- AJACO TOWING, INC. VS. NEW JERSEY STATE POLICE (NEW JERSEY DIVISION OF STATE POLICE) A-3162-21 Appellate April 19, 2024
- R.R. VS. DIVISION OF MEDICAL ASSISTANCE AND HEALTH SERVICES, ET AL. (DIVISION OF MEDICAL ASSISTANCE AND HEALTH SERVICES) A-3838-21 Appellate April 19, 2024
- STATE OF NEW JERSEY VS. DA'RON D. HOWARD (14-05-0378, UNION COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) A-0349-22 Appellate April 19, 2024
- BRAINBUILDERS, LLC VS. OPTUM, INC., ET AL. (L-8088-17, BERGEN COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) A-0621-22 Appellate April 19, 2024
- BONA PACKAGING, INC. VS. KEVIN INGRALDI, ET AL. (L-0194-21, CAMDEN COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) A-1062-22 Appellate April 19, 2024
- NEW JERSEY DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION, ET AL. VS. HEXCEL CORPORATION, ET AL. (L-1864-22, BERGEN COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) A-1189-22 Appellate April 19, 2024
- B.D. VS. SUSSEX COUNTY PROSECUTOR'S OFFICE (L-0396-22, SUSSEX COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) A-1781-22 Appellate April 19, 2024
- M.R. VS. NEW JERSEY DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS (NEW JERSEY DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS) A-2825-22 Appellate April 19, 2024 Summary A-2825-22 M.R. appealed from a final decision of the Department of Corrections (DOC), denying his application for a certificate of eligibility for compassionate release under the Compassionate Release Act (CRA), N.J.S.A. 30:4-123.51e. The DOC denied his application because two licensed physicians designated by the commissioner of the DOC had rendered medical diagnoses in which they found M.R. had neither a terminal condition nor a permanent physical incapacity as defined by the CRA. M.R. argued on appeal the CRA and related regulations required the designated physicians to examine him physically and the DOC's decision was arbitrary, capricious, and unreasonable because the physicians had not physically examined him and had failed to make certain findings required under the CRA. The court disagreed, concluding that, while a physician may request a physical examination, the CRA and related regulations did not require one. The court also concluded the physicians had made the requisite findings. Accordingly, the court affirmed the DOC's decision. Close
- DCPP VS. M.P. AND D.S., IN THE MATTER OF THE GUARDIANSHIP OF L.J.P. (FG-19-0011-23, SUSSEX COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) (RECORD IMPOUNDED) A-0030-23 Appellate April 19, 2024
- Schreiber v. Marantz MON-C-161-22 Trial April 18, 2024
- Gavin v. Lomack MON-C-195-22 Trial April 18, 2024
- STATE OF NEW JERSEY VS. M.A.U. (19-03-0307, BERGEN COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) (RECORD IMPOUNDED) A-2064-21 Appellate April 22, 2024
- BOROUGH OF ENGLEWOOD CLIFFS VS. THOMAS J. TRAUTNER, ET AL. (L-5785-21, BERGEN COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) A-2765-21 Appellate April 22, 2024 Summary A-2765-21 The Borough of Englewood Cliffs retained Thomas J. Trautner and Chiesa Shahinian & Giantomasi PC, (collectively CSG), Albert Wunsch III, and Jeffrey Surenian and Jeffrey Surenian and Associates, LLC, (collectively Surenian) to represent it in affordable housing litigation. After judgment was entered for developer 800 Sylvan Avenue, LLC. (Sylvan), a settlement was reached between the Borough and Sylvan. Thereafter, political control of the Borough Council majority changed hands and the newly constituted Council sued CSG, Wunsch, and Surenian, alleging professional malpractice, breach of contract, unjust enrichment, civil conspiracy, and aiding and abetting arising from their representation of the Borough in the litigation. The Borough also sued Sylvan, alleging claims of conspiracy and aiding and abetting. The trial court granted defendants' Rule 4:6-2(e) motions to dismiss the Borough's complaint with prejudice. The trial court subsequently granted defendants' motion for sanctions, ordering the Borough to pay their attorney's fees and costs for filing a frivolous lawsuit. The Borough appeals, arguing the sanction applications were procedurally deficient; as a public entity, it is immune from paying sanctions under the FLS; and the trial court abused its discretion in finding the Borough's lawsuit was frivolous. [1] The court rejects the Borough's arguments and affirms based on our interpretation of the FLS that the Borough is not immune from sanctions, defendants' applications for sanctions were procedurally compliant with Rule 1:4-8, and the trial court did not abuse its discretion in imposing sanctions against the Borough. [1] After their merit briefs were filed, the Borough and Jeffrey Surenian and Jeffrey Surenian and Associates, LLC filed a stipulation of dismissal dismissing all claims and counterclaims, including but not limited to claims for attorney's fees. Close
- IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION OF 68-72 FRANKLIN PLACE, LLC, ET AL. VS. NEW JERSEY AMERICAN WATER COMPANY (NEW JERSEY BOARD OF PUBLIC UTILITIES) A-3971-21 Appellate April 22, 2024
- JN EQUITY PERTH AMBOY, LLC VS. JIMMY HIRALDO (LT-002939-21, MIDDLESEX COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) A-0636-22 Appellate April 22, 2024
- DCPP VS. R.S., ET AL., IN THE MATTER OF A.A., C.A., AND B.A. (FN-04-0320-21, CAMDEN COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) (RECORD IMPOUNDED) A-0927-22 Appellate April 22, 2024
- D.Q. VS. F.Q. (FV-12-2404-21, MIDDLESEX COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) (RECORD IMPOUNDED) A-0950-22 Appellate April 22, 2024
- STATE OF NEW JERSEY VS. TONY CANTY (07-12-1018 AND 07-12-1019, UNION COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) A-1729-22 Appellate April 22, 2024
- R.H. VS. N.S., N.S. VS. R.H. (FV-04-2252-23, CAMDEN COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) (RECORD IMPOUNDED) (CONSOLIDATED) A-2499-22/A-2500-22 Appellate April 22, 2024
- C.R. v. M. T. (087887)(Gloucester County & Statewide) A-47-22 Supreme April 22, 2024 Oral Argument A-47-22 A-47-22 Audio for A-47-22 Close Summary A-47-22 The plain language of N.J.S.A. 2C:14-16(a)(2) creates a standard that is permissive and easily satisfied. Here, plaintiff testified that a sexual assault “destroyed” her, she was intensely traumatized, and she was “terrified” for her safety. The family court found her testimony credible. Based on that testimony, the court held plaintiff had demonstrated a “possibility of future risk” to her “safety or well-being.” The Court affirms. “Any person alleging to be a victim of nonconsensual sexual contact, sexual penetration, or lewdness, or any attempt at such conduct,” who is not eligible for a restraining order as a “victim of domestic violence” under the Prevention of Domestic Violence Act of 1991 (PDVA) may apply for a protective order under SASPA. N.J.S.A. 2C:14-14(a)(1), -16. The standard for granting a SASPA protective order differs depending on whether the applicant seeks a temporary or final order. Importantly, an FPO does not require a showing that it is “necessary to protect the safety and well-being” of the victim like a TPO does, see N.J.S.A. 2C:14-15(a); rather, an FPO requires only the “possibility of future risk to the safety or well-being of the alleged victim,” N.J.S.A. 2C:14-16(a)(2). (pp. 14-18) The permissive standards for a SASPA TPO and a PDVA temporary restraining order (TRO) are nearly identical, as are the procedures for seeking a PDVA final restraining order (FRO) and a SASPA FPO. Notably, both SASPA FPOs and PDVA FROs require consideration of a list of non-exhaustive factors, but SASPA lists only two such factors -- “(1) the occurrence of one or more acts of nonconsensual sexual contact, sexual penetration, or lewdness . . . ; and (2) the possibility of future risk to the safety or well-being of the alleged victim,” N.J.S.A. 2C:14-16(a) -- whereas the PDVA lists six, see N.J.S.A. 2C:25-29(a). The Legislature could have duplicated the second factor for a PDVA FRO -- “[t]he existence of immediate danger to person or property,” N.J.S.A. 2C:25-29(a)(2) -- in SASPA, but it did not. In addition, the consequences to a defendant of a PDVA FRO are drastically different from the consequences to a respondent of a SASPA FPO. (pp. 18-22) Applying ordinary definitions of the terms used in N.J.S.A. 2C:14-16(a)(2), the statute’s plain language requires a court to consider whether there is a chance that a survivor may be exposed to physical danger, risk, or injury, or may be exposed to something emotionally unwelcome or unpleasant that could make the survivor feel uncomfortable, unhealthy, or unhappy. Because the language of factor two is centered on the safety or well-being of the victim-survivor, a survivor’s own testimony regarding possible future risks to their safety or emotional well-being can suffice. The Court’s reading of the plain text of factor two as creating a lenient and easy-to-satisfy standard is reinforced by context: the “possibility of future risk” required for a SASPA FPO is less demanding than the “necessary” protection required for a SASPA TPO or the “immediate danger” required for a PDVA FRO. Applying that standard, the Court defers to the trial court’s factual findings because they are supported by substantial evidence and finds no error in the court’s legal conclusion. (pp. 22-26) The Court explains why it is not persuaded by Martin’s claims of error, why it disagrees with the concurrence’s view of N.J.S.A. 2C:14-16(e) and (f), and why it declines to adopt either the six PDVA factors or the standard established for PDVA FROs for use in the SASPA context. Finally, the Court explains that its discussion of Clara’s testimony is not intended to imply that such evidence of psychological symptoms or treatment is necessary to satisfy N.J.S.A. 2C:14-16(a)(2). (pp. 26-33) Close