Supreme Court Opinions

*To avoid serious constitutional concerns, the Court interprets the statute narrowly and holds that N.J.S.A. 39:3-33 requires that all markings on a license plate be legible or identifiable. If a frame conceals or obscures a marking in a way that it cannot reasonably be identified or discerned, the driver would be in violation of the law. In practice, if a registration letter or number is not legible, the statute would apply; but if a phrase like "Garden State" is partly covered but still recognizable, there would be no violation.

Annese’s lay opinion testimony is rationally based on the witness’s perception and therefore satisfies the first prong of N.J.R.E. 701. Based on Annese’s extensive contacts with defendant, the absence of any other identification testimony, and the quality of the surveillance photograph, the testimony meets the second requirement of N.J.R.E. 701 because it will assist the jury in determining a fact at issue in defendant’s trial. Sanitized to avoid disclosure of defendant’s status as a parolee at the time of his alleged offense, Annese’s lay opinion testimony will not be so prejudicial that its probative value is substantially outweighed by the risk of undue prejudice, and that testimony should not be excluded under N.J.R.E. 403. The Court concurs with the Appellate Division that the trial court abused its discretion when it barred Annese’s lay opinion testimony.

There are facts that support plaintiff’s claim that, had defendant not breached his duty by advising her to accept a guilty plea for offenses she did not commit, there would have been (1) no conviction to report, which would mean (2) no failure to report the conviction, which would mean (3) no inquiry leading to the discovery of prior failures to report, which, in turn, would mean (4) no imposition of disciplinary charges or the other adverse consequences plaintiff asserts as damages. Under the circumstances presented here, a reasonable jury could find that defendant’s breach of his professional duty was a substantial factor in -- and thus a proximate cause of -- plaintiff’s harm.

A finding of substantial compliance with the Tort Claims Act cannot be premised on comments made by plaintiff’s counsel in three different letters sent to lawyers representing the defendant public entities. H.C. Equities’ letters, individually or collectively, did not communicate the core information that a claimant must provide to a public entity in advance of filing a tort claim. See N.J.S.A. 59:8-4. H.C. Equities did not comply with the notice of claim provisions of the Tort Claims Act or file a timely motion to submit a late claim, and the trial court was correct when it granted the motion of the Authority to dismiss H.C. Equities’ claims against it, and the motion of the County to dismiss H.C. Equities’ tort claims.

The Court agrees with the Appellate Division that Martinez had a duty to Coleman under the circumstances presented here.

*Courts, not the parties, oversee the jury selection process. On occasion, it may be appropriate to conduct a criminal history check to confirm whether a prospective juror is eligible to serve and to ensure a fair trial. That decision, though, cannot be made unilaterally by the prosecution. Going forward, any party seeking to run a criminal history check on a prospective juror -- through a government database available only to one side -- must present a reasonable, individualized, good-faith basis for the request and obtain permission from the trial judge. The results of the check must be shared with both parties and the court, and the juror should be given an opportunity to respond to any legitimate concerns raised.

NERA mandates that a defendant serve 85% of the sentence "actually imposed" for certain crimes before becoming eligible for parole. N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.2(b). Allowing defendants to proceed with a Rule 3:21-10(b)(2) motion prior to serving that 85% would circumvent the Legislature’s objectives and its approach to violent crimes. Moreover, the timing of defendant’s motion aside, he failed to meet his burden under Priester since he cannot prove the necessary devastating effect that incarceration had on his health, in addition to various other Priester factors.

The arbitrator’s award is supported by a reasonably debatable interpretation of the disputed provision, and therefore, the award should have been upheld on appeal.

The Court affirms the decision to deny the Tax Collector qualified immunity. Based on the summary judgment record, the Tax Collector’s refusal to provide the redemption amount to plaintiffs because the request was not in writing or timely made was not objectively reasonable. The Court disagrees, however, that plaintiffs have not established the basis for municipal liability. The Tax Collector is the final policymaker on matters related to the redemption of tax sale certificates in the Borough. The Borough is liable if the Tax Collector violated the constitutional or statutory rights of plaintiffs.

The denial of J.K.’s application was not arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable. J.K’s submissions to the Parole Board were inadequate to secure the relief sought. To the extent that J.K. has refined and updated his application, his recourse is before the Parole Board, which has the necessary expertise to assess the quality of his new submissions under its Policy # 09.821.

Because defendant was aware of the letter and the circumstances relevant to this appeal for nearly twenty-five years, yet provides no evidence -- and made almost no effort to uncover evidence -- that police interviewed Theresa after production of the letter, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying defendant’s post-conviction discovery request.

If a charter school’s "district of residence demonstrates with some specificity that the constitutional requirements of a thorough and efficient education would be jeopardized" by the diversion of district funding to a charter school, the Commissioner must "evaluate carefully" the question of fiscal harm. In re Englewood on the Palisades Charter Sch. (Englewood), 164 N.J. 316, 334-35 (2000). Here, however, the District made no such preliminary showing. The Court declines to depart from the governing standard simply because the District is a former Abbott district or because the District was State-operated at the time of the charter school applications.

Because MPD officers create the information contained in the CDR-1s, the CDR-1s fall well within OPRA’s definition of a government record. Further, AADARI’s records request is narrowly tailored and would not constitute research beyond OPRA’s scope.

At a motion for summary judgment, courts view the evidence in a light most favorable to the non-moving party -- in this case, Rios. And the Court considers the remarks from the perspective of a reasonable Hispanic employee in Rios’s position. Under all the circumstances, a rational jury could conclude the demeaning and contemptuous slurs, allegedly uttered by a direct supervisor, were sufficiently severe or pervasive to create a hostile work environment in violation of the LAD.

Pursuant to the facts of this case, a reasonable 17-year-old in defendant’s position would have believed he was in custody and not free to leave, so Miranda warnings were required. It was harmful error to admit his statement at trial.

The limiting principles established in the Court’s precedent warrant the adoption of the ongoing storm rule. Commercial landowners do not have a duty to remove the accumulation of snow and ice until the conclusion of the storm, but unusual circumstances may give rise to a duty before then. There are two exceptions that could impose a duty: if the owner’s conduct increases the risk, or the danger is pre-existing.

*The Attorney General had the authority to issue the Directives, which satisfy the deferential standard of review for final agency decisions. The Directives are designed to enhance public trust and confidence in law enforcement, to deter misconduct, to improve transparency and accountability in the disciplinary process, and to identify repeat offenders who may try to move from one sensitive position to another. In short, the Directives are consistent with legislative policies and rest on a reasonable basis.

Trial courts may conduct voir dire questioning about a prospective juror’s views on disputed issues to determine whether the juror will follow the court’s instructions and deliberate with an open mind. The trial court must ensure, however, that such questioning is not partisan and that it will not indoctrinate prospective jurors in favor of either side’s position. The court must present the issue to prospective jurors in balanced and impartial terms. In this case, the questioning addressed only the component of the legal standard that assisted the State; it did not equitably present the evidentiary issue to the prospective jurors. The responses of some of the prospective jurors indicate that the inquiry may have confused them. The form of the questioning strongly favored the State’s position and may have encouraged jurors to convict defendant. Accordingly, defendant was not afforded his right to an impartial jury and is entitled to a new trial.

Because it is unclear whether defendants’ motion for summary judgment was decided based on the CEPA provision on which plaintiff relies, the Court remands plaintiff’s claim regarding the Capehart & Scatchard proposal to the trial court. As a matter of law, plaintiff presented no prima facie evidence of a causal nexus between her comments on the retention of Ballard Spahr and the County’s decision not to renew her contract. The Court reinstates the order granting summary judgment as to that claim.