Supreme Court Opinions

The trial court did not err in the admission of the photographs, nor did the State commit reversible error when it commented on the defendant’s silence.

Under the limited circumstances of this case, extraordinary circumstances existed justifying O’Donnell’s late filing.

The so-called “arbitration agreement” within this consumer contract fails to support a finding of mutuality of assent to form an agreement to arbitrate. The provision’s language is debatable, confusing, and contradictory -- and, in part, misleading. The “arbitration agreement” is also obscure when this consumer contract is viewed as a whole. The provision does not fairly convey to an ordinary person that arbitration would be the required method of dispute resolution. Accordingly, this arbitration agreement is not enforceable.

(1) The term “person” in section 35.1 includes not only ticket brokers and resellers, but also other individuals and entities with “access to tickets to an event prior to the tickets’ release for sale to the general public.” N.J.S.A. 56:8-35.1. (2(a)) The sale of tickets to winners of the NFL’s ticket lottery constitutes a “release for sale to the general public” within the meaning of section 35.1. (2(b)) The Super Bowl tickets sold to lottery winners were the only 2014 Super Bowl tickets designated by the NFL for “release for sale to the general public” within the meaning of section 35.1, however. The NFL’s distribution of other tickets to the 2014 Super Bowl to its teams, other selected individuals, and entities therefore does not constitute the unlawful withholding of more than five percent of “tickets to an event prior to the tickets’ release for sale to the general public” under section 35.1.

The plain language of the 2016 drug court expungement statute requires judges to determine whether expungement would be consistent with the public interest. N.J.S.A. 2C:35-14(m)(2); id. § 52-2(c)(3). Successful graduates who have committed certain offenses and apply for expungement are entitled to a rebuttable presumption that expungement is consistent with the public interest.

The judgment of the Appellate Division is affirmed substantially for the reasons expressed in the per curiam opinion. The Court adds modifying comments to clarify that the affirmance is based solely on a plain language reading of the Highlands Act that does not incorporate the definition of “final approval” contained in the separate but related MLUL.

The Pennsylvania detectives violated Edwards by attempting to question Wint in Camden after his earlier request for counsel, and Wint did not initiate the interrogation that occurred in Bucks County. The giving of repeated Miranda warnings did not cure the Edwards violation. Wint remained in continuous pre-indictment custody for six months before the questioning in Bucks County. Pre-indictment, pretrial detainment does not qualify as a break in custody under Shatzer, and none of the exceptions set forth in Edwards apply here. Edwards requires suppression of Wint’s incriminating statement concerning the shooting in Camden. The admission of that statement was not harmless error.

When exculpatory evidence is disclosed after a detention hearing, judges should use a modified materiality standard to decide whether to reopen the hearing. If there is a reasonable possibility that the result of the detention hearing would have been different had the evidence been disclosed, the hearing should be reopened. Applying that standard in this case, the Court reverses and remands to the trial court to reopen the detention hearing.

The Court reaffirms New Jersey’s longstanding adherence to the principle that a competent litigant may represent himself or herself in a matter in which he or she is a party, subject to exceptions set forth in statutes, court rules, and case law. No such exception is prescribed by the statute that governs this case. Although a parent’s decision to appear pro se in this complex and consequential litigation represents poor strategy in all but the rarest case, N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.4 plainly authorizes that parent to proceed unrepresented. The parent’s right of self-representation, however, is by no means absolute. That right must be exercised in a manner that permits a full and fair adjudication of the dispute and a prompt and equitable permanency determination for the child. In this case, the court properly denied J.J.’s untimely and ambivalent claim.

The trial court did not abuse its discretion in excluding defendant’s two prior DWI convictions here. Although the Court imposes no per se exclusion of prior DWI convictions in a prosecution for vehicular homicide while intoxicated, this case does not present the rare circumstances that would render their admission appropriate.

The Special Master’s findings are supported by substantial credible evidence in the record, and the Court adopts them. Breath test results produced by Alcotest machines not calibrated using a NIST-traceable thermometer are inadmissible.

The four-year period of parole ineligibility imposed by the court in exercising its sentencing discretion pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6(b) fell within the range authorized by the jury’s verdict and therefore did not violate Alleyne or the Sixth Amendment. In issuing a mandatory-minimum term, the court merely identified and weighed traditional sentencing factors to set an appropriate sentence within the statutory range set by the Legislature. The aggravating factors found by the court here were not the functional equivalent of the elements of an offense.

The judgment of the Appellate Division is reversed substantially for the reasons expressed in Judge Espinosa’s dissenting opinion. Defendant’s guilty plea is vacated and the matter is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings.

The Court now reverses in all those cases in which the Appellate Division reinstated plaintiffs’ actions against Roche. New Jersey has the most significant interests, given the consolidation of the 532 cases for MCL purposes. New Jersey’s interest in consistent, fair, and reliable outcomes cannot be achieved by applying a diverse quilt of laws to so many cases that share common issues of fact. Plaintiffs have not overcome the PLA’s presumption of adequacy for medication warnings approved by the FDA. As a matter of law, the warnings provided physicians with adequate information to warn their patients of the risks of IBD.

The appellate tests for reviewing an administrative disciplinary sanction and a criminal sentence are virtually the same. Therefore, the Appellate Division erred in suggesting that appellate review of a disciplinary sanction imposed by a judge is de novo and different from traditional appellate review of an agency determination. Additionally, merely because the factual findings and rulings made by ALJs are oftentimes contingent on whether an agency accepts, rejects, or modifies an ALJ’s decision does not mean that ALJs are second-tier players or hold an inferior status as factfinders. Based on its deferential standard of review, the Court cannot conclude that the ALJ’s decision is shocking to one’s sense of fairness.

The Court affirms the panel’s approval of the judge’s jury instruction, albeit under a different standard of review, finding that the judge’s actions were harmless error. The Court reverses the imposition of sanctions. It would be unfair to impose sanctions in a case where the only means for a party to avoid sanctions would be to pay an amount greater than the jury’s verdict against that party, without advance notice of that consequence.

Quaker Valley had the right to erect hoop houses, but did not have the authority to permanently damage a wide swath of premier quality soil in doing so. Quaker Valley clearly violated the deed and the ARDA. Accordingly, the judgment of the Appellate Division, which overturned the trial court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the SADC, is reversed. Those who own deed-restricted farmland must have well delineated guidelines that will permit them to make informed decisions about the permissible limits of their activities. It is only the extreme nature of this case that saves the present enforcement action.

The Court reverses the judgment of the Appellate Division panel, concurring with the panel’s dissenting judge that the MVR recordings were not “required by law” within the meaning of N.J.S.A. 47:1A-1.1, that they constitute criminal investigatory records under that provision, and that they are therefore not subject to disclosure under OPRA. The Court agrees with the panel’s conclusion that the recordings are not within OPRA’s “investigations in progress” provision, and that OPRA’s privacy clause does not exempt the recordings from disclosure. The Court remands the matter to the trial court for consideration of plaintiff’s claim of a common-law right of access to the MVR recordings.

The trial court and Appellate Division correctly determined that a conviction under N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4(a) can be sustained by exposing children to a substantial risk of harm.

A court may reverse the Legislature’s invalidation of an agency rule or regulation pursuant to the Legislative Review Clause if (1) the Legislature has not complied with the procedural requirements of the Clause; (2) the Legislature has incorrectly asserted that the challenged rule or regulation is inconsistent with “the intent of the Legislature as expressed in the language of the statute which the rule or regulation is intended to implement,” N.J. Const. art. V, § 4, ¶ 6; or (3) the Legislature’s action violates a protection afforded by any other provision of the New Jersey Constitution, or a provision of the United States Constitution. To determine legislative intent, the court should rely exclusively on statutory language. It should not apply a presumption in favor of either the Legislature’s findings or the agency’s exercise of its rulemaking authority. Here, the Court finds no procedural defect or constitutional infirmity in the Legislature’s actions. The Legislature correctly determined that N.J.A.C. 4A:3-3.2A conflicts with two provisions of the Civil Service Act.