Supreme Court Opinions

Persons who received pre-CREAMMA conditional discharges for specified marijuana offenses -- just like persons who had pre-CREAMMA convictions for those marijuana offenses -- are no longer categorically precluded from future admission into PTI. Instead, prosecutors and reviewing courts must consider the merits of their PTI applications, without regard to the existence or circumstances of the earlier marijuana-related conditional discharges. The holding harmonizes CREAMMA and its manifest legislative intent with the pre-existing general language of the PTI and expungement statutes, including the Legislature’s command in CREAMMA to apply its reforms to “any case” that arose before its enactment.

Informed by the Legislature’s expression of public policy in N.J.S.A. 34:15-36, the Court concurs with the Appellate Division that defendant had a duty to advise the LLC members, at the time of the workers’ compensation policy’s purchase or renewal, that an LLC member actively performing services on the LLC’s behalf is eligible for workers’ compensation coverage, but that the LLC must elect to purchase such coverage in order to obtain it. Consistent with N.J.S.A. 34:15-36, however, the Court holds that defendant may not be held liable for breach of that duty unless the damages alleged were caused by defendant’s willful, wanton or grossly negligent act of commission or omission. The Court disagrees with the trial court’s assessment of the evidence presented by plaintiff on the question of proximate cause.

The Court agrees with the Appellate Division that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in deciding to hear the defendant’s waiver motion before considering his suppression motion. The Court declines, however, to adopt a preference that the Family Part hear suppression motions before waiver motions, holding instead that it is within the discretion of the Family Part to determine its schedule of proceedings and manage its calendar. The Court sets forth factors that Family Part judges should take into consideration in exercising their discretion as to the order in which to hear waiver and suppression motions.

It was error to admit defendant’s statements after detectives failed to honor his invocation of the right to counsel, and that error was not harmless in light of the circumstantial nature of the evidence against defendant and his statements’ capacity to undermine his credibility before the jury.

As a matter of law, the evidence presented, even affording plaintiffs all favorable inferences, does not establish that defendants’ acts or omissions were motivated by actual malice or accompanied by wanton and willful disregard for Ruscitto’s health and safety. A reasonable jury could not find by clear and convincing evidence that punitive damages are warranted based on the facts of this case, and partial summary judgment should have been granted.

Under the totality of the circumstances reviewed here, the State Police detectives who entered the neighboring residence without a warrant did not have grounds to invoke the hot pursuit doctrine. The warrantless entry violated the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article I, Paragraph 7 of the New Jersey Constitution. Although the Court is disturbed by the manner of execution of this warrant, it declines to adopt a rigid, one-size-fits-all approach to the execution of all ATS arrest warrants.

The jury could not have understood that the reasonable corporal punishment language in the child endangerment charge also applied to the simple assault charge. The trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury, in the context of the simple assault charge, that reasonable corporal punishment is not prohibited. Because that error in jury instructions could have led the jury to an unjust result, the Court vacates defendant’s conviction and remands for further proceedings.

The Court joins the majority of jurisdictions that reject a per se ban on claims by new businesses for lost profits damages, and it declines to follow Weiss to the extent that it bars any claim by a new business for such damages. Claims for lost profits damages are governed by the standard of reasonable certainty and require a fact-sensitive analysis. Because it is substantially more difficult for a new business to establish lost profits damages with reasonable certainty, a trial court should carefully scrutinize a new business’s claim that a defendant’s tortious conduct or breach of contract prevented it from profiting from an enterprise in which it has no experience and should bar that claim unless it can be proven with reasonable certainty. The Court remands these matters so that the trial court may decide defendants’ motions in accordance with the proper standard.

The policy’s broad and unambiguous language makes clear that a causal relationship is not required in order for the exclusionary clause to apply; rather, any claim "in any way connected with" the insured’s operations or activities in a county identified in the exclusionary clause is not covered under the policy. Richfield’s operations in an excluded county are alleged to be connected with the injuries for which recovery is sought, so the exclusion applies. Admiral has no duty to defend a claim that it is not contractually obligated to indemnify.

The Compassionate Release Statute does not require that an inmate prove that he is unable to perform any activity of basic daily living in order to establish a "permanent physical incapacity" under N.J.S.A. 30:4-123.51e(l). Rather, the statute requires clear and convincing evidence that the inmate’s condition renders him permanently unable to perform two or more activities of basic daily living, necessitating twenty-four-hour care.