Supreme Court Opinions

The Ordinance is sustained subject to the Court’s further modifications to comply with current legislative enactments. The Court concludes that state law permits the creation by ordinance of this civilian board with its overall beneficial oversight purpose. The Court holds that this review board can investigate citizen complaints alleging police misconduct, and those investigations may result in recommendations to the Public Safety Director for the pursuit of discipline against a police officer. In addition, the review board may conduct its oversight function by reviewing the overall operation of the police force, including the performance of its IA function in its totality or its pattern of conduct, and provide the called-for periodic reports to the officials and entities as prescribed by municipal ordinance. However, to the extent some investigatory powers that the City wishes to confer on its oversight board conflict with existing state law, the Court modifies the Appellate Division’s judgment. The board cannot exercise its investigatory powers when a concurrent investigation is conducted by the Newark Police Department’s IA unit. An investigation by the IA unit is a function carefully regulated by law, and such an investigation must operate under the statutory supervision of the police chief and comply with procedures established by Newark’s Public Safety Director and the mandatory guidelines established by the Attorney General. Concurrent investigations would interfere with the police chief’s statutory responsibility over the IA function, and the review board’s separate investigatory proceedings would be in conflict with specific requirements imposed on IA investigations and their results. The Court also invalidates the conferral of subpoena power on this review board.

Pfizer’s Agreement and related communications informed Skuse that if she remained a Pfizer employee more than sixty days from her receipt of that Agreement, she was deemed to assent to it. Those communications clearly and unmistakably explained the rights that Skuse would waive by agreeing to arbitration, thus complying with waiver-of-rights case law, and Pfizer’s delivery of the Agreement by e-mail did not warrant its invalidation. Pfizer’s use of the word “acknowledge” was appropriate in the circumstances of this case, given the terms of Pfizer’s arbitration policy and other expressions of assent that immediately preceded that request. Pfizer should not have labeled its communication explaining its arbitration agreement a “training module” or training “activity,” but that is not a basis to invalidate the Agreement. The Agreement was valid and binding, and the Court concurs with the trial court’s decision to enforce it.

The health insurance premium contribution rates paid by the Association’s members were preempted by statute and therefore non-negotiable. PERC’s construction of Chapter 78 comports with the statute’s language and the Legislature’s stated objective to achieve a long-term solution to a fiscal crisis.

Subject to the limits imposed here by the Court, the Bond Act does not violate the Constitution

Neither federal nor state protections against compelled disclosure shield Andrews’s passcodes

The Court concurs in substantial part with the ACJC’s factual findings and holds that clear and convincing evidence supports the ACJC’s determination that respondent committed the Code violations charged. The Court modifies the ACJC’s recommendation that respondent be removed from judicial office, however, and instead imposes on respondent a three-month suspension from judicial duties.

When all factors bearing upon retroactivity are weighed -- whether the rule's purpose "would be furthered by a retroactive application," the State's reliance on the previous rule, and "the effect a retroactive application would have on the administration of justice," State v. Henderson, 208 N.J. 208, 300 (2011) -- pipeline retroactivity is appropriate. Considering the evidence presented in G.E.P.'s case, the admission of CSAAS testimony did not deny him a fair trial, and the Court reverses the Appellate Division's judgment as to him. As to R.P., C.P., and C.K., the CSAAS testimony bolstering the alleged victims' testimony was clearly capable of producing an unjust result, and their convictions were thus properly reversed by the Appellate Division.

The language of the kidnapping statute, along with the case law construing that language, must be read in a sensible manner and not taken to an illogical conclusion. Holding a victim in captivity for a period of four to five hours, while assaulting and sexually abusing her, satisfies the “substantial period” requirement of the kidnapping statute -- even if the length of the confinement is co-extensive with the continuous sexual and physical abuse of the victim. In addition, the Court cannot find that, as a matter of law, the terrifying four-to-five-hour period of C.M.’s confinement was “merely incidental” to the sexual violence committed against her. There is no basis to disturb the jury’s verdict.

The Court answers the certified question in the affirmative. A CFA claim alleging express misrepresentations -- deceptive, fraudulent, misleading, and other unconscionable commercial practices -- may be brought in the same action as a PLA claim premised upon product manufacturing, warning, or design defects. It is the nature of the claims brought, not the nature of the damages sought, that is dispositive of whether the PLA precludes the separate causes of action. In other words, the PLA will not bar a CFA claim alleging express or affirmative misrepresentations.

All claims related to the MCPO defendants’ acts or alleged omissions associated with duties imposed by the Directive constitute state prosecutorial functions. The Department’s parsing of the pleadings in this matter led to crabbed determinations about the scope of law enforcement activity that are inconsistent with the letter and purpose of Wright. The Court finds the Department’s four determinations -- which reflect shifting and conflicting positions -- to be arbitrary and unreasonable.

The expert report relied on by the Township did not apply any reliable methodology to assure that the assessment allocating the costs among the properties was “in proportion to and not in excess of the benefits conferred,” as required by N.J.S.A. 58:4-12(d)(1) and other statutes. The Court is constrained to invalidate Sparta Township Resolution 6-1, which imposes a special assessment on plaintiffs’ properties to recoup the costs of the dam restoration project. The Township must pass a resolution allocating costs based on a valid methodology in accordance with the applicable statutes and relevant case law.

The Court answers the certified question in the negative. A party who files a successful motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim is not precluded by the entire controversy doctrine from asserting claims in a later suit that arise from the same transactional facts.

The history of the CJRA reveals the Legislature did not intend to authorize criminal contempt charges for violations of release conditions. Beyond that, allowing such charges for all violations of conditions of release, no matter how minor, is at odds with the purpose and structure of the CJRA. No-contact orders are treated differently, however, because the CJRA did not modify settled law relating to them. In State v. Gandhi, 201 N.J. 161 (2010), the Court held that violations of no-contact orders -- even if issued as part of a pretrial release order -- can serve as a basis for contempt charges. That precedent remains firmly in place. Because neither appeal here involved a violation of a no-contact order, the Court reverses the judgment of the Appellate Division and dismisses the contempt charges against both defendants.

It was error to grant summary judgment because, construing all inferences in Christian Mission’s favor, there is evidence that the property might have been used in a manner that could satisfy N.J.S.A. 54:4-3.6’s actual use requirement -- storage of religious items and/or other church-related activities at the property before construction began, during construction, and as of the valuation date in 2012.

The NJAA may apply to arbitration agreements even if parties to the agreements are exempt under section 1 of the FAA. Therefore, the parties in both Colon and Arafa are not exempt from arbitration and their arbitration agreements are enforceable. In Arafa, the arbitration agreements are enforceable under the NJAA. In Colon, the arbitration agreements are enforceable under either the FAA or the NJAA, which will be determined by the trial court upon remand when it resolves whether the employees in that case were transportation workers engaged in interstate commerce.

The NJAA may apply to arbitration agreements even if parties to the agreements are exempt under section 1 of the FAA. Therefore, the parties in both Colon and Arafa are not exempt from arbitration and their arbitration agreements are enforceable. In Arafa, the arbitration agreements are enforceable under the NJAA. In Colon, the arbitration agreements are enforceable under either the FAA or the NJAA, which will be determined by the trial court upon remand when it resolves whether the employees in that case were transportation workers engaged in interstate commerce.

For summary judgment purposes, the Court must accept as true the sworn deposition testimony of Baskin and the independent eyewitness, who both stated that Baskin’s open and empty hands were above his head, in an act of surrender, when Detective Martinez fired the shot. Under that scenario, a police officer would not have had an objectively reasonable basis to use deadly force. The law prohibiting the use of deadly force against a non-threatening and surrendering suspect was clearly established, as evidenced by cases in jurisdictions that have addressed the issue. Thus, Detective Martinez was not entitled to qualified immunity on summary judgment.

The use of fair market value credit by this debtor to obtain a money judgment against a creditor -- in the absence of a deficiency claim threatened or pursued or any objection being raised at the time of the sheriff’s sales -- is inconsistent with sound foreclosure processes and, moreover, inequitable in the circumstances presented.

Section 12 does not require a formal application when a prosecutor agrees not to request a mandatory extended-term sentence under N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6(f) yet seeks the benefit of a Section 12 plea agreement. Here, defendant was given ample notice that he was extended-term eligible and that the State was seeking the benefit of Section 12 for the negotiated plea agreement, and defendant did not object to the State’s proffer that he was extended-term eligible. The Court affirms the judgment of the Appellate Division upholding his sentence. Given the importance of ensuring consistency and accuracy in sentencing, the Court provides guidance for future cases where the State agrees not to request an extended term but still seeks the benefit of a negotiated waiver of the CDRA’s mandatory sentencing requirements under N.J.S.A. 2C:35-12.

Under the circumstances here, the jury should have had full access to the cooperating witness’s plea agreement history through the defense counsel’s unfettered examination of that history. The trial court’s limitations on defendant’s cross examination were in error. Defendant was deprived of his right to confrontation and denied a fair trial. His conviction for conspiracy to commit burglary is vacated.