Opinion Summaries

N.J.S.A. 2C:24-8(a) imposes criminal liability on those who have "assumed continuing responsibility for the care of a person 60 years of age or older" and who "abandon[] the elderly person . . . or unreasonably neglect[] to do or fail[] to permit to be done any act necessary for the physical or mental health of the elderly person." In reversing, the court held that a conviction under this statute cannot be sustained when the defendant's conduct was alleged to be a physical assault. The Legislature intended instead to criminalize neglect, abandonment, and failures to act, not an assault, which is criminalized elsewhere in the criminal code.

Appellants challenge the Governor's Executive Order 283, which imposes a COVID-19 vaccination mandate for, among others, the State's corrections officers. The court held that the Civilian Defense and Disaster Control Act, N.J.S.A. App. A:9-33 to -63, empowered the Governor to issue the order and that the order's vaccination mandate was rationally and adequately tailored to the problem posed.

The Court agrees with the trial court that plaintiffs’ new theory should not have been considered given its late presentation. The Court nonetheless holds, for completeness, that plaintiffs’ new theory did not raise an issue of material fact. The Court reinstates summary judgment in favor of defendants and dismisses the complaint with prejudice. The Court also finds that Earle is entitled to derivative immunity.

Defendant’s question about the attorney was an ambiguous invocation of her right to counsel. Under settled New Jersey law, see, e.g., State v. Reed, 133 N.J. 237, 253 (1993), the detective was required to cease questioning and clarify whether defendant was requesting counsel during the interview. Because the State played defendant’s recorded statement at trial and read the apology note -- written at the detective’s suggestion -- to the jury, the error in failing to suppress that evidence was harmful. The Court also finds plain error in the trial court’s admission of certain challenged evidence, and it provides guidance for the proceedings on remand.

This interlocutory appeal arises from an ongoing prosecution for strict liability for drug-induced death, N.J.S.A. 2C:35-9, following a fatal heroin overdose. The State appeals from a trial court order suppressing incriminating statements defendant made during a stationhouse interrogation because the officers did not advise him that a death had occurred and that he was facing prosecution for a first-degree homicide offense. The trial court had initially held the statements were admissible but granted defendant's motion for reconsideration that cited to the majority opinion in State v. Sims, 466 N.J. Super. 346 (App. Div.), certif. granted, 246 N.J. 146 (2021). While the parties and the trial court knew that the Supreme Court had granted certification, they appeared to be unaware that the Supreme Court had stayed the Sims opinion.

In Sims, the majority announced a new per se rule that when police make an arrest following an investigation, they must at the outset of a custodial interrogation advise the interrogee of the offense(s) for which he or she was arrested regardless of whether a complaint-warrant or arrest-warrant has been issued. 466 N.J. Super. at 367. The question to be addressed by the Supreme Court is: "[w]ere the officers required to advise defendant, who was not charged with any offenses at the time, why he was arrested before proceeding with the custodial interrogation."

In the present case, the court follows an alternate analytical route that does not depend on the outcome in Sims. The court leaves to the Supreme Court to decide whether police may remain silent during a Miranda colloquy with respect to the essence of unfiled charges for which the interrogee was taken into custody. Rather, the court focuses on the impact of the police decision in this instance to advise defendant of the reason for his arrest in a manner that was misleading. Under this analytical approach, the failure to advise defendant of the overdose death was a relevant factor to be considered in determining whether defendant's waiver of Miranda rights was made knowingly.

The court concludes, considering the totality of the circumstances, the State failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant's waiver of his right against self-incrimination was made knowingly because the detectives affirmatively misled defendant by providing a deliberately vague and incomplete answer to his question of why he was taken into custody. The court reasons that it is one thing for police to withhold information; it is another thing entirely for them to provide an explanation that creates or reinforces a false impression.

The court recognizes that police are permitted, within limits, to use trickery or deception in the course of a custodial interrogation. The court draws a fundamental distinction, however, between police trickery with respect to the strength of the evidence against an interrogee on the one hand, and trickery with respect to the seriousness of the offense(s) for which he or she was arrested on the other hand. While police are allowed to use certain forms of trickery following a knowing and voluntary Miranda waiver, the court finds no New Jersey precedent that authorizes trickery as part of the waiver process. Indeed, the court notes that Miranda v. Arizona expressly held that "any evidence that the accused was . . . tricked . . . into a waiver will, of course, show that the defendant did not voluntarily waive his [or her] privilege." 384 U.S. 436, 476 (1966).

The court adds that affirmatively misleading an interrogee about the seriousness of the offense for which he or she was taken into custody strikes at the heart of the waiver decision. The court does not, however, propose a categorical, per se rule that any deception or trickery of this type automatically warrants suppression. Rather, the court holds that the use of such a stratagem is an important factor to be considered as part of the totality of the circumstances in determining whether the State has met its burden of proving, beyond a reasonable doubt, that defendant made a knowing waiver of his right against self-incrimination.

Finally, the court rejects the State's argument that the detectives did not have probable cause to charge defendant with the strict liability for drug-induced death offense pending the completion of autopsy and toxicology reports. Applying de novo review, the court concludes that the detectives were aware of facts constituting probable cause that defendant committed the strict liability homicide offense, viewed from the standpoint of an objectively reasonable police officer.

The Three Strikes Law and the mandatory life-without-parole sentence imposed upon defendant under that statute do not violate the constitutional prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment. Further, Miller and Zuber have no application to adult defendants sentenced under the Three Strikes Law.

Plaintiff, which contracted to purchase a large tract of vacant land from Hovbros Burlington, alleged in this action that defendant TD Bank tortiously interfered with that contract by foreclosing its mortgage on the property. The trial judge dismissed for failure to state a claim.

In affirming in part, the court held that the foreclosure sale cut off plaintiff's unrecorded contract interest and thereby eviscerated plaintiff's continuing claim of a legal or equitable interest in the property despite an assumption of TD Bank's knowledge of plaintiff's contract rights when TD Bank foreclosed. In this regard, the court rejected the holding of a published trial court decision, PNC Bank v. Axelsson, 373 N.J. Super. 186 (Ch. Div. 2004), which found relevance in the application of N.J.S.A. 2A:50-30 when a foreclosing party has knowledge of an unrecorded interest.

In reversing in part, the court held that plaintiff could continue to seek damages on its tortious interference claim against TD Bank based on its theory, which the court was obligated to assume as true, that TD Bank manipulated its rights as to Hovbros and its related companies so as to interfere with plaintiff's contract rights.

Following the dismissal of a chancery action against them that sought a constructive trust on the proceeds of a sale of real property, plaintiffs filed a complaint against the prior suitor, alleging, among other things, the tortious interference with their contract to sell the real property. The prior suitor sought dismissal, arguing her earlier claim was cloaked by the litigation privilege. The trial judge held that the complaint and other pleadings were insulated by the litigation privilege but not the notice of lis pendens, which had been recorded but discharged in the earlier action.

In permitting review of that interlocutory disposition, the court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding that the notice of lis pendens – a mere statement of the complaint's claims – was insulated by the litigation privilege, but the litigation privilege did not absolve the prior suitor of the consequences of having filed that earlier suit; in other words, the litigation privilege protected the prior suitor's statements and communications in the earlier judicial proceeding but did not protect her from a later action based on the allegation that the earlier suit was frivolous, vexatious or tortious.

Tax Court: Erez Holdings Urban Renewal, LLC, v. Director, Division of Taxation and Township of Lakewood, Docket No. 013941-2018, opinion by Sundar, P.J.T.C., decided February 1, 2022. For plaintiff - Catherine J. Bick (Giordiano Halleran Ciesla PC, attorneys); for defendants - Joseph Palumbo, Anthony D. Tancini (Andrew J. Bruck, Acting Attorney General of New Jersey, attorney); Harold H. Hensel (Secare & Hensel, attorneys).

Held: Plaintiff’s contention that the Non-Residential Development Fee (NRDF) imposed under N.J.S.A. 40:55D-8.4 should be computed by attributing $0 to equalized assessed value of the improvements because they are exempt from local property tax under the Long - Term Tax Exemption law, N.J.S.A. 40A:20-1 to -22, is rejected based on the plain language of the NRDF statute. The amount to be excluded for the parking lot when computing the NRDF is its value as determined under the accepted methods employed for valuing all real property in the local property tax arena (cost, income, comparable sales). The court’s standard of review of the assessor’s value determination of the parking lot for purposes of its exclusion when computing the NRDF, is the same as in local property tax matters. Thus, a presumptive correctness attaches to the assessor’s determination with the burden of proof upon the property owner to overcome the same and persuade the court that the exclusion amount should be different. Here, based on the evidence provided, plaintiff failed to persuade the court that the value of the parking lot to be excluded for purposes of calculating the NRDF should be $3,407,000. The court therefore affirms the final determination of defendant, Director, Division of Taxation, that the assessor of defendant, Township of Lakewood, correctly determined the NRDF.

On January 24, 2020, defendant ordered a floral arrangement that was to be delivered to his former girlfriend on February 13, 2020. One week after the order was placed, a temporary restraining order (TRO) was entered against defendant, prohibiting him from having contact with his former girlfriend. Defendant made no effort to cancel the delivery, which did not occur until after the entry and service of the TRO on defendant. Defendant was charged with contempt for violation of a TRO entered pursuant to the Prevention of Domestic Violence Act.

Following trial, it was determined that the State was not able to satisfy its burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant "purposely or knowingly" violated the TRO, and the complaint was dismissed. Since the TRO had not yet been entered at the time the defendant ordered the flowers, he could not have possessed the requisite mental state for a finding of contempt.

Similarly, the argument that defendant had an affirmative obligation to recall the communication initiated prior to his having been served with the TRO was rejected, because the TRO provided no notice of any such requirement.

The court permitted defendants in this medical malpractice action leave to appeal the trial court's denial of their motions for partial summary judgment on plaintiff's claims for breach of contract and hospital policy based on a third-party beneficiary theory as well as his claims for negligence per se for defendants' alleged violation of the hospital policies incorporated into those contracts. Because well-established precedent makes clear neither cause of action is available to plaintiff in this case as a matter of law, the court reversed the orders and remanded for entry of partial summary judgment for defendants dismissing those claims.

This appeal presents an issue of first impression—whether DNA evidence obtained from extremely small amounts of DNA through a technique known as low copy number (LCN) DNA testing, and in one instance, by using a proprietary Forensic Statistical Tool (FST) software program, which defendant contends are not generally accepted in the relevant scientific community, was improperly admitted at trial.

Defendant was indicted for the murder of a woman he had recently visited, that worked at his father's business. Her partially burned body was found in her residence. She died from blunt force head injuries. As part of their investigation, detectives obtained DNA samples from defendant, his apartment, a condominium that he had access to, his car, and the victim's fingernails. Samples from the kitchen of the apartment tested positive for blood. The DNA samples were sent to a laboratory DNA analysis.

The trial court denied defendant's motion for a Frye1 hearing to determine the admissibility of the LCN DNA test results. At trial, the State's experts testified that DNA samples from the kitchen was consistent with the victim's DNA. Analysis of a second set of DNA samples showed a mixture of DNA from two people, one of whom was the victim. DNA samples from the victim's home did not test positive for defendant's DNA, but samples taken from the victim's fingernails did. Samples from defendant's apartment and car did not test positive for the victim's DNA. Defense experts opined that the LCN DNA testing and FST were neither reliable nor generally accepted in the relevant scientific community. Defendant was found guilty of the murder.

On appeal, the court remanded the case for a Frye hearing to determine the admissibility of the disputed DNA evidence under the standards adopted in State v. Harvey, 151 N.J. 117 (1997), and retained jurisdiction.

Following a multi-day Frye hearing, at which numerous expert witnesses testified, the trial court determined the State clearly established that the LCN DNA testing technique and FST were generally accepted in the relevant scientific community and ruled the DNA analysis was admissible.

The court rejected the trial courts determinations, concluding that the State did not clearly establish that the LCN DNA testing technique and FST were generally accepted in the relevant scientific community. Therefore, the DNA evidence derived by using that technique and software was inadmissible. Noting that the remaining evidence was not overwhelming and recognizing that DNA evidence is powerful and compelling, the court determined that admission of the disputed DNA evidence raised a reasonable doubt that the jury was led to a verdict it otherwise might not have reached. Because the error was not harmless, the court reversed defendant's conviction and remanded for retrial.

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1 Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).

The only information the officer possessed at the time of the stop was the race and sex of the suspects, with no further descriptors. That information, which effectively placed every single Black male in the area under the veil of suspicion, was insufficient to justify the stop of the vehicle and therefore does not withstand constitutional scrutiny.

The only information the officer possessed at the time of the stop was the race and sex of the suspects, with no further descriptors. That information, which effectively placed every single Black male in the area under the veil of suspicion, was insufficient to justify the stop of the vehicle and therefore does not withstand constitutional scrutiny.

In this breach of contract action, the owner/operator of an aerobic biodigester facility sued defendant, Denali, which was contractually obligated to deliver quantities of organic waste to the facility for processing. Shortly after entry of the initial case management order, Denali served subpoenas on plaintiff and several nonparties, including Symbiont Science, Engineering and Construction, Inc. (Symbiont), which had designed and retrofitted the facility for plaintiff. Symbiont's subpoena required it to identify a corporate designee with familiarity in seventeen topic areas and demanded documents and electronically stored information in thirteen categories.

Much of the requested information centered on communications between plaintiff and Symbiont, such as the terms of Symbiont's agreement with plaintiff, "including the drafting, revision, and execution of the agreement"; "[t]he calculation of Symbiont's guaranteed maximum price to complete the construction to retrofit the Trenton Facility"; and "[a]ll communications with [plaintiff c]oncerning the construction and design" of the facility, "including but not limited to, the construction cost, construction schedule, and design modifications." Denali served similar requests on plaintiff.

When negotiations regarding the scope of production broke down between Denali and plaintiff, and between defendant and Symbiont, Denali moved to compel, and plaintiff and Symbiont moved to quash. The judge granted Denali's motion as to both plaintiff and Symbiont, relying on the broad scope of discovery permitted by Court Rules and case law.

The court granted Symbiont's motion for leave to appeal and reversed. Despite the broad scope of discovery permitted between parties, a court facing a discovery dispute involving a nonparty to the litigation must consider additional factors. The court also noted the special recognition the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provide to discovery demanded from nonparties.

The parties were involved in litigation relating to the Hackensack Planning Board's zoning determinations and ordinances adopted in the City's redevelopment plan. Separately, plaintiff's attorney submitted requests for records from defendants pursuant to the Open Public Records Act (OPRA), N.J.S.A. 47:1A-1 to -13, designated as OPRA requests from the attorney.

Defendants argued plaintiff lacked standing to bring suit under OPRA because the requests were submitted from plaintiff's attorney. The trial judge rejected the standing argument because counsel had implied authority to submit the requests. The trial judge also noted the Denial of Access complaint form adopted by the Government Records Council requires parties represented by counsel who make a request to state the name of the client on whose behalf the complaint is being filed.

Among other arguments raised by the parties in their respective appeals, defendants repeated their standing argument and urged the court to "establish the standard that if an attorney is filing an OPRA request on behalf of a client, it must clearly disclose that fact to the custodian of records, or if the response proceeds to litigation the attorney must be deemed the 'requestor.'"

The court affirmed, rejecting defendants' argument for the same reasons expressed by the trial judge. Although N.J.S.A. 47:1A-6 states the right to institute a suit under OPRA belongs "solely" to the requestor, OPRA and the rules of standing are broadly construed. Therefore, the literal reading of the statute urged by defendants should be eschewed.

When an arrest occurs outside a home, the police may not enter the dwelling or conduct a protective sweep in the absence of a reasonable and articulable suspicion that a person or persons are present inside and pose an imminent threat to the officers’ safety. This sensible balancing of the fundamental right to privacy in one’s home and the compelling interest in officer safety will depend on an objective assessment of the particular circumstances in each case, such as the manner of the arrest, the distance of the arrest from the home, the reasonableness of the officers’ suspicion that persons were in the dwelling and likely to launch an imminent attack, and any other relevant factors. A self-created exigency by the police cannot justify entry into the home or a protective sweep. Here, a protective sweep was not warranted in the Radel case but was constitutionally justified in the Terres case.

When an arrest occurs outside a home, the police may not enter the dwelling or conduct a protective sweep in the absence of a reasonable and articulable suspicion that a person or persons are present inside and pose an imminent threat to the officers’ safety. This sensible balancing of the fundamental right to privacy in one’s home and the compelling interest in officer safety will depend on an objective assessment of the particular circumstances in each case, such as the manner of the arrest, the distance of the arrest from the home, the reasonableness of the officers’ suspicion that persons were in the dwelling and likely to launch an imminent attack, and any other relevant factors. A self-created exigency by the police cannot justify entry into the home or a protective sweep. Here, a protective sweep was not warranted in the Radel case but was constitutionally justified in the Terres case.

In these matters arising out of the tragic shooting of a minor during a football game and his subsequent death several days later, the court considered whether the time for a minor's parent to file a notice of tort claim for her Portee1 claim is tolled under the New Jersey Tort Claims Act (TCA), N.J.S.A. 59:1-1 to 59:12-3. In reading in pari materia N.J.S.A. 59:8-8, which extends the statute of limitations for an injured minor to institute a cause of action until two years after their eighteenth birthday, and N.J.S.A. 2A:14-2, which tolls a parent's claim for the duration of the child's tolling period, and because the parent's Portee claim essentially includes the elements of the minor's claim, the court concludes it is only logical to toll the notice requirements under the TCA for the parent's Portee claim to coincide with the tolling period of the minor's claim. The court's ruling is consistent with the purposes underlying the entire controversy doctrine and in promoting judicial economy.

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1 Portee v. Jaffee, 84 N.J. 88 (1980).

After being waived to adult court, defendant pled non vult to two murders that he committed when he was seventeen years old. He was sentenced to two concurrent life terms with no specified period of parole ineligibility, rendering him eligible for parole in May 1995, after serving thirteen years.

Defendant had no prior juvenile charges or adjudications of delinquency. Defendant has been a model prisoner during his decades of imprisonment. He has incurred no disciplinary infractions, committed no new crimes, obtained his GED, engaged in multiple programs to address his behavior and substance abuse, taken vocational courses, achieved and maintained gang minimum custody status, and serves as the electrician for the correctional facility. Defendant has now served over forty years in prison after being denied parole seven times and receiving lengthy future eligibility terms, despite multiple psychological evaluations that concluded he was a low risk for committing a new offense if released.

Defendant filed a motion for an adversarial hearing under Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012), to correct an unconstitutional sentence. Defendant contended that being eligible for parole was not the same as having a "meaningful opportunity for release." In support of his motion, defendant submitted parole data statistics regarding inmates who received life terms with no specified period of parole ineligibility. Defendant argued that although his sentence was life with no specified period of parole ineligibility, he was serving the practical equivalent of life without parole, which was not the intent of the sentencing judge. Defendant also emphasized that he has "a perfect institutional record" and "is a trusted inmate."

The State opposed the motion, arguing that the parole data was not relevant to whether defendant's sentence was illegal, and that defendant was not entitled to a Miller/Zuber1 hearing because his original sentence was neither life without parole nor "the practical equivalent of life without parole."

Although recognizing that defendant had a blemish-free institutional record, the trial court denied the motion, finding it did not have the authority to review Parole Board or Appellate Division decisions. While crediting the parole data submitted by defendant and acknowledging that the "continued incarceration of defendant at the hands of the Parole Board did not seem to be the intention of [the sentencing judge]," the trial court nonetheless concluded that defendant's sentence was not within the purview of Miller, Zuber, or Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (2010). Noting the absence of any "mandated system of review for all lengthy juvenile sentences," the trial court held "there [were] no grounds for relief to defendant under the holdings in Miller, Graham or Zuber."

Applying Article I, Paragraph 12 of the New Jersey Constitution and the fundamental fairness doctrine, the court extended the procedure recently adopted by our Supreme Court in State v. Comer, ___ N.J. ___ (2022), for a juvenile convicted of homicide to petition the trial court for a review of their sentence after having served twenty years in prison, to defendant, who was sentenced to life without a specified period of parole ineligibility, and has now been imprisoned more than forty years as a result of seven parole denials.

The court reversed and remanded for an adversarial hearing to afford defendant the "meaningful opportunity to obtain release based on demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation" envisioned by Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (2010) and Zuber, and adopted by Comer. At the evidentiary hearing, defendant shall have the right to be represented by legal counsel, present witnesses and expert testimony, cross-examine the State's witnesses, and introduce his nonconfidential parole records and other relevant, admissible exhibits. The court left the admissibility of such records and exhibits and any request for discovery to the sound discretion of the trial court. The court directed the trial court to consider the Miller factors and determine whether defendant has demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation.

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1 State v. Zuber, 227 N.J. 422 (2017).