Supreme Court Opinions

The Court modifies the judgment of the Appellate Division and remands this matter to the OAL for further proceedings to allow the City the opportunity to demonstrate that the hospital records are admissible as business records, and the opportunity to present any other theories of admissibility.

The circumstances at issue in McKenney, which heavily depended on the prejudice caused to the party disadvantaged by the surprise change in trial testimony, are distinguishable from the change in testimony here. Here there was no demonstration that the changed testimony caused prejudice to T.L., and the plain error standard does not compel reversal, especially because counsel’s failure to object was likely strategic. Under the circumstances, T.L. is not entitled to a new trial.

The trial courts’ resolution of these matters was correct and consistent with clear rulings from the United States Supreme Court that bind state and federal courts on how challenges such as plaintiffs’ should proceed. Those rulings do not permit threshold issues about overall contract validity to be resolved by the courts when the arbitration agreement itself is not specifically challenged. Here, plaintiffs attack the sales contracts in their entirety, not the language or clarity of the agreements to arbitrate or the broad delegation clauses contained in those signed arbitration agreements. The Supreme Court’s precedent compels only one conclusion: an arbitrator must resolve plaintiffs’ claims about the validity of their sales contracts as well as any arbitrability claims that plaintiffs may choose to raise.

The Court answers both parts of the first certified question in the affirmative: a life insurance policy procured with the intent to benefit persons without an insurable interest in the life of the insured does violate the public policy of New Jersey, and such a policy is void at the outset. In response to the second question, a party may be entitled to a refund of premium payments it made on the policy, depending on the circumstances.

The State may appeal a Drug Court sentence only when the sentencing judge makes a plainly mistaken, non-discretionary, non-factual finding under N.J.S.A. 2C:35-14(a). Because application of N.J.S.A. 2C:35-14(a)(9) requires fact-finding and an exercise of the sentencing judge’s discretion, a sentence based on application of that factor is not appealable as an illegal sentence.

The 2009 amendments to N.J.S.A. 2C:35-7’s sentencing structure reflect a more flexible sentencing policy that renders Caliguiri’s reasoning no longer viable. The presumption against PTI for second-degree offenders cannot be applied to N.J.S.A. 2C:35-7(a) offenders. And the presumption against PTI for the “sale” of narcotics was not applicable here because defendant was charged with possession with intent to “distribute” and there is no allegation or evidence that he sold the narcotics. The decision to deny defendant’s application must be reevaluated.

An individual sentenced to a fixed minimum term of parole ineligibility under N.J.S.A. 2C:40-26(c) may not serve his or her sentence intermittently at night or on weekends pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:43-2(b)(7).

New Jersey does not have territorial jurisdiction to prosecute Ferguson, Potts, or Byrd for the drug-induced death of Cabral in New York.

The judgment of the Appellate Division is affirmed substantially for the reasons expressed in the panel’s opinion.

Although the Legislature may decide that N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4(a)(1) should not apply in juvenile proceedings based on conduct such as that at issue here, nothing in the current text of that statute precludes the adjudication in this case. The Court declines to rewrite the statute’s plain language in this appeal. However, the Family Part court’s adjudication must be reversed because the court’s disavowal, at the disposition hearing, of critical aspects of its previously-stated factual findings undermined its determination as to both offenses. In this extraordinary setting, it is unclear whether the State met its burden to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that D.M. violated N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4(a)(1). Accordingly, the Court affirms on other grounds the panel’s judgment.

Defendant’s confession and the drug evidence must be suppressed.

Nelson’s traffic stop was prolonged as he waited for the arrival of the canine unit, but the officers had developed the reasonable and articulable suspicion necessary to prolong the stop under State v.Dunbar, 229 N.J. 521, 540 (2017). The Court therefore affirms as modified the Appellate Division’s determination that the evidence seized during the car’s subsequent search should not be suppressed.

The concert was promoting the University’s educational objectives and purposes at the time of Green’s injury, and as a result, Monmouth University is afforded charitable immunity. Although Green was not a Monmouth University student, she was a beneficiary under the language of the Charitable Immunity Act.

The MSA required Timothy to “maintain” life insurance to support the children in the event of Timothy’s death. Because Timothy’s suicide barred recovery of the life insurance proceeds, he failed to “maintain” life insurance and therefore breached the Agreement. A precise calculation of Timothy’s outstanding child support obligations would be speculative, and the Chancery Division did not abuse its discretion by finding that Timothy’s outstanding obligations exceed the remaining assets of Timothy’s estate. Thus, there would be no remaining estate assets to pay Sandra’s claims, and a remand for a precise damages calculation is unnecessary.

Defendant was repeatedly and explicitly warned that the estimated 2438 days of jail credit may not affect his period of parole ineligibility and that he should not enter the plea agreement expecting as much. Defendant cannot now credibly argue that he relied on a belief that all 2438 days would be applied to his term of parole ineligibility

The only requirements for an asset sale are that a seller is conducting business by holding a valid license and is not subject to an action by the Commissioner. As such, the asset sale was valid, the Irvington location retained its grandfathered status, and DOBI’s decision to grant the license to New Loan was appropriate.

Protection of compensation is not restricted to protection of the hourly rate of pay, and a remand is needed. A record must be created to allow the Commissioner to assess the SCESC’s reasons for allocating work among its part-time teachers in a manner that severely reduced the number of hours afforded to the two tenured teachers and awarded work to non-tenured and less senior staff. The Court thus affirms the judgment of the Appellate Division but does not encourage a strict arithmetic calculation along the lines the panel has suggested

Based on its interpretation of N.J.S.A. 43:21-5(a), the Court concludes that McClain and Blake are entitled to UI benefits because (1) they qualified for UI benefits at their former employment at the time of their departure, (2) they were scheduled to commence their new jobs within seven days of leaving their former employment, and (3) their new job offers were rescinded through no fault of their own before the start date.

Based on its interpretation of N.J.S.A. 43:21-5(a), the Court concludes that McClain and Blake are entitled to UI benefits because (1) they qualified for UI benefits at their former employment at the time of their departure, (2) they were scheduled to commence their new jobs within seven days of leaving their former employment, and (3) their new job offers were rescinded through no fault of their own before the start date.

The judgment of the Appellate Division is affirmed substantially for the reasons expressed in Judge Alvarez’s majority opinion