Supreme Court Opinions

The relevant date for purposes of determining whether subsection (g) is effective as to a particular registrant is the date on which that registrant committed the sex offenses that would otherwise bar termination of registration under subsection (f). Thus, subsection (g) does not apply to registrant.

The Dog Bite Statute’s strict liability standard applies to the claim of an independent contractor who agrees to care for a dog. The statute’s plain language reveals no legislative intent to recognize an exception to strict liability under the Dog Bite Statute for any category of injured plaintiffs. See N.J.S.A. 4:19-16. However, the Comparative Negligence Act, N.J.S.A. 2A:15-5.1 to -5.8, applies to plaintiff’s strict liability claim, and plaintiff’s status as a professional experienced in the care of dogs is relevant to an allocation of fault. Genuine issues of material fact warrant the denial of plaintiff’s motion for partial summary judgment on her common-law claims.

The immunities from liability provided by the Good Samaritan Act, N.J.S.A. 26:2B-16, and most TCA provisions invoked by defendants do not apply here. Defendants’ actions may be entitled to qualified immunity under certain TCA provisions on which defendants rely, however, if the involved officers’ actions were discretionary, rather than ministerial, in nature. In this instance, because of a factual dispute, that determination is for the jury to make upon remand.

The mandatory period of parole supervision imposed under NERA is part of a unitary sentence that is penal in nature. The State has kept Njango in prison for more than a year beyond his release date. Without credit for the excess prison time, Njango would serve more time in the custody of the Department of Corrections than authorized by his sentence. Under the fundamental fairness doctrine -- an integral part of the due process guarantee of the New Jersey Constitution -- the excess time Njango erroneously served in prison must be credited to reduce the period of his parole supervision.

*To avoid serious constitutional concerns, the Court interprets the statute narrowly and holds that N.J.S.A. 39:3-33 requires that all markings on a license plate be legible or identifiable. If a frame conceals or obscures a marking in a way that it cannot reasonably be identified or discerned, the driver would be in violation of the law. In practice, if a registration letter or number is not legible, the statute would apply; but if a phrase like "Garden State" is partly covered but still recognizable, there would be no violation.

*To avoid serious constitutional concerns, the Court interprets the statute narrowly and holds that N.J.S.A. 39:3-33 requires that all markings on a license plate be legible or identifiable. If a frame conceals or obscures a marking in a way that it cannot reasonably be identified or discerned, the driver would be in violation of the law. In practice, if a registration letter or number is not legible, the statute would apply; but if a phrase like "Garden State" is partly covered but still recognizable, there would be no violation.

Annese’s lay opinion testimony is rationally based on the witness’s perception and therefore satisfies the first prong of N.J.R.E. 701. Based on Annese’s extensive contacts with defendant, the absence of any other identification testimony, and the quality of the surveillance photograph, the testimony meets the second requirement of N.J.R.E. 701 because it will assist the jury in determining a fact at issue in defendant’s trial. Sanitized to avoid disclosure of defendant’s status as a parolee at the time of his alleged offense, Annese’s lay opinion testimony will not be so prejudicial that its probative value is substantially outweighed by the risk of undue prejudice, and that testimony should not be excluded under N.J.R.E. 403. The Court concurs with the Appellate Division that the trial court abused its discretion when it barred Annese’s lay opinion testimony.

There are facts that support plaintiff’s claim that, had defendant not breached his duty by advising her to accept a guilty plea for offenses she did not commit, there would have been (1) no conviction to report, which would mean (2) no failure to report the conviction, which would mean (3) no inquiry leading to the discovery of prior failures to report, which, in turn, would mean (4) no imposition of disciplinary charges or the other adverse consequences plaintiff asserts as damages. Under the circumstances presented here, a reasonable jury could find that defendant’s breach of his professional duty was a substantial factor in -- and thus a proximate cause of -- plaintiff’s harm.

A finding of substantial compliance with the Tort Claims Act cannot be premised on comments made by plaintiff’s counsel in three different letters sent to lawyers representing the defendant public entities. H.C. Equities’ letters, individually or collectively, did not communicate the core information that a claimant must provide to a public entity in advance of filing a tort claim. See N.J.S.A. 59:8-4. H.C. Equities did not comply with the notice of claim provisions of the Tort Claims Act or file a timely motion to submit a late claim, and the trial court was correct when it granted the motion of the Authority to dismiss H.C. Equities’ claims against it, and the motion of the County to dismiss H.C. Equities’ tort claims.

The Court agrees with the Appellate Division that Martinez had a duty to Coleman under the circumstances presented here.

*Courts, not the parties, oversee the jury selection process. On occasion, it may be appropriate to conduct a criminal history check to confirm whether a prospective juror is eligible to serve and to ensure a fair trial. That decision, though, cannot be made unilaterally by the prosecution. Going forward, any party seeking to run a criminal history check on a prospective juror -- through a government database available only to one side -- must present a reasonable, individualized, good-faith basis for the request and obtain permission from the trial judge. The results of the check must be shared with both parties and the court, and the juror should be given an opportunity to respond to any legitimate concerns raised.

NERA mandates that a defendant serve 85% of the sentence "actually imposed" for certain crimes before becoming eligible for parole. N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.2(b). Allowing defendants to proceed with a Rule 3:21-10(b)(2) motion prior to serving that 85% would circumvent the Legislature’s objectives and its approach to violent crimes. Moreover, the timing of defendant’s motion aside, he failed to meet his burden under Priester since he cannot prove the necessary devastating effect that incarceration had on his health, in addition to various other Priester factors.

The arbitrator’s award is supported by a reasonably debatable interpretation of the disputed provision, and therefore, the award should have been upheld on appeal.

The Court affirms the decision to deny the Tax Collector qualified immunity. Based on the summary judgment record, the Tax Collector’s refusal to provide the redemption amount to plaintiffs because the request was not in writing or timely made was not objectively reasonable. The Court disagrees, however, that plaintiffs have not established the basis for municipal liability. The Tax Collector is the final policymaker on matters related to the redemption of tax sale certificates in the Borough. The Borough is liable if the Tax Collector violated the constitutional or statutory rights of plaintiffs.

The denial of J.K.’s application was not arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable. J.K’s submissions to the Parole Board were inadequate to secure the relief sought. To the extent that J.K. has refined and updated his application, his recourse is before the Parole Board, which has the necessary expertise to assess the quality of his new submissions under its Policy # 09.821.

Because defendant was aware of the letter and the circumstances relevant to this appeal for nearly twenty-five years, yet provides no evidence -- and made almost no effort to uncover evidence -- that police interviewed Theresa after production of the letter, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying defendant’s post-conviction discovery request.

If a charter school’s "district of residence demonstrates with some specificity that the constitutional requirements of a thorough and efficient education would be jeopardized" by the diversion of district funding to a charter school, the Commissioner must "evaluate carefully" the question of fiscal harm. In re Englewood on the Palisades Charter Sch. (Englewood), 164 N.J. 316, 334-35 (2000). Here, however, the District made no such preliminary showing. The Court declines to depart from the governing standard simply because the District is a former Abbott district or because the District was State-operated at the time of the charter school applications.

Because MPD officers create the information contained in the CDR-1s, the CDR-1s fall well within OPRA’s definition of a government record. Further, AADARI’s records request is narrowly tailored and would not constitute research beyond OPRA’s scope.

At a motion for summary judgment, courts view the evidence in a light most favorable to the non-moving party -- in this case, Rios. And the Court considers the remarks from the perspective of a reasonable Hispanic employee in Rios’s position. Under all the circumstances, a rational jury could conclude the demeaning and contemptuous slurs, allegedly uttered by a direct supervisor, were sufficiently severe or pervasive to create a hostile work environment in violation of the LAD.