- EXELON GENERATION CO LLC, ETC V. TOWNSHIP OF LACEY/OYSTER CREEK ENVIRONMENAL PROTECT V. TOWNSHIP OF LACEY 02147-18 EXELON GENERATION CO LLC, ETC V. TOWNSHIP OF LACEY/OYSTER CREEK ENVIRONMENAL PROTECT V. TOWNSHIP OF LACEY Tax Feb. 25, 2025 Summary 02147-18 EXELON GENERATION CO LLC, ETC V. TOWNSHIP OF LACEY/OYSTER CREEK ENVIRONMENAL PROTECT V. TOWNSHIP OF LACEY, LOCAL PROPERTY TAXATION – REAL PROPERTY – PERSONAL PROPERTY - INTENTION OF PERMANENT AFFIXATION – LEGISLATION, INTERPRETATION – BUSINESS RETENTION ACT – CHAPTER 117, Tax Court: Exelon Generation Company, LLC, C-O Schwer/Oyster Creek Environmental Protect v. Township of Lacey ; Docket Nos. 002147-2018, 004238-2019, 007533-2020, 006775-2021, 005359-2022, 003409-2023, 004088-2024, opinion by Cimino, J.T.C., decided February 25, 2025. For plaintiff – Farhan Ali (McCarter & English LLP; Frank E. Ferruggia and Farhan Ali, on the Brief); for defendant – Andrea E. Wyatt, (Rothstein, Mandell, Strohm, Halm & Cipriani, P.A.)., Held, : Taxpayers challenge whether storage casks which house highly radioactive spent nuclear fuel are subject to taxation as real property. Taxpayers must store the spent fuel in the casks to protect the public and the environment from exposure to harmful radiation emitted from the spent fuel. To be taxable as real property, the storage casks must be affixed permanently. Taxpayers assert the spent fuel and storage casks are on-site temporarily until a disposal facility opens to accept the spent fuel from not only this site, but also other sites across the nation. The Township asserts the spent fuel and storage casks are on-site permanently. By law, there is nowhere to move the spent fuel. Though there have been plans over the course of decades for various disposal facilities, the spent fuel has continued to accumulate at the site since the 1970s. The court determines the storage casks are taxable since the Taxpayers cannot transfer the spent fuel to another site. (Judges Joseph M. Andresini and Michael Gilmore did not participate in the consideration of publication of this matter.) (30 pages) Close
- MARYANA IVLEV VS. DMITRIY IVLEV (FM-02-1644-13, BERGEN COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) A-2861-22 Appellate Feb. 26, 2025
- STATE OF NEW JERSEY VS. RAHDI RICHARDSON (14-01-0080 AND 14-12-2979, ESSEX COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) A-1579-23 Appellate Feb. 26, 2025
- IN RE TOM MALINOWSKI, PETITION FOR NOMINATION FOR GENERAL ELECTION, ETC. (NEW JERSEY DIVISION OF ELECTIONS) (CONSOLIDATED) A-3542-21/A-3543-21 Appellate Feb. 26, 2025 Summary A-3542-21/A-3543-21 The court holds that N.J.S.A. 19:13-8, which bars candidates for public office from being nominated by a political party, by way of direct petition, when they have already accepted the primary or general election nomination of another political party for the same office, does not violate the New Jersey Constitution. The court, therefore, affirms the decisions by the New Jersey Secretary of State to reject the Moderate Party's request to list Tom Malinowski as its nominee on the November 2022 general election ballot for the United States House of Representatives, 7th Congressional District because Malinowski had already sought and accepted the Democratic Party's primary nomination for that office. Close
- IN THE MATTER OF THOMAS R. TOMEI TRUST (CP-0120-2013, CAMDEN COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) (CONSOLIDATED) A-1660-21/A-1807-21/A-1808-21 Appellate Feb. 27, 2025
- MARLON VALDEZ-MARTINEZ, ET AL. VS. PARKSITE, INC., ET AL. (L-5894-17, MIDDLESEX COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) A-0250-22 Appellate Feb. 27, 2025
- S.B.B. VS. L.B.B. (FV-20-1159-21, UNION COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) (RECORD IMPOUNDED) A-1852-22 Appellate Feb. 27, 2025
- SPECTRUM CAPITAL NORTH BERGEN, LLC VS. CROWN BANK (L-1445-21, HUDSON COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) A-3581-22 Appellate Feb. 27, 2025
- STATE OF NEW JERSEY VS. D.C.N. (15-01-0222, ESSEX COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) A-0537-23 Appellate Feb. 27, 2025
- STATE OF NEW JERSEY VS. U.Y.A. (FO-06-0065-24, CUMBERLAND COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) (RECORD IMPOUNDED) A-1572-23 Appellate Feb. 27, 2025
- STATE OF NEW JERSEY VS. DANNY C. WILLIAMS (17-05-0322, UNION COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) A-3308-21 Appellate Feb. 28, 2025
- STATE OF NEW JERSEY VS. J.W. (16-11-3103, CAMDEN COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) (RECORD IMPOUNDED) A-2999-22 Appellate Feb. 28, 2025
- L.B. VS. S.B.J. (FV-11-0156-23, MERCER COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) (RECORD IMPOUNDED) A-0464-23 Appellate Feb. 28, 2025
- BURLINGTON COUNTY MUNICIPAL JOINT INSURANCE FUND, ETC. VS. KURT V. SMITH (L-1942-20, BURLINGTON COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) A-1553-23 Appellate Feb. 28, 2025
- S.V. VS. RWJ BARNABAS HEALTH, INC., ET AL. (L-2264-19, OCEAN COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) (RECORD IMPOUNDED) A-3598-23 Appellate Feb. 28, 2025 Summary A-3598-23 In this medical malpractice case, plaintiff S.V. alleges that defendants prematurely discharged her sister ("J.V.") from their care after J.V. was treated for seventeen days on a voluntary admission basis for psychiatric care at defendants' facility. The day after her psychiatric discharge, J.V. crashed her car into a utility pole, injuring plaintiff who was a passenger in the vehicle. Plaintiff's medical expert contends defendants breached their professional standards of care by releasing J.V. prematurely while her medications were still being adjusted and her condition allegedly was not yet sufficiently stabilized. This "premature release" theory is at the core of plaintiff's claim of negligence. Notably, plaintiff did not argue below that defendants owed her a duty to warn her that J.V. was too unstable to drive a car, or of any other dangers relating to J.V.'s post-discharge condition. The Law Division judge denied defendants' motions for summary judgment. Among other things, the judge rejected defendants' argument that they owed no legal duty to plaintiff in the circumstances presented. This court granted leave to appeal, limited to the discrete issue of whether defendants owed a duty to plaintiff with respect to her claims. The court reverses the summary judgment ruling, applying the four-factor criteria for a legal duty under Hopkins v. Fox & Lazo Realtors , 132 N.J. 426, 439 (1993). Under the circumstances presented, defendants could not have reasonably foreseen that J.V., shortly after her discharge, would cause a motor vehicle crash that would injure plaintiff. In addition, plaintiff's theory of liability—alleging that J.V., a voluntary mental health patient, should not have been discharged—clashes with the terms of our civil commitment laws. Close
- STATE OF NEW JERSEY VS. R.G.W. (17-04-0148, SUSSEX COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) (RECORD IMPOUNDED) A-0798-22 Appellate Feb. 28, 2025
- BOROUGH OF HIGHLAND PARK VS. MITCHELL S. CAPPELL (C-000195-16, MIDDLESEX COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) A-3461-21 Appellate March 3, 2025
- JOSEPH CHIARAVALLOTI, ET AL. VS. FREEDOM MORTGAGE CORPORATION, ET AL. (L-0814-21, CAMDEN COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) A-2965-22 Appellate March 3, 2025
- THE ALLIANCE FOR SUSTAINABLE COMMUNITIES, ET AL. VS. ROBBINSVILLE TOWNSHIP ZONING BOARD OF ADJUSTMENT, ET AL. (L-2035-22, MERCER COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) A-3235-22 Appellate March 3, 2025
- DCPP VS. M.E.R.G. AND S.P., IN THE MATTER OF C.P.R., M.P.R., A.P.R., M.P.R., and E.P.R. (FN-12-0050-20, MIDDLESEX COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) (RECORD IMPOUNDED) A-0597-23 Appellate March 3, 2025