Published Appellate Court Opinions

Petitioner applied to the Workers' Compensation Court for reimbursement of continued prescription opioid medication as part of his need for palliative care to treat a lower back injury suffered while he was working for respondent employer.

The compensation judge declined to compel the employer to pay for petitioner's prescription opioid medication in accordance with N.J.S.A. 34:15-15 of the Workers' Compensation Act. The statute requires employers to provide treatment to injured employees when the treatment is "necessary to cure and relieve the worker of the effects of the injury and to restore the functions of the injured member or organ where such restoration is possible . . . ." After six years of treating with the same physician who prescribed his pain medication, petitioner's pain had not been alleviated with either therapy or medication.

The court affirmed the compensation judge, holding petitioner failed to prove continued opioid treatment would cure or relieve his injury and return him to better function. The court found N.J.S.A. 34:15-15 requires proof that opioid medication provides curative relief and that continued use of opioids improves the function of the injured worker.

A jury convicted defendants, the mother and father of a two-year-old daughter, of reckless manslaughter and aggravated manslaughter respectively, and endangering the welfare of a child. The child died of blunt force head trauma and suffered numerous other internal and external injuries. Both defendants provided statements to law enforcement, but neither admitted causing the child's death, and the State had no eyewitnesses to any assault.

The State contended both defendants could be found guilty as principals or accomplices, and it urged the judge to provide instructions pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:2-6(c)(1)(c) (subsection 1(c)). That provides one may be an accomplice of another if "[w]ith the purpose of promoting or facilitating the commission of an offense . . . [and] [h]aving a legal duty to prevent the commission of the offense, fails to make a proper effort so to do[.]"

Relying on this court's decision in State v. Bass, 221 N.J. Super. 466 (App. Div. 1987), the only reported decision dealing with accomplice liability under subsection 1(c), and at the prosecutor's urging, the judge's jury charge carved out a separate basis for accomplice liability under Bass. The charge failed to tell jurors that in order to find a defendant guilty under subsection 1(c), they must find that defendant's failure to act was accompanied by a purpose to promote or facilitate the other's commission of a crime. The court specifically disapproved of Bass to the extent it implied otherwise, and reversed defendants' convictions.

The court held that a New York doctor who provided medical treatment to a New Jersey resident at a New York hospital was not subject to personal jurisdiction in New Jersey in a lawsuit alleging wrongful death and survivor claims resulting from the medical treatment. Moreover, web-based videos and internet postings describing the doctor's practice are insufficient contacts by themselves to support personal jurisdiction.

In this matter, we address whether it was error to grant C.P.M.'s petition for expungement under the "crime spree" doctrine set forth in the 2018 amendment to N.J.S.A. 2C:52-2(a). C.P.M. filed a petition seeking to expunge several offenses from his criminal record, including: (1) an April 10, 2005 conviction for third-degree possession of CDS, in violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:35-10(a)(1); and (2) two June 22, 2005 convictions for fourth-degree burglary, in violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:18-2, and fourth-degree criminal mischief, in violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:17-3(a)(1).

Despite the requirement under N.J.S.A. 2C:52-2(a) that a court could only grant an expungement to an applicant who had not been "convicted of any prior or subsequent crime," petitions were periodically granted under a "single spree" or "crime spree" doctrine. In 2015, the Supreme Court definitively rejected the crime spree doctrine, holding that the Legislature clearly intended to "permit expungement of a single conviction arising from multiple offenses only if those offenses occurred as part of a single, uninterrupted criminal event." In re Expungement Petition of J.S., 223 N.J. 54, 73 (2015).

On October 1, 2018, N.J.S.A. 2C:52-2(a) was amended to permit the expungement of multiple crimes or offenses that "were interdependent or closely related in circumstances and were committed as part of a sequence of events that took place within a comparatively short period. . . ." The Legislature explained that the addition of the "interdependent or closely related in circumstances" and "within a comparatively short period of time" language was intended to allow expungement of "a so-called 'crime spree.'" S. Judiciary Comm. Statement to S. 3307 1 (L. 2017, c. 244) (emphasis added).

During the hearing on his petition, C.P.M. contended he was eligible for expungement under the crime spree exception in the newly amended statute. He argued that because he was under the influence of drugs during the several-month period in which the offenses occurred, his April and June 2005 convictions were sufficiently related. C.P.M. asserted that the trial court's analysis should include the motivations behind why a defendant committed the crimes.

The court granted the expungement petition under the crime spree exception in N.J.S.A. 2C:52-2(a). In relying on C.P.M.'s certifications, the judge concluded that C.P.M.'s drug use during the time period of the offenses was the "nexus" permitting a determination that the two incidents were closely related in circumstances.

This court reverses, finding the plain language of N.J.S.A. 2C:52-2(a) bars the expungement of C.P.M.'s convictions as the offenses were not interdependent or closely related in circumstances. The offenses at issue – drug possession, burglary, and criminal mischief – do not share common elements. The crimes also are not similar in nature. These offenses were not committed as part of some larger criminal scheme; each offense was a distinct crime perpetrated under entirely different and unrelated circumstances.

A defendant's self-serving declaration of his or her motivation behind crimes fifteen years after their occurrence is not a cognizable consideration within the meaning of the statute. We are satisfied the Legislature did not intend the result compelled by the trial court – that any person addicted to drugs could be eligible for an expungement of any crime the person alleged was committed while he or she was under the influence of an illegal substance.

Defendant filed a petition for the expungement of all records relating to her arrest and conviction for third-degree endangering the welfare of a child for causing the child harm that would make the child an abused or neglected child, N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4(a)(2). She contended that the 2016 amendments to the expungement statute, N.J.S.A. 2C:52-2(b), permitted the expungement of non-sexual Title 9 crimes.

Although the intent behind the amended N.J.S.A. 2C:52-2(b) strongly favors expungement for rehabilitated offenders, the statute includes a list of numerous crimes that are barred from expungement. The crime to which defendant pleaded guilty is included on that list. Therefore, the court found the plain language of the statute prohibited the expungement of any conviction under N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4(a).

The court granted leave to consider a trial court ruling about excludable time under the Criminal Justice Reform Act. In this case, excludable time was generated by two separate pretrial motions, which, for a while, were pending at the same time. The trial judge ordered that the excludable time permitted for one motion would not commence until the excludable time for the other motion ended. The court reversed, holding that the applicable statute and rule mandate that excludable time for an eligible pretrial motions commences when the motion is filed, and may expire in whole or in part simultaneously. Courts have no authority to "stack" excludable time periods.

In these related interlocutory appeals, the motion judges suppressed weapons – allegedly involved in crimes in both counties – seized after a motor vehicle stop. The court determined the first motion judge improperly invalidated the arrest warrant that precipitated the seizure by: viewing a video that was not seen by the issuing judge; excising the statement that related to the video; and concluding the affidavit no longer supported probable cause, without conducting an evidentiary hearing.

While that suppression motion was pending, the parties in the other county urged the judge to adjourn defendants' identical suppression motion, pending the first motion judge's decision. Thereafter, the second motion judge properly granted defendants' motion based on the collateral estoppel doctrine. Because the court determined the first judge improperly invalidated the arrest warrant – and the second judge correctly concluded the collateral estoppel doctrine applied to the suppression motion before him – the court was compelled to vacate the second judge's suppression order.

The court remanded both matters for further proceedings.

The court granted leave to appeal an order amending an indictment to reduce five counts alleging endangering the welfare of a child through sexual conduct from second-degree to third-degree charges. At issue is whether defendant, a pediatric surgeon who the State alleges molested four teenage patients during and after medical examinations, had a "legal duty for the care of" his victims or had "assumed responsibility for the care of" his victims within the meaning of second-degree endangering under N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4(a)(1).

The court held that although defendant had a professional duty to refrain from sexual contact with his patients, under the Supreme Court's narrow interpretation of N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4(a)(1) in State v. Galloway, 133 N.J. 631 (1993), the State must prove defendant had a "continuing or regular supervisory or caretaker relationship" with his victims to establish second-degree endangering. The evidence presented to the grand jury, even when viewed in the light most favorable to the State, instead suggests defendant, who treated the victims as a specialist for acute medical conditions, had limited and infrequent contact with his victims more akin to the "temporary, brief, or occasional caretaking functions" the Court determined in Galloway to fall under what now constitutes third-degree endangering.

The court also held that the legal duty for the care element of second-degree endangering cannot be established by proving defendant violated N.J.A.C. 13:35-6.3(c), a regulation of the Board of Medical Examiners prohibiting sexual contact between a physician and his or her patient. The regulation subjects physicians who violate its provisions to disciplinary measures relating to their licenses to practice medicine, but not criminal sanctions.

After criminal charges were lodged against him, Rockaway Township suspended Clifton Gauthier, a police officer, without pay. Gauthier successfully completed the pretrial intervention program (PTI), N.J.S.A. 2C:43-12 to -22, and the charges were dismissed. The Township reinstated him, and paid him withheld wages from the date of the PTI dismissal to the date of reinstatement. The Township refused to pay him wages from the time the charges were filed to the date of dismissal. The Civil Service Commission affirmed.

The court affirmed the Commission, as Gauthier's successful PTI completion was not one of the favorable dispositions of criminal charges which mandate payment of back wages enumerated in N.J.S.A. 40A:14-149.2. The statute predated the PTI scheme by years. The Court further held that the adoption of N.J.A.C. 4A:2-2.10(c), which exempts municipal police from its scope, was not thereby intended to require back wages to be paid.

In this vehicular homicide case, the State contended that defendant recklessly caused a pedestrian's death by speeding excessively. Defendant denied excessive speed and disputed that he caused the death of a pedestrian, alleging the pedestrian unexpectedly crossed the roadway outside the crosswalk and against the light. The court reverses defendant's conviction because the trial court should have delivered the model jury charge on causation, consistent with N.J.S.A. 2C:2-3(c), and it also should have instructed the jury, as defendant requested, that the motor vehicle code, N.J.S.A. 39:4-36(a)(4), requires pedestrians outside a crosswalk to yield to vehicles in the roadway.

Defendant was charged under N.J.S.A. 2C:40-26 with the fourth-degree criminal offense of driving with a license that had been suspended because of multiple previous drunk driving convictions.

The court rejects defendant's claims that the 180-day mandatory minimum jail sentence prescribed by N.J.S.A. 2C:40-26 is cruel and unusual punishment, and that it also violates federal and state constitutional principles of equal protection and due process.

The stringent penalty chosen by the Legislature is constitutionally permissible to advance legitimate policy objectives of deterrence and public safety.

The court also reaffirms that the clear terms of statute do not allow judges the discretion to impose a lesser sentence.

In this automobile insurance coverage action, plaintiff sought recovery of his unpaid medical expenses from the defendant carriers that issued policies to the tortfeasor's mother and sister, with whom the tortfeasor resided. Plaintiff had exhausted his personal injury protection (PIP) benefits. And, he settled his claims with the tortfeasor and owner of the vehicle by accepting the policy limit under the owner's policy. Because plaintiff was not a named insured under the tortfeasor's relatives' policies, did not reside with the named insureds nor occupy a vehicle insured under those policies – and released the tortfeasor from any and all claims arising from the accident – the court held his claims against the defendant insurers fail.

For the period from July 2012 to July 2013, New Jersey Transit (NJT) had insurance policies that provided up to $400 million in coverage for property damage, but included a $100 million sublimit for losses generally "caused by flood." The damage to NJT property sustained during Superstorm Sandy came within the specific definitions in the policies of damage caused by "wind driven water" or a "storm surge" associated with a "named windstorm." Therefore, NJT's Sandy-related property damages do not fall within the general definition of losses "caused by flood," and are not subject to the $100 million flood sublimit.

This court addressed what general procedure and related due process protections are afforded to individuals who committed crimes outside New Jersey when law enforcement allege that those crimes are "similar to" Megan's Law offenses under N.J.S.A. 2C:7-1 to -23, and therefore require registration in this State. This court held that an assistant prosecutor first makes the "similar to" determination. If required to register, the offender can challenge that obligation in the Law Division. At a summary hearing, in accordance with R.B.,1 the judge should (1) undertake an element-by-element legal comparison of the criminal codes of New Jersey and the other state; and (2) compare the elements of the crimes with the purposes of the underlying criminal statutes. Consistent with R.B., the judge may also examine trustworthy relevant evidence as to the underlying factual predicate for the out-of-state conviction.

This appeal calls for the court to revisit the application of traditional constitutional principles of personal jurisdiction and due process in the context of a retail sale contract made over the Internet.

After viewing an Internet posting that advertised a vintage car for sale, a New Jersey customer sent an email to the California owner offering to buy it. The seller responded with a counteroffer, and the parties swiftly agreed on a price. The buyer arranged to have the purchased car shipped from California to New Jersey. When the vehicle arrived here, the buyer discovered it was in poor condition. He sued the seller in the Law Division. The seller moved to dismiss the complaint for lack of in personam jurisdiction. The judge granted the motion, and the buyer now appeals.

The court affirms the dismissal of the complaint for lack of personal jurisdiction over the California seller. The seller in this one-time-sale scenario did not "purposely avail" himself of this State's retail market to a degree that rises to the level of "minimum contacts" needed to support personal jurisdiction under the Due Process Clause.

The parties' follow-up communications that occurred after they agreed on the car's price were insufficient to create a jurisdictional nexus to New Jersey. In addition, their simple contractual documents lacked a forum selection clause, which could have specified New Jersey as an agreed-upon forum.

The court does not foreclose a finding of specific jurisdiction in future Internet retail sale contexts in which more extensive transactional activities connected to this State occur.

The trial judge found, in this action under the Sexual Assault Survivor Protection Act (SASPA), N.J.S.A. 2C:14-13 to -21, that plaintiff's claim that she did not consent to a sexual encounter, or that she submitted out of fear, was in equipoise with defendant's contention that the sexual encounter was consensual. But, in entering a restraining order in plaintiff's favor, the judge determined that plaintiff was extremely intoxicated and incapable of consenting. Applying the definition of "mentally incapacitated" in N.J.S.A. 2C:14-1(i), the court determined that the intoxication required to render the alleged victim incapable of consenting could have been voluntarily consumed. And the court held that the intoxication level required to render an alleged victim incapable of consenting must have caused a prostration of faculties. Because the judge did not apply the prostration standard, the court remanded for further proceedings.

When originally sentenced, defendant was found to be a persistent offender eligible for an extended term under N.J.S.A. 2C:44-3(a), even though his last prior conviction occurred more than ten years earlier; the sentencing judge determined that the probationary term imposed on that earlier conviction constituted "confinement" and therefore reasoned that defendant's "last release from confinement" occurred within ten years. We rejected the holding that probation may be equated with confinement and remanded for resentencing. State v. Clarity, 454 N.J. Super. 603 (App. Div. 2018). At the subsequent sentencing proceedings, the State came forward with new information purporting to show defendant violated the terms of the earlier probationary sentence and was imprisoned for thirty months as a result, so that his last release from confinement occurred within ten years. When confronted with this information at resentencing, defense counsel conceded defendant was eligible to be sentenced to an extended term as a persistent offender.

In this interlocutory appeal, the court is asked to determine whether the trial court's August 28, 2019 order violated N.J.S.A. 2A:162-22(a)(2)(a), the speedy trial requirements of the Criminal Justice Reform Act (CJRA), N.J.S.A. 2A:162-15 to -26, and Rule 3:25-4(c)(1). The order excluded 137 days – August 19, 2019 to January 2, 2020 – from the October 15, 2019 speedy trial deadline for defendant Vincent A. Paley. Defendant is consequently confined in jail until his scheduled January 2, 2020 trial date.