Published Appellate Court Opinions

In these appeals, the court holds, as a matter of first impression, that a valid grand jury subpoena is sufficient to obtain prescription drug information maintained in New Jersey's Prescription Monitoring Program (PMP) when law enforcement personnel are investigating a prescriber.

Plaintiff filed a complaint against defendants Millville and its police department under OPRA, N.J.S.A. 47:1A-1 to -13, seeking copies of DWI/DUI, drug possession, and drug paraphernalia summonses and complaints issued by Millville police officers. The trial judge granted relief but the court reversed. The court observed that the creation of a complaint-summons starts with a police officer – at the direction of the Attorney General – inputting information into an electronic system created and maintained by the Administrative Office of the Court. Once completed, the complaint-summons is retained by the municipal court, whose authority falls under the aegis of the judiciary. The court therefore held that the municipality and its police department are not the custodians of these records and they could not be compelled to search for and turnover these records in response to an OPRA request.

Defendants appeal the Chancery Division's denial of their motion to vacate a default judgment of mortgage foreclosure. Defendants' house was severely damaged by Superstorm Sandy, and they ceased paying their mortgage loan.

Defendants filed a federal lawsuit against their flood insurance company and homeowners' insurer policies, seeking payment for the storm damage. They named the mortgage holder as a co-defendant, claiming the storm extinguished their obligation to pay the mortgage. The federal court dismissed the complaint against all three defendants.

The mortgage holder's successor then filed the present state-court foreclosure action. Defendants defaulted and final judgment was entered against them. Defendants argue the foreclosure action was barred under the Entire Controversy Doctrine, because the mortgagee had the opportunity to file a counterclaim for foreclosure in the previous federal action.

This court affirms the Chancery judge's ruling that the foreclosure action was not barred by the Entire Controversy Doctrine.

The federal case seeking insurance payments lacked a sufficient nexus to the mortgage to preclude the foreclosure case. In addition, the mortgage holder's contractual right to direct the use of any insurance proceeds does not eliminate the mortgage debt or the right to foreclose on the defaulted loan.

The biological mother of two children appeals from the Judgment of Guardianship entered by the Family Part terminating her parental rights to her two sons. The judge assigned to manage this case made the decision to terminate appellant's parental rights after conducting a one-day trial in which she was not present nor represented by counsel. At the first case management conference, appellant complained to the judge about her inability to communicate with the attorney assigned by the Public Defender – Office of Parental Representation (OPR). Without a formal motion or prior notice to appellant, the judge granted OPR counsel's oral application to be relieved as counsel of record for appellant. The judge thereafter told appellant she had only two options: (1) retain private counsel or (2) proceed without a lawyer

This court holds the Family Part violated appellant's constitutional and statutory right to be represented by competent counsel. The trial judge's response to appellant's dissatisfaction with her assigned OPR counsel is irreconcilable with the approach the Supreme Court established in N.J. Div. of Child Prot. & Perm. v. R.L.M. (In re R.A.J.), 236 N.J. 123, 149-51 (2018). This court vacates the Judgment of Guardianship against appellant, and remands for the matter to be tried before a different judge.

In affirming defendant's conviction for murdering his former girlfriend, the court clarifies that evidence that satisfies a hearsay exception, such as defendant's prior threat to the victim, admissible as a statement of a party opponent, N.J.R.E. 803(b)(1), must also overcome the exclusion of other crimes, wrongs, and acts evidence under N.J.R.E. 404(b), as well as satisfy N.J.R.E. 403. The trial court mistakenly concluded that meeting the hearsay exception provided an independent basis for admitting the prior statement.Notwithstanding that mistake, the appellate court affirms the conviction, because the hearsay statement satisfied the Rule 404(b) test set forth in State v. Cofield, 127 N.J. 328, 338 (1992). In particular, its probative value as evidence of motive was not outweighed by its apparent prejudice.

Defendant pleaded guilty to two counts of violating N.J.S.A. 2C:40-26(b) by driving during a period of license suspension or revocation for a second or subsequent violation of N.J.S.A. 39:4-50, driving while under the influence, or N.J.S.A. 39:4-50a, refusal to provide a breath sample. The court sentenced defendant on each count to a 180-day term of imprisonment with a 180-day period of parole ineligibility as a condition of serving a two-year probationary term. The court ordered the custodial terms to be served consecutively and the probationary terms to be served concurrently.

Defendant argued his sentences are illegal because the Criminal Code does not authorize a spilt sentence with a term of imprisonment that includes a mandatory period of parole ineligibility. The court disagreed, finding the plain language of N.J.S.A. 2C:43-2(b)(2) authorizes sentences including terms of incarceration as a condition of probation, with the only limitation being the term of incarceration may not exceed 364 days. The court finds that because defendant's individual and aggregate custodial sentences require less than 364 days of imprisonment as a condition of probation, they are authorized by N.J.S.A. 2C:43-2(b)(2) even though the terms of imprisonment include mandatory periods of parole ineligibility.

The court also determined the sentencing court erred by failing to make findings supporting its imposition of consecutive sentences, see State v. Yarbough, 100 N.J. 627 (1985), and by imposing sentences that were both consecutive and concurrent, see State v. Rogers, 124 N.J. 113 (1991). The court remanded for resentencing.

Defendant pled guilty during trial to aggravated manslaughter. The victim was the boyfriend of his former girlfriend and mother of his daughter. The State introduced text messages defendant sent to her shortly before the homicide, alleging they were threatening and demonstrated defendant's jealous nature. Defendant moved pretrial to suppress the messages seized from her cellphone. Although the State asserted that police obtained consent before searching the phone, it objected to any evidentiary hearing on the issue, arguing that defendant lacked a reasonable expectation of privacy in those text messages and the requisite standing to challenge the search. Without holding an evidentiary hearing, the judge agreed with the State and denied the motion.

The court affirms, concluding that defendant had no reasonable expectation of privacy in the text messages once they were sent and received on another's phone, and that defendant lacked standing to challenge the search because he had no "proprietary, possessory or participatory interest in either the place searched or the property seized." State v. Randolph, 228 N.J. 566, 571 (2017) (quoting State v. Alston, 88 N.J. 211, 228 (1981)).

On leave granted, the New Jersey Department of Health Office of Emergency Medical Services appealed from a July 16, 2019 Law Division order lifting the summary suspension of plaintiff AmeriCare Emergency Medical Service, Inc.'s license to operate as an emergency medical service provider and permitting an action to proceed under the New Jersey Civil Rights Act, N.J.S.A. 10:6-1 to -2 (CRA). Although there is no jurisdictional requirement that administrative remedies be exhausted in order to bring suit under the CRA, the party alleging a claim must show a violation of a substantive right or that someone "acting under color of law" interfered with or attempted to interfere with a substantive right. State v. Quaker Valley Farms, LLC, 235 N.J. 37, 64 (2018). Since AmeriCare could not make that showing without agency adjudication of its administrative claims, the panel reversed the Law Division order.

This personal injury case arises from a pedestrian's fall on black ice in a parking lot leased by private owners to the Borough of Caldwell. The injured pedestrian and his wife sued both the Borough and the private owners, alleging negligent failure to maintain the parking lot and the internal driveway connected to it in a safe condition. The written lease between the owners and the Borough expressly delegates to the Borough the responsibility to clear the premises of ice and snow.

The trial court granted the Borough and the property owners summary judgment. Plaintiffs now appeal the ruling solely as to the property owners, arguing they had a non-delegable duty under tort law to keep the premises safe from accumulated ice and snow, or alternatively, that the language of the lease does not delegate that duty with sufficient clarity

We affirm, albeit for a legal reason not articulated by the trial court. Based on the Supreme Court's very recent opinion in Shields v. Ramslee Motors, 240 N.J. 479 (2020), the property owners are entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law. That is because the lease explicitly delegates to the Borough the exclusive responsibility to remove snow and ice from the premises. The fact that the tenant in this case is a public entity and that it uses the premises for a municipal parking lot does not warrant a different result than in Shields.

Plaintiffs Carmella C. Minelli and her husband Anthony Minelli appeal from the dismissal of their personal injury action against defendants Harrah's Resort Atlantic City, Harrah's Operating Company, Inc., Caesars Entertainment and Caesars Entertainment Operating Company, Inc. based on the two-year statute of limitations, N.J.S.A. 2A:2-14. Because the court concludes that operation of Section 108(c)(2) of the Bankruptcy Code made plaintiffs' claims timely filed, at least as to the debtor, defendant Caesars Entertainment Operating Company, the judgment is reversed.

This court granted the State leave to appeal in this pending criminal case to address the grading aspects of the money laundering statute, N.J.S.A. 2C:21-23 to -29. The core and unresolved legal question is the meaning of the term "amount involved" in N.J.S.A. 2C:21-27, which calibrates the severity of the offense.

Specifically, N.J.S.A. 2C:21-27(a) prescribes that a defendant commits a first-degree money laundering offense if the "amount involved" is $500,000 or more. The crime is a second-degree offense if the "amount involved" is under $500,000 but equal to or more than $75,000. Lastly, it is a third-degree offense if the "amount involved" is under $75,000

As this opinion explains, this court holds that where, as here, a defendant is charged with engaging in a money laundering transaction prohibited by N.J.S.A. 2C:21-25(b), the "amount involved" is the fair market value of the property transferred in that transaction and any other transactions conducted as part of that common scheme. That fair market value is to be determined by the trier of fact. The value is not necessarily equal to or limited by the sum that the money launderer received in the illicit transaction(s). However, the court rejects the prosecutor’s argument that the “amount involved” in a case charged under the “transactional” provision of the money laundering statute includes the value of unsold stolen goods that were not part of a laundering transaction.

Defendant was confined to the Bergen County Jail work release program for failure to pay child support. He was released to search for work and twice failed to return to jail on a timely basis resulting in his indictment, subsequent plea, and sentence on two counts of third-degree escape, N.J.S.A. 2C:29-5(a).

On this appeal, from a denial of defendant's PCR petition, the court reverses and holds that because a child support contempt proceeding is "essentially a civil proceeding," see Pasqua v. Council, 186 N.J. 127, 140 (2006), defendant could not be charged with the criminal offense of escape, and the PCR court erred as a matter of law.

In this action, the Attorney General and Director of the New Jersey Division on Civil Rights alleged defendants violated the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination, N.J.S.A. 10:5-1 to -49, by asking a prospective tenant of an apartment if she was a Muslim, refusing to lease the apartment based on the prospective tenant's religion, and making statements concerning the gender of a Division on Civil Rights investigator posing as a prospective tenant. A jury returned a no-cause verdict on plaintiffs' claims. The court reverses and remands for a new trial.

The court determines the trial court erred by allowing cross-examination of the prospective tenant about her religious beliefs and the teachings of the Quran in violation of N.J.R.E. 610 and in derogation of the privilege embodied in N.J.R.E. 512. The court rejects defendants' argument the cross-examination was permissible because the prospective tenant "opened the door" to questions about her religious beliefs and the teachings of the Quran during her direct testimony.

The court also concludes the trial court abused its discretion by allowing cross-examination of the prospective tenant about the alleged use of the term "infidels" by Muslims to refer to individuals that do not practice Islam. The court finds the cross-examination testimony, which defendants relied on to attack the prospective tenant's credibility, inadmissible under N.J.R.E. 608.

The court also finds the trial court did not conduct a proper analysis of the admissibility of the available portions of one of the defendant's recorded interview with a news organization, during which the defendant spoke about his interactions with prospective tenant and his beliefs concerning Muslims. The trial court incorrectly determined the available recorded portions of the interview were inadmissible under the "rule of completeness" without conducting the required analysis for the admissibility of the available portions of the recorded interview under the standard established by the Court in State v. Nantambu, 221 N.J. 390 (2015).

In this workers' compensation case, the court reverses an order dismissing with prejudice a claim petition and a motion for medical and temporary disability benefits. The court concludes the judge of compensation denied petitioner's due process rights by determining at the outset of case, and based solely on petitioner's affidavit supporting his motion for medical and temporary disability benefits, that petitioner was a "multiple liar" who lacked credibility. During the numerous subsequent proceedings in the matter, and without hearing any testimony from petitioner, the judge repeatedly found petitioner was a liar and, at one point, found petitioner's lack of credibility rendered it unnecessary to hear to any evidence on the merits of petitioner's claim. The court reverses the dismissal of the claim petition and denial of the motion for medical and temporary disability benefits, and remands for further proceedings before a different judge.

In this appeal from a final judgment of divorce and an order denying reconsideration, the court rejected a trial judge's reliance on Gilligan v. Gilligan, 428 N.J. Super. 69 (Ch. Div. 2012), to the extent it held an award of social security disability to a spouse during the marriage was not sufficient to establish a party's inability to work for purposes of income imputation in the calculation of spousal and child support. The court held here that despite Gilligan's holding, the court continued to hew to its holding in Golian v. Golian, 344 N.J. Super. 337, 338-43 (App. Div. 2001), that when the Social Security Administration has determined a party is disabled, a presumption of disability is established and the burden shifts to the opposing party to refute that presumption

The court also rejected the trial judge's reliance on income averaging in her determination of whether a party was earning income commensurate with his or her earning capacity because the judge ignored current earnings and relied upon six years of income that were earned prior to the parties separating, which was more than five years before the trial date. The court held that the judge on remand should use the years prior to the trial when determining earning capacity.Finally, the court concluded that the trial judge also improperly deviated from the Child Support Guidelines by relying on the elimination of parenting time in the final judgment of divorce. The court concluded that because the amount of parenting time is an element of the Child Support Guidelines, a reduction based on elimination of parenting time did not support a finding of an injustice warranting a downward deviation in support.

In this case of first impression, the court examines the meaning of a "dating relationship" under the Prevention of Domestic Violence Act, N.J.S.A. 2C:25-17 to -35, where the parties never experienced a traditional, in-person "date." Instead, their relationship was demonstrated by the intensity and content of their communications, including the exchange of nearly 1300 highly personal text messages.

Acknowledging the prevalence of virtual communications in today's society, especially in view of the COVID-19 pandemic, the court recognized text messaging and other forms of electronic communication enable rapid yet deep interactions at all hours. Those communications can form bonds that may be no less intimate than traditional dating activities.

The court concluded the proliferate and exceedingly intimate communications between the parties in the present matter constituted a dating relationship within the meaning of the Act and supported entry of the final restraining order.

In these consolidated appeals, the court is asked to determine whether two sentences imposed on convicted sexual offender R.K. for violating a New Jersey Parole Board regulation imposing a Community Supervision for Life (CSL) condition banning the use of the Internet to access social media are unconstitutional on its face and as applied to him. The trial judge denied R.K.'s motions to correct his illegal sentences finding the ban did not violate his constitutional rights of free speech. Because the court concludes the blanket social media prohibition is both unconstitutional on its face based on Packingham v. North Carolina, 582 U.S. ___, 137 S. Ct. 1730 (2017), and as applied to R.K. based on J.I. v. N.J. State Parole Bd., 228 N.J. 204 (2017) and K.G. v. N.J. State Parole Bd., 458 N.J. Super. 1 (App. Div. 2019), the trial court's rulings are reversed, and the court remands for: (1) resentencing to remove the 2007 CSL condition prohibiting R.K. from accessing social networking on the Internet without the express authorization of the District Parole Supervisor; and (2) allowing R.K. to withdraw his September 2012 guilty plea for violating the terms of his CSL condition prohibiting him from accessing social networking.

In this opinion, the court addresses the novel issue of whether a firearms toolmark identification expert's use of untested three-dimensional (3D) computer imaging technology known as BULLETTRAX, in conjunction with the traditional technique of comparing evidence and test bullets using a comparison microscope, requires that a Frye1 hearing be held to establish the scientific reliability of the BULLETTRAX machine and related software.

Following an evidentiary hearing, the trial court concluded that the State's expert relied upon the BULLETTRAX technology and the images it produced in concluding that a bullet fragment taken from the murder victim likely came from a handgun later seized from defendant. In so ruling, the trial court made extensive factual and credibility findings pertaining to the expert's testimony about his use of the images, and its findings are entitled to deference on appeal.

Under these circumstances, the court holds that a Frye hearing was necessary to demonstrate the reliability of the computer images of the bullets produced by BULLETTRAX before the expert would be permitted to testify at trial.