- STATE OF NEW JERSEY VS. JOSE E. RODRIGUEZ (18-01-0013, MIDDLESEX COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) A-0845-22 Appellate Feb. 6, 2025
- STATE OF NEW JERSEY VS. ORLANDO MATOS (17-03-0386, MIDDLESEX COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) A-1734-22 Appellate Feb. 6, 2025
- BAYVIEW CORPORATE CENTER, LLC VS. BAYVIEW PROPERTIES, LLC, ET AL. (L-2210-22, OCEAN COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) A-2568-22 Appellate Feb. 6, 2025
- DCPP VS. J.M. AND T.T.P., I/M/O THE GUARDIANSHIP OF H.P. AND R.P. (FG-17-0012-23, SALEM COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) (RECORD IMPOUNDED) (CONSOLIDATED) A-0989-23/A-0990-23 Appellate Feb. 6, 2025
- STATE OF NEW JERSEY VS. KEVIN MILLER (16-04-1284, ESSEX COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) A-1282-23 Appellate Feb. 6, 2025
- JOHN LAHOUD VS. ANTHONY & SYLVAN CORP., ETC. (L-0967-24, BERGEN COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) A-3049-23 Appellate Feb. 6, 2025 Summary A-3049-23 This matter presents a novel issue of whether an alternative dispute resolution (ADR) provision is enforceable if the party drafting the contract reserves the right to file certain claims in court while the other party does not have that same right. The court holds that the unilateral right to file in court is unenforceable. Plaintiff entered into a written contract with defendant to build an in-ground swimming pool. Defendant prepared a contract, which contained an ADR provision that both parties electronically signed. The court holds the portion of the ADR provision requiring mediation and arbitration of any controversy, dispute, or claim, including statutory claims, is valid and enforceable under Atalese v. U.S. Legal Servs. Grp., L.P., 219 N.J. 430 (2014). However, the court finds the reservation of rights provision contained in the ADR section of the contract, which created an exception to arbitration only for defendant, to pursue a claim for money damages in court if plaintiff failed to pay under the contract while plaintiff was barred from seeking any relief in court, is unconscionable and therefore, unenforceable. However, the court determined the reservation of rights provision was severable and struck it from the contract, which will allow the parties to mediate and arbitrate their disputes. Close
- STATE OF NEW JERSEY VS. ANDREW PENA (16-04-0298, MORRIS COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) A-2708-21 Appellate Feb. 7, 2025
- SERGIO AMOEDO, ET AL. VS. OSTEO RELIEF INSTITUTE, ET AL. (L-1754-17, MONMOUTH COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) A-3809-21 Appellate Feb. 7, 2025
- IN THE MATTER OF THE BUSINESS AUTOMATION TECHNOLOGIES, INC., ETC. VS. VERIZON NEW JERSEY, INC. (NEW JERSEY BOARD OF PUBLIC UTILITIES) A-4016-21 Appellate Feb. 7, 2025
- DAE SUN YOON VS. FLETCHER & WEST ASSOCIATES, LLC, ET AL. (L-8554-19, BERGEN COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) A-0988-23 Appellate Feb. 7, 2025
- STATE OF NEW JERSEY VS. CINDY KEOGH, ET AL. (19-05-0288, SOMERSET COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) A-0773-23 Appellate Feb. 7, 2025 Summary A-0773-23 In this interlocutory appeal the court considers the first element of third-degree endangering an injured victim, N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1.2(a), as applied to the conduct of third parties who allegedly aid or abet another person after that person injures the victim. The State alleges defendants aided their son after he shot the victim and left him for dead. More particularly, the State claims defendants failed to call 9-1-1 emergency services after defendants arrived at the scene of the injury, observed the injured victim, and learned he was shot. Crucially, the State does not allege defendants aided or assisted their son in causing the injuries. On appeal, the court affirms the Law Division order reconsidering and reversing an earlier order that denied defendants' motion to dismiss the endangering count. Discerning no procedural irregularity in the court's reconsideration of the interlocutory order under review, the court considers de novo the plain language of N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1.2, as it applies to those who aid or assist another person who caused bodily injury to the victim. The court concludes, as did the trial judge, defendants cannot be held liable for aiding or abetting their son within the meaning of the endangering statute because defendants did not knowingly aid their son in causing bodily injury to the victim. Accordingly, the court holds a third party cannot be held liable under N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1.2(a), unless the third party "knowingly solicited, aided, encouraged, purposely attempted or knowingly agreed to aid another person in causing bodily injury to the victim" as reflected in the pertinent model jury charge. See Model Jury Charges (Criminal), "Endangering Injured Victim (N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1.2)" (rev. Mar. 14, 2016). Close
- DCPP VS. A.L. AND W.L., SR., IN THE MATTER OF THE GUARDIANSHIP OF W.L., JR. (FG-11-0002-22, MERCER COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) (RECORD IMPOUNDED) (CONSOLIDATED) A-4008-22/A-4012-22 Appellate Feb. 7, 2025
- BOARD OF EDUCATION OF THE TOWNSHIP OF PENNSAUKEN, CAMDEN COUNTY VS. DR. LOVELL PUGH-BASSETT, ET AL. (NEW JERSEY COMMISSIONER OF EDUCATION) A-1652-22 Appellate Feb. 10, 2025
- STATE OF NEW JERSEY VS. MADISON GULLETT (18-05-0446, GLOUCESTER COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) (RECORD IMPOUNDED) A-2877-22 Appellate Feb. 10, 2025
- MATTHEW J. PLATKIN, ET AL. VS. MIDDLETOWN TOWNSHIP BOARD OF EDUCATION, ET AL. (C-000080-23, C-000079-23, and C-000078-23, MONMOUTH COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) (CONSOLIDATED) A-0037-23/A-0046-23/A-0118-23 Appellate Feb. 10, 2025
- MATTHEW J. PLATKIN, ET AL. VS. HANOVER TOWNSHIP BOARD OF EDUCATION, ET AL. (C-000042-23, MORRIS COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) A-0371-23 Appellate Feb. 10, 2025
- STATE OF NEW JERSEY VS. LUIS S. MANSO (98-11-4417, ESSEX COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) A-1137-23 Appellate Feb. 10, 2025
- DCPP VS. J.S. AND A.S., IN THE MATTER OF THE GUARDIANSHIP OF W.S. AND P.S. (FG-10-0102-23, HUNTERDON COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) (RECORD IMPOUNDED) A-1837-23 Appellate Feb. 10, 2025
- THE MOORISH SCIENCE TEMPLE OF AMERICA, NEW JERSEY VS. MOORISH SCIENCE TEMPLE OF AMERICA, INC., ET AL. (C-000004-23, MERCER COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) A-2287-23 Appellate Feb. 10, 2025
- RANDY HOPKINS, ETC. VS. LVNV FUNDING LLC, ET AL. (L-1732-22, HUDSON COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) A-1301-23 Appellate Feb. 10, 2025 Summary A-1301-23 Defendants moved to compel arbitration after approximately sixteen months of litigation in the trial court. The trial court granted defendants' motion, finding they had not waived their asserted contractual right to arbitrate. On appeal, plaintiff argued the trial court erred in compelling arbitration because defendants had waived their right to arbitrate through their litigation conduct. In response, defendants contended the court lacked jurisdiction to decide the appeal because the trial court's order was "interlocutory" and the arbitration agreement at issue was governed by the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), 9 U.S.C. §§ 1 to 16. The court reversed the order. The court held it had jurisdiction to decide the appeal because the FAA does not preempt Rule 2:2-3(a), a neutral procedural rule that identifies the types of orders that are appealable as of right. Conducting a de novo review of the waiver factors established by the New Jersey Supreme Court in Cole v. Jersey City Medical Center , 215 N.J. 265, 280-81 (2013), the court found defendants had waived their right to arbitration by their litigation conduct, including their failure to indicate their intention to seek arbitration in their Rule 4:5-1(b)(2) certification or to fulfill their continuing obligation to amend the certification. Close