Supreme Court Opinions

An explicit statement, explaining the overall fairness of a sentence imposed for multiple offenses in a single proceeding or in multiple sentencing proceedings, is essential to a proper Yarbough sentencing assessment and was lacking here. The lack of any overall assessment of the fairness of the decision to impose consecutive sentences compels reversal of defendant’s sentence and remand for a new resentencing, and the Court provides important guidance regarding that essential assessment.

The trial court correctly admitted A.B.’s statement identifying defendant as her shooter as a dying declaration under N.J.R.E. 804(b)(2), and the admission of A.B.’s statement as a dying declaration does not violate the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution or Article I, Paragraph 10 of the New Jersey Constitution.

Plaintiffs sufficiently pled the class certification requirements to survive a motion to dismiss. The Court remands the matter for class action discovery to be conducted pursuant to Rule 4:32-2(a) so that the trial court may determine whether to certify the class.

The Court has the constitutional authority to make rules and procedures for all courts of this state, including the grand jury; the Court’s authorization of a virtual format for the selection of grand jurors and grand jury presentations during a lethal pandemic does not violate the State Constitution’s separation of powers. There is no support for the facial constitutional challenge to the temporary use of the virtual grand jury during the current public health crisis, and virtual grand jury proceedings do not facially violate the fundamental fairness doctrine. In individual cases where a defendant claims that an alleged error or defect undermined the fairness of the proceeding, a challenge may be mounted. But in this case, no error undermined the integrity of the grand jury proceeding; nor is there a basis for the dismissal of the indictment.

The disputed coverage provision in the garage policy at issue constitutes an illegal escape clause, which may not be used to evade the minimum liability requirements for dealership vehicles set by the Chief Administrator of the Motor Vehicle Commission (MVC). The Court orders the reformation of Federal’s policy to the $100,000/$250,000 dealer-licensure minimum liability coverage required by N.J.A.C. 13:21-15.2(l).

The Court affirms as to defendants’ respective manslaughter convictions but reverses as to their convictions for endangerment.

M&K does not fit within the Compassionate Use Act’s limited reimbursement exception, and Hager presented sufficient credible evidence to the compensation court to establish that the prescribed medical marijuana represents, as to him, reasonable and necessary treatment under the WCA. Finally, the Court interprets Congress’s appropriations actions of recent years as suspending application of the CSA to conduct that complies with the Compassionate Use Act. As applied to the Order, the Court thus finds that the Act is not preempted and that M&K does not face a credible threat of federal criminal aiding-and-abetting or conspiracy liability. M&K is ordered to reimburse costs for, and reasonably related to, Hager’s prescribed medical marijuana.

The CJRA favors pretrial release over detention; it authorizes judges to detain defendants when the State has shown, by clear and convincing evidence, that no conditions of release would reasonably assure the eligible defendant’s appearance in court when required, would protect the public, or would prevent the defendant from obstructing the criminal justice process. To make that determination, the Act directs judges to conduct an individualized assessment of the level of risk each defendant presents in light of their own conduct, history, and characteristics. The Act does not seek to detain defendants whose behavior poses a minimal level of risk, which describes all three defendants here. Nor does the CJRA cede control over pretrial release decisions to outside agencies. The statute’s primary focus is on a defendant’s behavior and choices, and the risk they present. The language, structure, purpose, and history of the CJRA reveal the Act was designed to address a defendant’s own choice not to appear in court, not independent actions by third parties like ICE. The Court agrees with the Appellate Division that the CJRA does not authorize judges to detain defendants to thwart their possible removal by ICE.

The CJRA favors pretrial release over detention; it authorizes judges to detain defendants when the State has shown, by clear and convincing evidence, that no conditions of release would reasonably assure the eligible defendant’s appearance in court when required, would protect the public, or would prevent the defendant from obstructing the criminal justice process. To make that determination, the Act directs judges to conduct an individualized assessment of the level of risk each defendant presents in light of their own conduct, history, and characteristics. The Act does not seek to detain defendants whose behavior poses a minimal level of risk, which describes all three defendants here. Nor does the CJRA cede control over pretrial release decisions to outside agencies. The statute’s primary focus is on a defendant’s behavior and choices, and the risk they present. The language, structure, purpose, and history of the CJRA reveal the Act was designed to address a defendant’s own choice not to appear in court, not independent actions by third parties like ICE. The Court agrees with the Appellate Division that the CJRA does not authorize judges to detain defendants to thwart their possible removal by ICE.

The Court affirms settled principles of law that require trial judges to conduct a “reasoned, thoughtful analysis” of certain factors when they consider a request for an adjournment to hire new counsel. See State v. Kates, 216 N.J. 393, 396-97 (2014); State v. Furguson, 198 N.J. Super. 395, 402 (App. Div. 1985). If a trial judge does not conduct the proper analysis, it may be necessary to reverse a conviction. But defendants are not automatically entitled to a new trial. When a reviewing court can glean or infer the relevant considerations from the record, it may evaluate the appropriate factors. The Court does not find an actual deprivation of the right to counsel of choice here, so the doctrine of structural error does not apply.

The Court finds no error, let alone plain error, in the trial court’s omission of a theft charge. Nothing in Dunbrack’s version of the events “jumps off the page” as indicative of theft. Neither Dunbrack nor Rodriguez requested an instruction on theft, and the trial court was not required to scour the record for a combination of facts to justify giving such a lesser included jury charge.

Pretrial detention is not an absolute bar to receiving unemployment compensation benefits for the time following dismissal of the charges and release from detention. Based on the specific facts presented by this appeal, the UCL and N.J.A.C. 12:17-9.1(e)(10) required the Department to review the totality of the circumstances surrounding Haley’s detention and release to determine whether he “left work voluntarily.” That review did not occur here.

Because the trial court quizzed defendant on his knowledge of substantive law rather than provide the information required by New Jersey case law to confirm he was making a knowing and voluntary waiver of counsel, the denial of defendant’s request to represent himself was an abuse of discretion.

The plain language of N.J.S.A. 30:4-27.30(b) requires the State to produce psychiatric testimony in support of commitment when the State seeks the initial or continued commitment of a sexually violent predator. The State therefore did not meet its burden in this case by producing a psychiatrist who did not support commitment.

The trial court erroneously kept admissible evidence from the jury. The video rebutted what the prosecutor implied during cross-examination -- that defendant’s witnesses lied about their attempt to speak with the police at the scene. That video also contradicted the investigating detective’s testimony that she had thoroughly canvassed the area for witnesses. In summation, the prosecutor exploited the suppression of the video to present a false narrative and improperly suggested to the jury that the defense witnesses made no effort to give their accounts to the officers at the scene. The combination of the trial court’s erroneous evidentiary ruling and the prosecutor’s inappropriate remarks during summation had the clear capacity to cause an unjust result.

The Court agrees that the PWFA recognizes for pregnant and breastfeeding employees three distinct causes of action within N.J.S.A. 10:5-12(s): 1) unequal or unfavorable treatment; 2) failure to accommodate; and 3) unlawful penalization. The Court explains the contours of those causes of action and the necessary considerations as to each upon remand.

The Securities Law does not bar plaintiff’s promissory estoppel claim for reliance damages. The Court affirms the liability judgment on that claim and the remand for a new damages trial in which plaintiff will have the opportunity to prove reliance damages. He is not entitled to benefit-of-the-bargain damages. To the extent that the Appellate Division relied on an alternative basis for its liability holding -- that a later-adopted federal law “family office” exception has been incorporated into our Securities Law -- the Court rejects that reasoning and voids that portion of the court’s analysis.

NJ Transit and its bus drivers are held to the same negligence standard under the TCA as other common carriers -- to exercise the utmost caution to protect their passengers as would a very careful and prudent person under similar circumstances. See N.J.S.A. 59:2-2(a), :3-1(a). None of the TCA immunities defendants asserted abrogated their common-carrier duty to protect Maison from the dangerous and threatening conduct of the teenage passengers. The TCA leaves no doubt that an allocation of fault between a negligent public entity and its employee and an intentional tortfeasor is mandated. See N.J.S.A. 59:9-3.1. Nevertheless, to ensure that defendants’ duty to protect their passenger is not unfairly diluted or diminished, the trial court must give the jury clear guidance on the factors to consider in allocating degrees of fault. See Frugis v. Bracigliano, 177 N.J. 250, 274-75, 281-83 (2003).

*Section 19(f) of the CJRA offers a path for potential relief under the present circumstances. Under that provision, N.J.S.A. 2A:162-19(f), individual defendants can apply to reopen detention hearings if they can present information that was not known at the time of the initial hearing and that “has a material bearing” on the release decision.

A defendant seeking discovery in connection with a Franks hearing may -- in the trial court’s discretion and on showing a plausible justification that casts reasonable doubt on the veracity of the affidavit -- be entitled to limited discovery described with particularity that is material to the determination of probable cause. The Court affirms and modifies the Appellate Division’s judgment and remands to the trial court for consideration under the standard adopted in this decision.