Published Appellate Court Opinions

Defendant appealed from a judgment of conviction after a jury convicted him of murder, arguing he was denied the right to a jury of his peers

During the voir dire, after an African American male juror was found acceptable to the court and seated in the jury box, the prosecutor performed acriminal background check on the juror and discovered someone with the same name had an outstanding municipal warrant. Without explanation to or from the juror, the trial judge granted the State's motion to remove the juror for cause so he could be arrested outside the presence of other jurors. Defendant argued the exclusion of the juror was racially motivated

The court reverses because the judge did not question the juror himself to ascertain the accuracy of the State's representation and the judge should have addressed defendant's objection under a Batson/Gilmore analysis.

In a prior appeal, this court reversed and remanded the trial judge's open duration alimony determination directing him to find the marital lifestyle numerically and, if necessary, adjust the life insurance securing the alimony. The trial judge failed to enumerate the marital lifestyle and instead supplemented the supported spouse's current expenses with some expenses incurred during the marriage. The trial judge also decreased the life insurance obligation and calculated the death benefit using the supporting spouse's full social security age as the presumed end date for alimony.

The court reverses and remands the matter again to the trial judge and holds that N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23(b)(4) requires the judge to numerically calculate the marital lifestyle. The court's decision explains the purpose for and the means by which to calculate the marital lifestyle. The court also reverses and remands the life insurance computation and provides a method for calculating the present-day value of the alimony obligation to determine the life insurance death benefit.

In these two consolidated appeals, calendared back-to-back for the purposes of a single opinion, plaintiff appeals the trial court's denial under the Open Public Records Act (OPRA), N.J.S.A. 47:1A-1 to -13, and the common law right of his access, to the names and addresses on dog license records issued by defendant municipalities. The Law Division determined plaintiff was not entitled to the information because his sole purpose was to solicit dog licensees to install invisible fences at their homes. The court reverses.

The court concludes there is no outright prohibition under OPRA for the access of public records for commercial purposes, Burnett v. Cty. of Bergen, 198 N.J. 408, 435 (2009), and the licensees' names and addresses are public records in which they have no, or an insufficient, expectation of privacy in the information, Brennan v. Bergen Cty. Prosecutor's Office, 233 N.J. 330, 338, 342 (2018). Accordingly, the court need not reach plaintiff's common law argument.

The court addressed whether the unconscionability standard embodied in N.J.S.A. 2A:18-61.1(f) of New Jersey's Anti-Eviction Act is preempted by federal regulations promulgated by the United States Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD). N.J.S.A. 2A:18-61.1(f) provides that the unconscionability of a rent increase is a defense in a summary dispossess action to removal for cause based on a tenant's failure to pay rent. Relying on the language in the governing HUD regulations, explicitly preempting the entire field of rent regulation, the court held that N.J.S.A. 2A:18-61.1(f) is preempted by the regulations. As a result, HUD-approved rent increases are not reviewable in summary dispossess proceedings, and the trial judge properly precluded evidence challenging the increase as unconscionable. The court also concluded that if the unit in which the tenant resides is subject to a HUD Section 8 housing assistance payments contract, then the operation, management, and maintenance of that unit, including the approval of rent increases, is governed by HUD's regulatory control irrespective of whether the tenant receives a Section 8 housing subsidy.

Defendant, while incarcerated for a parole violation, was arrested for a homicide he committed while on parole. After defendant completed his parole violation sentence, he remained in jail awaiting resolution of the homicide charges. He thereafter entered a guilty plea to the homicide charges. At sentencing, the trial court, following the holding in State v. Black, 153 N.J. 438 (1998), awarded defendant eighty-six days of jail credits for the period from the day he completed his parole violation sentence to the day of sentencing.

Defendant acknowledged that if Black applies, the trial court awarded the correct number of jail credits. He argued, however, that the holding in Black was effectively overruled by the Court in State v. Hernandez, 208 N.J. 24 (2011), and as a result, he is entitled to 1149 days of jail credits for the period from the day he was arrested on the homicide charge to the day of sentencing.

The court rejected defendant's argument, noting that Hernandez concerns circumstances unlike those in Black and that in Hernandez, the Court discussed its holding in Black at length without stating it was departing from that holding. In addition, the court reviewed a number of precedents cited by defendant applying the holding in Hernandez but found all inapposite to the circumstances addressed in Black. In the absence of a Supreme Court decision overruling its prior decision, the court declined to stray from the unequivocal holding in Black and affirmed the award of jail credits.

The court considered whether the omission of one of the Miranda warnings during custodial interrogation adequately conveys the substance of the warnings and concluded it did not, notwithstanding the fact that defendant continuously interrupted the administration of the warnings. Acknowledging out-of-state authority holding that a suspect may waive Miranda warnings by interrupting their delivery, the court concluded that the suspect's interruption of the warnings does not discharge law enforcement of their duty to deliver them. Finding that the erroneous introduction of the partially unwarned statements was not harmless error, the court reversed defendant's conviction, which followed a bifurcated jury trial, and vacated his guilty plea on the weapons offense. Relying on United States v. Patane, 542 U.S. 630 (2004), however, the court rejected defendant's contention that suppression of the weapon was mandated as a remedy for the Miranda violation despite the fact that the weapon was seized as a result of a search warrant based on the statements.

The court held that when police file a use of force report (UFR) regarding an officer's interaction with a minor charged as a delinquent, it is available under the Open Public Records Act (OPRA), N.J.S.A. 47:1A-1 to -13, if redacted to remove the minor's name, as are UFRs filed regarding interactions with adults. Deletion of the minor's name preserves the confidentiality of a juvenile's records of delinquency or family in crisis as guaranteed pursuant to Rule 5:19-2 and N.J.S.A. 2A:4A-60. Redacted UFRs filed regarding police encounters with minors charged as a delinquent are not records "pertaining to juveniles"—they are government records capturing details of police conduct available to the public.

This appeal presents an issue of first impression, requiring the court to determine whether Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356 (2010), and State v. Gaitan, 209 N.J. 339 (2012), require defense counsel to advise their clients whether – and under what circumstances – the successful completion of the pretrial intervention program would permit a defendant to avoid immigration consequences. The Law Division judge denied defendant's petition for postconviction relief, finding Padilla and Gaitan did not apply here, where defendant did not enter a guilty plea.

Because neither Padilla nor Gaitan expressly limits its holding to cases in which a defendant enters a guilty plea, the court declines to narrowly construe their application only to those dispositions. Instead, the court interprets those decisions to impose an obligation upon defense attorneys to advise their clients of the potential immigration consequences of any criminal disposition, whether that disposition will result from a guilty plea, trial, or diversionary program. Accordingly, the court reverses and remands for an evidentiary hearing.

In this appeal, the court held that an intoxicated defendant asleep and behind the wheel of a parked motor vehicle with its engine running is "operating" the vehicle within the meaning of N.J.S.A. 39:4-50(a).

Plaintiff appealed a grant of summary judgment in favor of defendant, a fellow golfer, with whom plaintiff was playing in a foursome. Defendant rented a golf cart, and plaintiff alleged that defendant – contrary to the rental agreement – allowed the cart to be driven by another golfer, who was allegedly unfamiliar with its operation and who, while operating the cart, struck plaintiff, causing his injuries. The trial judge granted summary judgment because, among other things, he viewed the rental agreement as a contract of adhesion that benefitted only the golf course, not other golfers like plaintiff.

In reversing, the court held, among other things, that the rental agreement was irrelevant because defendant owed plaintiff a common law duty to refrain from negligently entrusting the golf cart to an allegedly incompetent operator. The court also rejected the argument that the rental agreement was a contract of adhesion, as well as defendant's argument that plaintiff was not a beneficiary of the promises contained in that agreement.

This case probes the boundaries of the United States Supreme Court’s landmark decision in Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000), which held that under the Sixth Amendment, "[o]ther than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt." Id. at 490. In this case, defendant's original sentence to special probation was revoked for a series of violations. He was resentenced on his second-degree robbery conviction to the statutory maximum ten-year sentence after already serving roughly four years of special probation. He was given credit towards his prison sentence for the time spent in county jail and in residential treatment but not for the time he participated in outpatient treatment.

Defendant claims his prison sentence violates Apprendi because the combination of the ten-year prison term and time previously spent on special probation exceeds the ten-year maximum sentence for a second-degree conviction. In State v. Hawkins, __ N.J. Super. __ (App. Div.), certif. denied, __ N.J. __ (2019), the court rejected the argument that under Apprendi, a year on special probation undergoing outpatient treatment counts as a year in prison. However, the court in Hawkins affirmed the defendant's eight-year prison sentence on his second-degree conviction “without ruling directly on . . . whether imposition of the maximum custodial sentence plus special probation would be constitutionally defective.” __ N.J. Super. at __ (slip op. at 12).

The court in the present case addresses that issue and holds that such a sentence, which was actually imposed in this instance, does not violate the Sixth Amendment. The court embraces the reasoning in Hawkins and concludes that time on special probation outside a residential treatment facility cannot be combined with a prison term when determining whether a sentence exceeds the "prescribed statutory maximum." The court finds further support for that conclusion in the Supreme Court's most recent pronouncement in the line of Apprendi cases, United States v. Haymond, 588 U.S. __, 139 S. Ct. 2369 (2019). Based on an analysis of Haymond and other precedents, the court holds that the Sixth Amendment issues raised in Apprendi and its progeny apply only to minimum and maximum terms of imprisonment; Apprendi principles simply do not apply to non-custodial forms of punishment such as special probation.

A general contractor hired a subcontractor to design and construct a renewable solar generating facility on the campus of the Mercer County Community College. The Mercer County Improvement Authority issued bonds in excess of $29,000,000 to fund the project. The subcontractor filed a mechanics' lien notice against the Authority when it was unable to resolve a payment dispute with the general contractor. The subcontractor settled its claim against the general contractor and filed a complaint against the Authority to foreclose on its mechanic's lien.

The Law Division granted the Authority's motion to dismiss the foreclosure complaint under Rule 4:6-2(e). The trial court held that pursuant to N.J.S.A. 40:37A-127, all of the Authority's property was exempt from judicial process.

In this appeal, the subcontractor argues it's municipal mechanic's lien is enforceable against the Authority's project fund pursuant to the Municipal Mechanics' Lien Law, N.J.S.A. 2A:44-125 to -142. Amicus curiae Utility and Transportation Contractors Association of New Jersey, Inc. supports the subcontractor's legal position. The Authority argues the subcontractor's mechanic's lien is not valid under the County Improvement Authorities Law, N.J.S.A. 40:37A-44 to -135.

This court affirms the Law Division's order dismissing the foreclosure complaint as a matter of law under Rule 4:6-2(e), but for reasons other than those expressed by the trial court. Hayes v. Delamotte, 231 N.J. 373, 387 (2018). As a matter of first impression in a published opinion, this court holds that the Municipal Mechanics' Lien Law does not apply to county improvement authorities.

The court holds that New Jersey's Constitution should be construed consistent with the federal Constitution in that a "class-of-one" equal protection claim cannot be asserted by a public employee. See Engquist v. Oregon Dep't of Agric., 553 U.S. 591, 594 (2008). Accordingly, the court affirms the dismissal of plaintiff's constitutional equal protection claim. The court also affirms the dismissal of plaintiff's claims under the Conscientious Employee Protection Act (CEPA), N.J.S.A. 34:19-1 to -14, because those claims were precluded when he asserted retaliation as a defense in the administrative proceedings upholding his termination as a municipal police officer. Therefore, plaintiff cannot relitigate the retaliation issue in a CEPA action. See Winters v. N. Hudson Reg'l Fire & Rescue, 212 N.J. 67 (2012).

These consolidated appeals present an issue of first impression, requiring the court to decide whether the State's utilization of federally-contracted civilian monitors, who were sworn as "Special County Investigators," violated the New Jersey Wiretapping and Electronic Surveillance Control Act, N.J.S.A. 2A:156A-1 to -37. Unlike Title III of the federal Omnibus Crime and Safe Streets Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2523, New Jersey's Wiretap Act does not expressly permit delegation of wire interception to civilian personnel.

Because the Prosecutor exercised his inherent power to appoint personnel as part of his responsibility to carry out the duties of his office here, the court concludes the monitors were cloaked with the investigative responsibility of law enforcement officers when they intercepted the communications at issue. Accordingly, the court discerns no violation of the Wiretap Act, and affirms the Law Division order that denied defendants' motion to suppress the intercepted communications and the evidence seized as a result of those communications.

Criminal defense counsel who represented a State witness who was questioned in the investigation of a murder may not then represent the defendant in the same case. On leave granted, the State argues that because defense counsel was present for the witness's interview with detectives, she will be hampered in her ability to effectively cross-examine the witness at trial, materially limiting her ability to represent defendant Lucian Faulcon. The anticipated testimony of the witness involves his identification of a phone number that the police connected to defendant and used to trace defendant's whereabouts at the time of the murder. Defense counsel's former representation of the witness materially limit's counsel's ability to represent defendant. To allow this conflicted representation is contrary to the fair administration of justice.

The court affirms a decision by the Department of Labor and Workforce Development's Board of Review (Board) that disqualified petitioner from unemployment benefits. Petitioner was arrested on multiple charges and incarcerated for fifty-five days. While he was in jail, his employer filled his position. The grand jury did not indict petitioner. He was released from jail and the charges were dismissed. He unsuccessfully filed for unemployment compensation benefits after his release. The court agrees petitioner is disqualified from benefits under the Unemployment Compensation Law, N.J.S.A. 43:21-1 to -24.30. It is consistent with the Act's amendment in 1961 to review petitioner's incarceration as a voluntary separation that is "without good cause attributable to such work . . . ." N.J.S.A. 43:21-5(a). Because his loss of employment was not related to his work, petitioner was disqualified from benefits.

Following the stop of defendant's car for allegedly violating N.J.S.A. 39:3-33 because the license plate frame on the car's rear license plate "conceal[ed] or otherwise obscure[d]" the words "Garden State" at the bottom of the license plate, a warrantless search of the car uncovered an unloaded handgun. The trial court denied defendant's motion to suppress the search and seizure of the handgun, and defendant subsequently pled guilty to second-degree certain persons not to possess a weapon, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-7(b)(1).

In defendant's appeal, the court was asked to decide: (1) whether there was reasonable suspicion to stop defendant's car for violating N.J.S.A. 39:3-33; and (2) whether the subsequent search and seizure of the handgun was legally permissible.

Based upon the common understanding of the words "conceal" and "obscure," this court concludes there was no reasonable suspicion to stop defendant's car for violating N.J.S.A. 39:3-33 where the minimal covering of "Garden State" did not make the words indecipherable. Hence, the seized gun was inadmissible to prove a second-degree certain persons offense.

For the sake of completeness, the court further decides that even if there was reasonable suspicion to stop defendant's car for a N.J.S.A. 39:3-33 violation, the subsequent search was not legally permissible because it did not satisfy the State's proffered exceptions to conduct a warrantless search of an automobile, i.e., a search incident to arrest, or a protective sweep.

Accordingly, the court reverses and vacates the conviction for second-degree certain persons not to possess weapons, and remands so defendant can move to vacate his guilty plea and have the judgment of conviction vacated pursuant to Rule 3:9-3(f).

The court granted leave to appeal to review an order entered in this matrimonial action that denied plaintiff the opportunity to appear at the trial and testify by contemporaneous video transmission from his home in India. Recognizing that the court rules neither authorize nor prohibit such relief, the court identified and described the factors a judge should consider in ruling on the propriety of allowing a witness to testify remotely, and remanded so that plaintiff may provide the trial judge with a more fulsome application for the relief he requested.

In this special civil part action, defendant Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority filed an answer but did not plead any affirmative defenses and never moved to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction prior to trial. Despite SEPTA's waiver of the defense, the trial judge raised it on his own at the trial's outset, and, after hearing brief argument, dismissed the claim against SEPTA for lack of personal jurisdiction.

In reversing the dismissal of the claim against SEPTA and remanding for a trial on the merits, the court concluded that once the defense of lack of personal jurisdiction is waived, a judge is not empowered to resurrect it.

In this case of first impression, the court considers whether a workers' compensation judge can order an employer to reimburse its employee for the employee's use of medical marijuana prescribed for chronic pain following a work-related accident.

Because the court concludes the order does not require M&K to possess, manufacture or distribute marijuana, but only to reimburse petitioner for his purchase of medical marijuana, the court discerns no conflict between the federal Controlled Substance Act, (CSA), 21 U.S.C. § 841, which makes it a crime to manufacture, possess or distribute marijuana, and the New Jersey Compassionate Use Medical Marijuana Act (MMA), N.J.S.A. 24:6I-1 to -29.

Furthermore, M&K's compliance with the order does not establish the specific intent element of an aiding and abetting offense under federal law. The court also concludes M&K is not a private health insurer. Therefore, it is not excluded under the MMA from reimbursing the costs of medical marijuana.

Here, where petitioner has demonstrated the severity and chronic nature of his pain, his attempts to unsuccessfully alleviate the pain with multiple surgeries and medical modalities, and the validated efficacy of the prescribed medical marijuana, the court finds the use of medical marijuana is reasonable and necessary. Finding no legislative or legal barrier to an employer's reimbursement of its employee's expense for medical marijuana in a workers' compensation setting, the court affirms the order.