant did not have an expectation of finality in the sentence originally imposed. State v. Roth, 95 N.J. 334, 344 (1984) (adopting the test set forth in United States v. DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. 117, 133 (1980)). Accord State v. Sanders, 107 N.J. 609, 18-20 (1987); State v. Young, 379 N.J. Super. 498, 505 (App. Div. 2005), remanded on other grounds, 188 N.J. 349 (2006).

3. Examples of No Expectation of Finality. The following cases discuss situations in which the defendant does not have an expectation of finality in the sentence:

(a) **Appeal of Conviction and Sentence.** "[A] defendant who appeals his substantive conviction along with the corresponding sentence has no legitimate expectation of finality in either the underlying conviction or the corresponding sentence." State v. Haliski, 140 N.J. 1, 21 (1995).

(b) **State's Right to Appeal.** A defendant cannot expect a sentence to be final when pronounced if the State has a statutory right to appeal the sentence, as in the case of a term imposed pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(f)(2) (downgrades and non-custodial terms for a first- or second-degree crime). State v. Locane, 454 N.J. Super. 98, 117-18 (App. Div. 2018); State v. Sanders, 107 N.J. 609, 619 (1987). If the State succeeds in challenging a

downgraded sentence, on remand the court may impose a sentence one degree higher than originally imposed without offending double jeopardy principles. State v. Sanders, 107 N.J. 609, 619 (1987).

(c) **Illegal Sentence.** "An illegal sentence that has not been completely served may be corrected at any time without impinging upon double-jeopardy principles." State v. Austin, 335 N.J. Super. 486, 494 (App. Div. 2000). A sentence that does not include a parole ineligibility term mandated by statute is an illegal sentence. Ibid. (finding error in a Graves Act sentence without a mandatory parole ineligibility term). Accord State v. Robinson, 253 N.J. Super. 346, 358-59 (App. Div. 1992).

(d) **State Appeal of a Judgment notwithstanding the Verdict.** A defendant has no expectation of finality in the sentence imposed when the State appeals the entry of judgment notwithstanding the verdict pursuant to Rule 2:3-1(b)(3). State v. Cetnar, 341 N.J. Super. 257, 265 (App. Div. 2001).

4. Harsher Sentence on Remand. The court may not impose a "substantially harsher" sentence on remand if the increased sentence is not required by law or supported by "any evidence of intervening conduct or prior oversight to justify the new sentence." State v. Heisler, 192 N.J. Super. 586, 592-93 (App. Div. 1984). Accord State v. Pindale, 279 N.J. Super. 123, 128-30 (App. Div. 1995) (discussing North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 723 (1969)). To hold otherwise would effectively penalize a defendant for successfully challenging an illegal sentence. State v. Heisler, 192 N.J. Super. 586, 593 (App. Div. 1984). See also State v. Eigenmann, 280 N.J. Super. 331, 341 (App. Div. 1995) (holding that the court could not increase the part of a sentence based on a lawful, though mistaken, declaration that the defendant was a young adult offender, as that part of the sentence was not illegal). The court must specifically explain its reasons for imposing a harsher sentence. State v. Pindale, 279 N.J. Super. 123, 129-30 (App. Div. 1995).

5. Restructuring the Sentence on Remand and Parole Ineligibility. Because "the basic sentencing issue is always the real time defendant must serve," on resentencing the court may not restructure a sentence to impose a greater period of parole ineligibility than it imposed in the initial sentencing. State v. Cooper, 402 N.J. Super. 110, 116-17 (App. Div. 2008) (quoting State v. Mosley, 335 N.J. Super. 144, 157 (App. Div. 2000)). See also State v. Towey (II), 244 N.J. Super. 582, 598 (App. Div. 1990) (explaining that where a defendant successfully

challenges only the excessiveness of a parole disqualifier, the court on remand may not increase the base term).

6. Restitution. A restitution award may be increased on resentencing after remand without offending double jeopardy principles. State v. Rhoda, 206 N.J. Super. 584, 590 (App. Div. 1986).

7. Unmerged Offenses and the Aggregate Term. In resentencing, the court may impose consecutive terms on "unmerged" convictions, so long as the new sentence, in the aggregate, does not exceed the original aggregate term. State v. Crouch, 225 N.J. Super. 100, 107-08 (App. Div. 1988). But see State v. Loftin, 287 N.J. Super. 76, 113 (App. Div. 1996) (explaining that the defendant might face a longer aggregate term on remand because the sentencing court erroneously merged a first-degree robbery conviction into a murder conviction, and on remand, the court had to impose a sentence for the robbery conviction).

8. Completed Sentence May Not Be Increased. The court may not add a punitive term to a sentence that the defendant has completed, even if the punitive term was mandated by statute and absence of it rendered the sentence illegal. State v. Schubert, 212 N.J. 295, 311-12 (2012) (holding that the court could not correct a sentence that did not include community supervision for life by imposing that term on a defendant who had completed his sentence, even though the Violent Predator Incapacitation Act, N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6.4, required that term).

XX. POST-CONVICTION RELIEF

In limited situations, and after exhausting direct appeals, a defendant may challenge his or her sentence by way of a petition for post-conviction relief (see sections A and B).

A. Post-Conviction Relief: Court Rules

1. Court Rule Authorizing a First Petition for Post-Conviction Relief. Rule 3:22-2(c) allows a defendant to file a petition for post-conviction relief challenging his or her sentence on the ground that the sentence is "in excess of or otherwise not in accordance with the sentence authorized by law if raised together with other grounds cognizable under" subparts (a), (b) or (d) of Rule 3:22-2. Those grounds are: the defendant suffered a substantial denial of a right under the United States Constitution or New Jersey Constitution or laws; the court lacked jurisdiction; and any ground "available as a basis for collateral attack upon a conviction by habeas corpus or any other common-law or statutory remedy."

Effective September 1, 2018, R. 3:22-2(e) allows a defendant to file a petition alleging "[a] claim of ineffective assistance of counsel based on trial counsel's failure to file a direct appeal of the judgment of conviction and sentence upon defendant's timely request."

See Rule 3:22-12(a)(1) for time limitation for filing a petition. See Rule 7:10-2 for post-conviction relief petitions in municipal court.

2. Subsequent Petitions for Post-Conviction Relief. Rule 3:22-4(a) limits the filing of a subsequent petition for post-conviction relief to claims that (1) "could not reasonably have been raised in any prior proceeding," (2) "result in fundamental injustice," or (3) implicate a new or existing constitutional right. Rule 3:22-12(a)(2) sets forth the time limitations for a subsequent petition for post-conviction relief.

3. Appeal of a Denial for Post-Conviction Relief. Rule 2:3-2 provides: "In any criminal action, any defendant, the defendant's legal representative, or other person aggrieved by . . . an adverse judgment in a post-conviction proceeding attacking a conviction or sentence . . . may appeal or, where appropriate, seek leave to appeal, to the appropriate appellate court."

B. Post-Conviction Relief: Case Law

1. Post-Conviction Relief Is Not a Substitute for a Direct Appeal. A petition for post-conviction relief is not a substitute for a direct appeal. State v. Mitchell, 126 N.J. 565, 583 (1992). A defendant may not raise in a post-conviction relief proceeding any issue that might reasonably have been raised in a direct appeal unless denial of the petition would be contrary to constitutional law or would result in fundamental injustice. Id. at 584; State v. Laurick, 120 N.J. 1, 10 (1990).

2. Excessive Sentence Challenges Prohibited. An excessive sentence claim challenges the harshness of a sentence that is "within the range permitted by the verdict or plea." State v. Hess, 207 N.J. 123, 145 (2011). It must be asserted on direct appeal; it will not be heard in a post-conviction relief petition. Ibid. See also State v. Tormasi, 466 N.J. Super. 51, 67 (App. Div. 2021) (explaining that the addition of a mitigating factor provides no basis for a post-conviction relief petition because the weighing of the factors relates to a sentence's excessiveness, not its legality), remanded on other grounds, 250 N.J. 6 (2022) (remanding for resentencing pursuant to State v. Comer, 249 N.J. 359 (2022)). Only illegal sentences may be challenged on post-conviction relief. State v. Acevedo, 205 N.J. 40, 46-47 (2011). Note, however, that a defendant may raise an ineffective assistance of counsel claim in a post-conviction relief petition based on failure to present mitigating sentencing factors. Hess, 207 N.J. at 145-46.

3. Illegal Sentence Challenges Allowed. A defendant may file a petition to correct an illegal sentence at any time before the defendant completes the sentence. State v. Schubert, 212 N.J. 295, 313 (2012); State v. Crawford, 379 N.J. Super. 250, 257 (App. Div. 2005). The claim may be asserted in a petition for post-conviction relief, even if the claim could have been presented on direct appeal. State v. Levine, 253 N.J. Super. 149, 156 (App. Div. 1992).

4. Plea Withdrawal Based on Misinformation. A defendant may be able to retract a guilty plea by way of a petition for post-conviction relief if he or she was misinformed about the consequences of the plea. State v. Jamgochian, 363 N.J. Super. 220, 225 (App. Div. 2003) (reversing the denial of a petition for post-conviction relief and remanding for a hearing to determine whether the incorrect information regarding community supervision for life of a sex offender rendered the plea uninformed).

5. Challenge to Gap-Time Credits. Gap-time credit claims "pertain to the legality of the sentence imposed and may be raised in a petition for post-conviction relief." State v. Shabazz, 263 N.J. Super. 246, 251 (App. Div. 1993).

6. Enhanced Sentence Based on a Prior Uncounseled Guilty Plea. Under state constitutional law, the court may not impose an enhanced term of incarceration based on a prior uncounseled guilty plea without waiver of the right to counsel. State v. Hrycak, 184 N.J. 351, 362-63 (2005); State v. Laurick, 120 N.J. 1, 16 (1990); State v. Thomas, 401 N.J. Super. 180, 184 (Law Div. 2007). An enhanced jail term based on an uncounseled prior conviction is not an illegal sentence, however. State v. Bringhurst, 401 N.J. Super. 421, 431 (App. Div. 2008). Thus, a challenge to it should be asserted on direct appeal. Id. at 428-37.

XXI. JUVENILE DISPOSITIONS

This chapter addresses statutes, court rules and case law applicable to juveniles who have been adjudicated delinquent by the Chancery Division, Family Part. With the exception of discussing the process of transfer of jurisdiction to another court, this chapter does not apply to juveniles tried as adults. The law applicable to those juveniles derives from Title 2C (Criminal Code) and is set forth in Chapters I to XX of this Manual. Unlike Title 2C sentences imposed on adults, dispositions imposed on juveniles under Title 2A (Code of Juvenile Justice) are intended to rehabilitate, and not punish, the offender. Section A of this chapter sets forth the Title 2A policies and procedures for imposing a disposition on a juvenile adjudicated delinquent by the Family Part. Section B discusses available and mandatory dispositions set forth in Title 2A and factors the court must consider in determining a disposition. Section C discusses special Title 2A rules that apply to incarceration of a juvenile adjudicated delinquent. Section D discusses statutes contained within Title 2C that apply to juveniles adjudicated delinquent, even though the statutes are found in the Criminal Code. Section E discusses court rules that relate to juvenile dispositions. And section F summarizes relevant case law relating to juvenile dispositions.

A. Title 2A Disposition Policy and Procedure: Statutory Provisions

1. Purposes of the New Jersey Code of Juvenile Justice. N.J.S.A. 2A:4A-21, as amended by, L. 2019, c. 363 (eff. Nov. 1, 2020), sets forth the purposes of the Code of Juvenile Justice (**Note:** section (i) was added by L. 2019, c. 363):

- (a) To preserve the family unit "whenever possible and to provide for the care, protection, and wholesome mental and physical development" of the child;
- (b) "Consistent with the protection of the public interest, to remove from children committing delinquent acts certain statutory consequences of criminal behavior, and to substitute therefor an adequate program of supervision, care and rehabilitation, and a range of sanctions designed to promote accountability and protect the public";
- (c) "To separate juveniles from the family environment only when necessary for their health, safety, or welfare or in the interests of public safety";

(d) "To secure for each child . . . the care, guidance, and control, preferably in his own home, as will conduce to the child's welfare and the best interests of the State; and when the child is removed from his own family, to secure for him custody, care, and discipline as nearly as possible equivalent to that which should have been given by his parents";

(e) "To insure that children under the jurisdiction of the court are wards of the State, subject to the discipline and entitled to the protection of the State, which may intervene to safeguard them from neglect or injury and to enforce the legal obligations due to them and from them";

(f) "[T]o insure that any services and sanctions for juveniles provide balanced attention to the protection of the community, the imposition of accountability for offenses committed, fostering interaction and dialogue between the offender, victim, and community, and the development of competencies to enable children to become responsible and productive members of the community";

(g) "To insure protection and a safe environment for those sexually exploited juveniles who are charged with prostitution or who are alleged to be victims of human trafficking; and to provide these juveniles with the appropriate shelter, care, counseling, and crisis intervention services from the time they are taken into custody and for the duration of any legal proceedings"; and

(h) "To insure that in any action undertaken within the provisions of this act, the best interests of the child shall be a primary consideration."

(i) "To ensure a fairer and more efficient and effective juvenile justice system by incorporating the following principles and strategies into every stage of the delinquency action:" (quoted from the statute)

(1) promoting collaboration between juvenile court officials, probation agencies, prosecutors, defense attorneys, schools, community organizations, and advocates;

(2) using rigorous data collection and analysis to guide decision making;

(3) utilizing objective criteria, processes, and tools, such as risk-assessment instruments, to replace subjective decision-making processes to determine:

(a) whether a juvenile should be incarcerated; and

(b) the length of time a juvenile should remain in custody;

(4) implementing new or expanded community-based alternatives that can be used in lieu of incarceration;

(5) reducing delays in processing and corresponding length of stay in all stages of a delinquency action, including parole and revocation proceedings, to ensure that juveniles do not remain in out-of-home placements longer than necessary or are unnecessarily returned to custody;

(6) reserving the use of incarceration for only those cases in which it is necessary to eliminate a substantial threat to public safety or as required by the Interstate Compact for Juveniles;

(7) combatting racial and ethnic disparities by collecting and examining data to identify policies and practices that may disadvantage minority juveniles at various stages of the process and pursuing strategies to eliminate those disparities; and

(8) monitoring and improving conditions of confinement in secure facilities.

2. Jurisdiction. Pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2A:4A-24(a), "the court shall have exclusive jurisdiction in all cases where it is charged that a juvenile has committed an act of delinquency and over all matters relating to a juvenile-family crisis. . . . Such jurisdiction shall extend . . . over a juvenile and his parent, guardian or any family member found by the court to be contributing to a juvenile-family crisis. The court shall, in accordance with the Rules of Court, clearly specify the responsibilities of those subject to its jurisdiction with respect to the plan of rehabilitation for the juvenile."

The Superior Court, Chancery Division, Family Part has jurisdiction over juveniles charged with a crime, offense or violation. N.J.S.A. 2A:4A-25. See also N.J.S.A.

2C:4-11. "[I]f during the pendency in any other court of a case charging a person with a crime, offense or violation, it is ascertained that such person was a juvenile at the time of the crime, offense or violation charged, such court shall immediately transfer such case to the . . . Family Part." N.J.S.A. 2A:4A-25.

(a) Delinquency Defined. With limited exceptions set forth in N.J.S.A. 2A:4A-23, "delinquency" refers to the commission of an act by a juvenile, which, if committed by an adult, would constitute a crime, disorderly persons offense, petty disorderly persons offense or violation of any penal statute, ordinance or regulation. N.J.S.A. 2A:4A-23.

(b) Juvenile-Family Crisis Defined. According to N.J.S.A. 2A:4A-22(g), juvenile-family crisis means "behavior, conduct or a condition of a juvenile, parent or guardian or other family member which presents or results in (1) a serious threat to the well-being and physical safety of a juvenile, or (2) a serious conflict between a parent or guardian and a juvenile regarding rules of conduct which has been manifested by repeated disregard for lawful parental authority by a juvenile or misuse of lawful parental authority by a parent or guardian, or (3) unauthorized absence by a juvenile for more than 24 hours from his home, or (4) a pattern of repeated unauthorized absences from school by a juvenile subject to the compulsory education provision of Title 18A of the New Jersey Statutes, or (5) an act which if committed by an adult would constitute prostitution in violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:34-1 or any offense which the juvenile alleges is related to the juvenile being a victim of human trafficking."

3. Diversion of a Complaint from Court Action. In limited situations described in N.J.S.A. 2A:4A-71(b) and N.J.S.A. 2A:4A-71.1, the Family Part may divert a complaint from court action and thus avoid adjudication and disposition. See also N.J.S.A. 2A:4A-72 to 75.

4. Referral to another Court (Transfer or Waiver of Jurisdiction).

(a) Election by the Juvenile. A juvenile may elect to have the case transferred to an appropriate court where the juvenile is (a) age fourteen or older, or (b) younger than fourteen and charged with murder. N.J.S.A. 2A:4A-27.

(b) Motion by the State. Upon motion by the prosecutor, and after a hearing, the Family Part shall waive jurisdiction and refer the matter to the

appropriate court if the juvenile was at least age fifteen at the time of the offense, there is probable cause to believe the juvenile committed one of the offenses listed in N.J.S.A. 2A:4A-26.1(c)(2), and the factors set forth in N.J.S.A. 2A:4A-26.1(c)(3) support waiver. N.J.S.A. 2A:4A-26.1(a) to (c). The court may deny a motion to waive jurisdiction "if it is clearly convinced that the prosecutor abused his discretion in considering" the N.J.S.A. 2A:4A-26.1(c)(3) factors. N.J.S.A. 2A:4A-26.1(c)(3). (Please note that N.J.S.A. 2A:4A-26.1 replaced N.J.S.A. 2A:4A-26 as of March 1, 2106. L. 2015, c. 89.)

(1) N.J.S.A. 2A:4A-26.1(c)(2) Offenses (quoted from the statute):

- (a) criminal homicide, other than death by auto;
- (b) strict liability for drug-induced deaths;
- (c) first-degree robbery;
- (d) carjacking;
- (e) aggravated sexual assault;
- (f) sexual assault;
- (g) second-degree aggravated-assault;
- (h) kidnapping;
- (i) aggravated arson;
- (j) possession of a firearm with a purpose to use it unlawfully against the person of another under N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4(a), or possession of a firearm while committing or attempting to commit, including the immediate flight therefrom, aggravated assault, aggravated criminal sexual contact, burglary, or escape;
- (k) a violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:35-3 (Leader of a Narcotics Trafficking Network);

(l) a violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:35-4 (Maintaining and Operating a CDS Production Facility);

(m) a violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4.1 (Weapons Possession while Committing certain CDS Offenses);

(n) an attempt or conspiracy to commit any of the crimes enumerated in subparagraphs (a) through (m) of this paragraph; or

(o) a crime committed at a time when the juvenile previously had been sentenced and confined in an adult correctional facility.

(2) N.J.S.A. 2A:4A-26.1(c)(3) Factors (quoted from the statute):

(a) The nature and circumstances of the offense charged;

(b) Whether the offense was against a person or property, allocating more weight for crimes against the person;

(c) Degree of the juvenile's culpability;

(d) Age and maturity of the juvenile;

(e) Any classification that the juvenile is eligible for special education to the extent this information is provided to the prosecution by the juvenile or by the court;

(f) Degree of criminal sophistication exhibited by the juvenile;

(g) Nature and extent of any prior history of delinquency of the juvenile and dispositions imposed for those adjudications;

(h) If the juvenile previously served a custodial disposition in a State juvenile facility operated by the Juvenile Justice Commission, and the response of the juvenile to the programs provided at the facility to the extent this information is provided to the prosecution by the Juvenile Justice Commission;

(i) Current or prior involvement of the juvenile with child welfare agencies;

(j) Evidence of mental health concerns, substance abuse, or emotional instability of the juvenile to the extent this information is provided to the prosecution by the juvenile or by the court; and

(k) If there is an identifiable victim, the input of the victim or victim's family.

5. Sentencing after Transfer. Upon transfer to another court, "[t]he case shall proceed as if it originated in that court and shall be subject to the sentencing provisions available to that court." N.J.S.A. 2A:4A-26.1(f)(1).

(a) Confinement for an N.J.S.A. 2A:4A-26.1(c)(2) Enumerated Offense. Pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2A:4A-26.1(f)(1), if the juvenile is convicted of an offense listed in N.J.S.A. 2A:4A-26.1(c)(2), "there shall be a presumption that the juvenile shall serve any custodial sentence imposed in a State juvenile facility operated by the Juvenile Justice Commission until the juvenile reaches the age of 21, except that":

(a) a juvenile under the age of twenty-one "may, in the discretion of the Juvenile Justice Commission, be transferred to the Department of Corrections in accordance with the plan established pursuant to N.J.S.A. 52:17B-175(e) and regulations adopted pursuant to that section"; and

(b) an offender age twenty-one or older "may continue to serve a sentence in a State juvenile facility operated by the Juvenile Justice Commission in the discretion of the Juvenile Justice Commission and if the juvenile so consents; otherwise the juvenile shall serve the remainder of the custodial sentence in a State correctional facility" N.J.S.A. 2A:4A-26.1(f)(1).

(b) Remand for Disposition where the Juvenile Is Not Convicted of an N.J.S.A. 2A:4A-26.1(c)(2) Enumerated Offense. If the juvenile is not convicted of an offense set forth in N.J.S.A. 2A:4A-26.1(c)(2), which had made the juvenile eligible for waiver, then the conviction shall be deemed a

juvenile adjudication and the case must be remanded to the Family Part for disposition. N.J.S.A. 2A:4A-26.1(f)(2).

6. Remand to the Family Part after Transfer. "With the consent of the defense and the prosecutor, at any point in the proceedings subsequent to the decision ordering waiver the court may remand to the . . . Family Part if it appears that: (a) the interests of the public and the best interests of the juvenile require access to programs or procedures uniquely available to that court; and (b) the interests of the public are no longer served by waiver." N.J.S.A. 2A:4A-26.1(f)(3).

7. Duration of the Family Part's Jurisdiction. The Family Part retains jurisdiction for the duration of the disposition. N.J.S.A. 2A:4A-45(b).

8. Right to Counsel. A juvenile has the right to counsel "at every critical stage in the proceeding which, in the opinion of the court may result in the institutional commitment of the juvenile." N.J.S.A. 2A:4A-39(a).

Waiver of the Right. A juvenile with mental capacity may waive the right to counsel after consultation with counsel and a parent. N.J.S.A. 2A:4A-39(b)(1) and (2). A juvenile who lacks mental capacity shall have a guardian ad litem appointed, who may waive rights after consultation with the child and parent. N.J.S.A. 2A:4A-39(b)(3).

9. Rights and Defenses Available to Adults. A juvenile shall have "[a]ll defenses available to an adult charged with a crime, offense or violation," and "[a]ll rights guaranteed to criminal defendants by the Constitution of the United States and the Constitution of this State, except the right to indictment, the right to trial by jury and the right to bail" N.J.S.A. 2A:4A-40.

10. Timing of Disposition.

(a) Where the Juvenile Is Detained or in a Shelter. If the juvenile is in a detention facility or shelter-care facility, "the disposition of the case shall be entered within thirty days" of adjudication. N.J.S.A. 2A:4A-41. If "no disposition of the case is made after thirty days, the court shall, upon motion of the juvenile, fix a date certain for the dispositional hearing which shall be within ten days of the motion, unless an extension is granted by the court for good cause shown." Ibid.

(b) Where the Juvenile Is Not Detained or in a Shelter. If the juvenile is not detained or in a shelter-care facility, disposition shall be made within sixty days unless the court grants an extension for good cause shown. N.J.S.A. 2A:4A-41.

11. Notice of Disposition Hearing. The court shall notify "the proper parties" in writing of the date, time and place of a disposition hearing and "sufficiently in advance of the hearing to allow adequate time for preparation." N.J.S.A. 2A:4A-41.

12. Predisposition Evaluation. Prior to disposing of the case, "the court may refer the juvenile to an appropriate individual, agency or institution for examination and evaluation." N.J.S.A. 2A:4A-42(a). "[T]he court may also consult" individuals and agencies as may be appropriate. N.J.S.A. 2A:4A-42(b).

13. Predisposition Report. The predisposition report shall include information regarding the nature of the offense, the impact the offense had on the community, any history of delinquency, the juvenile's family situation and financial resources, and the parents' or guardians' supervision and control relevant to commission of the offense. N.J.S.A. 2A:4A-42(c)(2). The report may also include a victim statement. N.J.S.A. 2A:4A-42(c)(1).

14. Victim's Right to Address the Court. The Crime Victims Bill of Rights provides that the victim of an offense committed by a juvenile has the right to address the court in writing or in person at the disposition hearing. N.J.S.A. 52:4B-36(m) and (n).

15. Prohibited Effects of Disposition. Pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2A:4A-48, no disposition "shall operate to impose any of the civil disabilities ordinarily imposed by virtue of a criminal conviction, nor shall a juvenile be deemed a criminal by reason of such disposition." Further, a disposition "shall not be admissible against the juvenile in any criminal or penal case or proceeding in any other court except for consideration in sentencing, or as otherwise provided by law." Ibid.

16. Violation of a Disposition Term. Where the juvenile has allegedly violated a term of disposition, the court may substitute the disposition with any other disposition that it could have originally imposed, after providing notice and a hearing. N.J.S.A. 2A:4A-45(b).

17. Substitution of Disposition. At any time during the duration of the disposition, the court may substitute any other disposition, other than incarceration. N.J.S.A. 2A:4A-45(a).

18. Termination of Disposition Order. An order of disposition terminates when the juvenile reaches eighteen years of age "or three years from the date of the order whichever is later unless such order involves incarceration or is sooner terminated by its terms or by order of the court." N.J.S.A. 2A:4A-47(a).

B. Title 2A Disposition Factors and Available Dispositions: Statutory Provisions

1. Factors to Consider in Determining a Disposition. Pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2A:4A-43(a), the court shall weigh the following factors (quoted from the statute) in determining a disposition:

- (1) The nature and circumstances of the offense;
- (2) The degree of injury to persons or damage to property caused by the juvenile's offense;
- (3) The juvenile's age, previous record, prior social service received, and out-of-home placement history;
- (4) Whether the disposition supports family strength, responsibility and unity and the well-being and physical safety of the juvenile;
- (5) Whether the disposition provides for reasonable participation by the child's parent, guardian, or custodian, provided, however, that the failure of a parent or parents to cooperate in the disposition shall not be weighed against the juvenile in arriving at an appropriate disposition;
- (6) Whether the disposition recognizes and treats the unique physical, psychological, and social characteristics and needs of the child;
- (7) Whether the disposition contributes to the developmental needs of the child, including the academic and social needs of the child where the child has intellectual disabilities or learning disabilities;

- (8) Any other circumstances related to the offense and the juvenile's social history as deemed appropriate by the court;
- (9) The impact of the offense on the victim or victims;
- (10) The impact of the offense on the community; and
- (11) The threat to the safety of the public or any individual posed by the child.

2. Available Dispositions. N.J.S.A. 2A:4A-43(b), as amended by, L. 2019, c. 363 (eff. Nov. 1, 2020), provides that unless an additional specific disposition is required by this section, the court, in accordance with N.J.S.A. 2A:4A-21(i) may order incarceration, pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2A:4A-44, or one or more of the following dispositions. (**Note:** Pursuant to L. 2020, c. 50, and in light of COVID-19, the Legislature suspended certain fines and mandatory penalties and changed from mandatory to discretionary post-incarceration supervision from July 1 to October 31, 2020.)

- (1) "Adjourn formal entry of disposition of the case for a period not to exceed 12 months for the purpose of determining whether the juvenile makes a satisfactory adjustment, and if during the period of continuance the juvenile makes such an adjustment, dismiss the complaint" (**Note:** Pursuant to L. 2021, c. 342 (eff. Jan. 10, 2022), the Legislature deleted the N.J.S.A. 2C:35-15 monetary punishment for juveniles.);
- (2) Release the juvenile, with or without conditions, to a parent or guardian;
- (3) Place the juvenile on probation under the supervision of the chief probation officer or "any other suitable person who agrees to" supervise the juvenile, for a period not to exceed three years and with written conditions that "the court deems will aid rehabilitation of the juvenile";
- (4) Transfer custody of the juvenile to anyone qualified to care for the child;
- (5) Place the child under the care of the Department of Children and Families so that the commissioner may designate a unit or division to provide services. The commissioner must submit a plan to the court within fourteen days, or, within thirty days upon a showing of good cause, and the court shall presume the plan valid. "If the court determines that the service

plan is inappropriate, given existing resources, the department may request a hearing on that determination";

(6) "Place the juvenile under the care and custody of the Commissioner of Children and Families for the purpose of receiving the services of the Division of Children's System of Care of that department, provided that the juvenile has been determined to be eligible for those services under N.J.S.A. 30:4-25.4";

(7) Commit the juvenile to the Department of Children and Families under the responsibility of the Division of Children's System of Care "for the purpose of placement in a suitable public or private hospital or other residential facility for the treatment of persons who are mentally ill, on the ground that the juvenile is in need of involuntary commitment";

(8) (fine provision deleted by L. 2019, c. 363 (eff. Nov. 1, 2020))

(9) Order restitution "to a person or entity who has suffered loss resulting from personal injuries or damage to property as a result of the offense. . . . If the juvenile participated in the offense with other persons, the participants shall be jointly and severally responsible for the payment of restitution. The court shall not require a juvenile to make full or partial restitution if the juvenile reasonably satisfies the court that the juvenile does not have the means to make restitution and could not reasonably acquire the means to pay restitution";

(10) Require community service under the supervision of probation or other appropriate agency or individual. "Such services shall be compulsory and reasonable in terms of nature and duration," and "may be performed without compensation." If the juvenile receives compensation, the money "may be applied towards any payment of restitution or fine which the court has ordered the juvenile to pay";

(11) Order participation in work programs designed to provide job skills and specific employment training. If the juvenile receives compensation, it may be applied towards any court ordered restitution or fine;

(12) Require participation in "programs emphasizing self-reliance, such as intensive outdoor programs teaching survival skills, including but not limited to camping, hiking, and other appropriate activities";

(13) Order participation "in a program of academic or vocational education or counseling, such as a youth service bureau, requiring attendance at sessions designed to afford access to opportunities for normal growth and development. This may require attendance after school, evenings, and weekends";

(14) "Place the juvenile in a suitable residential or nonresidential program for the treatment of alcohol or narcotic abuse, provided that the juvenile has been determined to be in need of such services";

(15) "Order the parent or guardian of the juvenile to participate in appropriate programs or services when the court has found either that such person's omission or conduct was a significant contributing factor towards the commission of the delinquent act, or, under its authority to enforce litigant's rights, that such person's omission or conduct has been a significant contributing factor towards the ineffective implementation of a court order previously entered in relation to the juvenile";

(16)(a) "Place the juvenile in a nonresidential program operated by a public or private agency, providing intensive services to juveniles for specified hours, which may include education, counseling to the juvenile and the juvenile's family if appropriate, vocational training, employment counseling, work, or other services";

(16)(b) "Place the juvenile under the custody of the Juvenile Justice Commission established pursuant to section N.J.S.A. 52:17B-170 for placement with any private group home or private residential facility with which the commission has entered into a purchase of service contract";

(17) "[P]ostpone, suspend, or revoke for a period not to exceed two years the driver's license, registration certificate, or both of any juvenile who used a motor vehicle in the course of committing an act for which the juvenile was adjudicated delinquent. In imposing this disposition and in deciding the duration of the postponement, suspension, or revocation, the court shall consider the circumstances of the act for which the juvenile was adjudicated delinquent and the potential effect of the loss of driving privileges on the juvenile's ability to be rehabilitated. Any postponement, suspension, or revocation shall be imposed consecutively with any custodial commitment";

(18) Order "any other conditions reasonably related to the rehabilitation of the juvenile";

(19) Order a parent or guardian who failed or neglected to exercise reasonable supervision or control of a juvenile adjudicated delinquent to make restitution to any person or entity who suffered a loss as a result of the offense; or

(20) Place the juvenile, if eligible, in an appropriate juvenile offender program established pursuant to N.J.S.A. 30:8-61 to 69 (Juvenile Offender Rehabilitation Act).

3. Mandatory Dispositions under N.J.S.A. 2A:4A-43(e). In the following cases, the court must impose the following dispositions, in addition to any other disposition that the court may impose: (**Note:** N.J.S.A. 2A:4A-43(e)(2), (e)(4) and (f) have been deleted by L. 2019, c. 363 (eff. Nov. 1, 2020)).

(a) Theft of a Motor Vehicle, Unlawful Taking of a Motor Vehicle and Third-Degree Eluding. The court must impose sixty days of community service if the juvenile has been adjudicated delinquent for an act which, if committed by an adult, would constitute the crime of theft of a motor vehicle, unlawful taking of a motor vehicle (N.J.S.A. 2C:20-10(c)), or third-degree eluding (N.J.S.A. 2C:29-2(b)). N.J.S.A. 2A:4A-43(e)(1), as amended by, L. 2019, c. 363, eff. Nov. 1, 2020.

(b) Fourth-Degree Unlawful Taking of a Motor Vehicle. The court must impose at least thirty days of community service if the juvenile committed an act which, if committed by an adult, would constitute fourth-degree unlawful taking of a motor vehicle (N.J.S.A. 2C:20-10(b)). N.J.S.A. 2A:4A-43(e)(3), as amended by, L. 2019, c. 363 (eff. Nov. 1, 2020).

4. Community Based Dispositions and Underlying Interests. When the court imposes community service, restitution, or participation in any other program, "the order shall include provisions which provide balanced attention to the protection of the community, accountability for offenses committed, fostering interaction and dialogue between the offender, victim and community and the development of competencies to enable the child to become a responsible and productive member of the community." N.J.S.A. 2A:4A-43(g).

Duration. Community service, restitution and participation in a program "shall extend for a period consistent with the program goal for the juvenile and shall in no event exceed one year beyond the maximum duration permissible for the delinquent if the juvenile had been committed to a term of incarceration." N.J.S.A. 2A:4A-43(d).

5. AIDS and HIV Testing for Sex Offenders. N.J.S.A. 2A:4A-43.1 requires the court to order "serological testing for acquired immune deficiency syndrome (AIDS) or infection with the human immunodeficiency virus (HIV) or any other related virus identified as a probable causative agent of AIDS," where the juvenile is adjudicated delinquent for aggravated sexual assault or sexual assault.

6. AIDS and HIV Testing in Certain Disorderly Persons and Petty Disorderly Persons Cases. The court shall order the juvenile to undergo serological testing for acquired immune deficiency syndrome (AIDS), infection with the human immunodeficiency virus (HIV), or any other related virus identified as a probable causative agent of AIDS, where the juvenile is adjudicated delinquent for a disorderly persons or petty disorderly persons offense and (1) there is probable cause to believe the juvenile is an intravenous drug user and someone suffered a prick from a hypodermic needle, and (2) someone had contact with, or likely had contact with, the juvenile's bodily fluids. N.J.S.A. 2A:4A-43.4(a)(1) and (2).

7. Penalties for Graffiti. The court may require a juvenile to make restitution or conduct community service where, during an act of graffiti, the juvenile committed an act that would constitute the following crimes if committed by an adult: criminal mischief (N.J.S.A. 2C:17-3), attempting to put another in fear of bodily violence (N.J.S.A. 2C:33-10), or defacing private property (N.J.S.A. 2C:33-11). "If community service is ordered, it shall be for either not less than 20 days or not less than the number of days necessary to remove the graffiti from the property." N.J.S.A. 2A:4A-43.2. **Note:** N.J.S.A. 2A:4A-43.3, repealed by, L. 2019, c. 276 (eff. Jan. 1, 2021) included license suspension as a penalty for graffiti.

C. Rules Regarding Incarceration: Statutory Provisions

1. Aggravating Factors. Pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2A:4A-44(a)(1), as amended by, L. 2019, c. 363 (eff. Nov. 1, 2020), in considering whether incarceration is an appropriate disposition, the court shall consider the following aggravating factors (quoted from the statute) in addition to the considerations in N.J.S.A. 2A:4A-21(1):

- (a) The fact that the nature and circumstances of the act, and the role of the juvenile therein, was committed in an especially heinous, cruel, or depraved manner;
- (b) The fact that there was grave and serious harm inflicted on the victim and that based upon the juvenile's age or mental capacity the juvenile knew or reasonably should have known that the victim was particularly vulnerable or incapable of resistance due to advanced age, disability, ill-health, or extreme youth, or was for any other reason substantially incapable;
- (c) The character and attitude of the juvenile indicate that the juvenile is likely to commit another delinquent or criminal act;
- (d) The juvenile's prior record and the seriousness of any acts for which the juvenile has been adjudicated delinquent;
- (e) The fact that the juvenile committed the act pursuant to an agreement that the juvenile either pay or be paid for the commission of the act and that the pecuniary incentive was beyond that inherent in the act itself;
- (f) The fact that the juvenile committed the act against a policeman or other law enforcement officer, correctional employee or fireman, acting in the performance of his duties while in uniform or exhibiting evidence of his authority, or the juvenile committed the act because of the status of the victim as a public servant;
- (g) The need for deterring the juvenile and others from violating the law;
- (h) The fact that the juvenile knowingly conspired with others as an organizer, supervisor, or manager to commit continuing criminal activity in concert with two or more persons and the circumstances of the crime show that he has knowingly devoted himself to criminal activity as part of an ongoing business activity;

(i) The fact that the juvenile on two separate occasions was adjudged a delinquent on the basis of acts which if committed by an adult would constitute crimes;

(j) The impact of the offense on the victim or victims;

(k) The impact of the offense on the community; and

(l) The threat to the safety of the public or any individual posed by the child.

2. Mitigating Factors. Pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2A:4A-44(a)(2), in considering whether incarceration is an appropriate disposition, the court shall consider the following mitigating factors (quoted from the statute):

(a) The child is under the age of 14;

(b) The juvenile's conduct neither caused nor threatened serious harm;

(c) The juvenile did not contemplate that the juvenile's conduct would cause or threaten serious harm;

(d) The juvenile acted under a strong provocation;

(e) There were substantial grounds tending to excuse or justify the juvenile's conduct, though failing to establish a defense;

(f) The victim of the juvenile's conduct induced or facilitated its commission;

(g) The juvenile has compensated or will compensate the victim for the damage or injury that the victim has sustained, or will participate in a program of community service;

(h) The juvenile has no history of prior delinquency or criminal activity or has led a law-abiding life for a substantial period of time before the commission of the present act;

(i) The juvenile's conduct was the result of circumstances unlikely to recur;

(j) The character and attitude of the juvenile indicate that the juvenile is unlikely to commit another delinquent or criminal act;

(k) The juvenile is particularly likely to respond affirmatively to noncustodial treatment;

(l) The separation of the juvenile from the juvenile's family by incarceration of the juvenile would entail excessive hardship to the juvenile or the juvenile's family;

(m) The willingness of the juvenile to cooperate with law enforcement authorities;

(n) The conduct of the juvenile was substantially influenced by another person more mature than the juvenile.

3. Presumption against Incarceration. There is a presumption against incarceration for:

- "any crime or offense of the fourth degree or less committed by a juvenile who has not previously been adjudicated delinquent or convicted of a crime or offense," N.J.S.A. 2A:4A-44(b)(1); and
- juveniles who are developmentally disabled, as that term is defined in N.J.S.A. 30:6D-3, N.J.S.A. 4A-44(c)(2).

4. Juvenile-Family Crisis and Commitment. Pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2A:4A-46(b), "[n]o juvenile involved in a juvenile-family crisis [defined in N.J.S.A. 2A:4A-22(g)] shall be committed to or placed in any institution or facility established for the care of delinquent children or in any facility, other than an institution for persons with intellectual disabilities, a mental hospital or facility for the care of persons addicted to controlled dangerous substances, which physically restricts such juvenile committed to or placed in it."

5. Short Term Incarceration in a County Juvenile Detention Facility. "[I]f the county in which the juvenile has been adjudicated delinquent has a juvenile detention facility meeting the physical and program standards established pursuant to this subsection by the Juvenile Justice Commission, the court may, in addition to any of the dispositions not involving placement out of the home enumerated in this section, incarcerate the juvenile in the youth detention facility in that county for a

term not to exceed sixty consecutive days." N.J.S.A. 2A:4A-43(c)(1), as amended by, L. 2019, c. 363 (eff. Nov. 1, 2020).

(a) Incarceration Agreements with another County. "[C]ounties which do not operate their own juvenile detention facilities may contract for the use of approved commitment programs with counties with which they have established agreements for the use of pre-disposition juvenile detention facilities." The Juvenile Justice Commission shall promulgate rules and regulations to establish minimum facility and program standards. N.J.S.A. 2A:4A-43(c)(1).

(b) Juvenile Justice Commission Certification. "A juvenile shall not be incarcerated in any county detention facility unless the county has entered into an agreement with the Juvenile Justice Commission concerning the use of the facility for sentenced juveniles. Upon agreement with the county, the Juvenile Justice Commission shall certify detention facilities which may receive juveniles sentenced pursuant to this subsection and shall specify the capacity of the facility that may be made available to receive such juveniles; provided, however, that in no event shall the number of juveniles incarcerated pursuant to this subsection exceed 50% of the maximum capacity of the facility. N.J.S.A. 2A:4A-43(c)(2), as amended by, L. 2019, c. 363 (eff. Nov. 1, 2020).

- Pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2A:4A-43(c)(3), as amended by, L. 2019, c. 363 (eff. Nov. 1, 2020), the court may impose incarceration under this section that is in accordance with N.J.S.A. 2A:4A-21(i) where:

(a) The offense would constitute a crime or repetitive disorderly persons offense if committed by an adult;

(b) "Incarceration of the juvenile is consistent with the goals of public safety, accountability, and rehabilitation and the court is clearly convinced that the aggravating factors substantially outweigh the mitigating factors as set forth in N.J.S.A. 2A:4A-44"; and

(c) The detention facility has been certified pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2A:4A-43(c)(2).

(c) **Transportation Expenses.** "If as a result of incarceration of adjudicated juveniles pursuant to this subsection, a county is required to transport a predisposition juvenile to a juvenile detention facility in another county, the costs of such transportation shall be borne by the Juvenile Justice Commission." N.J.S.A. 2A:4A-43(c)(4).

6. Incarceration in a State Juvenile Facility Prohibited.

(a) **Developmental Disability.** A juvenile may not be incarcerated in a State juvenile facility if the juvenile is developmentally disabled, as that term is defined in N.J.S.A. 30:6D-3. N.J.S.A. 2A:4A-44(c)(2).

(b) **Age Eleven or Less.** A juvenile age eleven or under may not be incarcerated in a State juvenile facility unless the act he or she committed would constitute arson or a crime of the first or second degree if committed by an adult. N.J.S.A. 2A:4A-44(c)(1).

7. Rationale Required. Except where the court imposes incarceration under N.J.S.A. 2A:4A-43(c), when the court determines that incarceration is warranted in light of the N.J.S.A. 2A:4A-44(a) factors, the court "shall state on the record the reasons for imposing incarceration, including any findings with regard to these factors, and commit the juvenile to the custody of the Juvenile Justice Commission which shall provide for the juvenile's placement in a suitable juvenile facility pursuant to the conditions set forth in this subsection." N.J.S.A. 2A:4A-44(d)(1).

8. Maximum Terms of Incarceration. Pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2A:4A-44(d)(1), the court may not order a term of incarceration that exceeds the following maximum terms:

- Purposeful or knowing murder (N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3(a)(1) or (2)): twenty years;
- Felony murder (N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3(a)(3)): ten years;
- First-degree crimes other than murder: four years;
- Second-degree crimes: three years;
- Third-degree crimes: two years;

- Fourth-degree crimes: one year;
- Disorderly persons offense: six months.

9. Extended Term. N.J.S.A. 2A:4A-44(d)(3) and (4) authorizes extended terms in the following two situations, upon application by the State:

(a) Repeat Offender. If "the juvenile was previously adjudged delinquent on at least two separate occasions, for offenses which, if committed by an adult, would constitute a crime of the first or second degree," and the juvenile is adjudicated delinquent for a first-, second-, or third-degree offense, then the court may impose an extended term not to exceed the following (N.J.S.A. 2A:4A-44(d)(3)):

- Murder: five additional years;
- All other first-degree offenses: three additional years;
- Second-degree offenses: two additional years; and
- Third-degree offenses: one additional year.

(b) Multiple Offenses. "Upon application by the prosecutor, when a juvenile is before the court at one time for disposition of three or more unrelated offenses which, if committed by an adult, would constitute crimes of the first, second or third degree and which are not part of the same transaction, the court may sentence the juvenile to an extended term . . . not to exceed the maximum of the permissible term for the most serious offense for which the juvenile has been adjudicated plus two additional years." N.J.S.A. 2A:4A-44(d)(4).

10. Review by and Reports of the Commission. N.J.S.A. 2A:4A-44(d)(6), created by, L. 2019, c. 363 (eff. Nov. 1, 2020), requires the commission to "review the case of each juvenile sentenced to a term of commitment with the commission at least every three months and submit a status report to the court, the prosecutor, and the counsel for the juvenile." Subsections (a) through (d) set forth the requirements of the review and report. N.J.S.A. 2A:4A-44(d)(6)(a) to (d). The commission's quarterly reports must continue "until the juvenile is paroled or

released at the expiration of the term of incarceration" and shall resume if the juvenile is returned to custody. N.J.S.A. 2A:4A-44(d)(6). "The court may conduct a hearing at any time to determine whether commitment with the commission continues to be appropriate . . . and may release the juvenile or otherwise modify the dispositional order." Ibid.

11. Parole. Confinement shall continue until (1) the panel (N.J.S.A. 2A:4a-44(b)(2)) determines that the person is eligible for early release or (2) the term of confinement expires, whichever occurs first; except that confinement and parole may not exceed the maximum provided by law. N.J.S.A. 2A:4A-44(d)(2), as amended by, L. 2019, c. 363 (eff. Nov. 1, 2020). "A juvenile shall be granted early release on parole when it appears that the juvenile has made substantial progress toward positive behavioral adjustment and rehabilitative goals articulated by the panel." Ibid.

(a) When Court Approval Is Required. If the panel approves parole prior to the juvenile's serving (1) one-third of the term, including an extended term, for a first-, second-, or third-degree offense, or (2) one-fourth of the term for any other offense, then the court must approve parole after affording the State notice and an opportunity to respond. N.J.S.A. 2A:4A-44(d)(2), as amended by, L. 2019, c. 363 (eff. Nov. 1, 2020). If the court denies parole "it shall state its reasons in writing and notify the panel . . . the juvenile, and the juvenile's attorney. The court shall have 30 days from the date of notice of the pending parole to exercise the power granted under this paragraph. If the court does not respond within that time period, the parole will be deemed approved." Ibid.

(b) Conditions of Parole. The panel shall determine the conditions of parole, "which shall be appropriately tailored to the needs of each juvenile" and which "shall constitute the least restrictive alternatives necessary to promote the successful return of the juvenile to the community." N.J.S.A. 2A:4A-44(d)(2), as amended by, L. 2019, c. 363 (eff. Nov. 1, 2020). "The juvenile shall not be required to enter or complete a residential community release program, residential treatment program, or other out-of-home placement as a condition of parole unless it is determined that the condition is necessary to protect the safety of the juvenile." Ibid. The panel "may relieve a juvenile of any parole conditions," including residence within this State. N.J.S.A. 2A:4A-44(f), created by, L. 2019, c. 363 (eff. Nov. 1, 2020),

(c) Motion for Return to Custody. "The panel, . . . the juvenile, the juvenile's attorney, the juvenile's parent or guardian or, with leave of the court any other interested party, may make a motion to the court, with notice to the prosecuting attorney, for the return of the juvenile from a juvenile facility prior to the juvenile's parole and provide for an alternative disposition which would not exceed the duration of the original time to be served in the facility." N.J.S.A. 2A:4A-44(d)(2), as amended by, L. 2019, c. 363 (eff. Nov. 1, 2020).

(d) Violations of Parole. N.J.S.A. 2A:4A-44(e), created by, L. 2019, c. 363 (eff. Nov. 1, 2020), provides that if the panel determines that "there is probable cause to believe that the juvenile has seriously or persistently violated the terms and conditions of parole, the commission shall conduct a hearing to determine if the juvenile's parole should be revoked." For the requirements of the hearing, see N.J.S.A. 2A:4A-44(e). "Notwithstanding a determination that the juvenile violated a condition of parole, the panel . . . may modify those conditions." N.J.S.A. 2A:4A-44(e).

Revocation of Parole. The panel may not revoke parole unless "the hearing officer determines, by clear and convincing evidence, that: (1) the juvenile has seriously or persistently violated the conditions of parole; (2) the juvenile poses a substantial danger to public safety and no form of community-based supervision would alleviate that danger; and (3) revocation is consistent with the provisions of N.J.S.A. 2A:4A-21." N.J.S.A. 2A:4A-44(e), created by, L. 2019, c. 363 (eff. Nov. 1, 2020).

12. Post-Incarceration Supervision. Pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2A:4A-44(d)(5), as amended by, L. 2019, c. 363 (eff. Nov. 1, 2020), the panel (N.J.S.A. 2A:4A-44(b)(2)) may impose post-incarceration supervision "only if it is deemed necessary to effectuate the juvenile's rehabilitation and reintegration into society." The term shall not exceed six months, except that it may be extended for an additional six months if the panel deems continuation "necessary to effectuate the juvenile's rehabilitation and reintegration into society." N.J.S.A. 2A:4A-44(d)(5), as amended by, L. 2019, c. 363 (eff. Nov. 1, 2020). The term may not exceed one year and "shall not be imposed on any juvenile who has completed a period of parole supervision of six months or more." Ibid. As a condition of post-incarceration supervision, the juvenile "shall not be required to enter or complete a residential community release program, residential treatment program, or other out-of-home placement." Ibid. During post-incarceration supervision the juvenile

remains in "the legal custody of the commission." Ibid. The supervision may be terminated by the panel or court "if the juvenile has made a satisfactory adjustment in the community" and "continued supervision is not required." Ibid.

D. Title 2C (Criminal Code) Punishments Applicable to Juveniles Adjudicated Delinquent: Statutory Provisions

1. Drug Court (renamed Recovery Court). Pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:35-14(a), a court may require a juvenile who is drug or alcohol dependent to participate in drug court. See Chapter XIV on drug offender sentencing for additional information on drug court.

2. Drug Offender Restraining Orders. N.J.S.A. 2C:35-5.7(h) provides: "When a person is convicted of or adjudicated delinquent for any criminal offense, the court, upon application of a law enforcement officer or prosecuting attorney pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:35-5.9 [certification of offense location] and except as provided in subsection e. of this section, shall, . . . issue an order prohibiting the person from entering" the place where the offense occurred. A law enforcement agency may post, publish and distribute the order, along with a photograph of the juvenile. N.J.S.A. 2C:35-5.7(h).

(a) Exception. N.J.S.A. 2C:35-5.7(e) provides: "The court may forego issuing a restraining order . . . only if the defendant establishes by clear and convincing evidence that":

(1) "the defendant lawfully resides at or has legitimate business on or near the place, or otherwise legitimately needs to enter the place. In such an event, the court shall not issue" a restraining order "unless the court is clearly convinced that the need to bar the person from the place in order to protect the public safety and the rights, safety and health of the residents and persons working in the place outweighs the person's interest in returning to the place." The court may also impose an order permitting entry with conditions; or

(2) imposition of a restraining order "would cause undue hardship to innocent persons and would constitute a serious injustice which overrides the need to protect the rights, safety and health of persons residing in or having business in the place."

(b) Duration of the Order. The order "shall remain in effect for such period of time as shall be fixed by the court but not longer than the maximum term of imprisonment or incarceration allowed by law for the underlying offense or offenses." N.J.S.A. 2C:35-5.7(j).

(c) Additional Dispositions. N.J.S.A. 2C:35-5.7(i) provides that in addition to a restraining order, the court may order any disposition, including requiring "any parent, guardian or any family member over whom the court has jurisdiction to take such actions or obey such restraints as may be necessary to facilitate the rehabilitation of the juvenile or to protect public safety or to safeguard or enforce the rights of residents of the place. The court may commit the juvenile to the care and responsibility of the Department of Children and Families until such time as the juvenile reaches the age of eighteen or until the order of removal and restraint expires, whichever first occurs, or to such alternative residential placement as is practicable."

(d) Violation of the Order. Violation of an order "shall subject the person to civil contempt, criminal contempt, revocation of bail, probation or parole, or any combination of these sanctions and any other sanctions authorized by law. A law enforcement officer may . . . take into custody a juvenile when an officer has probable cause to believe that the person has violated the terms of any removal and restraining order issued pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:35-5.7." N.J.S.A. 2C:35-5.8.

3. Drug Enforcement and Demand Reduction Penalty. Until November 1, 2020, N.J.S.A. 2C:35-15(a)(1) required the court to impose drug enforcement and demand reduction (DEDR) penalties on a juvenile adjudicated delinquent for an offense in Chapter 35 (drug offenses) or 36 (drug paraphernalia offenses). This requirement was eliminated by L. 2019, c. 363 (eff. Nov. 1, 2020).

4. Drug Offenses and License Forfeiture. N.J.S.A. 2C:35-16(a) requires forfeiture of a juvenile's driver's license for a period between six months and two years, absent compelling circumstances, upon a delinquency adjudication for a drug offense under Chapter 35 (drug offenses) or 36 (drug paraphernalia) of Title 2C. "[C]ompelling circumstances warranting an exception exist if the forfeiture . . . will result in extreme hardship and alternative means of transportation are not available." If the juvenile is less than seventeen years of age, the suspension, including suspension of any driving privilege to operate a motorized bike, "shall commence on the day the disposition is imposed and shall run for a period as fixed

by the court of not less than six months or more than two years after the day the person reaches the age of 17 years." N.J.S.A. 2C:35-16(a). If the juvenile's driving privileges are currently suspended for a violation of Title 2C or Title 39, the subsequent suspension "shall commence as of the date of termination of the existing revocation, suspension, or postponement." Ibid.

5. Controlled Dangerous Substance Lab Fee. N.J.S.A. 2C:35-20(b) requires a \$25 laboratory analysis fee for each delinquency adjudication based on a Chapter 35 drug offense. Effective January 10, 2022, this provision has been deleted. L. 2021, c. 342.

6. Defacing or Removing a Traffic Sign or Signal. Where a juvenile is adjudicated delinquent for defacing or removing a traffic signal or sign and the court imposes a fine, "the juvenile's parents or legal guardian shall be responsible for the imposed fine" if the juvenile is unable to pay it. N.J.S.A. 2C:17-3.1.

7. False Public Alarm Offense. N.J.S.A. 2C:33-3.1, repealed by, L. 2019, c. 276 (eff. Jan. 1, 2021) required the court to suspend or postpone for six months the juvenile's license to operate a motor vehicle.

8. Cyber-Harassment. Where a juvenile under age sixteen is adjudicated delinquent for cyber-harassment, the court may require the juvenile, accompanied by a parent or guardian, to complete one or both of the following: "(1) a class or training program intended to reduce the tendency toward cyber-harassment behavior; or (2) a class or training program intended to bring awareness to the dangers associated with cyber-harassment." N.J.S.A. 2C:33-4.1(c). A parent or guardian who fails to comply with such order "shall be fined not more than \$25 for a first offense and not more than \$100 for each subsequent offense." N.J.S.A. 2C:33-4.1(d).

9. Victims of Crime Compensation Board (VCCB) Assessments. Until November 1, 2020, N.J.S.A. 2C:43-3.1(a)(2)(b) required an assessment of at least \$30 and not more than "the amount which could be assessed pursuant to paragraph (1) or paragraph (2) (a) of subsection a. of this section if the offense was committed by an adult." N.J.S.A. 2C:43-3.1(a)(2)(b), deleted by, L. 2019, c. 363 (eff. Nov. 1, 2020).

10. Law Enforcement Officers Training and Equipment Assessment. Pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:43-3.3(b), "a juvenile adjudicated delinquent for an offense which if committed by an adult would be a crime shall be assessed a

penalty of \$15." Effective January 10, 2022, this provision has been deleted. L. 2021, c. 342.

11. Computer Crime Prevention Penalty. N.J.S.A. 2C:43-3.8(a) provides that any person adjudicated delinquent for endangering the welfare of a child (N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4(b)(3), (4) or (5)); leader of a child pornography network (N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4.1); child obscenity (N.J.S.A. 2C:34-3); or an offense involving computer criminal activity contrary to any provision within Chapter 20 of Title 2C (theft offenses), shall be assessed the following penalties to be deposited in the Computer Crime Prevention Fund (**Note** that N.J.S.A. 2C:43-3.8(a) was amended effective February 1, 2018, to add N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4(b)(3) and (4) (child endangerment) and N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4.1 (leader of a child pornography network). L. 2017, c. 141.):

- \$2000 for a first-degree crime;
- \$1000 for a second-degree crime;
- \$750 for a third-degree crime;
- \$500 for a fourth-degree crime; and
- \$250 for a disorderly persons offense.

12. Registration Requirements and Penalties for "Sex Offenders" (also known as Megan's Law). N.J.S.A. 2C:7-1 to -23 sets forth registration and public notification requirements for persons, including juveniles adjudicated delinquent, for a "sex offense." N.J.S.A. 2C:7-2(b)(2). Failure to comply with Megan's Law registration requirements is a third-degree crime. N.J.S.A. 2C:7-2(d)(1) and (2).

(a) Sex Offense Defined. Pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:7-2(b)(2), a sex offense includes the following offenses (**Note** that N.J.S.A. 2C:7-2(b) was amended effective February 1, 2018, to include N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4(b)(5)(b)(i) and (ii) (child endangerment) and N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4.1 (leader of a child pornography network):

- Aggravated sexual assault (N.J.S.A. 2C:14-2(a));
- Sexual assault (N.J.S.A. 2C:14-1));

- Aggravated criminal sexual contact (N.J.S.A. 2C:14-3(a));
- Kidnapping (N.J.S.A. 2C:13-1(c)(2));
- Endangering the welfare of a child (N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4(a), N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4(b)(3) and (4), N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4(b)(5)(a), and N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4(b)(5)(b)(i) or (ii));
- Leader of a child pornography network (N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4.1);
- Luring or enticing a child (N.J.S.A. 2C:13-6);
- Criminal sexual contact with a minor (N.J.S.A. 2C:14-3(b));
- Kidnapping (N.J.S.A. 2C:13-1);
- Criminal restraint (N.J.S.A. 2C:13-2);
- False imprisonment "if the victim is a minor and the offender is not the parent of the victim" (N.J.S.A. 2C:13-3; and
- Knowingly promoting prostitution of a child (N.J.S.A. 2C:34-1(b)(3) or (4)).

(b) Exception for Certain Images of Nudity (Endangering the Welfare of a Child). "[A] sex offense shall not include an adjudication of delinquency for endangering the welfare of a child pursuant to" N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4(b)(4) or (5) if the juvenile establishes that "(a) the facts of the case are limited to the creation, exhibition or distribution of a photograph depicting nudity or portraying a child in a sexually suggestive manner, as defined in N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4, through the use of an electronic communications device, an interactive wireless communications device, or a computer; (b) the creator and subject of the photograph are juveniles or were juveniles at the time of its making; and (c) the subject of the photograph whose nudity is depicted or who is portrayed in a sexually suggestive manner, as the case may be, knowingly consented to the making of the photograph." N.J.S.A. 2C:7-2(b)(4).

13. Restricted Internet Access. Where a juvenile is adjudicated delinquent for a sex offense (N.J.S.A. 2C:7-2(b)) that included use of a computer or device with internet capabilities, and the juvenile is required to register under Megan's Law (N.J.S.A. 2C:7-2(c) and (d)), or is serving parole supervision for life (N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6.4), or has been adjudicated delinquent for promoting or providing obscene materials to a minor (N.J.S.A. 2C:34-3), then, pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6.6(a), the court must impose the following internet access restrictions:

(1) Prohibited access to "a computer or any other device with Internet capability without the prior written approval of the court," with the exception that a person on probation or parole "may use a computer or any other device with Internet capability in connection with that person's employment" or to "search for employment with the prior approval of the person's probation or parole officer";

(2) "[P]eriodic unannounced examinations of the person's computer . . . including the retrieval and copying of all data . . . and removal of such information, equipment or device to conduct a more thorough inspection";

(3) Installation, "at the person's expense, [of] one or more hardware or software systems to monitor the Internet use"; and

(4) "[A]ny other appropriate restrictions concerning the person's use or access of a computer or any other device with Internet capability."

A violation of the Internet access restrictions constitutes a fourth-degree crime. N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6.6(b).

14. Permissive Internet Restrictions. The court may impose the internet access conditions enumerated in N.J.S.A. 2C:45-1(d)(2)(a) to (d) upon a juvenile adjudicated delinquent for (1) a sex offense that requires Megan's Law compliance (N.J.S.A. 2C:7-2 (c) and (d)), or (2) a violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:34-3 (obscenity for persons under eighteen). N.J.S.A. 2C:45-1(d)(2).

15. Offenses Involving False Government Documents. N.J.S.A. 2C:21-2.1(e), as amended by, L. 2019, c. 276 (eff. Jan. 1, 2021), permits a suspension of the juvenile's driver's license for a period not to exceed two years.

E. Rules Regarding Juvenile Dispositions: Court Rules and Directives

1. Jurisdiction. Rule 5:1-2(b) provides that juvenile delinquency actions are cognizable in the Family Part.

2. Referral of Jurisdiction to the Law Division.

(a) Election by the Juvenile. A competent juvenile may elect to have the case transferred to an appropriate court where the juvenile is (a) age fourteen or older, or (b) younger than fourteen and charged with murder. R. 5:22-1.

(b) Motion by the State. Upon motion by the prosecutor, the Family Part may waive jurisdiction and refer the matter to the appropriate court if the criteria in N.J.S.A. 2A:4A-26.1 are satisfied. R. 5:22-2(a) to (d). The motion must be filed within sixty days of the complaint, but that time period may be extended upon a showing of good cause. R. 5:22-2(a).

3. Remand to the Family Part.

(a) Consent of the Parties. The court may remand a matter to the Family Part if both parties consent and it appears that "(1) the interests of the public and the best interests of the juvenile require access to programs or procedures uniquely available in the Family Part; and (2) the interests of the public are no longer served by waiver. R. 5:22-4(a).

(b) Conviction of Non-Waivable Offense. "If a juvenile is not convicted of an offense set forth in N.J.S.A. 2A:4A-26.1(c)(2), a conviction for any other offense shall be deemed a juvenile adjudication and be remanded to the Family Part for disposition, in accordance with the dispositional options available to the Family Part" R. 5:22-5(b).

4. Sentencing after Referral. Where the case is referred from the Family Part to another court, the juvenile "shall be subject to the sentencing provisions available to that court." R. 5:22-4(a).

Presumption of Detention in a Juvenile Facility after Conviction in the Law Division. Where the juvenile is convicted in the Law Division of an offense listed in N.J.S.A. 2A:4A-26.1(c)(2), "there shall be a presumption that the juvenile shall serve any custodial sentence imposed in a State juvenile facility operated by the Juvenile Justice Commission until the

juvenile reaches the age of twenty-one, except as provided in N.J.S.A. 2A:4A-26.1(f)." R. 5:22-4(b).

5. Adult Criminal Proceeding Rules. Pursuant to Rule 5:1-1, "[j]uvenile delinquency actions shall be governed by the rules in Part III [Rules Governing Criminal Practice] insofar as applicable and except as otherwise provided by the rules in Part V."

6. Plea Agreements. "A juvenile's guilty plea is subject to the requirements of Rule 3:9-2." R. 5:21A. The court may also require the juvenile to sign a plea form. R. 5:21A. However, use of the plea form "does not eliminate the obligation of the court to determine by inquiry of defendant and others, in the court's discretion, that a factual basis exists for the plea and that the plea is being made voluntarily, not the result of any threats or of any promises or inducements not disclosed on the record, and with an understanding of the nature of the charge and the consequences of the plea." Ibid.

Rule 3:9-2 Requirements. Rule 3:9-2 provides that the court may accept a plea of guilty if, after questioning the defendant on the record, the court is satisfied that the admitted facts support the charges and that the defendant is entering the plea knowingly and voluntarily. The court may accept a written stipulation of facts signed by the defendant, defense counsel and the prosecutor.

7. Timing of Disposition.

(a) Where the Juvenile Is Detained or in a Shelter. In cases where a juvenile is in a detention center or a shelter-care facility, the court must hold a disposition hearing within thirty days of adjudication. R. 5:24-1(a). "If, after 30 days, no order of disposition has been entered, the court shall, upon motion of the juvenile, fix a date certain for a dispositional hearing which shall be within 10 days of the motion unless an extension is granted by the court for good cause shown." Ibid.

(b) Where the Juvenile Is Not Detained or in a Shelter. Where the juvenile is not detained or in a shelter-care facility, disposition shall occur within sixty days of adjudication, unless the court grants an extension upon a showing of good cause. R. 5:24-1(b).

8. Predisposition Evaluation. After an adjudication of delinquency, or prior to an adjudication where the court finds that the evidence is sufficient to support an adjudication, and prior to disposition, the court may refer the juvenile to an appropriate individual, agency or institution for examination and evaluation, and may consult individuals and agencies as may be appropriate. R. 5:24-2(a). "Before the juvenile may be referred to any institution as an in-patient for such purpose, the court must first provide for the representation of the juvenile, the juvenile's parents, guardian or custodians by counsel as the circumstances require." Ibid.

9. Predisposition Report. Any predisposition report shall be filed with the court and made available to the parties three days prior to the disposition hearing, "or as determined by the court." R. 5:24-2(b).

10. Right of Allocution. Pursuant to Rule 3:21-4(b), made applicable to juvenile proceedings by way of Rule 5:1-1, a juvenile has the right to directly address the court prior to disposition.

11. Disposition Options. "[T]he court may make any custodial or non-custodial disposition on such terms and conditions as it may impose in accordance with the provisions of N.J.S.A. 2A:43 and 2A:4A-44." R. 5:24-3.

12. Disposition Order. Rule 5:24-4(a) requires the court to impose an order in every case setting forth the disposition.

(a) Treatment Information where the Court Imposes Probation or Incarceration. If the court orders probation or incarceration, the court must include in the order "such information as may assist the receiving agency or institution in the treatment of the juvenile." R. 5:24-4(b).

(b) Statement of Crime and Punishment where the Court Imposes Incarceration. If the court orders incarceration and the maximum authorized term for the offense committed is less than three years, the court must include in the commitment order the degree the offense would be if committed by an adult and the maximum sentence the adult would face. R. 5:24-4(b).

(c) Findings on the Family's Ability to Pay for Incarceration and Referral to the State Diagnostic Center. The court must consider the juvenile's parents' or guardians' ability to pay expenses related to the juvenile's incarceration or referral to the State Diagnostic Center, and the

order of commitment must contain the court's findings on that matter. R. 5:24-4(c).

13. Predisposition Investigation and Report where the Court Imposes Incarceration. "Before a juvenile is committed to a correctional institution a predisposition investigation and report or other functional equivalent (such as a Juvenile Intensive Supervision Program (JISP) report or a Violation of Probation summary) shall be made and considered by the court." R. 5:24-4(b).

14. Sentencing Guidelines and Protocols During the COVID-19 Pandemic. Pursuant to Sentencing Guidance/Protocol (FO and FJ Dockets) for Family Part Judges in Response to COVID-19, Directive # 13-20, p. 1, 4 (April 2020), in order to further social distancing efforts during the COVID-19 pandemic, the court, with consent of all parties, may remotely conduct sentencing and disposition hearings by video or telephone, and the victims may participate in the hearing.

Sentencing in the Family Division - FO Docket:

(a) Probation Sentences. "Sentences that include only a probationary term, . . . may proceed or be adjourned at the judge's discretion." Id. at 2. If the term is to immediately commence, then Probation staff should participate in the hearing. Ibid.

(b) Probation and County Jail Sentences. "For sentences imposed that include a county jail term of 180 days or less, with a condition of probation, judges should consider whether the commencement of the custodial portion of the sentence will be stayed." Ibid. If it is stayed, "the defendant shall report to Probation as directed in the interim." Ibid.

(c) County Jail Sentences. Where the court imposes a county jail term of 180 days or less without a probation component, "judges should consider whether the sentence can be adjourned to a later date. If the custodial sentence is imposed, judges should consider whether to stay the commencement of the custodial term until a later date." Id. at 2-3.

(d) Staying Commencement of a County Jail Sentence. The court may stay a sentence to county jail "because of risks attendant to the COVID-19 public health emergency. The court shall state the reasons on the record for immediately commencing or staying" the sentence. Id. at 3. "[T]he court must consider and [make] findings on the risk of danger to the public, the

risk of flight, and the seriousness of the offense, as well as other factors relevant to public safety. The court should also consider the positions of the defendant, the prosecution, and any victims." Ibid.

(e) Non-custodial Sentencing Provisions. Non-custodial aspects of the sentence shall commence upon sentencing, even if the court imposes a stay of the custodial term. Ibid.

Dispositions in the Family Division - Delinquency Matters (FJ Docket):

(a) The Predisposition Report. Prior to imposition of a disposition, defense counsel must review the predisposition report with the juvenile. Ibid.

(b) Commitment to the Juvenile Justice Commission (JJC). Where the court imposes commitment, the court may adjourn the proceeding in its discretion. Id. at 4. "Any action by the JJC to delay transport and commitment of juveniles to JJC facilities should not delay the disposition." Ibid.

(c) Probationary Terms and Out-of-State Transfers. "Dispositions that include only a probationary term or dispositions for juveniles seeking to leave the state that require transfer of supervision under the Interstate Compact on Juveniles (ICJ) may proceed or be adjourned at the judge's discretion." Id. at 5. If the court intends to impose probation, then Probation staff should participate in the hearing. Ibid.

(d) Probation and Secure Facility Dispositions. "For dispositions imposed that include a secured placement term of 60 days or less, with a condition of probation, judges should consider whether the commencement of the custodial portion of the disposition will be deferred. If the commencement of the custodial portion is deferred, the juvenile shall report to probation as directed in the interim." Ibid.

(e) Secure Facility Dispositions. For dispositions that include a secured placement term of 60 days or less, without a probation component, "judges should consider whether the disposition can be adjourned to a later date. If the custodial disposition is imposed, judges should consider whether to stay the commencement of the custodial term until a later date." Ibid.

(f) Pending Placement Dispositions. "For dispositions imposed that include non-secure placement, judges should consider any other alternatives until non-secure placement is available. If there is a probation component, the juvenile shall report as directed to probation in the interim." Ibid.

(g) Deferment of a Custodial Term. The court may defer a custodial term "because of risks attendant to the COVID-19 public health emergency. The court shall state the reasons on the record for immediately commencing or deferring the start of a custodial term. In that regard, the court must consider and make findings on the risk of danger to the public, the risk of flight, the seriousness of the offense, and other factors relevant to public safety. The court should also consider the positions of the juvenile, the juvenile's parent(s)/guardian(s), the prosecution, and any victims." Id. at 6.

(h) Non-custodial Provisions. Unless the court states otherwise, non-custodial aspects of the disposition shall commence immediately, even if the court stays a custodial term. Ibid.

15. Jail Credit. Where the juvenile served time in detention or court-ordered shelter care between the time of apprehension and disposition and the court imposes incarceration as a disposition, the court must award the juvenile jail credit for the time served in detention or a shelter. R. 5:21-3(e).

16. Jurisdiction Retained. The court retains jurisdiction over the case for the duration of the disposition. R. 5:24-5(a). The court may retain jurisdiction for an additional term specified in the order of disposition. R. 5:24-5(b).

17. Substitution or Modification of Disposition. If after notice and hearing the court determines that the juvenile violated the terms of the disposition, the court may substitute any other disposition "it might originally have made." R. 5:24-5(a). "If the disposition was an order of commitment or incarceration the court may, during the duration of that disposition, substitute any other disposition otherwise available to it." Ibid.

18. Post-Disposition Relief. Pursuant to Rule 5:24-6, "the court may correct, change or modify an order of disposition at any time pursuant to law and may entertain an application for post-disposition relief, which shall be made and determined in accordance with the provisions of Rule 3:22 [post-conviction relief], insofar as applicable."

F. Rules Regarding Juvenile Dispositions: Case Law

1. Family Part Jurisdiction Retained. "The family court retains jurisdiction over delinquent juveniles and has the power to recall cases previously decided and to modify dispositions previously ordered." State in the Interest of R.M., 141 N.J. 434, 451 (1995) (citing R. 5:24-5(a)). Accord In the Matter of Request to Modify Prison Sentences, Expedite Parole Hearings, and Identify Vulnerable Prisoners, 242 N.J. 357, 394 (2020) (noting that pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2A:4A-45(a), the court retains jurisdiction over the juvenile and, in light of COVID-19, may modify custodial terms).

2. Jurisdiction of Young Adults Ages Eighteen to Twenty-One. The Family Part retains jurisdiction over those between the ages of eighteen and twenty-one who have been adjudicated delinquent. In the Matter of K.F., 313 N.J. Super. 319, 324 (App. Div. 1998). Thus, "the Family Part has jurisdiction to place an adjudicated juvenile delinquent under the care and custody of DYFS [now DCP] pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2A:4A-43b(5) even when the delinquent is between the ages of eighteen and twenty-one." Id. at 321.

3. Juvenile-Family Crisis. "A juvenile involved in a juvenile-family crisis as defined in N.J.S.A. 2A:4A-22(g) is distinguished from a delinquent in that a juvenile involved in a juvenile-family crisis is considered 'self-destructive' and the [police] officer acts 'in loco parentis' to protect the juvenile." State in the Interest of J.G., 227 N.J. Super. 324, 328 (Ch. Div. 1988).

(a) Purpose of Juvenile-Family Crisis Jurisdiction. "[T]he goal of the juvenile-family crisis jurisdiction is to assist the family--especially the juvenile--in resolving the problems that contributed to the juvenile's acting-out behaviors." State in the Interest of S.S., 367 N.J. Super. 400, 407 (App. Div. 2004).

(b) Truancy and Running Away. "Truancy and running away from home are known as 'status offenses,' which are by definition uniquely applicable to a minor. They would not be crimes if committed by an adult." State in the Interest of S.S., 367 N.J. Super. 400, 402 (App. Div. 2004), aff'd, 183 N.J. 20, 21-22 (2005). Both offenses form a basis for the court to invoke its juvenile-family crisis jurisdiction. Ibid. However, the court may not adjudicate a juvenile delinquent for failure to abide by an order precluding the juvenile from acts of truancy or running away. Id. at 413-14 (explaining

that the N.J.S.A. 2C:29-9 contempt of court statute was not intended to apply to status offenses, and thus may not form a basis for a delinquency finding).

4. Waiver of Jurisdiction by the Family Part. The Family Part's decision to waive jurisdiction and transfer a complaint to the Law Division is "the single most serious act that the juvenile court can perform." State in the Interest of A.D., 212 N.J. 200, 215 (2012) (quoting State v. R.G.D., 108 N.J. 1, 4 (1987)). See also State in the Interest of E.S., 252 N.J. 331, 344-47 (2022) (discussing the significance of waiver hearings and the Family Part's discretion to decide whether to hear a suppression motion before a waiver motion). Once waived to the Law Division, the rules on juvenile dispositions do not apply. State in the Interest of A.B., 109 N.J. 195, 198 (1988). For a discussion of the sufficiency of the State's reasons for requesting waiver, see State in the Interest of Z.S., 464 N.J. Super. 507, 533-43 (App. Div. 2020).

Note: The majority of case law on waiver of jurisdiction analyzes N.J.S.A. 2A:4A-26, the waiver statute that existed prior to the current waiver statute, N.J.S.A. 2A:4A-26.1, which became effective on March 1, 2016. L. 2015, c. 89. A major change in the new waiver statute is that the Family Part may no longer waive jurisdiction to the Law Division of a juvenile who was age fourteen at the time of the alleged offense. N.J.S.A. 2A:4A-26.1(c)(1). Notably, the revised waiver statute has "only prospective application to those juvenile waiver proceedings conducted after the statute's effective date." State v. J.V., 242 N.J. 432, 444 (2020). Accord State in the Interest of J.D., 467 N.J. Super. 345, 352-53 (App. Div. 2021); State v. Bass, 457 N.J. Super. 1, 4 (2018).

5. Juvenile's Rights. "The juvenile code guarantees to juveniles '[a]ll defenses available to an adult charged with a crime,' and, but for indictment, trial by jury and bail, all rights under the Federal and State Constitutions guaranteed to adult criminal defendants." State in the Interest of N.C., 453 N.J. Super. 449, 455 (App. Div. 2018). Accord State v. Franklin, 175 N.J. 456, 465 (citing In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 31 (1967)); State in the Interest of B.H., 112 N.J. Super. 1, 5 (Juv. & Dom. Rel. 1970) (affording juveniles charged with a penal offense all substantive defenses, including the statute of limitations).

6. Right of Allocution. Failure to provide a juvenile the opportunity to directly address the court prior to disposition will require a remand for a new disposition hearing. State in the Interest of J.R., 244 N.J. Super. 630, 639 (App. Div. 1990).

7. Victim's Right to Address the Court. The provision within the Crime Victims Bill of Rights, N.J.S.A. 52:4B-36(n), that grants a victim the right to address the court in person at a sentencing hearing, applies to juvenile delinquency proceedings. State in the Interest of O.G., 274 N.J. Super. 182, 187-89 (Ch. Div. 1993).

8. Plea Agreements. In accepting a guilty plea, the court must ensure that the juvenile fully understands the direct and penal consequences of the plea and that the juvenile is entering the plea knowingly and voluntarily. State in the Interest of B.P.C., 421 N.J. Super. 329, 354 (App. Div. 2011) (the record did not establish that the juvenile understood that by pleading guilty to a Megan's Law offense, he would be subject to life-long registration requirements).

9. Plea Form. While the court is not required to use a plea form when a juvenile enters a guilty plea, use of the form aids the court and parties in addressing the pertinent issues at the plea hearing. State in the Interest of B.P.C., 421 N.J. Super. 329, 356 (App. Div. 2011).

10. Withdrawal of a Guilty Plea. To withdraw a guilty plea based on a lack of understanding of the plea consequences, a juvenile must demonstrate that the omitted information "materially affected" the decision to plead guilty. State in the Interest of B.P.C., 421 N.J. Super. 329, 356 (App. Div. 2011) (quoting State v. Johnson, 182 N.J. 232, 244 (2004)).

Consequences of Plea Withdrawal. Where the court allows the juvenile to withdraw a guilty plea, the juvenile has three options: "(1) renegotiate the plea agreement, if the State is willing to do so; (2) withdraw his guilty plea and proceed to trial; or (3) withdraw the motion to vacate the plea and accept the original sentence." State in the Interest of B.P.C., 421 N.J. Super. 329, 356 (App. Div. 2011) (quoting State v. Johnson, 182 N.J. 232, 244 (2004)).

11. Predisposition Evaluation and Report. "[A]bsent an express waiver, a predisposition report is required as a prerequisite to a delinquency disposition." State in the Interest of T.A., 386 N.J. Super. 642, 644 (App. Div. 2006) (citing R. 5:24-2, N.J.S.A. 2A:4A-42 and authority for presentence reports in adult criminal matters).

12. Rehabilitation. "[T]he emphasis of the Juvenile Code is on rehabilitation, expressly stating that its purpose is 'to remove from children committing delinquent acts certain statutory consequences of criminal behavior, and to substitute therefor an adequate program of supervision, care and rehabilitation, and

a range of sanctions designed to promote accountability and protect the public." A.A. ex rel. B.A. v. Atty. Gen. of NJ, 189 N.J. 128, 136 (2007) (quoting N.J.S.A. 2A:4A-21(b)). Accord State in the Interest of S.S., 367 N.J. Super. 400, 407 (App. Div. 2004). See also State in the Interest of S.T., 273 N.J. Super. 436, 444-45 (App. Div. 1994) (discussing the different purposes of adult sentencing and juvenile dispositions).

13. Protection of the Public. "Although rehabilitation, historically, has been the primary focus of the juvenile justice system, a second purpose—increasingly so in recent times—is protection of the public." State in the Interest of C.K., 233 N.J. 44, 67 (2018).

14. Education. "It has been strongly emphasized that education is an important aspect of, and that in every instance should be provided for, in the rehabilitative process. An attempt to make a disposition in a juvenile case without providing for education would clearly be a non sequitur." State in the Interest of G.S., 330 N.J. Super. 383, 390 (Ch. Div. 2000) (citing State in the Interest of F.M., 167 N.J. Super. 185, 191 (Juv. & Dom. Rel.1979)).

15. Public Safety and Deterrence. "As our notions of juvenile justice have evolved, there has come the increasing recognition that while 'rehabilitation remains a primary goal of the Juvenile Code[,] [n]evertheless, the Juvenile Code also reflects a correlative emphasis on public safety and deterrence.'" State v. Franklin, 175 N.J. 456, 466 (citing State in the Interest of J.L.A., 136 N.J. 370, 377-78 (1994)).

16. Judicial Flexibility. "One of the 'major hallmarks of the [Juvenile Justice] Code' was to provide the newly created, specialized family court with flexibility in juvenile dispositions." State in the Interest of C.V., 201 N.J. 281, 295 (2010) (quoting State in the Interest of M.C., 384 N.J. Super. 116, 127 (App. Div. 2006)).

17. Individualized Assessment and Policy Concerns. In making a disposition, the court must consider family issues, "the complex, diverse, and changing needs of youth," and "the unique emotional, behavioral, physical, and educational problems of each juvenile." State in the Interest of C.V., 201 N.J. 281, 296 (2010). The goal is to "determine the most appropriate course of action in respect of the individual to 'accomplish both rehabilitation and preservation of the family unit and at the same time protect society.'" Ibid. (quoting State in the Interest of M.C., 384 N.J. Super. 116, 128 (App. Div. 2006)).

18. Preservation of the Family Unit. While preservation of the family unit is an important goal, the primary focus of the Code is rehabilitation of the juvenile. State in the Interest of K.O., 327 N.J. Super. 555, 567 (App. Div. 2000). Thus, the court may separate the juvenile from the family when necessary for the child's safety. Ibid.

19. Family Counseling. The court may order the parents of a delinquent child to attend counseling where the court finds that family counseling is in the child's best interest. State in the Interest of K.O., 327 N.J. Super. 555, 574 (App. Div. 2000).

20. Psychiatric Care and Probation. As a condition of probation, the court may commit a juvenile to the care of the Division of Child Protection and Permanency (formerly the Division of Youth and Family Services) and require the juvenile to submit to psychiatric care. State in the Interest of D.F., 145 N.J. Super. 381, 389-90 (App. Div. 1976). The court does not have the authority, however, to dictate the specific facility in which the juvenile shall receive psychiatric care at the department's expense. Ibid. The department has discretion to determine the facility or program that best suits the juvenile's needs within the department's budgetary constraints. Ibid.

21. Decrease in Punishment Prior to Conviction. When the Legislature lessens punishment prior to conviction and imposition of sentence or disposition, the court applies the law in effect at the time of sentencing, not the harsher penalty that was applicable at the time of the offense. State in the Interest of C.F., 444 N.J. Super. 179, 189-90 (App. Div. 2016).

22. Disposition and Standard of Review. An appellate court reviews a disposition under the abuse of discretion standard. State in the Interest of S.B., 333 N.J. Super. 236, 246 (App. Div. 2000).

23. Suspended Sentence. "Although not explicitly included in the statute, the [Juvenile Justice] Code has been found to permit suspended sentences as a necessary, viable disposition." State in the Interest of C.V., 201 N.J. 281, 295 (2010); State in the Interest of M.C., 384 N.J. Super. 116, 118 (App. Div. 2006).

24. Title 2C Sanctions. "[I]n the absence of a specific provision in the Code of Juvenile Justice attaching a penalty to a given offense, and in the absence of specific language in the Criminal Code imposing a given sanction on juveniles adjudicated delinquent, penalties set out in the Criminal Code should not be imposed on juveniles in the Family Part." State in the Interest of N.S., 272 N.J.

Super. 492, 497 (Ch. Div. 1993) (declining to find that N.J.S.A. 2C:20-2.1 confers jurisdiction on the Family Part to impose a license suspension on a juvenile adjudicated delinquent). Accord State in the Interest of T.D., 460 N.J. Super. 297, 306 (Ch. Div. 2019) (declining to impose as a required disposition for a juvenile "the mandatory community service hours set forth in the shoplifting statute, N.J.S.A. 2C:20-11" because that sanction is "not expressly or unequivocally applied to juveniles" in the criminal statute).

25. Adjudged Formal Entry of Disposition. An adjudged formal entry of disposition for a period not to exceed twelve months (N.J.S.A. 2A:4A-43(b)(1)) is a disposition, even though successful completion of the deferment period will result in dismissal of the delinquency complaint. State in the Interest of V.M., 279 N.J. Super. 535, 537 (App. Div. 1995).

Statutorily Mandated Terms. During the N.J.S.A. 2A:4A-43(b)(1) deferment period, the juvenile is not required to serve a statutorily mandated disposition, except for those set forth in N.J.S.A. 2A:4A-43(b)(1). State in the Interest of V.M., 279 N.J. Super. 535, 537-38 (App. Div. 1995) (refusing to find a N.J.S.A. 2C:20-2.1 license suspension applicable to a juvenile serving a deferred disposition).

26. Incarceration and Developmental Disabilities. If evidence "suggests a substantial likelihood that a delinquent juvenile is developmentally disabled, the family court may order" an evaluation. State in the Interest of R.M., 141 N.J. 434, 451 (1995). "Where the evidence does not establish or strongly suggest a developmental disability, the family court may order any authorized disposition, including incarceration if otherwise deemed appropriate." The juvenile bears the burden of proof; however, if evidence suggests a substantial likelihood of a developmental disability, the court, on its own initiative, should order an evaluation or require additional evidence on the issue of disability. Ibid.

27. Short Term Detention Facilities. To comply with the equal protection clause, the Juvenile Justice Code must be interpreted to prohibit a juvenile with a developmental disability from being incarcerated in a short-term county-detention facility because only some counties have short term juvenile detention facilities. State in the Interest of T.C., 454 N.J. Super. 189, 201-02 (App. Div. 2018). "The Legislature could not have intended to create an unconstitutional law by subjecting similarly situated juveniles to different risks of detention based solely upon an arbitrary factor like geography." Id. at 202.

28. Incarceration and Third-Degree Offenses. "[T]here is no presumption against imprisonment for first offenders adjudicated as delinquent for third degree crimes." State in the Interest of J.R., 244 N.J. Super. 630, 639-40 (App. Div. 1990).

29. Petty Disorderly Persons Offense. The court may not impose incarceration for an act that would constitute a petty disorderly persons offense if committed by an adult. State in the Interest of A.R., 246 N.J. Super. 241, 244 (App. Div. 1991).

30. Probation. "Probation is a disposition that offers the court a great amount of flexibility to achieve the Code's rehabilitative goals." State in the Interest of C.V., 201 N.J. 281, 296 (2010). "[P]robation provides the court with leverage over a juvenile without moving the child into a more custodial environment." Id. at 296-97.

31. Split Sentence Not Authorized. "The Juvenile Justice Code does not contain the equivalent of N.J.S.A. 2C:43-2(b)(2), permitting a criminal court to sentence a defendant to a jail term not to exceed 364 days as a condition of probation." State in the Interest of T.S., 413 N.J. Super. 540, 544 (App. Div. 2000). Thus, a court may not condition probation upon the completion of a term of detention. Ibid.

32. Conditions of Probation. "By granting the court a vast amount of flexibility in setting conditions of probation, N.J.S.A. 2A:4A-43(b)(3) allows the court to construct requirements designed to secure appropriate behavior from the juvenile while obtaining the individualized rehabilitative and therapeutic help needed by the particular child." State in the Interest of C.V., 201 N.J. 281, 297 (2010).

33. Violation of Probation (VOP). Where the juvenile violates a term of probation, "the court may impose any sentence that the court could have initially imposed. Moreover, the court need not formally set aside or vacate the original sentence in order to impose a new sentence on a juvenile probationer who violated or otherwise imperfectly performed during probation." State in the Interest of C.V., 201 N.J. 281, 298 (2010). Accord State in the Interest of A.R., 246 N.J. Super. 241, 243 (App. Div. 1991); State v. H.B., 259 N.J. Super. 603, 610-11 (Ch. Div. 1992).

(a) Suspended Terms and Lesser Terms. Where the court imposes a suspended term of incarceration and probation, and the juvenile violates probation, the court may impose for the violation of probation a lesser term than the suspended sentence. State in the Interest of C.V., 201 N.J. 281, 299 (2010).

(b) Jurisdiction over a VOP Disposition Order. The family court retains jurisdiction to impose a VOP disposition order, even if the period in N.J.S.A. 2A:4A-47 has expired. State v. S.T., 254 N.J. Super. 1, 4 (App. Div. 1991); N.J.S.A. 2A:4A-47 ("any order of disposition entered in a case under this act shall terminate when the juvenile who is the subject of the order attains the age of eighteen, or one year from the date of the order whichever is later").

34. Extended Terms. "Like adult offenders, juveniles adjudged delinquent can be sentenced to an extended-term custodial sentence." State in the Interest of K.O., 217 N.J. 83, 86 (2014).

35. Consecutive Terms. Although consecutive dispositions are authorized by the Code of Juvenile Justice, they should be the exception and not the rule. State in the Interest of J.L.A., 136 N.J. 370, 380 (1994).

Commission of an Offense while Serving a Disposition. "[I]n cases where a juvenile who is convicted of one offense and, while serving that disposition, commits a second offense, it is within the dispositional court's discretion to impose a disposition for that subsequent offense which runs consecutively to that juvenile's prior term." State in the Interest of D.R., 276 N.J. Super. 192, 198 (Ch. Div. 1994).

36. Aggregate Terms and Parole. "Unlike multiple sentences of imprisonment for adult inmates, . . . multiple sentences for juveniles are not aggregated in determining the juvenile's primary parole-eligibility date." State in the Interest of J.L.A., 136 N.J. 370, 382 (1994). Instead, "the act of delinquency [that] represents the most serious act of delinquency shall be considered in determining the tentative parole release date." Ibid. (quoting N.J.A.C. 10A:71-3.23(b)).

37. Consecutive Terms and Parole. "[A] fully-rehabilitated juvenile should not languish unnecessarily in a correctional facility because the court sentenced the juvenile to consecutive terms." State in the Interest of J.L.A., 136 N.J. 370, 382 (1994). In such cases, the court may exercise its authority to impose an alternative disposition. Ibid.

38. Megan's Law. Generally, the Megan's Law registration and notification requirements for sex offenders apply to juveniles. In re Registrant J.G., 169 N.J. 304, 319 (2001); State in the Interest of J.P.F., 368 N.J. Super. 24, 39, 42-44 (App.

Div. 2004); State in the Interest of K.B., 304 N.J. Super. 628, 633-34 (App. Div. 1997).

(a) Lack of Sexual Motivation. So long as a juvenile commits a Megan's Law enumerated offense, the juvenile is subject to Megan's Law reporting requirements, regardless of whether the juvenile's actions lacked sexual motivation. In re Registrant T.T., 188 N.J. 321, 334 (2006).

(b) Juveniles under Age Fourteen. "[W]ith respect to juveniles adjudicated delinquent for sexual offenses committed when they were under age fourteen Megan's Law registration and community notification orders shall terminate at age eighteen if the Law Division, after a hearing held on motion of the adjudicated delinquent, determines on the basis of clear and convincing evidence that the delinquent is not likely to pose a threat to the safety of others." In re Registrant J.G., 169 N.J. 304, 337 (2001).

(c) Lifetime Registration. The lifetime registration and reporting requirement in N.J.S.A. 2C:7-2(g) is unconstitutional as applied to juveniles. State in the Interest of C.K., 233 N.J. 44, 72-73 (2018). In accordance with N.J.S.A. 2C:7-2(f), a juvenile who committed an enumerated offense may petition the court to terminate reporting and notification requirements if the juvenile establishes by clear and convincing evidence that he or she has been offense free for fifteen years and does not pose a risk to society. Id. at 77.

(d) Disclosure of Megan's Law Offender Status. The court may impose disclosure requirements in addition to those required by Megan's Law. State in the Interest of D.A., 385 N.J. Super. 411, 415-17 (App. Div. 2006) (requiring the juvenile to disclose his Megan's Law offender status to the parents of any girl he dated).

(e) Guilty Plea and Penal Consequences. Prior to accepting a guilty plea, the court must notify a juvenile of any Megan's law penal consequences. State in the Interest of B.P.C., 421 N.J. Super. 329, 355 (App. Div. 2011).

39. Sex Offender Treatment Imposed on an Adult. Where the court adjudicates an adult delinquent for a sex offense that he committed as a juvenile, the court may require the adult to undergo sex offender treatment. State in the Interest of J.S., 202 N.J. 465, 467-68 (2010).

40. Drug Enforcement and Demand Reduction (DEDR) Fines. Juveniles must pay mandatory DEDR fines. State in the Interest of L.M., 229 N.J. Super. 88, 97-98 (1988). Imposition of DEDR penalties furthers the Legislature's purpose in fighting drug crime and does not discriminate against juveniles in violation of the State or Federal Equal Protection Clauses. State v. Lagares, 127 N.J. 20, 36 (1992); State in the Interest of L.M., 229 N.J. Super. 88, 94-98 (1988).

41. Restitution. In imposing restitution, the court must set the specific amount to be paid based on the facts of the case and the juvenile's ability to pay, after providing the juvenile an opportunity to challenge the evidence at a hearing. State in the Interest of D.G.W., 70 N.J. 488, 503-06 (1976). The court may consider future earnings and may impose a reasonable amount of restitution even if the juvenile is presently unable to pay. State in the Interest of R.V., 280 N.J. Super. 118, 121-23 (App. Div. 1995). The court may not impose a general restitution requirement and delegate to the department of probation the authority to determine the amount. State in the Interest of D.G.W., 70 N.J. 488, 503-06 (1976).

42. Driving Privilege Suspension for Drug Offenses. Juveniles are subject to the mandatory forfeiture or suspension of driving privileges for drug crimes pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:35-16. State in the Interest of T.B., 134 N.J. 382, 383 (1992). Where the juvenile has committed multiple offenses that require loss of driving privileges, the court must order the multiple suspensions to run concurrently. Ibid.

43. Disposition for Multiple Offenses. The court may impose a single disposition for multiple offenses if the offenses "arise out of a single transaction, involve precisely the same conduct or are so interrelated as to constitute a single delinquent event In that event, the reasons therefor should be stated in the order of disposition." State in the Interest of T.B., 149 N.J. Super. 1, 6 (App. Div. 1977).

44. Jail Credit. A juvenile is entitled to jail credit, or credit against any parole bar, for time served in detention or court-ordered shelter care prior to disposition. State in the Interest of I.C., 447 N.J. Super. 247, 254-55 (App. Div. 2016); State in the Interest of W.M., 147 N.J. Super. 24, 26 (App. Div. 1977).

Circumstances Where Jail Credit May Not Be Awarded. A juvenile is not entitled to jail credit for:

- Time served in a residential treatment program prior to incarceration, State in the Interest of I.C., 447 N.J. Super. 247, 249-50, 257 (App.

Div. 2016); State in the Interest of C.V., 201 N.J. 281, 286, 294 (2010);

- Time served in the Juvenile Intensive Supervision Program, State in the Interest of I.C., 447 N.J. Super. 247, 249-50, 258 (App. Div. 2016);
- Time spent wearing an electronic monitoring device during pretrial release, State v. Mastapeter, 290 N.J. Super. 56, 62 (App. Div. 1996); and
- Time spent in a noncustodial sex offender treatment center for juveniles, State in the Interest of S.T., 273 N.J. Super. 436, 439 (App. Div. 1994).

45. Gap-Time Credit. Like adults, juveniles are entitled to gap-time credit for time served between the date of the first sentence and the date of the second sentence, where both offenses occurred before imposition of the first sentence. State v. Franklin, 175 N.J. 456, 459 (2003) (awarding gap-time credit where the juvenile served a period of imprisonment after a parole revocation).

46. Double Jeopardy and Post-Disposition Modifications. While the court retains jurisdiction over a juvenile during the duration of the disposition and may modify the disposition during that time, the court may not increase the punishment absent a new offense or violation of a disposition term. State in the Interest of C.B., 163 N.J. Super. 215, 217-18 (App. Div. 1978) (holding that where the juvenile has not violated a term of probation, the court may not impose restitution post disposition). To hold otherwise would subject a juvenile to multiple punishments for the same offense, which is inconsistent with Federal and State double jeopardy protections. Ibid.

47. State May Not Appeal a Disposition Order. "The State has no right to appeal from a sentence in a criminal case except in accordance with express statutory authorization." State in the Interest of R.P., 198 N.J. Super. 105, 106 (App. Div. 1984). The same is true in juvenile delinquency cases. Ibid. No statute grants the State the right to appeal a disposition order. Id. at 107-08.

48. Appeal by the Juvenile's Parents. "Parents, as the guardians of their children, have standing to be heard." State in the Interest of K.O., 327 N.J. Super.

555, 565 (App. Div. 2000). Thus, they may appeal an order continuing their child's probation. Ibid.