Opinion Summaries

Defendant pleaded guilty to two counts of violating N.J.S.A. 2C:40-26(b) by driving during a period of license suspension or revocation for a second or subsequent violation of N.J.S.A. 39:4-50, driving while under the influence, or N.J.S.A. 39:4-50a, refusal to provide a breath sample. The court sentenced defendant on each count to a 180-day term of imprisonment with a 180-day period of parole ineligibility as a condition of serving a two-year probationary term. The court ordered the custodial terms to be served consecutively and the probationary terms to be served concurrently.

Defendant argued his sentences are illegal because the Criminal Code does not authorize a spilt sentence with a term of imprisonment that includes a mandatory period of parole ineligibility. The court disagreed, finding the plain language of N.J.S.A. 2C:43-2(b)(2) authorizes sentences including terms of incarceration as a condition of probation, with the only limitation being the term of incarceration may not exceed 364 days. The court finds that because defendant's individual and aggregate custodial sentences require less than 364 days of imprisonment as a condition of probation, they are authorized by N.J.S.A. 2C:43-2(b)(2) even though the terms of imprisonment include mandatory periods of parole ineligibility.

The court also determined the sentencing court erred by failing to make findings supporting its imposition of consecutive sentences, see State v. Yarbough, 100 N.J. 627 (1985), and by imposing sentences that were both consecutive and concurrent, see State v. Rogers, 124 N.J. 113 (1991). The court remanded for resentencing.

Tax Court: Carmine Paul, Executor v. Director, Division of Taxation; Docket No. 000307-2016, opinion by Nugent, J.T.C., decided June 2, 2020. For plaintiff – Thomas M. Wolfe (Wolfe Ossa Law, attorneys); for defendant – Heather Lynn Anderson (Gurbir S. Grewal, Attorney General of New Jersey, attorney).

Decedent formed an irrevocable inter vivos trust in June 2007, funded with cash and securities, naming himself and his son-in-law, Carmine Paul, as trustees. By the terms of the Trust Indenture the trustees were required to pay to Decedent the net income from the trust on a quarterly basis. Trustees had the discretion to distribute principal to the beneficiaries in an amount limited by the trust, but Decedent was not entitled to any distribution of trust principal. At Decedent’s death, the remaining trust property was to be distributed to the beneficiaries named in the Trust Indenture. Prior to his death Decedent suffered a stroke and Carmine Paul assumed the role of trustee. Decedent continued to receive net income distributions from the trust until his death in 2013. After Decedent’s death Defendant audited the New Jersey Resident Decedent Inheritance Tax return and included in Decedent’s estate the value of the trust. Defendant found that Decedent had reserved a life estate in the trust income and assessed inheritance tax on the assets under N.J.S.A. 54:34-1(c) as a transfer “intended to take effect in possession or enjoyment at or after . . . death.” In challenging the tax, Plaintiff claimed that because the trust authorized the trustees to distribute principal to the beneficiaries on a discretionary basis, Decedent never retained a life estate in the property since the trustees could have drained the trust principal. Moreover, Plaintiff claimed the court should apply N.J.S.A. 54:34-1.1 to exempt the property from tax. The court finds that neither the statutes nor the case law provides support for Plaintiff’s claim. The facts fit within the plain text of the statutes, where Decedent reserved an interest in the property transferred for a period measured by Decedent’s life. Moreover, N.J.S.A. 54:34-1.1 requires that a Grantor who retained an interest in the property transferred must execute in writing a complete disposition of the property interest more than three years prior to death. Plaintiff failed to meet his burden of proof to establish that the transfer was outside the reach of the “at or after death” provision of the statute or that Decedent executed a timely and complete disposition of his interest in the property. Accordingly, the court grants Defendant’s motion for summary judgment affirming the assessment.

Defendant pled guilty during trial to aggravated manslaughter. The victim was the boyfriend of his former girlfriend and mother of his daughter. The State introduced text messages defendant sent to her shortly before the homicide, alleging they were threatening and demonstrated defendant's jealous nature. Defendant moved pretrial to suppress the messages seized from her cellphone. Although the State asserted that police obtained consent before searching the phone, it objected to any evidentiary hearing on the issue, arguing that defendant lacked a reasonable expectation of privacy in those text messages and the requisite standing to challenge the search. Without holding an evidentiary hearing, the judge agreed with the State and denied the motion.

The court affirms, concluding that defendant had no reasonable expectation of privacy in the text messages once they were sent and received on another's phone, and that defendant lacked standing to challenge the search because he had no "proprietary, possessory or participatory interest in either the place searched or the property seized." State v. Randolph, 228 N.J. 566, 571 (2017) (quoting State v. Alston, 88 N.J. 211, 228 (1981)).

As the Court explained in Borough of Saddle River v. 66 East Allendale, LLC, evidence that risks misleading the jury into assuming a zoning variance for purposes of calculating a property’s value must not be admitted absent a judicial finding it is reasonably probable that the variance will be obtained. 216 N.J. 115, 142 (2013). Therefore, the trial court erred by allowing the jury to consider testimony that the highest and best use of the subject property would require a variance without first confirming the probability of securing that variance.

SOMA’s legislatively enumerated purposes demonstrate that a special need -- not an immediate need to gather evidence to pursue criminal charges -- motivates the GPS monitoring prescribed by the Legislature. That satisfies the first step in a special needs analysis and allows the determination that this search may be constitutional. The Court therefore balances the interests of the parties and concludes that, although GPS monitoring is a significantly invasive search, it is outweighed by the compelling government interest advanced by the search and H.R.’s severely diminished expectation of privacy. The Court notes that H.R.’s PSL status is critical to that conclusion.

By its terms, RISA applies to services contracts. Further, in the statute as written, there is no requirement that a contract include a financing arrangement to be covered by RISA.

The Court reverses and remands (a) for the Department to provide improved notice of the basis on which its investigation has found some evidence -- which the Court stresses must be some credible evidence -- to support the allegation of harm; and (b) for S.C. to have an informal opportunity before the Department to rebut and/or supplement the record before the Department finalizes its finding. The Court does not address the amici’s challenge to the validity of the “not established” category but recognizes problems with the standard as presently articulated and notes that it would be well worth the effort of the Department to revisit its regulatory language concerning the standard for making a “not established” finding as well as its processes related to such findings.

On leave granted, the New Jersey Department of Health Office of Emergency Medical Services appealed from a July 16, 2019 Law Division order lifting the summary suspension of plaintiff AmeriCare Emergency Medical Service, Inc.'s license to operate as an emergency medical service provider and permitting an action to proceed under the New Jersey Civil Rights Act, N.J.S.A. 10:6-1 to -2 (CRA). Although there is no jurisdictional requirement that administrative remedies be exhausted in order to bring suit under the CRA, the party alleging a claim must show a violation of a substantive right or that someone "acting under color of law" interfered with or attempted to interfere with a substantive right. State v. Quaker Valley Farms, LLC, 235 N.J. 37, 64 (2018). Since AmeriCare could not make that showing without agency adjudication of its administrative claims, the panel reversed the Law Division order.

Based on its review of the extensive record, the Court finds beyond a reasonable doubt that there is cause for removal. Because of Respondent’s multiple, serious acts of misconduct -- in particular, his inappropriate behavior in a matter involving an alleged victim of domestic violence -- the Court orders his removal from office.  

This personal injury case arises from a pedestrian's fall on black ice in a parking lot leased by private owners to the Borough of Caldwell. The injured pedestrian and his wife sued both the Borough and the private owners, alleging negligent failure to maintain the parking lot and the internal driveway connected to it in a safe condition. The written lease between the owners and the Borough expressly delegates to the Borough the responsibility to clear the premises of ice and snow.

The trial court granted the Borough and the property owners summary judgment. Plaintiffs now appeal the ruling solely as to the property owners, arguing they had a non-delegable duty under tort law to keep the premises safe from accumulated ice and snow, or alternatively, that the language of the lease does not delegate that duty with sufficient clarity

We affirm, albeit for a legal reason not articulated by the trial court. Based on the Supreme Court's very recent opinion in Shields v. Ramslee Motors, 240 N.J. 479 (2020), the property owners are entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law. That is because the lease explicitly delegates to the Borough the exclusive responsibility to remove snow and ice from the premises. The fact that the tenant in this case is a public entity and that it uses the premises for a municipal parking lot does not warrant a different result than in Shields.

This court granted the State leave to appeal in this pending criminal case to address the grading aspects of the money laundering statute, N.J.S.A. 2C:21-23 to -29. The core and unresolved legal question is the meaning of the term "amount involved" in N.J.S.A. 2C:21-27, which calibrates the severity of the offense.

Specifically, N.J.S.A. 2C:21-27(a) prescribes that a defendant commits a first-degree money laundering offense if the "amount involved" is $500,000 or more. The crime is a second-degree offense if the "amount involved" is under $500,000 but equal to or more than $75,000. Lastly, it is a third-degree offense if the "amount involved" is under $75,000

As this opinion explains, this court holds that where, as here, a defendant is charged with engaging in a money laundering transaction prohibited by N.J.S.A. 2C:21-25(b), the "amount involved" is the fair market value of the property transferred in that transaction and any other transactions conducted as part of that common scheme. That fair market value is to be determined by the trier of fact. The value is not necessarily equal to or limited by the sum that the money launderer received in the illicit transaction(s). However, the court rejects the prosecutor’s argument that the “amount involved” in a case charged under the “transactional” provision of the money laundering statute includes the value of unsold stolen goods that were not part of a laundering transaction.

Plaintiffs Carmella C. Minelli and her husband Anthony Minelli appeal from the dismissal of their personal injury action against defendants Harrah's Resort Atlantic City, Harrah's Operating Company, Inc., Caesars Entertainment and Caesars Entertainment Operating Company, Inc. based on the two-year statute of limitations, N.J.S.A. 2A:2-14. Because the court concludes that operation of Section 108(c)(2) of the Bankruptcy Code made plaintiffs' claims timely filed, at least as to the debtor, defendant Caesars Entertainment Operating Company, the judgment is reversed.

This case presents the question of whether petitioner A.R.'s convictions fall within the "crime-spree" exception contained within N.J.S.A. 2C:52-2(a), making them eligible for expungement. Specifically, the granting or denying of petitioner’s expungement petition turns on the phrase: “crimes [which are] interdependent or closely related in circumstances and were committed as part of a sequence of events that took place within a comparatively short period of time.” N.J.S.A. 2C:52-2(a). Petitioner and the State concede that this phrase is undefined in the statute, yet offer competing interpretations. The State proposes a strict interpretation of this language, whereas petitioner asserts that the expungement statute – as remedial legislation – should be liberally interpreted. This court concludes that a liberal interpretation of this language is consistent with the general purpose of the expungement statute. Petitioner’s convictions are “closely related in circumstances” because they stem from two instances where he engaged in the unlawful sale of narcotics to a “friend” and an undercover officer, and were committed over a period of six weeks, which is a “comparatively short period of time.” Therefore, petitioner’s convictions are eligible for expungement pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:52-2(a).

Defendant was confined to the Bergen County Jail work release program for failure to pay child support. He was released to search for work and twice failed to return to jail on a timely basis resulting in his indictment, subsequent plea, and sentence on two counts of third-degree escape, N.J.S.A. 2C:29-5(a).

On this appeal, from a denial of defendant's PCR petition, the court reverses and holds that because a child support contempt proceeding is "essentially a civil proceeding," see Pasqua v. Council, 186 N.J. 127, 140 (2006), defendant could not be charged with the criminal offense of escape, and the PCR court erred as a matter of law.

In this action, the Attorney General and Director of the New Jersey Division on Civil Rights alleged defendants violated the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination, N.J.S.A. 10:5-1 to -49, by asking a prospective tenant of an apartment if she was a Muslim, refusing to lease the apartment based on the prospective tenant's religion, and making statements concerning the gender of a Division on Civil Rights investigator posing as a prospective tenant. A jury returned a no-cause verdict on plaintiffs' claims. The court reverses and remands for a new trial.

The court determines the trial court erred by allowing cross-examination of the prospective tenant about her religious beliefs and the teachings of the Quran in violation of N.J.R.E. 610 and in derogation of the privilege embodied in N.J.R.E. 512. The court rejects defendants' argument the cross-examination was permissible because the prospective tenant "opened the door" to questions about her religious beliefs and the teachings of the Quran during her direct testimony.

The court also concludes the trial court abused its discretion by allowing cross-examination of the prospective tenant about the alleged use of the term "infidels" by Muslims to refer to individuals that do not practice Islam. The court finds the cross-examination testimony, which defendants relied on to attack the prospective tenant's credibility, inadmissible under N.J.R.E. 608.

The court also finds the trial court did not conduct a proper analysis of the admissibility of the available portions of one of the defendant's recorded interview with a news organization, during which the defendant spoke about his interactions with prospective tenant and his beliefs concerning Muslims. The trial court incorrectly determined the available recorded portions of the interview were inadmissible under the "rule of completeness" without conducting the required analysis for the admissibility of the available portions of the recorded interview under the standard established by the Court in State v. Nantambu, 221 N.J. 390 (2015).

Although the facts lie at the outer edges of what is sufficient to show a substantial step based on verbal acts, when defendant’s statements on the recorded conversations are considered in the context of this case, the State presented sufficient evidence for the jury to find a substantial step for attempted murder.

The judgment of the Appellate Division is affirmed by an equally divided Court.

In this workers' compensation case, the court reverses an order dismissing with prejudice a claim petition and a motion for medical and temporary disability benefits. The court concludes the judge of compensation denied petitioner's due process rights by determining at the outset of case, and based solely on petitioner's affidavit supporting his motion for medical and temporary disability benefits, that petitioner was a "multiple liar" who lacked credibility. During the numerous subsequent proceedings in the matter, and without hearing any testimony from petitioner, the judge repeatedly found petitioner was a liar and, at one point, found petitioner's lack of credibility rendered it unnecessary to hear to any evidence on the merits of petitioner's claim. The court reverses the dismissal of the claim petition and denial of the motion for medical and temporary disability benefits, and remands for further proceedings before a different judge.

This domestic violence case concerns the breadth of “household member” jurisdiction in the context of a modern, blended-family where the parties are adult, half-siblings who shared meaningful, regular parenting time with their common father during their youth – though never resided together. Throughout their youth, the parties regularly and consistently spent substantial periods of time at their common father’s home, including the defendant spending overnights every other weekend during the school year and more extended times during the summer at their father’s home. Although he did not have a bedroom, he had a fixed sleeping arrangement and drawers containing underwear, gym shorts, and toiletries. During and after college, their in-person contact decreased, but they still gathered informally and at family milestones and vacations.

In view of those facts, for purposes of the Prevention of Domestic Violence Act’s (“PDVA”) jurisdictional “household member” requirement, the court holds that a child whose parents are separated during youth but who spends meaningful, regular periods of time at a parent of alternate residence’s home such that he or she is substantially integrated into that household may have two “households” creating jurisdiction vis-à-vis a victimized half-sibling who resided solely with the common parent. “Household member” as used in the PDVA’s definition of “victim of domestic violence” must be sufficiently flexible to accommodate the ever-changing dynamics of modern families. To restrict a child whose parents are separated to only one household despite meaningful, regular time in a second household would untenably alter the statutory construct, discriminate against members of blended families, and unduly restrict the broadly designed, legislatively crafted protections afforded victims of domestic violence.

The caseworker’s testimony regarding Sharie’s statement is clear evidence of third-party guilt and was therefore impermissibly excluded at trial. As such, the Court reverses the judgment of the Appellate Division and vacates defendant’s convictions for crimes against Sharie. However, the State’s leading questions were appropriate for the child victim witnesses, and defendant’s sentence was not manifestly excessive with respect to the convictions for crimes against Brianna. The Court finds no reason to disturb defendant’s convictions or sentence as to his offenses against Brianna.