Published Appellate Court Opinions

A grand jury indicted defendant with first degree kidnapping, four counts of first degree aggravated sexual assault, and other related offenses. At the victim's request, the State sought a protective order pursuant to Rule 3:13-3(e)(1) to exclude her home address from the discovery made available to defendant. The trial court ordered the State to disclose the victim's home address to his counsel and investigators.

By leave granted, this court holds that the disclosure of the victim's home address in this case violates the public policy of this State, as reflected in The Victims' Rights Amendment to our State Constitution. N.J. Const., art. I, ¶ 22. This disclosure also violates the Sexual Assault Victim's Bill of Rights, N.J.S.A. 52:4B-60.1 to 60.3, which gives a victim of sexual violence the right "[t]o choose whether to participate in any investigation of the assault[.]" N.J.S.A. 52:4B-60.2(7).

In this third-party automobile negligence action, this court determined that plaintiff was entitled, under the Comparative Negligence Act (CNA), N.J.S.A. 2A:15-5.1 to -5.8, to fully recover his damages from defendant after the jury found her sixty percent responsible for causing the accident, even though defendant was unable to obtain contribution under the Joint Tortfeasors Contribution Law, N.J.S.A. 2A:53A-1 to -5, directly from plaintiff's uninsured motorist (UM) carrier. From a practical standpoint, defendant receives an offset up to plaintiff's uninsured motorist policy limit, thereby foreclosing the possibility of plaintiff receiving double recovery. But her inability to recover directly from the UM carrier for any amount defendant paid above her pro rata share does not present an obstacle to plaintiff's full recovery under the CNA.

Plaintiff and defendant—brother and sister, respectively—were named as co-trustees of a trust created by their mother. A few months after their mother's passing, plaintiff resigned as trustee. He later contested his resignation and his sister's actions as the remaining trustee, filing a verified complaint and subsequent amended verified complaint seeking: an order declaring him a trustee; a full accounting of the actions taken by defendant as trustee; a return of all trust and non-trust property taken by defendant or any agent of defendant; compensatory, consequential, incidental, nominal and expectation damages; and lawful interest, attorney's fees and other equitable relief.

The court determined the trial court's decision that plaintiff signed a Resignation of Trustee and did not, as he contended, delegate his authority to a co-trustee was supported by substantial, credible evidence. Neither prior notice of the resignation to the trust's beneficiaries and the co-trustee nor approval of the court was needed under N.J.S.A. 3B:31-50(a), because the trust provided if either trustee was "unable or unwilling to serve or to continue to serve, then the other shall serve as sole trustee[.]" It further provided "[n]o [t]rustee shall be required to obtain the order of any court to exercise any power or discretion" under the trust. Not only did the trust allow resignations, it provided for continuity of the trust's administration if a trustee did resign. Because plaintiff resigned, the court further rejected his argument that defendant violated N.J.S.A. 3B:31-48 by making unilateral decisions.

The court also upheld the trial court's determination that defendant did not violate the Prudent Investor Act (the Act), N.J.S.A. 3B:20-11.1 to -11.12, by holding trust assets in regular bank accounts. The prudent investor rule is a default rule—expressing "a standard of conduct, not outcome," N.J.S.A. 3B:2-11.9—and was expanded by the trust provisions granting defendant broad investment powers. The degree of caution exercised by defendant was befitting her fiduciary capacity

Although defendant breached her fiduciary duty by making a one-time distribution of trust funds to herself, she acted in accordance with the trust's broad grant of powers by delaying other interim distributions until inheritance taxes were paid. The court also determined, under N.J.S.A. 3B:31-72(a), the trial court properly found plaintiff was entitled only to five-percent interest on the amount of the co-trustee's self-serving distribution, dismissing plaintiff's request for "other appropriate relief" under N.J.S.A. 3B:31-71(b)(10), including lost investment opportunity and punitive damages, because the "opinion" of plaintiff's expert was "nothing more than speculation of what [p]laintiff might have earned if distributions were made to [him] from the [t]rust," and plaintiff did not pray for punitive damages in his complaint or prove defendant acted with actual malice or wanton and willful disregard for plaintiff.

In addition, the court determined, notwithstanding a fiduciary's duty to communicate with beneficiaries as required by N.J.S.A. 3B:31-67(a) and 3B:31-5(b)(7), there was no evidence that plaintiff suffered damages as a result of defendant's unresponsiveness to his inquiries for a brief period.

The court also summarily addressed plaintiff's counsel-fee arguments and his argument that the trial court abused its discretion by refusing to allow him to testify as a rebuttal witness.

This interlocutory appeal from a Rule 4:6-2(e) dismissal order raises novel issues of legal duty and tort liability in a drunk driving context. The issues concern whether a volunteer who assures police officers at a roadside stop of an apparently inebriated driver that he will take the driver and his car safely to a residence—but thereafter relinquishes the car to the driver before reaching that destination—can be civilly liable as a joint tortfeasor if the driver then collides with and injures another motorist

In the present case, police officers stopped a driver who was traveling in the wrong direction on a one-way street. Perceiving the motorist was unfit to drive, the officers asked him if he could arrange for someone to pick him up. The motorist called a friend, who quickly arrived and assured the officers that he would drive the motorist and his car to another location. Relying on this assurance, the police issued a moving violation traffic ticket to the motorist and allowed the friend to drive him away. Minutes later, the friend returned the car to the motorist at a railroad crossing and separated from him. The motorist, who was intoxicated well over the legal limit, resumed driving and crashed his car into the plaintiff's vehicle. He later pled guilty to committing assault by auto while under the influence of alcohol. The severely injured plaintiff sued the driver, a bar where the driver had been drinking that night, the police officers and their city employer, and the volunteer. The volunteer moved to dismiss the claims against him, arguing he owed no legal duty that could make him civilly liable to any extent for this accident.

After reviewing a video of the motor vehicle stop and a prosecutor's investigative report, the motion judge concluded the volunteer breached no legal duty to the injured plaintiff. The judge accordingly dismissed plaintiff's claims, as well as the police defendants’ related cross-claims for contribution, against the volunteer.

Applying statutory public policies, including John's Law, N.J.S.A. 39:4-50.22, and allied common law principles, the court reverses the motion judge's dismissal order.

The court holds that a volunteer who fails to discharge his commitment to the police in such a situation and who willingly allows a visibly intoxicated motorist to resume driving can bear a portion of the civil liability for an ensuing motor vehicle accident caused by that drunk driver. The presence of such a legal duty will hinge upon whether the volunteer is advised by the police, or objectively has reason to know from the surrounding circumstances, that his or her promise is an important obligation and that failing to carry it out could result in civil financial consequences.

The court granted leave to appeal and summarily vacated an order that denied reconsideration of an earlier interlocutory order because the judge invoked the "palpably incorrect" standard, which applies only to Rule 4:49-2 motions to alter or amend a final judgment or final order, instead of the more liberal standard of Rule 4:42-2, which declares that interlocutory orders "shall be subject to revision at any time before the entry of final judgment in the sound discretion of the court in the interest of justice." The court also found the judge erred by giving undue deference to the prior judge's interlocutory order and by applying the law of the case doctrine, which has no bearing in this setting.

In remanding, the court provided guidance about the prior order that precluded a non-party, who failed to appear for a subpoenaed deposition, from testifying at trial. The court observed that the first judge had applied Rule 4:23-2, which applies only to parties, instead of Rule 1:9-5, which applies when a non-party fails to honor a subpoena. The court directed that the trial judge, in ruling on the reconsideration motion, consider how the latter rule's purpose is to secure the non-party's compliance with the subpoena, not to hamper the trial's search for the truth by eliminating the non-party's potentially relevant testimony.

A jury convicted defendant of the murder of her six-year-old son, who defendant reported went missing while both were at a Memorial Day carnival in 1991. Although defendant was immediately suspected of the crime in 1992 when her son's remains were found in a shallow grave, and the case received national media attention, the State did not indict defendant until 2014, after three women who babysat the child in the late 1980s and early 1990s identified a distinctive blanket found at the gravesite as the child's.

Defendant appealed, contending the evidence was insufficient to prove that she caused her son's death, and the delay in prosecution violated her due process rights. Defendant also argued that the judge erred by dismissing a deliberating juror who had conducted independent research and substituting an alternate juror to continue deliberations.

The court affirmed defendant's conviction, concluding that giving the State the benefit of all favorable testimony and inferences drawn from the circumstantial evidence presented to the jury, there was sufficient evidence to prove defendant purposefully or knowingly caused her son's death. The court also concluded the delay in prosecution did not deny defendant her due process rights, and the judge did not err in substituting an alternate for a deliberating juror who had violated the court's instructions and conducted independent research.

Plaintiff, a limited liability company (LLC), sued defendants, alleging they had been members of plaintiff, were bound by an operating agreement they had not signed, and, under the terms of the operating agreement, owed plaintiff shortfall amounts and penalties when they voluntarily left plaintiff. The trial court summarily determined defendants were bound by the operating agreement, relying primarily on N.J.SA. 42:2C-12(b), which states "[a] person that becomes a member of a limited liability company is deemed to assent to the operating agreement."

Considering the definition of operating agreement set forth in N.J.S.A. 42:2C-2 and the language of N.J.S.A. 42:2C-12(b), the court held a draft operating agreement does not become the operating agreement of an LLC unless it is "the agreement . . . of all the members of" the LLC, N.J.S.A. 42:2C-2, meaning "all the members" have to agree to it. If all existing members do not agree to the draft agreement when it is proposed, then the draft operating agreement remains a draft agreement and does not become the operating agreement of the LLC. If all members agree to a draft operating agreement, it then becomes the operating agreement of the LLC and any subsequent members are bound by the already-existing operating agreement. Because the trial court misinterpreted statutory law, the court reversed the partial summary judgment entered in plaintiff's favor.

J.S. challenged an order continuing his civil commitment to the Special Treatment Unit under the Sexually Violent Predators Act, N.J.S.A. 30:4-27.24 to -27.38 on grounds his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance. The court affirmed the order of commitment and held that a litigant subject to a civil commitment may raise claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. The court also held that such claims may be raised on appeal from the commitment order or an order continuing commitment. However, the record must be sufficient to address the claims. Otherwise, the claims of ineffective assistance of counsel must be raised to the trial court in the first instance.

Defendant Bey Lea Village Care Center owned and operated a nursing facility where Maryann Cottrell was a patient. She signed an arbitration agreement upon her admission in 2017, was there for twenty days and discharged. She was admitted to Bey Lea again in early 2018 where she resided for ten months until her death. Maryann Cottrell did not sign an arbitration agreement for the 2018 admission. While she was a resident in 2018, Bey Lea sold the nursing facility to defendant Complete Care at Bey Lea, LLC. Defendants claim the 2017 arbitration agreement applies to the 2018 admission.

The court affirms the order denying arbitration of issues arising from the 2018 admission. The court concludes there was no arbitration agreement for the 2018 admission and the 2017 agreement did not apply. Although the 2017 arbitration agreement included a clause delegating to an arbitrator the ability to decide "gateway disputes regarding the enforceability, validity, severability and/or interpretation" of the arbitration agreement, it was for a judge —not an arbitrator— to decide whether the 2017 arbitration agreement applied to the 2018 admission. The 2017 agreement did not apply because Maryann Cottrell did not assent to arbitrate disputes about the 2018 admission.

Plaintiff was severely injured in a one-vehicle motorcycle accident and was diagnosed with quadriplegia. He claims the EMTs who responded to the accident scene caused or exacerbated his injuries by the way they picked him up from the ground and placed him in the ambulance. Plaintiff appeals from the order of Law Division that denied his motion for leave to file a late notice of claim under the Tort Claims Act.

N.J.S.A. 59:8-8 requires a claimant to file a notice of claim within ninety days of its accrual. This court holds the Law Division mistakenly exercised its discretion by not giving proper consideration to the traumatic ramifications of the catastrophic, life-altering injuries plaintiff suffered in this accident. Under the standard established by the Supreme Court in S.E.W. Friel Co. v. New Jersey Turnpike Auth., 73 N.J. 107, 122 (1977), these facts are sufficient to constitute "extraordinary circumstances" pursuant to N.J.S.A. 59:8-9.

The court remands the matter for resentencing of Latonia Elizabeth Bellamy, a/k/a Na-Na, Latonia E. Bellamy, Latonia Bellamy, whom a jury convicted of first-degree murder, N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3(a)(1) and (2), among other offenses. The court reiterates that a resentence, absent some specific limiting directive to the contrary, allows a judge to engage in the statutory analysis anew. State v. Case, 220 N.J. 49 (2014). The judge must sentence the defendant as he or she stands before the court at that time.

The court also addressed the applicability of N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(b)(14), a mitigating factor enacted after defendant's prior sentence. It applies when a defendant is less than twenty-six years of age when the crimes occurred. It may be considered on remand because this is essentially a new sentence proceeding. Application of the statute is therefore not "retroactive," and even if so, the statute's ameliorative purpose allows it. This does not automatically entitle youthful defendants sentenced before October 19, 2020, with cases in the pipeline, to reconsideration of their sentences based solely on a claim that the new law should be applied.

Furthermore, defendant should be granted access, pursuant to N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.10a(b)(6), to her Division of Child Protection and Permanency records in preparation for her sentence. Defendants charged with crimes are entitled to the records, redacted by the court, to aid in their defense where relevant as a matter of due process. State v. Cusick, 219 N.J. Super. 452, 459 (App. Div. 1987). The records should be made equally available to individuals who came under the Division's care and may benefit from access to the information. The application may be made in the Law Division, not in the Family Part.

The novel issue presented in this appeal is whether a claim of self-defense applies to a charge of endangering an injured victim, N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1.2(a), when the injured victim has been injured by the defendant in the course of defending himself against said victim.

Following a jury trial, defendant was acquitted of murder and weapons offenses but convicted of endangering an injured victim, whom he admitted stabbing in self-defense after an altercation during which the victim forbade defendant from entering a store, threatened to beat defendant up, and threw a punch when defendant refused to heed the warnings. Defendant dodged the punch and stabbed the victim once in the chest with a knife defendant had produced from his pocket and brandished during the altercation. After the stabbing, the victim staggered around before collapsing on the ground and defendant left the scene without calling for medical assistance. The victim was later transported to the hospital where he died from the stab wound the following morning. Video surveillance footage of the entire five-minute encounter was played at the trial.

The trial judge instructed the jury on self-defense as applied to the homicide and weapons-related charges, but not the endangering charge. At trial, defense counsel neither requested the charge nor objected to its omission. However, on appeal, defendant argued the charge should have been given because self-defense applied to endangering.

After analyzing the general principles pertaining to justification defenses and considering the elements and legislative history of the endangering an injured victim statute, the court concluded that its omission in the unique facts presented in this case does not rise to the level of plain error. The court reasoned that when defendant left the scene, it was clear that his conduct had rendered the victim physically helpless such that he no longer posed a threat to defendant or anyone else. Because the victim was physically helpless, defendant could not have had a reasonable belief in the continued need to use force or the requirement to retreat without summoning medical assistance to justify self-defense. Rather than imposing an obligation on defendant to secure the safety of his attacker while endangering himself, the application of the endangering statute in this case sought to preserve a life after the threat or need for force had been neutralized.

Judge Sabatino joins in the result and issues a concurring opinion. The concurrence underscores the court's recognition that principles of self-defense, necessity or other justification may appropriately apply in some factual situations to relieve a crime victim, who has repelled and injured an attacker, of criminal liability under N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1.2(a).

Defendant owned a trampoline park and required that adults who brought minors to the facility electronically execute a waiver of rights that also included an arbitration agreement at a computer station prior to entry. The adult would necessarily have to certify he/she was the parent or legal guardian of the minor or had been granted power-of-attorney to execute the waiver on behalf of the child's parent. Third-party defendant listed plaintiff's child as one of the minors seeking entry to the facility and executed the waiver. Plaintiff's child fractured his leg while using the trampolines.

Defendant sought summary judgment dismissing the complaint and compelling arbitration of plaintiff's negligence claims. Defendant argued that it reasonably believed in the third party's "apparent authority" to execute the waiver on plaintiff's behalf. The judge denied defendant's motion and defendant appealed as of rights.

The court affirmed, rejecting defendant's argument that it was entitled as a matter of law on the motion record to rely on the doctrine of apparent authority to enforce the waiver and compel arbitration. In particular, the court examined the provisions and commentary of the Restatement (Third) of Agency regarding the doctrine of apparent authority.

Defendant appealed from a final restraining order (FRO) entered against her pursuant to the Prevention of Domestic Violence Act, N.J.S.A. 2C:25-17 to -35, based on a predicate act of harassment, N.J.S.A. 2C:33-4(a). This court reversed because the trial court did not conduct the required legal analysis necessary to enter the FRO under Silver v. Silver, 387 N.J. Super. 112 (App. Div. 2006) and the record did not demonstrate plaintiff needed future protection. Further, our review of the record also disclosed defendant was deprived of due process due to numerous trial irregularities in the remote proceeding, including that defendant had insufficient notice and opportunity to prepare a defense in her case, plaintiff's witness was not sequestered, plaintiff testified in the witness's presence with witness coaching plaintiff, and the trial court engaged in inappropriate questioning of defendant.

This appeal implicates the proper application and limitations of Rule 1:13-7, an administrative "docket-clearing rule." The court considered two issues: (1) whether the good cause or exceptional circumstances standard applies for reinstatement of the complaint in a multi-defendant case, where no defendants have appeared in the case and participated in discovery; and (2) whether the rule empowers the trial court to dismiss a complaint with prejudice in response to a motion filed by the nondelinquent party.

The court concluded the trial court misapplied the exceptional circumstances standard under Rule 1:13-7, thereby preventing adjudication of plaintiffs' claims on the merits. In that regard, the trial court mistakenly exercised its discretion by denying plaintiffs' motion to reinstate their complaint. The court also held that Rule 1:13-7 neither empowers a trial court to dismiss a cause of action with prejudice nor authorizes a party in a case to affirmatively seek such a drastic sanction as a form of relief.

Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded the order under review so the underlying medical malpractice action can be decided on the merits.

In 2019, three women alleged that J.D. sexually assaulted them years earlier when they and J.D. were minors. The State filed juvenile delinquency complaints against J.D. and moved to waive certain charges to the Criminal Part to try J.D. as an adult on the alleged assaults that occurred when he was between the ages of fifteen and seventeen.

The issue on this appeal is whether the waiver proceedings should be governed by the current statute, N.J.S.A. 2A:4A-26.1, which became effective in March 2016, or by a hybrid of the current statute and one provision of the statute in effect at the time of the alleged offenses, N.J.S.A. 2A:4A-26(e). The court holds that the current statute governs.

The mother of an infant girl was unable to identify the father, so defendant was not a specified party to the KLG action the Division instituted shortly after his daughter's birth because the mother's disabilities rendered her unable to care for her daughter. Defendant remained incarcerated for the greater part of the first twelve years of her life but, after he learned of the child and established paternity, applied for visitation. By then, the child had been in the care and custody of the KLG guardian. Eventually, the trial court amended the KLG judgment and granted defendant limited contact with his daughter.

After a series of motions relating to that contact, defendant sought visitation and vacation of the KLG judgment. The trial court granted limited contact with the child—then twelve years old—and refused to address the motion to vacate the KLG judgment, concluding res judicata precluded such an application.

We reversed, determining the court erred because res judicata did not bar defendant's application to vacate the judgment rendered in an action to which he was not a party and involved proofs related solely to the mother, not defendant. We recognized the KLG judgment did not abrogate defendant's parental rights.

We reviewed the statutory grounds for vacating a KLG judgment under N.J.S.A. 3B:12A-6(f) and 3B:12-6(g), the procedures that should be followed and the criteria analyzed in determining the child's best interests when a non-party seeks to vacate a KLG judgment.

Defendant appealed from a declaratory judgment finding the marital agreement (MA) she and her former spouse signed eight months after they married was a valid, enforceable agreement. And, she appealed from the final judgment of divorce (JOD) that incorporated the MA. We conclude the trial court erred by deeming the agreement to be in the nature of an enforceable pre-marital agreement. The parties' mid-marriage agreement was negotiated and executed after they wed, and the inherently coercive circumstances accompanying the making of the agreement here warranted heightened judicial scrutiny to assure it was fair and equitable. Therefore, we reverse the declaratory judgment and that portion of the JOD which enforced the MA, vacate the denial of defendant's counsel fee request, and remand for further proceedings. We identify factors the trial court should consider on remand when assessing whether to enforce the agreement.

The court reverses the final judgment in this quiatimet and ejectment action that divested defendant State of New Jersey of its title to seven parcels of land in the Preservation Area of the Pinelands National Reserve, consisting of over 250 acres, and granted title to those properties to an adjoining landowner, plaintiff Phoenix Pinelands Corporation, operator of a grandfathered sand and gravel mine. The court declares Phoenix's surreptitious, two-decade-long quest to undermine and cloud the State's title to the properties and establish its own competing chains of title — by plotting and resurveying the titles from the original grants from the Council of Proprietors of West Jersey, searching those titles forward, purchasing the fractional interests of the descendants of long-dead record title holders, convincing the tax assessor of Little Egg Harbor to make Phoenix's principal, David Denise, the assessed owner of the State's properties, consolidating the State's lands with Phoenix's sand mine, and having the State's parcels wiped off the tax map — the nefarious acts of a title raider, which should have barred it from any relief in a court of equity.

Having declared Phoenix's attempted annexation of the State's lands as violative of public policy, the court imposes a constructive trust on the "title" Phoenix acquired to one of the State's seven parcels, finding the State equitably entitled to the parcel upon payment to Phoenix of the sum it paid to acquire it, plus simple interest, and further finds Phoenix failed to establish title to any of the State's remaining six parcels under theories of quia timet or ejectment.

Accordingly, the court remands for entry of judgment in recordable form, following the State's tender of payment as described above, declaring Denise and Phoenix have no interest in these State lands and adjudging the State the owner of each parcel in fee simple.

Plaintiff Stephen Lanzo III filed a complaint alleging he contracted mesothelioma due to his long-term use of talc products that contained asbestos. His spouse asserted a claim for the loss of her husband's services, society, and consortium. The case was tried before a jury, which returned a verdict against defendants Johnson & Johnson Consumer, Inc. (JJCI), and Imerys Talc America, Inc. (Imerys).

We reverse the judgment and remand the matter to the trial court for new, separate trials against JJCI and Imerys. We conclude the trial court erred by permitting plaintiffs' experts to testify that non-asbestiform mineral fragments can cause mesothelioma because the experts' theory was not generally accepted in the scientific community and lacked support in a publication reasonably relied upon by other experts in the field.

We also conclude the trial court did not mistakenly exercise its discretion by providing an adverse inference instruction to the jury based on Imerys' discovery violations and failure to retain relevant evidence. We decided, however, that the trial court erred by failing to sever the claims against JJCI because the adverse inference instruction was unduly prejudicial to JJCI, which had no role in the discovery violations or the spoliation of evidence.