Opinion Summaries

Pursuant to the Solar Act of 2021, N.J.S.A. 48:3-114 to -120, the Legislature directed the Board of Public Utilities to create a solar facilities program for awarding contracts for grid supply solar facilities and net metered solar facilities greater than five megawatts.  In addition to setting renewable energy goals for the State, the Act directs the development of policy for grid supply solar siting so as not to compromise the State's commitment to preserving and protecting open space and farmland. 

To that end, the Board developed a competitive solar incentive (CSI) program in coordination with the New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection, the Department of Agriculture, and the State Agriculture Development Committee to issue recommendations and a straw proposal on siting requirements.  After a four-year process, which included extensive stakeholder engagement, the Board issued an order that launched the CSI Program. 

N.J.S.A. 48:3-119(c) sets forth seven categories of land where solar facilities shall not be sited unless authorized by a waiver.  N.J.S.A. 48:3-119(c)(7) prohibits siting solar facilities on certain agricultural soils where the grid supply solar facility exceeds the Statewide threshold of 2.5% of such soils unless authorized by the waiver process pursuant to N.J.S.A. 48:3-119(f).  N.J.S.A. 48:3-119(f) describes the waiver process but also states that in no case shall a grid supply solar facility occupy more than 5% of the unpreserved land containing prime agricultural soils and soils of Statewide importance located within any county's designated agricultural development area.

Appellant moved for reconsideration, arguing the Board misinterpreted the siting provisions of the Act codified in N.J.S.A. 48:3-119.  Among other arguments raised by appellant before the Board and on appeal, appellant claimed the Board misinterpreted the Act and ignored the legislative history.  Appellant alleged the 5% per county limit could be exceeded if the 2.5% Statewide limit was not exceeded.  The Board interpreted the siting provisions independently and held the 5% per county limit on development could not be waived. 

The court affirmed the Board's ruling and found the plain language of the Act demonstrated N.J.S.A. 48:3-119(f)'s limit on solar development to 5% of a county's agricultural land was unambiguous.  The 2.5% Statewide limit expressed in N.J.S.A. 483-119(c)(7) served a different purpose and was not a means for a solar developer to exceed the 5% per county restriction.  Moreover, applying the per county limit only after the Statewide limit has been reached could lead to the development of the entirety of a county's agricultural lands.

Given the Act's unambiguous language, the court did not need to resort to the legislative history.  Even so, the legislative history showed the Legislature intended to minimize the potential adverse environmental impacts of solar development and the Legislature never revised the 5% per county limit or stated the per county limit could be waived in either version of the bill before it became law. 

The Board's interpretation of the Act balanced the Legislature's intent to preserve the State's vital natural resources while encouraging the development of clean solar energy.  

The Borough of Englewood Cliffs retained Thomas J. Trautner and Chiesa Shahinian & Giantomasi PC, (collectively CSG), Albert Wunsch III, and Jeffrey Surenian and Jeffrey Surenian and Associates, LLC, (collectively Surenian) to represent it in affordable housing litigation.  After judgment was entered for developer 800 Sylvan Avenue, LLC. (Sylvan), a settlement was reached between the Borough and Sylvan.  Thereafter, political control of the Borough Council majority changed hands and the newly constituted Council sued CSG, Wunsch, and Surenian, alleging professional malpractice, breach of contract, unjust enrichment, civil conspiracy, and aiding and abetting arising from their representation of the Borough in the litigation.  The Borough also sued Sylvan, alleging claims of conspiracy and aiding and abetting. 

The trial court granted defendants' Rule 4:6-2(e) motions to dismiss the Borough's complaint with prejudice.  The trial court subsequently granted defendants' motion for sanctions, ordering the Borough to pay their attorney's fees and costs for filing a frivolous lawsuit.  The Borough appeals, arguing the sanction applications were procedurally deficient; as a public entity, it is immune from paying sanctions under the FLS; and the trial court abused its discretion in finding the Borough's lawsuit was frivolous.[1]

The court rejects the Borough's arguments and affirms based on our interpretation of the FLS that the Borough is not immune from sanctions, defendants' applications for sanctions were procedurally compliant with Rule 1:4-8, and the trial court did not abuse its discretion in imposing sanctions against the Borough.

[1] After their merit briefs were filed, the Borough and Jeffrey Surenian and Jeffrey Surenian and Associates, LLC filed a stipulation of dismissal dismissing all claims and counterclaims, including but not limited to claims for attorney's fees.

The plain language of N.J.S.A. 2C:14-16(a)(2) creates a standard that is permissive and easily satisfied. Here, plaintiff testified that a sexual assault “destroyed” her, she was intensely traumatized, and she was “terrified” for her safety. The family court found her testimony credible. Based on that testimony, the court held plaintiff had demonstrated a “possibility of future risk” to her “safety or well-being.” The Court affirms.

1. “Any person alleging to be a victim of nonconsensual sexual contact, sexual penetration, or lewdness, or any attempt at such conduct,” who is not eligible for a restraining order as a “victim of domestic violence” under the Prevention of Domestic Violence Act of 1991 (PDVA) may apply for a protective order under SASPA. N.J.S.A. 2C:14-14(a)(1), -16. The standard for granting a SASPA protective order differs depending on whether the applicant seeks a temporary or final order. Importantly, an FPO does not require a showing that it is “necessary to protect the safety and well-being” of the victim like a TPO does, see N.J.S.A. 2C:14-15(a); rather, an FPO requires only the “possibility of future risk to the safety or well-being of the alleged victim,” N.J.S.A. 2C:14-16(a)(2). (pp. 14-18)
2. The permissive standards for a SASPA TPO and a PDVA temporary restraining order (TRO) are nearly identical, as are the procedures for seeking a PDVA final restraining order (FRO) and a SASPA FPO. Notably, both SASPA FPOs and PDVA FROs require consideration of a list of non-exhaustive factors, but SASPA lists only two such factors -- “(1) the occurrence of one or more acts of nonconsensual sexual contact, sexual penetration, or lewdness . . . ; and (2) the possibility of future risk to the safety or well-being of the alleged victim,” N.J.S.A. 2C:14-16(a) -- whereas the PDVA lists six, see N.J.S.A. 2C:25-29(a). The Legislature could have duplicated the second factor for a PDVA FRO -- “[t]he existence of immediate danger to person or property,” N.J.S.A. 2C:25-29(a)(2) -- in SASPA, but it did not. In addition, the consequences to a defendant of a PDVA FRO are drastically different from the consequences to a respondent of a SASPA FPO. (pp. 18-22)
3. Applying ordinary definitions of the terms used in N.J.S.A. 2C:14-16(a)(2), the statute’s plain language requires a court to consider whether there is a chance that a survivor may be exposed to physical
   danger, risk, or injury, or may be exposed to something emotionally unwelcome or unpleasant that could make the survivor feel uncomfortable, unhealthy, or unhappy. Because the language of factor two is centered on the safety or well-being of the victim-survivor, a survivor’s own testimony regarding possible future risks to their safety or emotional well-being can suffice. The Court’s reading of the plain text of factor two as creating a lenient and easy-to-satisfy standard is reinforced by context: the “possibility of future risk” required for a SASPA FPO is less demanding than the “necessary” protection required for a SASPA TPO or the “immediate danger” required for a PDVA FRO. Applying that standard, the Court defers to the trial court’s factual findings because they are supported by substantial evidence and finds no error in the court’s legal conclusion. (pp. 22-26)
4. The Court explains why it is not persuaded by Martin’s claims of error, why it disagrees with the concurrence’s view of N.J.S.A. 2C:14-16(e) and (f), and why it declines to adopt either the six PDVA factors or the standard established for PDVA FROs for use in the SASPA context. Finally, the Court explains that its discussion of Clara’s testimony is not intended to imply that such evidence of psychological symptoms or treatment is necessary to satisfy N.J.S.A. 2C:14-16(a)(2). (pp. 26-33)

         M.R. appealed from a final decision of the Department of Corrections (DOC), denying his application for a certificate of eligibility for compassionate release under the Compassionate Release Act (CRA), N.J.S.A. 30:4-123.51e.  The DOC denied his application because two licensed physicians designated by the commissioner of the DOC had rendered medical diagnoses in which they found M.R. had neither a terminal condition nor a permanent physical incapacity as defined by the CRA.   

         M.R. argued on appeal the CRA and related regulations required the designated physicians to examine him physically and the DOC's decision was arbitrary, capricious, and unreasonable because the physicians had not physically examined him and had failed to make certain findings required under the CRA.  The court disagreed, concluding that, while a physician may request a physical examination, the CRA and related regulations did not require one.  The court also concluded the physicians had made the requisite findings.  Accordingly, the court affirmed the DOC's decision. 

On leave granted, in this medical negligence matter, we consider whether N.J.S.A. 2A:53A-41(a) under the New Jersey Medical Care Access and Responsibility and Patients First Act (Act), N.J.S.A. 2A:53A-37 to -42, requires plaintiffs to serve an affidavit of merit (AOM) from a physician board certified in both specialties if defendant physician is board certified in two specialties, and the treatment claimed to be negligent involves both specialties.

Plaintiffs rely on Buck v. Henry, 207 N.J. 377 (2011), in asserting they need only provide an AOM from a physician who specializes in either of the defendant doctor's specialties.  The trial court agreed and denied defendants' motions to dismiss for failure to provide the proper AOM and for reconsideration.

Defendant physician is board certified in internal medicine and gastroenterology.  He certified that his care and treatment of plaintiffs' decedent involved both specialties.  Plaintiffs only served an AOM from a physician board certified in internal medicine.

In considering defendants' dismissal motions, the trial court cited to two sentences from Buck:  "A physician may practice in more than one specialty, and the treatment involved may fall within that physician's multiple specialty areas.  In that case, an [AOM] from a physician specializing in either area will suffice."  Id. at 391.

Because the facts presented here are distinguishable from Buck and the discrete ruling in Buck was not specific to this issue, and in considering the legislative purpose of the Act, and the principles of law espoused in the subsequent cases of Nicholas v. Mynster, 213 N.J. 463, 480-88 (2013), and Pfannenstein ex. rel. Estate of Pfannenstein v. Surrey, 475 N.J. Super. 83, 90-91 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 254 N.J. 517 (2023), we conclude plaintiffs must serve an AOM from a physician board certified in each of defendant doctor's specialties.  We are also guided by the kind-for-kind, credential equivalency requirement articulated in N.J.S.A. 2A:53A-41(a).  Therefore, we reverse the court's orders denying defendants' motions to dismiss for a deficient AOM and for reconsideration.

However, because plaintiffs raised the issue of a waiver from the AOM requirement, and the issue was fully briefed and discussed during oral argument before the trial court, we remand for the court to determine the waiver argument on its merits.

CPANJ is neither a public agency under N.J.S.A. 47:1A-1.1 nor a public entity subject to the common law right of access. The ACLU’s factual allegations do not support a claim against CPANJ under OPRA or the common law.

1. OPRA applies only if the entity to which a request is directed meets the statutory definition of a public agency. For purposes of OPRA, the terms “public agency” or “agency” denote the entities specified in N.J.S.A. 47:1A-1.1, which include “any political subdivision of the State or combination of political subdivisions, and any division, board, bureau, office, commission or other instrumentality within or created by a political subdivision of the State or combination of political subdivisions, and any independent authority, commission, instrumentality or agency created by a political subdivision or combination of political subdivisions.” The term “political subdivision” denotes a division of a state that exists primarily to discharge some function of local government, such as a county or municipality, as well as certain entities formed by counties and municipalities, such as parking authorities. The ACLU argues that CPANJ is an instrumentality of the county prosecutors. Accordingly, the core question in this appeal is whether a county prosecutor constitutes a “political subdivision” for purposes of OPRA. (pp. 14-22)

2. A county is indisputably a “political subdivision of the State” as defined in OPRA, N.J.S.A. 47:1A-1.1. The status of the counties themselves as political subdivisions under OPRA, however, has no bearing on the analysis. A county prosecutor is distinct from the county that the prosecutor serves for purposes of OPRA’s reach. A county prosecutor, like the Attorney General, is a constitutional officer who serves by virtue of gubernatorial nomination and Senate confirmation. Although a county exercises considerable control over the fiscal operations of the county prosecutor’s office, a county prosecutor’s law enforcement function is unsupervised by county government or any other agency of local government. In short, the county prosecutor is not the alter ego of the county itself, and does not constitute a “political subdivision” as that term is used in N.J.S.A. 47:1A-1.1. CPANJ, meanwhile, constitutes an organization in which the county prosecutors are members and is not the alter ego of the prosecutors themselves. Because a prosecutor does not meet the definition of a “political subdivision” under N.J.S.A. 47:1A-1.1’s plain language, CPANJ is not a public agency for purposes of OPRA. The ACLU’s factual allegations do not support its assertion that CPANJ is a public agency within the meaning of N.J.S.A. 47:1A-1.1. Because the ACLU did not seek the documents from a public agency in accordance with N.J.S.A. 47:1A-5 and -6, the Court does not reach the question whether the documents identified in its request constitute “government records” under OPRA. (pp. 22-26)

3. A public record under the common law is one that is made by a public official in the exercise of the official’s public function, either because the record was required or directed by law to be made or kept, or because it was filed in a public office. Here, the ACLU identifies no statute, regulation, or other mandate requiring CPANJ to create or maintain the requested documents. It suggests no statutory or regulatory mandates of any kind addressing the records at issue. The ACLU does not allege that CPANJ maintains public documents in a public office; indeed, it does not dispute CPANJ’s assertion that it maintains no office at all. The ACLU identifies no precedential decision discussing, let alone upholding, a request for public documents served on a private entity such as CPANJ. In short, the ACLU asserts no factual allegations that would suggest that CPANJ constitutes an entity upon which a common law right of access request for documents may properly be served. The Court does not reach the question whether the documents that the ACLU requested from CPANJ would be considered common law public documents if requested from a public entity. (pp. 26-29)

Plaintiffs’ good faith and fair dealing claim properly survived summary judgment, but the jury was not correctly charged or asked to rule on that claim. The trial judge failed to instruct the jury that the only underlying contract to which the implied covenant could attach to had to be one beyond the rights afforded by the Bylaws. Adding to the significant uncertainty created by the jury charge and verdict sheet are the improper admission into evidence of the privileged emails and the improper remarks by plaintiffs’ attorney. Those errors, cumulatively, had the capacity to lead the jury to reach a verdict it would not have otherwise reached and thus deprived Valley of a fair trial.

1. A claim for breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing that is implied by law into every contract requires a plaintiff to demonstrate that the defendant’s alleged misdeeds prevented the plaintiff from enjoying the full benefit of a particular bargain. Although medical staff bylaws impose reciprocal legal obligations and rights between those who agreed to be bound, those obligations do not give rise to a traditional contract, to a claim for the traditional contract remedy of damages, or to a separate breach of the implied covenant claim. Instead, when a hospital violates its medical staff bylaws, equitable relief may be available. Thus, plaintiffs here would have been entitled to a hearing if Valley had violated the Bylaws by failing to provide one in the first place; the jury, however, expressly found that Valley did not violate the Bylaws. The Bylaws cannot constitute the underlying contract for purposes of plaintiffs’ separate breach of the implied covenant claim. (pp. 28-34)

2. Just as the Bylaws here offer no ground for a breach of an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing claim, Valley’s administrative healthcare decision to award exclusive privileges to a particular group cannot on its own give rise to a claim for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. A hospital may not act in bad faith and simultaneously serve a “genuine” healthcare objective based on “reasonable and reliable” information. See Desai, 103 N.J. at 91-93. Physicians who are adversely affected by a hospital’s administrative healthcare decision may challenge that decision by arguing that it was not made in accordance with the standard set forth in Desai. Here, however, the trial judge concluded that plaintiffs’ challenge to the Valley’s grant of exclusive privileges was “subsumed” with their implied covenant claim. As a result, the legal principles related to Valley’s administrative decision became relevant only as to its defense to the implied covenant claim, and not as an asserted basis for money damages. (pp. 34-38)

3. The final basis advanced in the course of this litigation for finding that Valley was bound to act in good faith and deal fairly with plaintiffs is an alleged implied contract between the parties, one that goes “beyond the Bylaws.” Plaintiffs allege that, from Valley’s initial offer to join and collaboratively build Valley’s neuroscience department and from the parties’ course of dealings since plaintiffs joined, it can be reasonably inferred that an implied contract existed between plaintiffs and Valley that would allegedly support their expectation to indefinitely maintain their privileges and rights absent a valid administrative healthcare decision providing otherwise. In the event that plaintiffs could demonstrate that all the fundamental elements of contract formation had been established, their theory of an agreement beyond the rights afforded by the Bylaws would be contractual in nature. Among the three possible sources to support plaintiffs’ claim here -- the Bylaws, Valley’s administrative healthcare decision, and the alleged implied-in-fact contract between plaintiffs and Valley -- the only alleged source of mutual obligation to which the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing could properly attach to is the implied-in-fact contract. (pp. 38-41)

4. The Court explains how the evidence in the record, taken in the light most favorable to plaintiffs, was sufficient to raise a factual dispute as to whether there was an implied-in-fact contract between plaintiffs and Valley and whether Valley acted in bad faith in revoking certain of plaintiffs’ privileges, such that the claim properly survived summary judgment. Although the claim properly reached the jury, however, the jury charge and verdict sheet did not properly instruct the jurors on the elements of the claim. Notably, the jury was given no law on how to measure Valley’s defense to the implied covenant claim, and consideration of the jury charge as a whole raises significant doubt as to whether the jury found the underlying contract for plaintiffs’ implied covenant claim to be some implied or oral agreement beyond the Bylaws, or just the Bylaws. The jury could have come to a different result had it been correctly instructed on the contract claims, especially because the underlying contract on the implied covenant claim -- purportedly an endless right to treat “unassigned” ER patients with special tools -- was not in writing. (pp. 41-52).

5. The emails between Valley and its general counsel for the purpose of legal advice, rather than business purposes, are protected by the attorney-client privilege. Valley did not place its general counsel’s pre-litigation legal advice “in-issue,” nor did it call its general counsel as a witness. Valley’s inadvertent disclosure of the emails -- allegedly consisting of 352 pages -- in the course of an exchange of about 57,000 documents in roughly two months did not amount to waiver of the attorney-client privilege. The parties’ discovery agreement’s claw-back provision anticipated precisely such an inadvertence. And admission of the emails into evidence was not harmless. Select emails in many ways became the centerpiece of plaintiffs’ case. On remand, if plaintiffs attempt to introduce emails from the batch Valley attempted to claw back, the judge should conduct a document-by-document review to determine whether the emails are privileged and thus not admissible. (pp. 52-58)

6. Certain comments by plaintiffs’ trial counsel in summation were improper. Plaintiffs’ trial counsel knew that Valley had evidence of sixty cases of patient transfers. The summation remarks implied, however, that there was evidence of only two cases of patient transfers, and that inaccurate statement impacted Valley’s contention that it made a valid healthcare decision. (pp. 58-61)

7. The cumulative errors here deprived Valley of a fair trial and warrant a new one. The Court sets forth specific guidance for the remand proceedings. (pp. 61-62)

This appeal addresses whether the trial court erred by admitting into evidence a statement defendant had made to police and barring in part the testimony of defendant's expert witness. 

Several months after the drug-induced death of the victim, a police detective interviewed defendant, eliciting from her information about her cell-phone usage before he advised her of her Miranda rights and information regarding her drug-selling activity and contact with the victim after he advised her of her rights.  The detective told defendant he was "not holding anything back" and was "laying it all out . . . on the table" but never mentioned the death of the victim and repeatedly used the present tense when discussing her.   Defendant confessed to selling heroin to the victim.  The parties did not raise before the trial court the admissibility of defendant's statement, and the statement was admitted into evidence. The trial court granted the State's pretrial motion to bar defendant's expert witness from testifying about drug use and addiction, finding him qualified only in toxicology and not in those fields.  A jury convicted defendant of committing a first-degree drug-induced death crime, in violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:35-9(a), along with other drug-related crimes. 

The court finds the trial court (1) committed plain error by admitting defendant's statement without first conducting a Rule 104 hearing to determine under a totality-of-the-circumstances test the voluntariness of defendant's statement and Miranda waiver; (2) erred in admitting the pre-Miranda questions and answers but that that error did not rise to the level of plain error because other evidence was admitted regarding defendant's cell-phone usage; and (3) abused its discretion by limiting defendant's expert testimony without conducting a Rule 104 hearing regarding the expert witness's qualifications and opinions.  The court remands the case and instructs the trial court to conduct evidentiary hearings regarding the voluntariness of defendant's statement, the qualifications of defendant's expert witness, and the admissibility of his opinions.   Whether defendant's convictions are affirmed or vacated for a new trial depends on the outcomes of those hearings.

     At issue in this interlocutory appeal is the propriety of a pretrial order compelling the administration of psychotropic medication in an attempt to restore competency, without a defendant's consent, when the accused has not been deemed a danger to self or others.  With defendant's constitutional rights in view, the court applies the four-pronged test enunciated by the United States Supreme Court in Sell v. United States, 539 U.S. 166 (2003), and concludes the motion judge erroneously determined the State satisfied the second Sell prong.  The court therefore reverses the order under review. 

     In doing so, the court departs from the majority of federal appellate courts and holds the standard of review under the Sell test is mixed; the court therefore reviews the motion court's legal conclusions de novo and its factual findings for clear error as to each Sell prong.  Having resolved the issues by applying the Sell standard, the court does not reach the constitutional arguments urged by defendant and amici curiae.

In this automobile insurance coverage dispute, the court considered defendant Wausau Underwriters Insurance Company's appeal from Law Division orders granting summary judgment to plaintiff Britney Motil, entitling her to $100,000 in underinsured motorist (UIM) insurance coverage, and denying reconsideration.  

This appeal presented the novel issue of whether plaintiff was entitled to UIM coverage as a "covered driver" injured in an automobile accident while driving a "covered auto" with an identified alternate garaging address under her parents' automobile policy.  Defendant disclaimed coverage, under the policy's uninsured motorist (UM)/UIM endorsement step-down provision, because plaintiff was neither a named insured nor a defined family member.  After a de novo review, the court concluded there was ambiguity between the declaration and the policy's step-down provision of $15,000 in UIM coverage because the declaration plainly provided:  $100,000 UM/UIM coverage for each person; plaintiff was a covered driver; the UM/UIM premium charged was the same for each vehicle; and plaintiff's vehicle was a covered vehicle with an alternate garaging address.  Further, the court concluded the policyholder's reasonable expectation of $100,000 UIM coverage should be afforded.  

The court affirmed the Law Division's orders finding plaintiff was entitled to $100,000 in UIM insurance coverage and denying reconsideration.

         In these cases that were consolidated for the purpose of issuing a single opinion, defendants appeal from their convictions following municipal court appeals because the Law Division decided their appeals without conducting hearings or permitting briefing.

         In both cases, the Law Division determined briefing was not required and, because defendants did not request argument, decided the appeals based solely on its review of the municipal court transcripts and the police body camera video introduced as evidence in the municipal court trials.  The court found it "is incumbent on counsel to . . . tell the court why briefing is necessary and to request argument if they want it."  On appeal, defendants argued the court deprived them of their rights to due process and counsel.

         The court reversed, concluding Rules 3:23-4 and -8 require that the Law Division schedule and conduct a hearing on a municipal appeal.  There is no requirement that a defendant request a hearing.  The court also noted, although the proceeding is technically designated an appeal, the Law Division must conduct a trial de novo on a municipal appeal.  At the trial de novo, the Law Division must make its own findings of fact and conclusions of law and, if the court finds the State proved its case beyond a reasonable doubt, sentence the defendant anew.

          The court also concluded, based on the arguments raised by defendants, it would be appropriate to permit, if not require, the parties to file briefs in these cases.  Finally, to avoid any appearance of bias or prejudice, the court required the appeals be assigned to a different judge on remand.

This appeal concerns issues of preclusion and the relationship between the statutory systems for the Commissioner of Education and the State Board of Examiners revoking or suspending an educator's certificate to teach in the New Jersey public schools under N.J.S.A. 18A:6-17.1, and the separate arbitration process specified since 2012 in N.J.S.A. 18A:6-38 to -39 2 (the TEACHNJ law) for a school district terminating or disciplining a teacher for improper conduct.

Appellant, a tenured teacher, was charged by the local board of education with unbecoming conduct.  The school board sought to terminate his employment in the district.  The contested matter was tried before an arbitrator.  The arbitrator found appellant had engaged in unbecoming conduct, but she imposed a milder sanction of a one-year suspension.  The arbitrator's decision was not challenged in court by either appellant or the school board.  The Board of Examiners then pursued the revocation of appellant's license based on his same improper conduct, and it is anticipated that contested case will be tried in the Office of Administrative Law.

Appellant contends the Board of Examiners and the Commissioner—even though they were not parties to the tenure arbitration—have no authority to pursue the revocation of his license because the arbitrator only suspended his employment for one year.  Among other things, appellant invokes a doctrine of "industrial double jeopardy" to support his preclusion argument.  He also contends the revocation proceedings violate his constitutional and civil rights.

The matter was presented to a Law Division judge, who confirmed the arbitration award but rejected appellant's arguments for preclusion.

This court affirms the trial court's decision and holds the Board of Examiners and the Commissioner are not precluded by the arbitration outcome from pursuing the revocation of appellant's teaching certificate.  The statewide teacher certificate revocation process authorized in N.J.S.A. 18A:6-38 and -39 operates separately from the teacher tenure arbitration process under N.J.S.A. 18A:6-17.1.  The manifest legislative intent is for the two statutes to be administered independently of one another.  The proceedings involve non-identical parties, and also different stakes, procedures, and avenues and standards of appellate review. 

The court rejects appellant's assertion of industrial double jeopardy and his claims of the violation of his constitutional and civil rights.

Conspiracy to distribute CDS is not an enumerated predicate offense of the promoting statute, N.J.S.A. 2C:33-30, and defendant’s conviction for a crime that does not exist must be vacated.

1. N.J.S.A. 2C:33-30(a) provides in relevant part that “[a] person promotes organized street crime if he conspires with others . . . to commit any crime specified in” one of several enumerated chapters of
Title 2C of the New Jersey statutes or one of the additional statutes listed from chapters 34 and 39 of Title 2C. To prove “promoting,” the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt the accused conspired to
commit at least one offense on that specific list of predicate offenses. Conspicuously absent from that list is the substantive offense of conspiracy pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:5-2. The offense of conspiracy is not listed as a predicate offense itself, nor is it specified within any of the enumerated chapters as a predicate offense of the promoting statute. The jury instruction in this case thus erroneously departed from the list of permissible predicate offenses in N.J.S.A. 2C:33-30(a) and erroneously opened to the jury the possibility of convicting defendant for conspiracy to conspire to distribute CDS, a crime that does not exist because conspiracy to distribute CDS is not a predicate offense under the promoting statute. (pp.13-15)

2. If the party contesting the jury instruction fails to object to it at trial, the standard on appeal is one of plain error; if the party objects, the review is for harmless error. Defendant raised an objection to the now challenged jury instruction at various points leading up to, during, and through the end of the trial. The issue was properly preserved, thus the Court reviews for harmless error. (pp. 15-19)

3. Defendant was convicted and sentenced based upon a charge that does not exist within the criminal code. Such a result is not harmless, but rather unjust. The jury’s verdict, premised upon the instructions provided by the trial court, is legally invalid. Because defendant was not on notice of any other proper predicate offense for the promoting statute under count four of the indictment, the jury’s verdict on that
count is vacated without a remand. The Court does not reach the question as to whether a double inchoate crime may exist within New Jersey’s criminal code. (pp. 19-20)

The judgment of the Appellate Division is affirmed substantially for the
reasons expressed in Judge Rose’s opinion. The Court adds one
additional point.

Defendant did not challenge the three-year delay between the child’s
interview and the return of the original indictment. The Court has no
way to assess the reason for the delay and does not suggest that the
delay violated defendant’s rights. A lengthy delay in a future case,
however, might prompt a legal challenge. As a result, it is incumbent
on the State to act expeditiously as it investigates and prosecutes
matters that rely heavily on a young child’s ability to recall events

Plaintiff, who was fired from her job as a physician, appeals from an order of the Superior Court, Law Division staying her complaint against defendants pending arbitration.  Plaintiff's claims included allegations of sexual assault, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and a statutory retaliation claim under the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination (LAD), N.J.S.A. 10:5-1 to -50.

Defendants moved to compel arbitration pursuant to plaintiff's employment contract.  The trial court granted the motion, finding the contract's arbitration clause was valid and enforceable.

The court engaged in a de novo review of the employment contract using well-settled contract principles, and it held the mandatory arbitration clause was ambiguous and therefore unenforceable against plaintiff.  Holding the arbitration clause unenforceable, the court declined to reach the question of whether the Federal Arbitration Act applies.

In a separate opinion concurring with the result, a member of the panel would reverse for a different reason, discerning no ambiguity in the arbitration provision and concluding, unlike the contract at issue in Antonucci v. Curvature Newco, Inc., 470 N.J. Super. 553 (2022), the present contract is not governed by the FAA.  Accordingly, plaintiff's LAD claims would not be arbitrable pursuant to N.J.S.A. 10:5-12.7.

A plaintiff can establish an ascertainable loss by demonstrating either an out-of-pocket loss or a deprivation of the benefit of one’s bargain. The Court does not find either type of ascertainable loss applicable here because plaintiffs purchased non-defective, conforming goods with no objective, measurable disparity between the product they reasonably thought they were buying and what they ultimately received. Plaintiffs’ CFA claim therefore fails, and, absent an ascertainable loss pursuant to the CFA, plaintiffs are not “aggrieved consumers” under TCCWNA, cannot show injury or damages under their common law claims, and are without claims entitling them to equitable relief.

In this matter, the court considers the novel issue of the circumstances under which a municipality may decline to adopt a Resolution of Support (ROS) for an applicant seeking to obtain a Class 5 Cannabis Retailer License (CRL) from the State of New Jersey Cannabis Regulatory Commission (the Commission) under N.J.S.A. 24:6I-31 to -56, the Cannabis Regulatory, Enforcement Assistance, and Marketplace Modernization Act (CREAMMA).

Plaintiff filed an order to show cause (OTSC) and a verified complaint against the Township of West Milford, the Council of West Milford Township (collectively referred to as the Township), and SoulFlora, Inc. after the Township effectively denied plaintiff's request for a ROS for its CRL application by not placing it on a public meeting agenda for consideration by the governing body.  The Township asserts its de facto denial was predicated on a Township ordinance prohibiting businesses with CRLs to be located less than 2,500 feet from each other.  The proposed location of plaintiff's cannabis business was less than 500 feet from SoulFlora's. 

Plaintiff sought injunctive relief to prevent SoulFlora from establishing a cannabis business; enjoining the Township from issuing a ROS to any other new cannabis business applicants; revoking SoulFlora's ROS; and requesting attorneys' fees and costs.  The court affirms denial of plaintiff's OTSC under Crowe v. De Gioia, 90 N.J. 126, 132-34 (1982).  The court holds plaintiff did not have a likelihood of success on the merits, finding the Township's effective denial of plaintiff's request for a ROS was not arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable since under CREAMMA, municipalities are delegated the authority to promulgate location and density requirements for cannabis retail businesses and are statutorily vested with the right to decline to provide local support for applicants who fail to meet those requirements. 

The court reverses the with-prejudice dismissal of the claims against the Township and remands to the trial court to issue a statement of reasons pursuant to Rule 1:7‑4(a), along with an accompanying order.   The court affirms the dismissal of the complaint against SoulFlora with prejudice, while finding that it is an indispensable party for notice purposes only. 

          In this matter, the court considers whether the trial court properly dismissed plaintiff's complaint with prejudice after finding it was barred by the entire controversy doctrine and res judicata.  Plaintiff's putative class action complaint, filed in Essex County, sought to claw back funds she paid in full satisfaction of a final default judgment, entered in a prior lawsuit adjudicated in Bergen County.  The court holds that the entire controversy doctrine precludes plaintiff from relitigating a final default judgment through the filing of a new complaint in a different court when she failed to pursue any of her substantive arguments in the previous litigation. 

          Plaintiff defaulted on paying an outstanding credit card balance, so the bank closed out her account and assigned her outstanding debt to defendants.  Through a complaint filed in Bergen County, defendants obtained a final default judgment against plaintiff, which she did not move to vacate or otherwise appeal.  Plaintiff fully satisfied the judgment through wage garnishments.

          Plaintiff filed a putative class action complaint in Essex County against defendants seeking a declaratory judgment voiding the debt and any judgments enforcing that debt, as well as treble damages and disgorgement of amounts previously paid to defendants, based on the assertion that defendant was not licensed, as required by the New Jersey Consumer Finance Licensing Act (CFLA), N.J.S.A. 17:11C-1 to -49. 

          Since the entire controversy doctrine precludes plaintiff from pursuing the Essex County litigation predicated on substantive defenses that could have been raised in the prior Bergen County litigation, there was no amendment to the pleading that could have rendered plaintiff's complaint viable.  Thus, dismissal of the complaint with prejudice based on the entire controversy doctrine was appropriate.  The court affirms the Essex County order.

Requests for reasonable accommodations like the one here should be assessed under the following framework: Individuals who seek an accommodation must show that they have a disability under the LAD and demonstrate that the requested accommodation may be necessary to afford them an “equal opportunity to use and enjoy a dwelling.” N.J.A.C. 13:13-3.4(f)(2). Housing providers then have the burden to prove the requested accommodation is unreasonable. During that process, both sides should engage in a good-faith, interactive dialogue. In the end, if the parties cannot resolve the request, courts may be called on to balance the need for, and benefits of, the requested accommodation against the cost and administrative burdens it presents. Here, the claims should not have been dismissed.

          Following the 2020 decennial United States Census, the City of Jersey City Ward Commission (the Commission) redrew the six election wards for the City of Jersey City (the City).  In these two consolidated appeals, plaintiffs challenge the ward boundaries and map adopted by the Commission.  Plaintiffs contend that the new ward map violates the Municipal Ward Law (the MW Law), N.J.S.A. 40:44-9 to -18, the New Jersey Civil Rights Act (the CR Act), N.J.S.A. 10:6-1 to -2, and their rights of free speech, free association, and equal protection under the New Jersey Constitution.  They also argue that the Commission did not comply with the Open Public Meetings Act (the OPMA), N.J.S.A. 10:4-6 to -21.

The court affirms in part and reverses in part the dismissal of plaintiffs' complaints in lieu of prerogative writs.  The court affirms the dismissal of the claims asserting violations of plaintiffs' constitutional rights, the CR Act, and the OPMA.  The court reverses the dismissal of the claims of violations of the MW Law.  Resolution of those statutory claims requires some, albeit limited, fact-finding.  Therefore, the court remands the MW Law claims for a focused and limited proceeding on whether the Commission had a rational basis for the ward boundaries and map it adopted.