Opinion Summaries

     In this appeal, the court was asked to consider whether plaintiff, a municipal court administrator, is an employee of the Administrative Office of the Courts (AOC), thereby allowing her to assert a claim against the AOC under the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination, N.J.S.A. 10:5-1 to -49.  Following the court's review of various statutes and court rules, it concluded that if the Legislature had intended municipal court administrators to be considered employees of the AOC, it could have expressly done so.  Instead, the Legislature enacted N.J.S.A. 2B:12-10(a), specifically establishing that municipalities "shall provide for an administrator" of municipal courts and pay "their compensation."  Moreover, N.J.S.A. 2B:12-1(a) provides "[e]very municipality shall establish a municipal court," not the AOC.  Although the AOC provides certain oversight and supervision of municipal courts, that does not equate with the AOC establishing an employer-employee relationship with plaintiff.

The Court views N.J.S.A. 40A:7-12 to require a planning board to independently evaluate the merits of a deannexation petition and make an objective recommendation to the municipality’s governing body. That did not occur in this case. Plaintiffs met their burden of proof with respect to all three prongs of N.J.S.A. 40A:7-12.1, and the trial court properly ordered deannexation.

Under N.J.R.E. 406, evidence of a specific, repeated, and regular business habit or practice, whether corroborated or not, would have  been admissible to establish a rebuttable presumption that Altice had acted in conformity with that habit or practice. But here, Altice produced insufficient evidence of such habit or practice. And because there is no proof that Altice emailed plaintiff the critical customer service agreement, the Court does not reach whether there exists mutual assent to waive a jury trial and arbitrate the dispute.

The State appealed trial court orders terminating Megan's Law, N.J.S.A. 2C:7-1 to -23, and Community Supervision for Life (CSL), N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6.4, obligations applicable to S.O. and G.N. (collectively, Registrants).  The court vacated the trial court orders and remanded both matters for further proceedings.

These appeals raised the novel issue of whether the "public safety prongs" in the termination provisions of Megan's law, N.J.S.A. 2C:7-2(f), and CSL, N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6.4(c), require trial courts to consider all subsequent non-sexual and sexual offenses when determining whether a registrant poses a threat to the safety of others.  The court concluded the public safety prongs contain ambiguous language, since they are susceptible to more than one interpretation.  Based on this ambiguity, the court applied principles of statutory construction, which required an examination of extrinsic evidence.   In reaching a decision, the court considered the legislative intent, legislative history and prior decisional law and interpreted the public safety prongs to require a trial court to determine whether a registrant established they were not likely to pose a threat to the safety of others, sufficient to warrant termination of their Megan's Law and CSL obligations, without confining its analysis to the threat of sexual re-offense.  

The court concluded, when evaluating whether the public safety prongs have been satisfied, trial courts shall engage in a holistic assessment of the individual registrant, considering the factual predicates for subsequent non-sexual and sexual offenses, a registrant's tier classification, Registrant Risk Assessment Scale (RRAS) score, any applications to modify their tier classification, expert psychological evaluations, evidence of therapeutic programs and counseling attended, and any other relevant proofs.   

In this slip and fall case, plaintiff attempts to expand the principles of sidewalk liability for commercial properties to a residential property that was unoccupied and undergoing renovations.  This court upholds the motion judge's rejection of plaintiff's invitation to adopt such expanded principles of liability. 

As an alternative argument, plaintiff contends the common law protection for residential property owners was nullified here because the defendant homeowners allegedly increased the sidewalk's slippery condition by negligently clearing snow from it. The court rejects this contention as well. 

Even viewing the record in a light most favorable to plaintiff, the motion judge properly deemed the evidence insufficient to present a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the homeowners had worsened the sidewalk's actual condition before her slip and fall.  The undisputed record establishes that the photographs plaintiff crucially relies upon to prove the sidewalk's supposedly worsened condition at the time of her fall were taken much later, after an intervening winter snowstorm—according to plaintiff's weather expert—had deposited as much as another 3.5 inches of snow in the area.  The weather data thus undermined plaintiff's contentions about the nature of the sidewalk's condition at the time of the accident, rendering her theory of liability untenable.

The court therefore affirms summary judgment and the dismissal of plaintiff's complaint. 

         In this appeal, the court reversed the trial court's decision permitting three write-in votes to be counted in the February 15, 2025 Toms River Board of Fire Commissioners, District No. 1 election. Petitioner Michael Hopson was an unsuccessful candidate for a position as a fire commissioner.  The trial court's decision changed the election results from a tie between Hopson and defendant Anthony Cirz to Cirz winning by one vote.  The court held the trial court misapplied N.J.S.A. 19:49-5, because the plain language of the statute prohibits the counting of a write-in vote for any person who is a candidate listed on the ballot.

         The court affirmed the trial court's decision not to count mail-in ballots that were deficient and incapable of being cured. Thus, the court remanded the matter for entry of an order for a run-off election between Hopson and Cirz for the one open seat.

The Commission’s map represents a proper exercise of the substantial discretion the MWL grants to ward commissions to set the boundaries of municipal wards. The Court does not concur with the Appellate Division’s ruling that additional factfinding is necessary to determine whether the Commission’s map meets N.J.S.A. 40:44-14’s compactness requirement. The Court reverses the Appellate Division’s judgment on that claim and reinstates the trial court’s judgment as to the Commission’s compliance with the MWL without further proceedings. The Court’s conclusion that the Commission complied with the MWL compels rejection of the equal protection claim. And, in light of its holding that the map did not violate either the MWL or the New Jersey Constitution, the Court affirms the Appellate Division’s determination that the trial court properly dismissed the Community Organizations’ NJCRA claim.

Applying First Amendment principles stated in Smith v. Daily Mail Publishing Co., 443 U.S. 97, 98, 102-03 (1979), and Florida Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524, 530 (1989), the Court views Caputo’s specific address to constitute truthful information, lawfully obtained, that addresses a matter of public concern. As the parties agree and the trial court and Appellate Division determined, Daniel’s Law serves a state interest of the highest order: the protection of certain public officials and their immediate family members living in the same household so that those officials can perform their duties without fear of reprisal. See N.J.S.A. 56:8-166.3. Daniel’s Law, as applied to prevent Kratovil’s proposed republication of Caputo’s exact home address, is narrowly tailored to serve that state interest.

     In this matter of apparent first impression, the court was asked to determine whether a future statutory lien pursuant to N.J.S.A. 30:4D-7.2 ("Medicaid Lien Statute") has priority over an accrued Division of Developmental Disabilities ("DDD") lien pursuant to N.J.S.A. 30:4-80.1 ("DDD Lien Statute").  The effect of that priority would be to bar appellant, DDD, from recovering on its lien against the inherited property of G.W. ("Gabrielle"), an adjudicated incapacitated person.    

     The court concluded the Medicaid Lien Statute and the DDD Lien Statute are not inconsistent with one another.  The Medicaid Lien Statute is clear that although Medicaid liens are "preferred claim[s] against the recipient's estate" and "have a priority equivalent to" N.J.S.A. 3B:22-2(d), N.J.S.A. 30:4D-7.2(d)(1) (emphasis added), they cannot come into being until the recipient of the funds has passed away, as "[a] lien may be filed against and recovery sought from the estate of a deceased recipient." N.J.S.A. 30:4D-7.2(a)(1) (emphasis added).  By its plain language, a Medicaid lien may attach only to the estate of a decedent, not the property of a living person.  When both liens exist at the same time, an existing DDD lien cannot take priority over an existing Medicaid lien.  However, in a situation such as this one, where no Medicaid lien exists because the recipient is still alive, DDD is entitled to recover on its lien, the only statutorily recognized lien in existence.  

     Because the plain language of the Medicaid Lien Statute and the DDD Lien Statute demonstrate DDD is entitled to recover its lien now and the DDD lien is not subordinate to a non-existing Medicaid lien, the court vacated the trial court's order finding the future Medicaid lien had priority over the existing DDD lien and remanded for an order consistent with its opinion.  However, the court affirmed the trial court's appointment of the Arc of Bergen and Passaic Counties ("Arc") as the guardian of Gabrielle's property and ordered Arc and DDD to engage in the compromise process pursuant to N.J.S.A. 30:4-80.6(c) regarding DDD's lien.  

The relevant case law and court rule on presentments contemplate the existence of both a grand jury investigation and an actual presentment for an assignment judge to review. But here, no grand jury has completed an investigation, and no presentment exists. Courts cannot presume the outcome of an investigation in advance or the contents of a presentment that has not yet been written. It was therefore premature for the trial court to conclude that any potential presentment in this matter had to be suppressed. The State has the right to proceed with its investigation and present evidence before a special grand jury. If the grand jury issues a presentment, the assignment judge should review the report and publish it if it complies with the legal standards outlined in the Court’s opinion. The Court cannot and does not decide the ultimate question in advance.

     The court considers if judicial estoppel prevents a party from benefiting by making representations in state court that are inconsistent with those previously made to obtain a modification of an automatic stay imposed by a federal court in a bankruptcy case.

     While this automobile-accident case was pending in the Law Division, defendant filed a petition for bankruptcy in the federal bankruptcy court.  Plaintiff moved for a modification of an automatic stay issued by the bankruptcy court.  He represented to the court he was pursuing a judgment only in the amount of defendant's insurance coverage.  Plaintiff made the same representation in the Law Division in opposition to defendant's motion for a stay.  Based on plaintiff's representations, the Law Division judge denied defendant's stay motion and the bankruptcy court granted plaintiff's motion and modified its automatic stay, expressly to permit plaintiff to pursue a judgment limited to the amount of insurance coverage.  The Law Division case proceeded to trial; the jury awarded plaintiff a verdict far in excess of the amount of the insurance coverage. Plaintiff requested and obtained a judgment in the amount of the verdict plus relief granted pursuant to Rule 4:58-2(a).  The Law Division judge denied defendant's multiple motions to mold the verdict to the insurance-coverage amount, or in the alternative for a new trial or remittitur.

     Based on the equitable doctrine of judicial estoppel and applicable bankruptcy law, the court reversed and remanded for entry of an order molding the verdict to the amount of the insurance coverage.

     The court takes this opportunity to clarify the legal principles that govern motions for a new trial based on evidence not previously available to the defense.  Such motions, the court explains, can arise in two distinct circumstances:  (1) where the prosecutor was in possession of the "new" evidence but failed to disclose it to the defense—a discovery violation—and (2) where the defense discovers the new evidence through its own efforts.  In Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), the United States Supreme Court addressed the first situation.  In State v. Carter, 91 N.J. 86 (1982), the New Jersey Supreme Court considered both situations and devised what has been applied as a general test for resolving newly discovered evidence motions.   

     Defendant contends the prosecutor committed a discovery violation by not disclosing that its key trial witness had accepted a plea agreement tendered by the prosecutor in an unrelated matter eight years before defendant's murder trial. The court explains that the separate multi-prong tests set forth in Brady and Carter overlap but are not identical, which can lead to confusion.  The court considers whether the trial judge ultimately reached the correct conclusion in denying defendant's motion for a new trial notwithstanding that the judge did not cite to the governing precedent, Brady.

     The court emphasizes that the Carter and Brady tests share a common element: whether the jury's verdict would have been different had the defense been aware of the new evidence before trial. The question of "materiality" under both Carter and Brady is essentially a form of harmless error analysis.  Further, the court explains, while the two tests start from a different factual predicate, they converge on the fact-sensitive question of whether the trial outcome would have been different if the defense had been aware of the new evidence before trial.  The court further holds there is no practical difference between the materiality/harmless error elements set forth in the Brady and Carter formulations.  Thus, the court reasons, the motion judge's findings under Carter allow it to evaluate the materiality element of the Brady test, which requires reversal of a conviction only where there is a reasonable probability that had the evidence suppressed by the prosecutor been timely disclosed to the defense, the trial result would have been different. The court concludes that in this application, the newly discovered information would not have led to a different trial result. 

     The court also addresses defendant's contention the motion judge abused discretion and violated defendant's due process and compulsory process rights by refusing to enforce a subpoena to the Crime Stoppers program concerning possible reward payments to the State's witness.  The court concludes the motion judge did not provide adequate reasons explaining his decision.  The court thus remands for the motion judge to make additional findings of fact and conclusions of law.

     Defendant was charged with the illegal possession of a firearm and other offenses.  He appeals the denial of his motion to suppress a gun that police found after opening his companion's backpack without a search warrant. 

     Two police officers encountered the companion on the street after she and defendant got out of a parked car that had been described in a Be-On-the-Lookout (BOLO) report of a recent shooting.  After defendant fled the scene, the police handcuffed the companion and put her in the back seat of a police car.  The police then secured her belongings, including her backpack, in the front seat of the squad car.  She told the police she thought defendant had put a weapon in her backpack at an earlier time.  The police immediately opened the backpack without seeking a warrant. 

     The prosecution solely invoked the automobile and the exigent circumstances exceptions to the warrant requirement and did not rely on consent-to-search nor other exceptions. 

     In reversing the suppression denial, the court holds: (1) defendant had standing to challenge the backpack search; (2) the automobile exception to the constitutional warrant requirement does not apply because the backpack was not the fruit of the automobile search; and (3) the State failed to demonstrate exigent circumstances to justify the immediate necessity to open the backpack, which was secured in a police car and not accessible to the either the handcuffed companion or defendant. 

Defendant K.H. appeals from his jury trial convictions for aggravated sexual assault and burglary.  He claims DNA evidence police collected from him should have been suppressed because his consent to the buccal swab test was coerced.  He argues inter alia that it was unlawful for detectives to ask for consent after he invoked his Miranda rights, citing the court's recent decision in State v. Amang, __ N.J. Super. __ (App. Div. 2025). 

The present case probes the underlying rationale and boundaries of the bright line rule established in Amang.  In that case, the court held that under the New Jersey Constitution, police may not ask a person in custody to grant consent to a search if they had previously asserted the right to confer with an attorney during the administration of Miranda warnings.  In adopting that bright line rule, the court stressed the unique ability of attorneys to protect the Fifth Amendment rights of a client undergoing custodial interrogation. 

The court in the present appeal makes clear the categorical rule announced in Amang is triggered only by an arrestee's assertion of the right to confer with counsel.  It is not triggered by a defendant's assertion of the right to remain silent. 

Although it is not disputed that defendant in this case invoked his Miranda rights, the motion court did not make a specific finding on whether defendant requested to confer with an attorney, as he claims.  The court concludes that a remand for further factfinding is unnecessary in this case because in any event, the motion court correctly found that defendant's DNA would ultimately have been obtained under the inevitable discovery doctrine.  The court notes, however, the Miranda waiver form used in this case, like the one used in Amang, documents whether the arrestee invoked Miranda rights, but does not memorialize whether they asked to confer with counsel, asserted the right to remain silent, or asserted both rights guaranteed under Miranda. 

That distinction is important not only with respect to applying the Amang rule but also to ensure compliance with Fifth Amendment case law that precludes police from reinitiating custodial interrogation after the arrestee has asserted the right to counsel.  The court recommends that the Attorney General and county prosecutors review existing Miranda waiver forms to consider whether they should be revised to facilitate documenting whether an arrestee asserted the right to confer with counsel.

     This case presents a novel constitutional question arising from the execution of a communications data warrant (CDW) that authorized the surreptitious installation of a global positioning system (GPS) device on a vehicle to electronically monitor its movements.  The initial plan was to install the device while the vehicle was on a public street or in a public parking lot.  When that failed, the State Police decided to install the device while the vehicle was parked on defendant's driveway.  The CDW did not expressly authorize entry onto the driveway. 

     In determining whether the State Police violated defendant's constitutional rights when they went on his driveway to perform the installation, the court considers a series of sub-questions, including:  was the portion of the driveway where the subject vehicle was parked part of the "curtilage" of defendant's home? If so, did the State Police have an "implied license" to step onto the private driveway and proceed to the subject vehicle to install the GPS device?  If they did not have such license, did the CDW itself implicitly authorize their entry?  Or were they required to obtain express judicial authorization to enter onto defendant's residential property, either in the initial CDW application or by going back to the judge who issued the CDW when they abandoned their initial plan to install the device while the vehicle was parked on public property? 

     The court concludes the driveway was part of the curtilage of defendant's home. The court further holds the State failed to establish that the State Police had "implied license" under the curtilage doctrine to approach the vehicle to install the GPS device, noting the State Police turned away from the pathway leading to the front door as they proceeded to the subject vehicle to attach the device.  Additionally, the court  holds that the implied license caveat to the curtilage doctrine would not in any event authorize police to enter the driveway for the purpose of installing a GPS device, since that is not something visitors would be expected or permitted to do. 

     The court thus concludes the State Police entry constitutes a search.  The court also holds the CDW did not authorize that search, stressing the plain language of the Fourth Amendment and Article I, Paragraph 7 of the New Jersey Constitution requires a search warrant to particularly, not impliedly, describe the place to be searched. 

     The court adds that it would have been a straightforward matter for the State Police to supplement the CDW once their initial plan to install the GPS device on public property was frustrated. Recognizing the exclusionary rule serves an educative function, the court reminds police and prosecutors that having a strong basis for obtaining a search warrant does not excuse the requirement to get one before conducting a search.  The court explains there is no probable cause exception to the warrant requirement; probable cause is a threshold prerequisite for a warrant, not a substitute for one. 

     The court notes the State at oral argument acknowledged that going forward, the better practice would be for police to preserve the option to enter upon a target's private property when installing a GPS device by asking the warrant judge for such authority when initially applying for a CDW or by seeking an amendment to the CDW if the practical need to enter upon private residential property later arises.  The court adds that such prudence would help to protect both the constitutional rights of the target of the investigation and the admissibility of evidence derived from the GPS tracking.

     Plaintiff sued defendants after they circulated a flyer advocating he give his wife a religious divorce.  The flyer contained plaintiff's photo and called for a protest outside his parents' home. His complaint sought a judgment for removal of his image, termination of the dissemination of the flyer, and uninfringed seclusion.  The complaint also alleged plaintiff suffered emotional distress and sought monetary damages.

     Plaintiff served all defendants but one.  When the parties could not agree on service of the remaining defendant and a briefing schedule, defendants' counsel moved to extend time to answer the complaint, and plaintiff cross-moved for entry of default judgment.  Defendants also filed an order to show cause under the Uniform Public Expression Protection Act (UPEPA), N.J.S.A. 2A:53A-49, to dismiss the complaint and for counsel fees, arguing plaintiff's complaint targeted their First Amendment activity. 

     The trial court granted defendants' motion to extend time to answer and denied plaintiff's cross-motion for default judgment.  Plaintiff then voluntarily dismissed his complaint the same day, after receiving the court's ruling on the motions.  Pursuant to Rule 4:50-1(f), defendants moved for relief from the judgment of dismissal to have the court reopen the matter to consider their application for counsel fees, costs, and expenses under the UPEPA.  The court denied defendants' motion because they had not filed an answer to the complaint and remarked plaintiff's complaint was not frivolous. 

     On appeal, the court reversed and remanded for consideration of defendants' application for fees, costs, and expenses on the merits.  The court held the UPEPA does not require a defendant in a strategic lawsuit against public participation (SLAPP) to file an answer before moving for dismissal and fees.  Drawing on case law from another jurisdiction involving an anti-SLAPP statute like the UPEPA, and the plain language of the UPEPA itself, the court concluded an order to show cause for fees is not extinguished when a plaintiff dismisses their complaint or a trial court dismisses a plaintiff's complaint for lack of prosecution. 

     Anti-SLAPP statutes such as the UPEPA are designed to prevent a plaintiff from bringing litigation to siphon a defendant's money, time, and resources.  Like other anti-SLAPP statutes, the UPEPA's order to show cause mechanism is intended to provide a defendant recompense where a plaintiff strategically dismisses their lawsuit to avoid paying a fee award.  The UPEPA does not require a defendant to initiate a separate lawsuit for fees and costs.

     The record is unclear whether the trial court had denied defendants' Rule 4:50-1(f) motion because it found plaintiff's lawsuit was not frivolous. To provide guidance to the court on remand, and in future cases, the court held the frivolous pleading standard applies under the UPEPA only where the court concludes the party responding to an order to show cause for fees prevailed, and "finds that the order to show cause was frivolous or filed solely with intent to delay the proceeding." N.J.S.A. 2A:53A-58(2).

Although the Fifth Amendment does not afford a defendant in a PDVA FRO hearing blanket immunity, a defendant may invoke the privilege against self-incrimination in response to specific questions that raise reasonable risks of self-incrimination, and no adverse inference may be drawn from the exercise of that right. The PDVA immunity provision contained in N.J.S.A. 2C:25-29(a) is not coextensive with the privilege against self-incrimination and is therefore insufficient to safeguard a defendant’s rights under the Fifth Amendment.

       Plaintiff, a nurse and acknowledged alcoholic, filed a complaint in the Law Division alleging defendants discriminated against her because of her alcoholism, and an amended complaint alleging defendants retaliated against her for filing the complaint, in violation of the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination, (LAD) N.J.S.A. 10:5-1 to -50.  Alcoholism is a disability under the LAD.

        The trial court granted defendants' motion to dismiss.  The court reversed and remanded because:  (1) plaintiff was not required to bring her LAD claims in an administrative hearing, nor exhaust administrative remedies; (2) the trial court misapplied Beaver v. Magellan Health Services, Inc., 433 N.J. Super. 430 (App. Div. 2013), as plaintiff's complaint was not a collateral attack on an administrative agency decision, nor an attempt to divest the court of its jurisdiction; and (3) the Board did not have primary jurisdiction after the correct application of the factors provided in Muise v. GPU, Inc., 332 N.J. Super. 140 (App. Div. 2000).

The practice of purchasing a competitor’s name as a keyword does not, in itself, constitute a violation of the RPCs. However, the Court requires that attorneys employing this strategy include a clear and conspicuous disclaimer on the landing page of their website when a user clicks on such a paid advertisement.

     In this litigation, a law firm and its partner challenge the constitutionality of the so-called "limited attorney exemption" of the Debt Adjustment and Credit Counseling Act ("DACCA"), N.J.S.A. 17:16G-1 to -9.  The present case was initiated when the Office of Attorney Ethics ("OAE") launched an investigation of plaintiffs who, among other things, represent debtors in bankruptcy and collections cases.  Such debt adjustment work may violate DACCA, which prohibits debt adjusters from operating for-profit in New Jersey unless exempted by the statute. 

     DACCA initially exempted "any attorney-at-law of this State."  In 1986, however, the Legislature amended DACCA to narrow the exception to the current "limited attorney exemption," which exempts only those attorneys who are "not principally engaged as debt adjuster[s]." N.J.S.A. 17:16G-1(c) (emphasis added). While rarely prosecuted, attorneys "principally engaged" in debt adjustment work may be subject to heavy civil and criminal sanctions under DACCA and the Criminal Code.

     This court invalidates the limited attorney exemption within DACCA because it (1) violates principles of separation of powers, and (2) is void for vagueness.

     First, this court holds that DACCA's limited attorney exemption is an unconstitutional violation of separation-of-powers principles.  As applied to attorneys who principally conduct their legal practice for clients seeking an adjustment of their debts, N.J.S.A.17:16G-1(c)(2)(a) represents an undue encroachment upon the Court's exclusive authority to regulate attorneys set forth in Article VI, Section 2, paragraph 3 of the New Jersey Constitution. 

     Second, this court further holds that the limited attorney exemption is unconstitutional for its vagueness.  The ambiguity of the limited attorney exemption denies attorneys due process because of the statute's failure to provide them with fair notice of what constitutes "principal engagement."

     This court therefore reverses the trial court's grant of summary judgment to defendants and remands the matter for further consideration of plaintiffs' civil rights and other claims. In doing so, this court invalidates the limited attorney exemption in N.J.S.A. 17:16G-1(c)(2)(a) and its cross-reference to N.J.S.A. 2C:21-19(f).  The rest of the statute remains intact.