Opinion Summaries

SOMA’s legislatively enumerated purposes demonstrate that a special need -- not an immediate need to gather evidence to pursue criminal charges -- motivates the GPS monitoring prescribed by the Legislature. That satisfies the first step in a special needs analysis and allows the determination that this search may be constitutional. The Court therefore balances the interests of the parties and concludes that, although GPS monitoring is a significantly invasive search, it is outweighed by the compelling government interest advanced by the search and H.R.’s severely diminished expectation of privacy. The Court notes that H.R.’s PSL status is critical to that conclusion.

By its terms, RISA applies to services contracts. Further, in the statute as written, there is no requirement that a contract include a financing arrangement to be covered by RISA.

On leave granted, the New Jersey Department of Health Office of Emergency Medical Services appealed from a July 16, 2019 Law Division order lifting the summary suspension of plaintiff AmeriCare Emergency Medical Service, Inc.'s license to operate as an emergency medical service provider and permitting an action to proceed under the New Jersey Civil Rights Act, N.J.S.A. 10:6-1 to -2 (CRA). Although there is no jurisdictional requirement that administrative remedies be exhausted in order to bring suit under the CRA, the party alleging a claim must show a violation of a substantive right or that someone "acting under color of law" interfered with or attempted to interfere with a substantive right. State v. Quaker Valley Farms, LLC, 235 N.J. 37, 64 (2018). Since AmeriCare could not make that showing without agency adjudication of its administrative claims, the panel reversed the Law Division order.

The Court reverses and remands (a) for the Department to provide improved notice of the basis on which its investigation has found some evidence -- which the Court stresses must be some credible evidence -- to support the allegation of harm; and (b) for S.C. to have an informal opportunity before the Department to rebut and/or supplement the record before the Department finalizes its finding. The Court does not address the amici’s challenge to the validity of the “not established” category but recognizes problems with the standard as presently articulated and notes that it would be well worth the effort of the Department to revisit its regulatory language concerning the standard for making a “not established” finding as well as its processes related to such findings.

Based on its review of the extensive record, the Court finds beyond a reasonable doubt that there is cause for removal. Because of Respondent’s multiple, serious acts of misconduct -- in particular, his inappropriate behavior in a matter involving an alleged victim of domestic violence -- the Court orders his removal from office.  

This personal injury case arises from a pedestrian's fall on black ice in a parking lot leased by private owners to the Borough of Caldwell. The injured pedestrian and his wife sued both the Borough and the private owners, alleging negligent failure to maintain the parking lot and the internal driveway connected to it in a safe condition. The written lease between the owners and the Borough expressly delegates to the Borough the responsibility to clear the premises of ice and snow.

The trial court granted the Borough and the property owners summary judgment. Plaintiffs now appeal the ruling solely as to the property owners, arguing they had a non-delegable duty under tort law to keep the premises safe from accumulated ice and snow, or alternatively, that the language of the lease does not delegate that duty with sufficient clarity

We affirm, albeit for a legal reason not articulated by the trial court. Based on the Supreme Court's very recent opinion in Shields v. Ramslee Motors, 240 N.J. 479 (2020), the property owners are entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law. That is because the lease explicitly delegates to the Borough the exclusive responsibility to remove snow and ice from the premises. The fact that the tenant in this case is a public entity and that it uses the premises for a municipal parking lot does not warrant a different result than in Shields.

Plaintiffs Carmella C. Minelli and her husband Anthony Minelli appeal from the dismissal of their personal injury action against defendants Harrah's Resort Atlantic City, Harrah's Operating Company, Inc., Caesars Entertainment and Caesars Entertainment Operating Company, Inc. based on the two-year statute of limitations, N.J.S.A. 2A:2-14. Because the court concludes that operation of Section 108(c)(2) of the Bankruptcy Code made plaintiffs' claims timely filed, at least as to the debtor, defendant Caesars Entertainment Operating Company, the judgment is reversed.

This court granted the State leave to appeal in this pending criminal case to address the grading aspects of the money laundering statute, N.J.S.A. 2C:21-23 to -29. The core and unresolved legal question is the meaning of the term "amount involved" in N.J.S.A. 2C:21-27, which calibrates the severity of the offense.

Specifically, N.J.S.A. 2C:21-27(a) prescribes that a defendant commits a first-degree money laundering offense if the "amount involved" is $500,000 or more. The crime is a second-degree offense if the "amount involved" is under $500,000 but equal to or more than $75,000. Lastly, it is a third-degree offense if the "amount involved" is under $75,000

As this opinion explains, this court holds that where, as here, a defendant is charged with engaging in a money laundering transaction prohibited by N.J.S.A. 2C:21-25(b), the "amount involved" is the fair market value of the property transferred in that transaction and any other transactions conducted as part of that common scheme. That fair market value is to be determined by the trier of fact. The value is not necessarily equal to or limited by the sum that the money launderer received in the illicit transaction(s). However, the court rejects the prosecutor’s argument that the “amount involved” in a case charged under the “transactional” provision of the money laundering statute includes the value of unsold stolen goods that were not part of a laundering transaction.

This case presents the question of whether petitioner A.R.'s convictions fall within the "crime-spree" exception contained within N.J.S.A. 2C:52-2(a), making them eligible for expungement. Specifically, the granting or denying of petitioner’s expungement petition turns on the phrase: “crimes [which are] interdependent or closely related in circumstances and were committed as part of a sequence of events that took place within a comparatively short period of time.” N.J.S.A. 2C:52-2(a). Petitioner and the State concede that this phrase is undefined in the statute, yet offer competing interpretations. The State proposes a strict interpretation of this language, whereas petitioner asserts that the expungement statute – as remedial legislation – should be liberally interpreted. This court concludes that a liberal interpretation of this language is consistent with the general purpose of the expungement statute. Petitioner’s convictions are “closely related in circumstances” because they stem from two instances where he engaged in the unlawful sale of narcotics to a “friend” and an undercover officer, and were committed over a period of six weeks, which is a “comparatively short period of time.” Therefore, petitioner’s convictions are eligible for expungement pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:52-2(a).

Defendant was confined to the Bergen County Jail work release program for failure to pay child support. He was released to search for work and twice failed to return to jail on a timely basis resulting in his indictment, subsequent plea, and sentence on two counts of third-degree escape, N.J.S.A. 2C:29-5(a).

On this appeal, from a denial of defendant's PCR petition, the court reverses and holds that because a child support contempt proceeding is "essentially a civil proceeding," see Pasqua v. Council, 186 N.J. 127, 140 (2006), defendant could not be charged with the criminal offense of escape, and the PCR court erred as a matter of law.

Although the facts lie at the outer edges of what is sufficient to show a substantial step based on verbal acts, when defendant’s statements on the recorded conversations are considered in the context of this case, the State presented sufficient evidence for the jury to find a substantial step for attempted murder.

In this action, the Attorney General and Director of the New Jersey Division on Civil Rights alleged defendants violated the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination, N.J.S.A. 10:5-1 to -49, by asking a prospective tenant of an apartment if she was a Muslim, refusing to lease the apartment based on the prospective tenant's religion, and making statements concerning the gender of a Division on Civil Rights investigator posing as a prospective tenant. A jury returned a no-cause verdict on plaintiffs' claims. The court reverses and remands for a new trial.

The court determines the trial court erred by allowing cross-examination of the prospective tenant about her religious beliefs and the teachings of the Quran in violation of N.J.R.E. 610 and in derogation of the privilege embodied in N.J.R.E. 512. The court rejects defendants' argument the cross-examination was permissible because the prospective tenant "opened the door" to questions about her religious beliefs and the teachings of the Quran during her direct testimony.

The court also concludes the trial court abused its discretion by allowing cross-examination of the prospective tenant about the alleged use of the term "infidels" by Muslims to refer to individuals that do not practice Islam. The court finds the cross-examination testimony, which defendants relied on to attack the prospective tenant's credibility, inadmissible under N.J.R.E. 608.

The court also finds the trial court did not conduct a proper analysis of the admissibility of the available portions of one of the defendant's recorded interview with a news organization, during which the defendant spoke about his interactions with prospective tenant and his beliefs concerning Muslims. The trial court incorrectly determined the available recorded portions of the interview were inadmissible under the "rule of completeness" without conducting the required analysis for the admissibility of the available portions of the recorded interview under the standard established by the Court in State v. Nantambu, 221 N.J. 390 (2015).

The judgment of the Appellate Division is affirmed by an equally divided Court.

In this workers' compensation case, the court reverses an order dismissing with prejudice a claim petition and a motion for medical and temporary disability benefits. The court concludes the judge of compensation denied petitioner's due process rights by determining at the outset of case, and based solely on petitioner's affidavit supporting his motion for medical and temporary disability benefits, that petitioner was a "multiple liar" who lacked credibility. During the numerous subsequent proceedings in the matter, and without hearing any testimony from petitioner, the judge repeatedly found petitioner was a liar and, at one point, found petitioner's lack of credibility rendered it unnecessary to hear to any evidence on the merits of petitioner's claim. The court reverses the dismissal of the claim petition and denial of the motion for medical and temporary disability benefits, and remands for further proceedings before a different judge.

This domestic violence case concerns the breadth of “household member” jurisdiction in the context of a modern, blended-family where the parties are adult, half-siblings who shared meaningful, regular parenting time with their common father during their youth – though never resided together. Throughout their youth, the parties regularly and consistently spent substantial periods of time at their common father’s home, including the defendant spending overnights every other weekend during the school year and more extended times during the summer at their father’s home. Although he did not have a bedroom, he had a fixed sleeping arrangement and drawers containing underwear, gym shorts, and toiletries. During and after college, their in-person contact decreased, but they still gathered informally and at family milestones and vacations.

In view of those facts, for purposes of the Prevention of Domestic Violence Act’s (“PDVA”) jurisdictional “household member” requirement, the court holds that a child whose parents are separated during youth but who spends meaningful, regular periods of time at a parent of alternate residence’s home such that he or she is substantially integrated into that household may have two “households” creating jurisdiction vis-à-vis a victimized half-sibling who resided solely with the common parent. “Household member” as used in the PDVA’s definition of “victim of domestic violence” must be sufficiently flexible to accommodate the ever-changing dynamics of modern families. To restrict a child whose parents are separated to only one household despite meaningful, regular time in a second household would untenably alter the statutory construct, discriminate against members of blended families, and unduly restrict the broadly designed, legislatively crafted protections afforded victims of domestic violence.

The caseworker’s testimony regarding Sharie’s statement is clear evidence of third-party guilt and was therefore impermissibly excluded at trial. As such, the Court reverses the judgment of the Appellate Division and vacates defendant’s convictions for crimes against Sharie. However, the State’s leading questions were appropriate for the child victim witnesses, and defendant’s sentence was not manifestly excessive with respect to the convictions for crimes against Brianna. The Court finds no reason to disturb defendant’s convictions or sentence as to his offenses against Brianna.

In this appeal from a final judgment of divorce and an order denying reconsideration, the court rejected a trial judge's reliance on Gilligan v. Gilligan, 428 N.J. Super. 69 (Ch. Div. 2012), to the extent it held an award of social security disability to a spouse during the marriage was not sufficient to establish a party's inability to work for purposes of income imputation in the calculation of spousal and child support. The court held here that despite Gilligan's holding, the court continued to hew to its holding in Golian v. Golian, 344 N.J. Super. 337, 338-43 (App. Div. 2001), that when the Social Security Administration has determined a party is disabled, a presumption of disability is established and the burden shifts to the opposing party to refute that presumption

The court also rejected the trial judge's reliance on income averaging in her determination of whether a party was earning income commensurate with his or her earning capacity because the judge ignored current earnings and relied upon six years of income that were earned prior to the parties separating, which was more than five years before the trial date. The court held that the judge on remand should use the years prior to the trial when determining earning capacity.Finally, the court concluded that the trial judge also improperly deviated from the Child Support Guidelines by relying on the elimination of parenting time in the final judgment of divorce. The court concluded that because the amount of parenting time is an element of the Child Support Guidelines, a reduction based on elimination of parenting time did not support a finding of an injustice warranting a downward deviation in support.

Both ordinances at issue are unquestionably zoning ordinances subject to the limitations of the MLUL, the plain language of which contains no exception for the retroactive application of changes in zoning requirements within two years of the issuance of a final approval. The City therefore cannot apply either ordinance to the Project, because they became effective within two years of the issuance of Shipyard’s final approval. And Shipyard’s period of statutory protection has been tolled.

In this case of first impression, the court examines the meaning of a "dating relationship" under the Prevention of Domestic Violence Act, N.J.S.A. 2C:25-17 to -35, where the parties never experienced a traditional, in-person "date." Instead, their relationship was demonstrated by the intensity and content of their communications, including the exchange of nearly 1300 highly personal text messages.

Acknowledging the prevalence of virtual communications in today's society, especially in view of the COVID-19 pandemic, the court recognized text messaging and other forms of electronic communication enable rapid yet deep interactions at all hours. Those communications can form bonds that may be no less intimate than traditional dating activities.

The court concluded the proliferate and exceedingly intimate communications between the parties in the present matter constituted a dating relationship within the meaning of the Act and supported entry of the final restraining order.

Here, where a patient removed the tube herself and refused replacement, important questions about the procedures, protocols, and duties of a licensed nurse in these circumstances must be explained in order to establish a deviation in the standard of care. In addition, important considerations about patient autonomy complicate the standard-of-care analysis. A jury could not reach a determination as to a nurse’s responsibility under these circumstances without the benefit of expert opinion as to the appropriate balance between patient autonomy and prescribed treatment. An affidavit of merit was therefore required.