Published Appellate Court Opinions

Plaintiffs sued defendants, a law firm and three individuals associated with the firm, claiming that their rights of privacy had been violated when defendants failed to redact their personal identifiers contrary to the directive of Rule 1:38-7.  Plaintiffs also contended that defendants violated one plaintiff's right of privacy by including records of that plaintiff's arrest and criminal charges.  The court holds that Rule 1:38-7 did not create a private cause of action for a violation of the Rule.  Instead, the remedy for a violation of Rule 1:38-7 is set forth in the Rule, which states that a party or other interested individual can move, on an expedited basis, to replace documents containing unredacted personal identifiers with redacted documents.  R. 1:38-7(g).  The court also holds that plaintiffs failed to state viable causes of action for invasions of privacy or infliction of emotional distress.   Accordingly, the court affirms the dismissal of plaintiffs' complaint. 

Defendant City of Jersey City's (City) Code of Ordinances Section 105 permits any individual to request a "determination of significance" from the City's Historic Preservation Officer (HPO) regarding whether a subject building warrants preservation.  Consistent with local ordinances, plaintiff, who owns a circa-1900 building in Jersey City, sought a determination of significance before applying for a demolition permit.  The City's HPO concluded plaintiff's building likely would not be approved for demolition due to its historic, architectural, and cultural significance.

Pursuant to local zoning ordinance, plaintiff appealed to defendant Zoning Board of Adjustment (ZBA), which upheld the determination of significance.  Thereafter, he filed a complaint in lieu of prerogative writs in the Law Division alleging defendants' actions were arbitrary, capricious, and unreasonable.  The Law Division found the ZBA's decision was not arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable and dismissed the complaint. 

The court concludes the HPO's issuance of a determination of significance — an advisory opinion seemingly intended to prevent plaintiff's submission of an application for a demolition permit — is not a procedure authorized by the Municipal Land Use Law (MLUL), N.J.S.A. 40:55D-1 to -163.  The MLUL does not authorize HPOs to unilaterally grant or deny historic preservation designations that bind a zoning officer in determining whether a demolition permit shall issue; that advisory function belongs solely to the Historic Preservation Commission, as detailed in the MLUL, and cannot be delegated to other entities or individuals.  The Commission, in turn, may designate a site as historic only if it is voted upon by a majority of the full governing body. 

The court reverses and remands to allow plaintiff to apply for a demolition permit in accordance with the MLUL.  The court also concludes Jersey City's Code of Ordinances Sections 105-3, 105-4, and 105-7 are ultra vires and inconsistent with the objectives and procedures concerning historic preservation mandated by the MLUL to the extent they delegate powers reserved for a municipality's historic preservation commission to the HPS.   

M.P., a juvenile, is charged with gun possession and participation in a murder.  He appeals the trial judge's decision to admit the statement he gave to detectives during a stationhouse interrogation, which was attended by his mother.  M.P. asks the court to adopt a new categorical rule that would prohibit police from conducting a stationhouse interrogation of a juvenile unless the minor has consulted with an attorney.  M.P. relies on neuroscience and behavioral science research that shows juveniles are not only more impulsive and compliant than adults but also tend to lack the cognitive skills to comprehend Miranda rights.  He contends that in view of advances in the scientific understanding of adolescent brain development, no juvenile should be subjected to a stationhouse interrogation—with or without parental participation—until the juvenile has consulted with counsel.

The court explains it has no authority to pronounce any such per se requirement.  While acknowledging there have been significant reforms to New Jersey's juvenile justice system in recent years based on scientific research on how a juvenile's brain develops and how it functions differently from a fully mature adult brain, the court holds those studies do not grant it authority to substantially rework the State's juvenile interrogation jurisprudence, and certainly not to overturn New Jersey Supreme Court precedents.  The court concludes that while the rules and principles announced in those precedents are not immutable, it is for our Supreme Court and the Legislature—not an intermediate appellate court—to weigh the benefits and costs of the major juvenile justice system policy shift M.P. proposes.

The court also declines M.P.'s request to revise the Miranda warnings to make them more comprehensible to adolescents.  While noting the current warnings are not sacrosanct and might be improved based on juvenile brain research, the court concludes the task of revising the warnings to address the inherent differences between adults and juveniles would benefit from a collaborative process the court cannot provide. 

Turning to the application of existing precedents to the present case, although the court is mindful of the deference it owes to the trial judge's factual findings, it concludes that considering all relevant circumstances, including M.P.'s intellectual challenges, mental conditions, highly emotional state, and the role his mother played, the State failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that M.P. knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived his right against self-incrimination.  The court therefore reverses the trial judge's decision. 

The court rejects the State's argument that reviewing courts should not consider an interrogee's personal characteristics, such as intelligence and education background, if those circumstances were not known by or "noticeable" to police.  The court holds those circumstances remain relevant notwithstanding they may not manifest outwardly during an interrogation.  The court explains that reviewing courts do not employ a purely objective test when determining whether the State proved a valid Miranda waiver beyond a reasonable doubt, but rather consider the characteristics of the accused and not just the details of the interrogation.   

The court also rules the guidance the Supreme Court provided in State in Int. of A.A., 240 N.J. 341, 354 (2020)—which held police should provide an opportunity for a juvenile and parent to consult privately after Miranda warnings are given—did not mandate a new rule of police procedure but rather amplified the existing totality-of-the-circumstances test.  Accordingly, the court reasons the rationale undergirding A.A. should be given retroactive effect.

The court considered plaintiff's challenge to a trial court order vacating a final judgment by default in a tax sale foreclosure.  Plaintiff obtained a final judgment by default on its tax sale lien and defendants timely moved to vacate the order, alleging defective service of process.  The trial court found sufficient defects with process to warrant vacating the final judgment, which reopened the redemption period and allowed defendant to redeem. 

The court affirmed, concluding service of process was defective pursuant to both the general court rules governing personal service, as well as the RULLCA-specific statute governing service of process on LLCs, N.J.S.A. 42:2C-17.  The court noted the differences between service rules in RULLCA and the Business Corporations Act (BCA), N.J.S.A. 14A:1-1 to: 18-11, in finding plaintiff's waiver argument unavailing.  Although RULLCA and the BCA contain some similarities, the rules governing service are distinct and materially different.  Service upon a corporation in New Jersey is governed by Rule 4:4-4(a)(6) and N.J.S.A. 14A:4-2, whereas service upon an LLC is governed by Rule 4:4-4(a)(5), and RULLCA, N.J.S.A. 42:2C-17. 

The RULLCA service of process provision contains an additional method of service lacking in the BCA, providing, as a permissive alternative, that where personal service in accordance with the court rules fails despite reasonably diligent efforts, service may be made upon the State filing office.  N.J.S.A. 42:2C-17(b).  The BCA service of process provisions do not authorize the State to accept process as an agent of a corporation.  R. 4:4-4(a)(6); N.J.S.A. 14A:4-2.

Because final judgment was vacated, the court followed Green Knight Cap., LLC v. Calderon, 252 N.J. 265 (2022), in holding the period of redemption reopened and continued until barred by a valid final judgment of the Superior Court.  The court interpreted the holding in Green Knight, in conjunction with Rule 4:64-6(b) and the tax sale law, N.J.S.A. 54:5-86(a), to mean the redemption period reopens when a final judgment in foreclosure is timely vacated.

Defendant injected himself with fentanyl-laced heroin, lost control of an SUV he had been driving, his vehicle crashed into a gas station, and tragically killed three persons and injured others.  He pled guilty to three counts of first-degree aggravated manslaughter, N.J.S.A. 2C:11-4(a), and was sentenced to an aggregate prison term of thirty years, with the requirement that he serve over twenty-five years before he is eligible for parole.

Defendant appeals from the denial of his motion to suppress and his sentence.  He argues that the warrantless search of his clothes, conducted at a hospital over an hour after his arrest, was unlawful, and that he is entitled to a resentencing.  The court holds that the search of his clothes was a lawful search incident to his arrest.  The court also holds that the sentencing court conducted the appropriate analysis and did not abuse its discretion in sentencing defendant to three consecutive prison terms of ten years for the death of each victim.  Accordingly, the court affirms defendant's convictions and his sentence. 

          This appeal arises out of an action challenging the suspension of a company that had been providing towing services in a municipality.  As a matter of first impression, the court holds that the company had limited constitutional due process rights when it was suspended from the Township's towing lists.  The court also holds that plaintiff received the process due its limited property interest.  In addition, the court rejected plaintiff's arguments that its suspension from the towing lists violated its constitutional substantive due process and equal protection rights.  Consequently, the court affirmed the summary judgment dismissal of plaintiff's claims against the Township, its police chief, and one of its police officers. 

          Appellant Karen McKnight appeals from the Board of Review's (the "Board") August 26, 2022 final agency decision, which held her liable to return an overpayment of $6,277 for unemployment benefits she was allegedly ineligible to receive for the weeks ending June 30, 2018 through May 4, 2019, pursuant to N.J.S.A. 43:21-16(d).  The central issue on appeal is whether a claimant, who is otherwise separated from full-time employment, may include wages received from a part-time position, which they continue to maintain, in the calculation of their average weekly wage for purposes of unemployment benefits.  The court concluded that the exclusion of the wages contravenes the legislative purpose of the unemployment benefits statute and is arbitrary as legally unsupported.  Therefore, the court reversed and remanded for a recalculation of benefits.

         In this appeal from the Law Division's grant of summary judgment to defendants, the court was asked to consider, for the first time, whether a motor vehicle subject to a recall notice alone is sufficient to establish a claim pursuant to the New Jersey Lemon Law statute, N.J.S.A. 56:12-29 to -49.  Defendant issued a recall notice that encompassed plaintiff's vehicle.  Plaintiff subsequently brought the vehicle to the dealer to have the recall repair performed.  Primarily due to disruptions resulting from the COVID-19 pandemic, defendant's ability to complete the recall was delayed.

         A Law Division judge granted defendant summary judgment.  The court affirmed and held the existence of a recall notice alone is not sufficient to establish the "nonconformity" element of a Lemon Law claim.  In addition, because plaintiff primarily used the vehicle for business purposes, it is excluded from the Lemon Law's coverage.

The court considers whether the Superior Court has jurisdiction to adjudicate claims for monetary damages, filed years after the statutory deadline for filing a tax appeal, based on allegations that municipal officials committed fraud and other torts by assessing real property in a manner inconsistent with law and at an amount above its true market value.  The court concludes that the Superior Court lacks jurisdiction to hear such claims because they are substantively equivalent to a tax appeal properly venued in the Tax Court or a county board of taxation, and the statutory deadlines for challenging local property tax assessments may not be circumvented by a late-filed complaint seeking damages for alleged torts arising from the tax assessment process.  In light of these conclusions, the court affirms the trial court order dismissing the complaint in this matter with prejudice for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.

Plaintiff and decedent were partners for twenty-five years but never married.  During their relationship, decedent owned an income-producing property in fee simple, which, unbeknownst to plaintiff, he transferred during his lifetime to himself and plaintiff as joint tenants with rights of survivorship.  Decedent signed and recorded the transfer deed.  Plaintiff discovered her interest in the property only after decedent passed away.  Plaintiff sought injunctive relief to quiet title and was granted summary judgment, based on the trial court's holding that all elements of a valid inter vivos gift were present.

Defendant, who is decedent's son and administrator of the estate, urges reversal, claiming material issues of fact precluded summary judgment, specifically challenging the validity of the inter vivos gift of real property.

The court affirms.  Defendants presented no evidence to rebut the presumptions of donative intent, delivery and acceptance raised by the recorded transfer deed.  Acceptance is presumed subject to plaintiff's right to disclaim her interest within a reasonable time of becoming aware of it.  The additional element of relinquishment required for a valid inter vivos gift in New Jersey was also satisfied upon recordation of the transfer deed because decedent could not unilaterally restore his former fee simple estate.

         These consolidated cases require us to consider the scope of the statutory self-critical analysis privilege and determine whether materials developed as part of self-critical analysis conducted pursuant to a facility's patient safety plan are subject to discovery, disclosure, and admissible at trial.  This analysis hinges upon whether the facilities involved in these cases met the requirements imposed by the Patient Safety Act (PSA), N.J.S.A. 26:2H-12.23 to -12.25, and related regulations, rendering the materials sought by plaintiffs privileged and protected from disclosure.

Defendants argue the trial court erred by ruling incident/investigation reports concerning separate incidents resulting in injuries at two facilities are not privileged under the PSA and therefore discoverable.  The court reversed the trial court's orders. 

Surveying the case law interpreting the PSA and regulations, the court notes that the PSA was designed to reduce medical errors by promoting internal self-reporting and self-critical analysis related to adverse events and near misses by health care facilities.  N.J.S.A. 26:2H-12.25 renders the entire self-critical-analysis process privileged, shielding a health care facility's deliberations and determinations from discovery or admission into evidence.  N.J.S.A. 26:2H-12.25(g), does not condition the privilege on the finding of a Serious Preventable Adverse Event (SPAE).  That an event is not reportable does not abrogate the self-critical-analysis privilege.  The privilege unconditionally protects the process of self-critical analysis, the results of the analysis, and the resulting reports developed by a facility in its compliance with the PSA.  A court may not order the release of documents prepared during the process of self-critical analysis. 

N.J.S.A. 26:2H-12.25(c) requires health care facilities to report every SPAE that occurs in that facility to the Department of Health (DOH).  The documents, materials and information submitted to the DOH pursuant to this requirement are absolutely privileged and shall not be "subject to discovery or admissible as evidence or otherwise disclosed in any civil, criminal, or administrative action or proceeding."  N.J.S.A. 26:2H-12.25(f).  The statute provides no rationale or standard for parsing the contents of the documents, allowing for some portions to be privileged and others not privileged. 

However, when information sought to be protected from disclosure is not submitted to the DOH, the path to a privilege is different.  N.J.S.A. 26:2H-12.25(g) establishes the self-critical analysis privilege for internal documents that are the product of an 'investigative process that may or may not lead to reporting to the DOH.  Any documents, materials, or information developed by a health care facility as part of a process of self-critical analysis conducted pursuant to N.J.S.A. 26:2H-12.25(b) is not subject to discovery, disclosure or admissible as evidence in any civil, criminal, or administrative proceeding. 

Accordingly, if documents are submitted to the DOH pursuant to N.J.S.A. 26:2H-12.25(f) or meet the requirements of N.J.S.A. 26:2H-12.25(g), they are absolutely privileged and not subject to discovery.  Under either of those circumstances, a trial court does not engage in a redaction process and release the redacted document.  The entire document is statutorily protected from disclosure. 

At the same time, the PSA expressly preserves plaintiffs' right to discover facts through conventional means of discovery if obtained from any source or context other than those specified in the PSA.  Moreover, documents created outside the self-critical analysis process are subject to discovery. 

In each case, plaintiffs are free to engage in discovery of facts from non-privileged sources.  Additionally, if defendants produced voluminous medical records in response to a discovery request in either case, plaintiff may request, and the court may order, that defendants provide a "narrative to steer them to information contained in thousands of pages of medical records" in accordance with Brugaletta v. Garcia, 234 N.J. 225, 252 (2018).

This appeal presents a question of first impression regarding whether a claim can be made under the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination (LAD), N.J.S.A. 10:5-1 to -49, where (1) an employer merges with another employer, (2) the employee does not apply for a position with the new employer, but (3) the employee contends that while all other employees were offered employment with the new employer, the employer did not extend the same offer, for reasons proscribed by the LAD.

Because of the LAD's remedial purpose, plaintiff's claim that the decision not to transition her employment from Graham Curtin, P.A. –– the closing employer –– to McElroy Deutsch, Mulvaney & Carpenter, LLP. –– the new employer –– was based on discriminatory factors may constitute a viable cause of action.  There are genuine disputes of material facts regarding whether the decision not to employ her at McElroy Deutsch, Mulvaney & Carpenter was, in fact, discriminatory.  Therefore, the court reverses the motion court's summary judgment dismissal of plaintiff's complaint.

In addition, because the motion court did not address the specifics of plaintiff's claims for wrongful termination, retaliatory termination, and aiding and abetting harassment based on age, disability, and use of disability leave,  we do not either.       

Plaintiff alleged his employer wrongfully terminated him based on a perceived disability in violation of the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination (LAD), N.J.S.A. 10:5-1 to -50.  The disability allegedly perceived by defendants was that plaintiff was "suffering from COVID-19."  A Law Division judge granted defendants' motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 4:6-2(e), finding plaintiff had failed to plead a viable cause of action for perceived disability discrimination under the LAD. 

The court affirmed, agreeing that even assuming defendants believed plaintiff had COVID-19, the facts plaintiff had alleged in his pleadings – on July 23, 2020, plaintiff felt ill in that he felt "cold, clammy, and weak"; he was able to report to work and stay until the end of the day; the next day he was able to go to a free clinic to obtain a COVID-19 test; he did not allege he had gone to a hospital or a doctor's office or that he had otherwise sought medical attention or treatment; some unspecified time later, he reported he "was feeling better"; he was feeling well enough that he felt able to and offered to return to work; and he was terminated on July 29, 2020, after he had reported his condition had improved and he felt well enough to work – were not sufficient to establish a prima facie case under the LAD that he was terminated because his employer perceived he had a disability.

Following the robbery of a store in West New York, police retrieved surveillance video from a nearby building and sent a still photo from the video to the New Jersey Regional Operations Intelligence Center (NJROIC) to help identify the perpetrator using facial recognition technology (FRT).  When the NJROIC could not find a match, police sent all the raw video footage to the Facial Identification Section of the New York Police Department Real Time Crime Center (NYPD RTCC), where a detective captured a still image, compared it against the center's databases, and offered defendant as a possible match.

Police subsequently included the photo from the NYPD RTCC along with five filler photos to construct photo arrays to show two eyewitnesses.  The eyewitnesses identified defendant as the perpetrator, and he was subsequently charged.

Defendant sent the State a discovery demand containing thirteen items seeking information regarding the FRT used to identify him.  He also moved to suppress the out-of-court identifications by the eyewitnesses.  The trial court conducted a Wade[1] hearing and denied the suppression motion.  Meanwhile the State obtained documents from the NYPD RTCC answering two of the thirteen discovery demands.  Defendant moved to compel the State to answer the remaining discovery requests, arguing the discovery was:  necessary to impeach the eyewitness identification; impeach the police investigation; and exculpatory.  Defendant's motion included a declaration from an FRT expert, detailing why the information sought was relevant and explaining the vulnerabilities of FRT, including problems with its reliability.  The trial court denied the motion to compel.

On leave granted, defendant re-asserts the arguments made to the trial court.  Amici joins in defendant's arguments on appeal.

The court held the discovery dispute was a separate matter than the Wade hearing and defendant was entitled to the discovery to construct a defense and for impeachment purposes.  Discovery into the FRT was necessary because it is a novel and untested technology, and no New Jersey court has addressed the issue.  Moreover, the discovery sought was attainable because:  the State raised no proprietary objections; had already obtained some discovery from the NYPD RTCC; and the items sought regarded defendant's identification and reliability of the identification process.

The court reversed and remanded for entry of an order compelling the State to provide the eleven remaining items of discovery.  The trial court is authorized to enter a protective order, order the in-camera review of the materials received from the State, and hold a Daubert[2] hearing, if necessary.

[1]  United States v. Wade, 338 U.S. 218 (1967).

[2]  Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm. Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993).

The court reverses the trial judge's denial of defendant's motion to suppress drugs police found following a motor vehicle stop based on observed traffic violations.  This case presents a novel question concerning the vehicle registration search exception to the warrant requirement.  That exception authorizes police to enter a lawfully stopped vehicle to conduct a pinpointed search for a registration certificate if the motorist is unable or unwilling to produce that document after having been provided a meaningful opportunity to comply with the police request for it.  State v. Terry, 232 N.J. 218, 222 (2018).  In this case, defendant parked and exited the vehicle before police could effectuate the stop.  The court addresses whether police may initiate a search under this "very narrow" exception when the detained motorist is outside the vehicle when police request the registration certificate, and the officer determines it would be unsafe to allow the motorist to reenter the vehicle to retrieve it. 

The court concludes that providing a detained motorist a meaningful opportunity to produce the registration certificate is an indispensable prerequisite to conducting a registration search—one that can only be excused when the motorist is unable or unwilling to comply with the police request for the vehicle credentials.  The court holds a motorist is not "unable" to produce a registration certificate within the meaning of the exception when the sole reason for such inability is a police officer's discretionary decision to prevent reentry.  The court reasons that any contrary interpretation of the registration search exception would undermine, if not eviscerate, the protection of privacy rights afforded by the meaningful-opportunity element by leaving its application to the mercy of unreviewable police discretion. The court declines to create a categorical exemption to the meaningful-opportunity requirement when police determine, in the exercise of their discretion, the motorist should not be allowed to reenter the stopped vehicle for reasons of officer safety. 

Although the police in this case were permitted for their own safety to place defendant in the police car and prevent him from reentering the detained vehicle throughout the investigative detention, that decision had the effect of foreclosing a warrantless registration search.  The court notes that strict enforcement of the meaningful-opportunity prerequisite in these circumstances would not deprive police the ability to investigate whether a car was stolen since they can obtain the information contained in the paper registration certificate by conducting a Motor Vehicle Commission database look-up.    

The court also addresses significant recent revisions to N.J.S.A. 39:3-29—the statute that prescribes a motorist's duty to possess and exhibit a registration certificate to police during a motor vehicle stop and that undergirds the registration search exception to the warrant requirement.  Under the revised statutory framework, motorists are no longer required to possess a paper copy of the vehicle registration certificate.  Rather, they are now permitted to keep and exhibit the registration certificate in either paper or electronic form.

To avoid the futility and needless privacy intrusion of a physical search for a paper document that may not even exist, and that need not be kept in the vehicle in any event, the court holds, prospectively, that police may not enter a detained vehicle under the authority of the registration search exception to search for a paper document without first asking the motorist whether the registration is kept in paper rather electronic form.

R.K. appeals from the denial termination of his registration obligations imposed by Megan's Law.  In June 2000, R.K. was convicted of endangering the welfare of a child and lewdness and was sentenced to a three-year term of probation conditioned upon 194 days in jail, which equaled time served, registration under Megan's Law, and Community Supervision for Life (CSL).

In April 2001, R.K. was convicted of engaging in prostitution as a patron, arising from an incident that took place in November 2000, less than seven months after he was convicted of endangering the welfare of a child. 

In February 2004, R.K.'s probation was revoked on multiple grounds, including committing the prostitution offense.  He was resentenced to a four-year prison term, which he completed on April 26, 2006.  He has not been convicted of any subsequent offense that has not been vacated. 

In December 2021, R.K. filed a motion to terminate his CSL and Megan's Law registration obligations.  The State opposed the motion, arguing R.K. does not meet the criteria for termination of Megan's Law registration obligations and that he remains a danger to the safety of others.  The trial court denied termination of his registration requirements.  R.K. appeals that decision.  The same order terminated CSL. 

On appeal, R.K. argues he is eligible under N.J.S.A. 2C:7-2(f) to terminate his Megan's Law registration requirements.  The court rejects his argument, finding it directly contrary to the clear and unambiguous language of N.J.S.A. 2C:7-2(f), established public policy, and the spirit of Megan's Law. 

N.J.S.A. 2C:7-2(f) allows Megan's Law registrants to apply for termination of registration requirements "upon proof that the person has not committed an offense with 15 years following conviction or release from a correctional facility for any term of imprisonment imposed, whichever is later, and is not likely to pose a threat to the safety of others." 

Within months of being sentenced to probation and released from jail, R.K. committed a prostitution offense, was convicted, and was sentenced.  The court holds that pursuant to the plain language of N.J.S.A. 2C:7-2(f), at the moment R.K. committed the new offense on November 27, 2000, he was permanently and categorically ineligible for termination of his Megan's Law registration requirements.  The fact he was subsequently found in violation of probation and resentenced to a prison term, which he has served, did not restart the clock for eligibility for termination of his registration requirements. 

The court granted defendant Shahaad I. Jones leave to appeal from an order denying his motion to suppress evidence — a handgun and large capacity magazine — seized without a warrant from his person.  The court finds the motion court erred by deciding the suppression motion without an evidentiary hearing because defendant's brief submitted in accordance with Rule 3:5-7(b) raised fact issues as to whether the warrantless search of defendant was justified under the plain view exception to the warrant requirement. 

The court also determined the motion court erred by concluding the statutory rebuttable presumption under N.J.S.A. 40A:14-118.5(q) — that, where law enforcement either fails to adhere to the statutory retention requirements found in N.J.S.A. 40A:14-118.3 to -118.5 for body worn camera (BWC) recordings, or intentionally interferes with a BWC's ability to accurately capture audio and video recordings, the law presumes exculpatory evidence was destroyed or not captured — applies only at trials and not at suppression hearings.  The court finds the plain language of N.J.S.A. 40A:14-118 does not support the motion court's determination and holds that because the statute expressly states the presumption is applicable in "criminal prosecutions," the rebuttable presumption applies in suppression hearings. 

The court reverses the motion court's order denying defendant's suppression motion and remands for further proceedings, including for a determination of whether defendant demonstrates an entitlement to the rebuttable presumption under N.J.S.A. 40A:14-118.5(q), and, if so, whether the State rebuts the presumption. 

In this appeal from summary judgment in a breach of contract action, defendants argue plaintiff law firm violated rules of professional conduct by failing to disclose in its retainer agreement the unit of incremental billing – one tenth of an hour – it would utilize during the course of representation.  Plaintiff and defendants entered two retainer agreements, both of which disclosed a required initial deposit, the hourly rates of each attorney at the firm, and which party was responsible for certain administrative costs. 

Plaintiff represented defendants for more than two years pursuant to the parties' retainer agreements, sending monthly and bimonthly invoices throughout the duration demonstrating work billed in increments of one-tenth of an hour.  When defendants refused to remain current with outstanding fees, plaintiff ceased representation and instituted the breach of contract action. The trial court granted summary judgment.  Defendants urged reversal on appeal.

The court affirmed summary judgment as properly granted, and held the retainer agreement was lawful and ethical where, among other things, it sufficiently apprised the clients of the express terms of the agreement in accordance with RPC 1.5(b), and the parties' course of conduct for two years demonstrated assent to those terms.

Law enforcement officers arrested defendant when he appeared for what he understood to be a sexual encounter with a fourteen-year-old girl with whom he believed he had exchanged text messages on the two preceding days.   In fact, defendant exchanged the messages with a detective using two different cellular phone applications.  After seizing defendant's phone, the officers obtained a search warrant for the phone and an order requiring defendant provide the phone's passcode.   

The court reverses an order denying defendant's motion to quash the search warrant, which authorized a search of all the phone's data.  The court holds the affidavit supporting issuance of the warrant did not establish probable cause to search all the phone's data.  The court also determines probable cause to search all the data on a phone is not established by merely demonstrating the phone's data may include evidence of criminal activity.  The court further concludes a search of data on a cell phone must be limited to only the particular data for which law enforcement establishes probable cause to believe includes evidence of criminal activity, and a search warrant affidavit must define the locations of such data on the phone to the extent possible based on available technology.

M.H., a Tier II registrant, filed a motion to terminate his Megan's Law obligations under N.J.S.A. 2C:7-2(f).  The court affirmed the denial of registrant's application as he committed a failure to report offense within fifteen years of his conviction. 

The court also rejected M.H.'s facial and as applied due process and equal protection challenges to subsection (f).  In doing so, the court relied principally on the reasoning set forth in Doe v. Poritz, 142 N.J. 1 (1995), which upheld as constitutional Megan's Law's registration and community notification provisions, and In re Registrant A.D., 441 N.J. Super. 403, 420 (App. Div. 2015).  The court also rejected registrant's reliance on State in Interest of C.K., 233 N.J. 44 (2018), as that case addressed a juvenile's challenge to subsection (g), and the authority relied upon by the court in concluding subsection (g) was unconstitutional to juveniles is inapplicable to M.H.'s challenges to subsection (f).