- STATE OF NEW JERSEY VS. MARQUIS ARMSTRONG (15-05-0932, ESSEX COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) A-0375-23 Appellate June 12, 2025
- WATERFRONT CORPORATE CENTER III JV LLC VS. GFG HOBOKEN LLC, ET AL. (L-0987-22, HUDSON COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) A-0514-23 Appellate June 12, 2025
- STATE OF NEW JERSEY VS. J.I.L. (14-09-0780, UNION COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) (RECORD IMPOUNDED) A-2134-23 Appellate June 12, 2025
- DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILIES, ETC. VS. B.B., ET AL. (NEW JERSEY DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILIES) (RECORD IMPOUNDED) (CONSOLIDATED) A-2291-23/A-2336-23 Appellate June 12, 2025
- AGIM MUCAJ, ET AL. VS. GREGORY J. COUGHLIN, ET AL. (L-1246-22, ATLANTIC COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) A-2554-23 Appellate June 12, 2025
- GAIL STAMLER VS. SHASTRI PERSAD (L-0309-19, ESSEX COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) A-2610-23 Appellate June 12, 2025
- FOREVER GREATFUL ART STUDIOS, LLC, ET AL. VS. CITY OF ORANGE TOWNSHIP (L-8346-23, ESSEX COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) A-3671-23 Appellate June 12, 2025
- MAGDI FAISAL VS. JAEHYUK CHOE (L-5497-23, BERGEN COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) A-4149-23 Appellate June 12, 2025
- STATE OF NEW JERSEY VS. YUSEF B. ALLEN (98-08-1208, UNION COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) A-1045-22 Appellate June 12, 2025 Summary A-1045-22 The court takes this opportunity to clarify the legal principles that govern motions for a new trial based on evidence not previously available to the defense. Such motions, the court explains, can arise in two distinct circumstances: (1) where the prosecutor was in possession of the "new" evidence but failed to disclose it to the defense—a discovery violation—and (2) where the defense discovers the new evidence through its own efforts. In Brady v. Maryland , 373 U.S. 83 (1963), the United States Supreme Court addressed the first situation. In State v. Carter , 91 N.J. 86 (1982), the New Jersey Supreme Court considered both situations and devised what has been applied as a general test for resolving newly discovered evidence motions. Defendant contends the prosecutor committed a discovery violation by not disclosing that its key trial witness had accepted a plea agreement tendered by the prosecutor in an unrelated matter eight years before defendant's murder trial. The court explains that the separate multi-prong tests set forth in Brady and Carter overlap but are not identical, which can lead to confusion. The court considers whether the trial judge ultimately reached the correct conclusion in denying defendant's motion for a new trial notwithstanding that the judge did not cite to the governing precedent, Brady . The court emphasizes that the Carter and Brady tests share a common element: whether the jury's verdict would have been different had the defense been aware of the new evidence before trial. The question of "materiality" under both Carter and Brady is essentially a form of harmless error analysis. Further, the court explains, while the two tests start from a different factual predicate, they converge on the fact-sensitive question of whether the trial outcome would have been different if the defense had been aware of the new evidence before trial. The court further holds there is no practical difference between the materiality/harmless error elements set forth in the Brady and Carter formulations. Thus, the court reasons, the motion judge's findings under Carter allow it to evaluate the materiality element of the Brady test, which requires reversal of a conviction only where there is a reasonable probability that had the evidence suppressed by the prosecutor been timely disclosed to the defense, the trial result would have been different. The court concludes that in this application, the newly discovered information would not have led to a different trial result. The court also addresses defendant's contention the motion judge abused discretion and violated defendant's due process and compulsory process rights by refusing to enforce a subpoena to the Crime Stoppers program concerning possible reward payments to the State's witness. The court concludes the motion judge did not provide adequate reasons explaining his decision. The court thus remands for the motion judge to make additional findings of fact and conclusions of law. Close
- IN THE MATTER OF LEAVE TO FILE A LATE NOTICE OF CLAIM PURSUANT TO THE NEW JERSEY TORT CLAIMS ACT ON BEHALF OF NAKEEDAH S. GREGG, ETC. (L-3328-23, UNION COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) A-1272-23 Appellate June 12, 2025
- KEITH HACKER VS. CARLOS JAIME-VALDEZ, ET AL. (L-3112-19, OCEAN COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) A-2886-22 Appellate June 13, 2025 Summary A-2886-22 The court considers if judicial estoppel prevents a party from benefiting by making representations in state court that are inconsistent with those previously made to obtain a modification of an automatic stay imposed by a federal court in a bankruptcy case. While this automobile-accident case was pending in the Law Division, defendant filed a petition for bankruptcy in the federal bankruptcy court. Plaintiff moved for a modification of an automatic stay issued by the bankruptcy court. He represented to the court he was pursuing a judgment only in the amount of defendant's insurance coverage. Plaintiff made the same representation in the Law Division in opposition to defendant's motion for a stay. Based on plaintiff's representations, the Law Division judge denied defendant's stay motion and the bankruptcy court granted plaintiff's motion and modified its automatic stay, expressly to permit plaintiff to pursue a judgment limited to the amount of insurance coverage. The Law Division case proceeded to trial; the jury awarded plaintiff a verdict far in excess of the amount of the insurance coverage. Plaintiff requested and obtained a judgment in the amount of the verdict plus relief granted pursuant to Rule 4:58-2(a). The Law Division judge denied defendant's multiple motions to mold the verdict to the insurance-coverage amount, or in the alternative for a new trial or remittitur. Based on the equitable doctrine of judicial estoppel and applicable bankruptcy law, the court reversed and remanded for entry of an order molding the verdict to the amount of the insurance coverage. Close
- STATE OF NEW JERSEY VS. KYMBERLY D. SPARROW (19-08-1337, MIDDLESEX COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) A-0255-23 Appellate June 13, 2025
- STEPHEN D. PERRY VS. NEW JERSEY STATE PAROLE BOARD (NEW JERSEY STATE PAROLE BOARD) A-0458-23 Appellate June 13, 2025
- WCPP RISK PURCHASING GROUP, INC. VS. LEXINGTON INSURANCE COMPANY (L-1025-22, CAMDEN COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) A-0928-23 Appellate June 13, 2025
- M & M WHOLSESALE DISTRIBUTORS VS. SAM'S WHOLESALE, LLC, ET AL. (L-6362-22, BERGEN COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) A-3025-23 Appellate June 13, 2025
- L.E.O. VS. A.S. (FV-13-1892-24, MONMOUTH COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) (RECORD IMPOUNDED) A-3382-23 Appellate June 13, 2025
- IVE SKROCE AND ESTATE OF MATE SKROCE VS. CLARITA'S DELI, LLC, ET AL. (L-1739-23, BERGEN COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) A-3582-23 Appellate June 13, 2025
- FREEDOM MORTGAGE CORPORATION VS. JAY BUBENHEIMER, ET AL. (F-011955-22, HUNTERDON COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) A-3826-23 Appellate June 13, 2025
- LENSCOAT, LLC VS. SCOTT ELOWITZ PHOTOGRAPHY, LLC, ET AL. (L-0470-23, MONMOUTH COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) A-0077-24 Appellate June 13, 2025
- TAHISHA ROACH, ET AL. VS. BM MOTORING, LLC, ET AL. (L-1333-14, MIDDLESEX COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) A-3561-23 Appellate Oct. 14, 2025