Opinion Summaries

For the first time in this appeal, the biological mother of a five-year-old child argues the judgment of guardianship, which terminated her parental rights, must be vacated and the case remanded for a new trial because the resource parent, with whom the Division of Child Protection and Permanency (DCPP) placed the child, worked as a domestic violence liaison in the district office that was responsible to investigate and manage this case from its inception. At oral argument, this court requested supplemental briefs from the parties exclusively on this issue.

This court holds the DCPP violated the Conflict of Interest Law, N.J.S.A. 52:13D-12 to -27, and the ethical standards and protocols promulgated by the Department of Children and Families in its Policy Manual when it failed to transfer this case to another regional office based on the resource parent's assignment as a domestic violence liaison. The Division's failure to take timely and effective action to address this material conflict of interest tainted the management of this case from its incepti.

Independent of this ethical transgression, the Family Part judge who presided over this trial did not: (1) make credibility findings regarding the biological mother's testimony, (2) identify which of the two psychologists who testified as expert witnesses he found more persuasive, or (3) incorporate the opinions offered by the experts in his analysis of the four statutory prongs in N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1(a). This court remands this matter for the judge to conduct a plenary hearing to determine whether reunification with her biological mother is in the child's best interest at this stage of her emotional, psychological, and cognitive development. The judge must assess what psychological and/or emotional harm the child may suffer if she were to be removed from the custody of the resource parent and returned to the physical custody of her biological mother.

Finally, pursuant to N.J.S.A. 52:13D-21(h), this court directs the Appellate Division Clerk's Office to forward a copy of this opinion to the State Ethics Commission Office.

The court holds that a career service employee who is disciplined by an appointing authority for violating the New Jersey State Policy Prohibiting Discrimination in the Workplace (State Policy), N.J.A.C. 4A:7-3.1, may not appeal directly to the Civil Service Commission (Commission), but instead must first appeal either in a departmental hearing or, if applicable, in accordance with the procedure in a collective negotiations agreement. The court interprets the plain language of N.J.A.C. 4A:7-3.2(n) and N.J.A.C. 4A:7-3.2(n)(3) to permit a direct appeal to the Commission from a finding an employee violated the State Policy only where no discipline is imposed.

The trial court erred by admitting both prejudicial testimony and, separately, lay opinion testimony as to defendant’s guilt. Yet, the evidence against Trinidad was overwhelming, and any error was therefore harmless. There was no error in the sentencing of defendant or the denial of his motion for a judgment of acquittal.

Appellants filed for benefits under New Jersey's Medicaid — Aged, Blind and Disabled (ABD) program. Both were disabled and lived with other family members; each applicant's total "countable income" was below the federal poverty level (FPL) for a family of their size, but each applicant's individual Social Security Disability benefits exceeded the FPL for a family of one. The Department of Human Services, Division of Medical Assistance and Health Services (the Division) applied N.J.A.C. 10:72-4.4(d)(1), which stated that an applicant was ineligible if his or her "countable income . . . exceed[ed] the poverty income guideline for one person[.]" The Division denied the applications.

The court held that the regulation did not violate the federal Medicaid statute, Title XIX of the Social Security Act, but did violate New Jersey's Medicaid statute, N.J.S.A. 30:4D-1 to -19.5, which defines a "qualified applicant" as, among other things, a disabled individual "whose income does not exceed 100% of the [FPL], adjusted for family size," N.J.S.A. 30:4D-3(i)(11), and defines FPL as "the official poverty level based on family size[.]" N.J.S.A. 30:4D-3(p).

In this consolidated appeal, Delaware Riverkeeper Network, Maya Van Rossum and Delaware Riverkeeper in one appeal, and Stony Brook-Millstone Watershed Association, Save Barnegat Bay, Raritan Headwaters Association, NY/NJ Baykeeper, Hackensack Riverkeeper and Association of New Jersey Environmental Commissions in the other, challenge the issuance of the Tier A municipal separate storm sewer system permit, claiming that it does not comply with federal and state law. They maintain that the permit does not include effluent limits and monitoring as required by federal law, and that the New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection's (DEP) inclusion of best management practices rather than effluent limits was a further violation of applicable law. Appellants also argue that the permit requirements are neither "clear, specific, and measurable," nor provide for meaningful review and that the DEP violated federal law by issuing permits without the public's involvement. Acknowledging its deferential standard of review, the court affirms the final agency decision.

Under the plain language of subsection (f), the fifteen-year period during which an eligible registrant must remain offense-free to qualify for registration relief commences upon his or her conviction or release from confinement for the sex offense that gave rise to his or her registration requirement.

Third-party defendants are subject to the contribution claims filed against them by joint tortfeasors, unless there exists a right to a dismissal of the claims against them. Here, Fernandez fails to present a meritorious right to dismissal. Fernandez is therefore an active third-party defendant who must participate at trial.

The court addressed two issues of first impression in New Jersey: (1) whether the swabbing of a defendant's hands for gunshot residue (GSR) constitutes a search under applicable constitutional doctrines, and if so, (2) whether such a search is valid under the search incident to arrest exception to the warrant requirement. The court held that the swabbing of a defendant's hands for GSR is a search under the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article I, Paragraph 7 of the New Jersey Constitution because it intruded upon a reasonable expectation of privacy. Balancing the intrusion of GSR testing on an individual's privacy against promoting vital governmental interests, the court further concluded that if an individual is lawfully arrested and in police custody, a delayed search of the arrestee's person for GSR evidence after the arrestee is transported to police headquarters is constitutionally permissible under the search incident to arrest exception as long as the delay itself and the scope of the search are objectively reasonable. In this case, given the existence of probable cause, the timeline, location, and limited intrusion involved in the testing, as well as the ready destructibility of GSR evidence, the court was satisfied that the search was objectively reasonable in time and scope to pass constitutional muster. Accordingly, the court reversed the Law Division's order suppressing the GSR evidence and remanded for further proceedings.

This matter was before the court on defendant’s application to disestablish paternity, terminate child support, and vacate child support arrears. After genetic testing confirmed that defendant was not the child’s biological father, the court granted those parts of the application seeking to disestablish paternity and terminate ongoing support.

The court denied that part of defendant’s application seeking to vacate arrears. In particular, the court rejected defendant’s argument that the arrears could be vacated on equitable principles.

There was no abuse of discretion with respect to either the imposition of sanctions or the denial of reconsideration.

A jury found defendant Kyle P. Brown guilty of third-degree arson, N.J.S.A. 2C:17-1(b), and second-degree causing or risking widespread injury or damage, N.J.S.A. 2C:17-2(a)(1), as a result of setting fire to, and causing an explosion of, his parked car in a sparsely-filled parking lot adjacent to his apartment building in the early morning hours.

The court holds the trial judge did not err in denying defendant's motion for acquittal of third-degree arson and second-degree causing or risking widespread injury or damage because there was sufficient evidence to establish that he caused a fire and explosion as set forth in N.J.S.A. 2C:17-1(b), and an explosion as set forth in N.J.S.A. 2C:17-2(a)(1).

In the unpublished portion of this opinion, the court affirms the trial judge's ruling on all other issues.

The judgment of the Appellate Division is affirmed substantially for the reasons expressed in that court’s opinion. The Court declines, however, to adopt the Appellate Division’s view that "the Compassionate Use Act intended to cause no impact on existing employment rights." See 458 N.J. Super. at 428.

Because the Kinship Legal Guardianship Act, N.J.S.A. 3B:12A-1 to -7, provides a permanent home for children, we affirm the decision of the Commissioner of Education that the children must now go to school where their kinship legal guardian lives. Neither the educational stability law, N.J.S.A. 30:4C-26; N.J.S.A. 18A:7B-12(a)(2), nor the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400 to 1482, allows the children to remain enrolled in the school district where their biological mother is located.

Before depriving S.T. of the right to control the direction of her case and appointing a guardian to make legal decisions on her behalf, the court was required to conduct a hearing to determine whether she lacked "sufficient capacity to govern [herself] and manage [her] affairs" "by reason of mental illness or intellectual disability." See N.J.S.A. 3B:1-2; N.J.S.A. 3B:12-24; R. 4:86-4. At such a hearing, S.T. had the right to independent counsel. See R. 4:86-4(a)(7). In the absence of a guardianship hearing and a judicial finding by clear and convincing evidence that S.T. lacked the requisite mental capacity to decide how to proceed with her lawsuit, the court had no authority to accept a settlement against S.T.’s wishes.

Defendant argued that unused prior service credits could be applied to reduce the period of mandatory parole supervision imposed by the No Early Release Act (NERA), N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.2. The court held that prior service credits could not be applied to reduce the period of parole supervision required under NERA.

In this appeal, the court examined whether a child's biological mother, who voluntarily surrendered her parental rights to allow her own mother, the child's maternal grandmother, to adopt the child, had standing as the child's legal sibling, per N.J.S.A. 9:2-7.1, to seek visitation rights against a non-relative adoptive mother. The court found the biological mother did not have standing under N.J.S.A. 9:2-7.1.

The child was placed with his non-relative adoptive mother following the death of his maternal grandmother. Several years later, a Family Part judge granted the biological mother's request to visit with the child pending his adoption. The visits continued for approximately one year until the child's non-relative adoptive mother adopted the child and stopped the visits. The biological mother filed a complaint to reinstate her visits post-adoption and her complaint was dismissed by another Family Part judge without an evidentiary hearing.

In adhering to the legal precepts expressed in Major v. Maguire, 224 N.J. 1 (2016) and In re D.C., 203 N.J. 545 (2010), the court determined the biological mother lacked standing as a legal sibling and was not entitled to visits under any other legal framework. Accordingly, the court affirmed the Family Part judge's dismissal of her complaint without an evidentiary hearing.

Invoking its supervisory authority, the Court holds that if grand juries decline to indict on two prior occasions, the State must obtain advance approval from the Assignment Judge before it can submit the same case to a third grand jury. To decide whether to permit a third presentation, Assignment Judges should consider whether the State has new or additional evidence to present; the strength of the State’s evidence; and whether there has been any prosecutorial misconduct in the prior presentations. Based on the circumstances of this case, which did not violate defendant’s right to a fundamentally fair grand jury presentation, the Court affirms the judgment of the Appellate Division and declines to dismiss defendant’s indictment

In this appeal, the court affirmed the trial court's denial of class certification to three plaintiffs who asserted claims under the Fair and Accurate Credit Transactions Act (FACTA) of 2003, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681 to 1681x, which prohibits retailers who accept credit or debit cards from printing more than the last five digits of the card number or expiration date upon any receipt. The complaint was dismissed as to all three plaintiffs for lack of personal jurisdiction over defendants.

Plaintiff Ellen Baskin is a New Jersey resident who made a purchase at one of defendants' New Jersey stores and plaintiffs Kathleen O'Shea and Sandeep Trisal are New York residents who made purchases at defendants' New York stores.

The court agreed with the trial court that plaintiffs failed to establish that class action was warranted under Rule 4:32-1(b)(3). Specifically, plaintiffs only alleged technical violations of FACTA, and they did not assert they were victims of identity theft, fraud, or other harm. The court determined that individual actions in the small claims section would be a superior means to adjudicate claims of technical violations of FACTA. Thus, the superiority and predominance requirements of Rule 4:32-1(b)(2) were not met.

The court held that the New Jersey courts do not have general jurisdiction over defendants or specific jurisdiction to entertain the claims of the New York plaintiffs. However, the court determined that the trial court erred in dismissing Baskin's complaint because she is a New Jersey resident with an alleged FACTA claim emanating from a transaction at one of defendants' New Jersey stores. Therefore, the court reversed dismissal of Baskin's claims and reinstated the complaint as to her individual claims only.

Tax Court: Pella Realty, LLC v. Paterson City; Docket Nos. 002345-2017 and 002348-2017; opinion by Novin, J.T.C., decided February 27, 2020. For Pella Realty, LLC – Peter J. Zipp and Joseph G.Buro (Zipp & Tannenbaum, LLC, attorneys); for Paterson City –Michael T. Wilkos (Florio Kenny Raval, LLP, attorneys); for amicus curiae, Director, New Jersey Division of Taxation – Abiola G. Miles and Michelline Capistrano Foster (Gurbir S. Grewal, Attorney General of New Jersey, attorney).

The court concluded that the Director of the New Jersey Division of Taxation’s regulation sanctioning use of an annual reassessment program, under N.J.A.C. 18:12A-1.14(i), was intended for counties electing to adhere to the Real Property Assessment Demonstration Program, N.J.S.A. 54:1-101 to -106 (the “RPADP”). During the tax years at issue, Passaic County was not a "demonstration county" under the RPADP, therefore, Paterson’s implementation of an annual reassessment program was improper. Moreover, the court found that implementation of an annual reassessment program under N.J.A.C. 18:12A-1.14(i) does not preclude application of the Freeze Act, N.J.S.A. 54:51A-8, as same does not constitute a complete reassessment of all real property in the taxing district. Finally, the court found that the Director inappropriately determined that Paterson’s annual reassessment program should receive credit for completion of a district-wide reassessment and recognition in the Director’s annual Certified Table of Equalized Valuations. Therefore, the court will conduct a plenary hearing to determine whether the annual reassessment program implemented by Paterson satisfied the district-wide reassessment criteria as expressed under established legal authority, N.J.A.C. 18:12A-1.14(c), and the Application for Full Reassessment, Form AFR.

In February 2017, defendant was charged with the crime of possession with intent to distribute marijuana in a quantity greater than twenty-five pounds and was released on home arrest with electronic monitoring (PML3+EM). On December 17, 2018, defendant entered a guilty plea to count one of the indictment, as amended to a second-degree offense. In consideration for the guilty plea, the State agreed to recommend a maximum sentence of a five-year state prison term. Defendant requested an extended sentencing date to “put his life in order” before commencing the custodial term. The court set April 5, 2019, as the sentence date and, in its discretion, continued defendant on pretrial release.

Defendant retained new counsel and on June 10, 2019, present counsel for defendant filed a motion to withdraw the guilty plea, requesting that the sentence be adjourned and that he continue free on pretrial release, pending the return of the motion. Defendant argued that pursuant to the Criminal Justice Reform Act (CJR), N.J.S.A. 2A:162-15 to -26, he was entitled to remain on release until sentencing or the resolution of the motion to vacate the plea. The court denied the request to remain free, holding that CJR did not vest defendant with any substantive or procedural grounds to remain free on pretrial release after entering a plea of guilty. Instead, in its discretion, the court remanded defendant pending same.

The matter presents the novel issue as to whether a defendant is entitled to continue pretrial release pursuant to CJR.