Opinion Summaries

In these appeals, consolidated for our opinion, plaintiff sued defendants under the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals Act (PCAA), N.J.S.A. 4:22-11.1 to -60, to recover civil penalties for acts that he contended constituted animal cruelty under its provisions. Plaintiff lacked standing to sue in his individual capacity and the cases were dismissed. He contends the complaints were filed as qui tam actions under N.J.S.A. 4:22-26 which provided, in relevant part, that a person who violates the PCAA shall pay a civil penalty according to a schedule in the statute "to be sued for and recovered, with costs, in a civil action by any person in the name of the New Jersey Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals".

We decline to interpret N.J.S.A. 4:22-26 as authorizing private citizens, who otherwise would not have standing, to sue for civil penalties under the PCAA in qui tam actions against other parties, who they alleged may have committed acts of animal cruelty. The language relied on by plaintiff does not signal authority for qui tam litigation in light of the PCAA's other provisions nor was it supported by the legislative history or case law. We affirm the dismissal of these cases for lack of standing

The single publication rule applies to an internet article. However, if a material and substantive change is made to the article’s defamatory content, then the modified article will constitute a republication, restarting the statute of limitations. In this case, there are genuine issues of disputed fact concerning whether Adelman made a material and substantive change to the original article, and the Appellate Division erred in dismissing the defamation action based on the single publication rule. However, the modified article is entitled to the protection of the fair report privilege. The article is a full, fair, and accurate recitation of a court-filed complaint. The trial court properly dismissed the defamation action, and on that basis the Court affirms the Appellate Division’s judgment

The New Jersey Division Of Child Protection and Permanency (Division), and the Law Guardian on behalf of the two young children, appeal from the Family Part's order denying termination of parental rights following an extended eighteen-month trial at which twelve witnesses testified and hundreds of exhibits were admitted into evidence. This appeal involves the termination of parental rights of T.D., a mother suffering from multiple sclerosis and R.C., the father of her two youngest children, born in 2012 and 2014, and removed from the care of their parents shortly after birth. The trial judge found, in particular, that the Division did not provide meaningful services to the mother, who uses a wheelchair. Considering the limited standard of review of a decision not to terminate parental rights, we affirm.

The judgment of the Appellate Division is affirmed substantially for the reasons expressed in Judge Leone’s majority opinion

Judicial review is premature because factual disputes require resolution before the Secretary can make a properly informed decision on the grant applications. Because an informed administrative decision could not have been made without the benefit of a proper record, the matter is remanded to the Secretary, in order that a contested case proceeding be conducted prior to the ultimate administrative decision of the Secretary concerning the challenged grants

The Court now revises Rule 3:4A(b)(5) to make clear that a recommendation against a defendant’s pretrial release that is based only on the type of offense charged cannot justify detention by itself unless the recommendation is based on one of two presumptions in the statute. See N.J.S.A. 2A:162-19(b). A pending charge is a charge that has a future pre-disposition related court date or is pending presentation to the grand jury, or has not been disposed of due to the defendant’s failure to appear pending trial or sentencing, or that is in some form of deferred status.

The Court now revises Rule 3:4A(b)(5) to make clear that a recommendation against a defendant’s pretrial release that is based only on the type of offense charged cannot justify detention by itself unless the recommendation is based on one of two presumptions in the statute. See N.J.S.A. 2A:162-19(b). A pending charge is a charge that has a future pre-disposition related court date or is pending presentation to the grand jury, or has not been disposed of due to the defendant’s failure to appear pending trial or sentencing, or that is in some form of deferred status.

This court consolidates these two insurance coverage cases for purposes of this opinion. The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment. The motion judge reserved decision at the conclusion of oral argument and entered orders that same day that granted the insurers' motions for summary judgment and denied the insureds' cross-motions. The judge did not issue a written opinion or oral decision, nor make factual findings or conclusions of law as required by Rule 1:7-4(a). In a Final Judgment entered a month later, the judge dismissed the insureds' complaints with prejudice "for the reasons set forth in [the insurers'] motion papers."

Although the standard of review from the grant or denial of summary judgment is de novo, the function of an appellate court is to review the decision of the trial court, not to decide the motion tabula rasa. The requirements of Rule 1:7-4(a) are unambiguous and cannot be carried out by the motion judge by a nebulous allusion to "the reasons set forth in defendant[s]' motion papers." Reversed and remanded.

Under the circumstances of this case, aggravated assault is, at most, a related offense of the State’s robbery charge. The trial court had no obligation to charge the jury sua sponte on aggravated assault as a lesser-included offense of the State’s robbery charge.

Defendant was sentenced to life imprisonment for murder in 2001, filed his first post-conviction relief petition in 2007, and filed his second petition in 2015. The Appellate Division ruled defendant's second petition was untimely under Rule 3:22-12's time limits. Those limits cannot be relaxed by invoking Rule 1:1-2. In 2009, the Supreme Court amended Rule 1:3-4(c) to prohibit enlargement of the time limits in Rule 3:22-12, and added Rule 3:22-12(c) prohibiting relaxation except as provided by Rule 3:22-12 itself. Moreover, in 2010, the Supreme Court amended Rule 3:22-4(b) and Rule 3:22-12(a)(2) to require second petitions to be filed within one year of specified events. Because that time limit applies "notwithstanding any other provision of this rule," it cannot be relaxed by showing excusable neglect and a fundamental injustice, as permitted for first petitions under the 2010 amendment. These amendments to the procedural rules of court apply to previously-convicted defendant, who had no vested right to file a petition fourteen years out of time.

In this case, we affirm the summary judgment dismissal of plaintiff's qui tam complaint which alleged defendant Steven Lonegan violated the New Jersey False Claims Act (FCA), N.J.S.A. 2A:32C-1 to -18, by submitting a false statement in a request for public campaign funds. Although the trial court dismissed on other grounds, we affirm the grant of summary judgment because we hold plaintiff lacks standing to bring the FCA complaint. We conclude the record clearly shows plaintiff is not the original source of the information supporting the allegations in his complaint.

In Pugliese v. State-Operated School District of City of Newark, 440 N.J. Super. 501 (App. Div. 2015), the court vacated and remanded for reconsideration anew an arbitrator's award sustaining tenure charges against appellants. In this appeal, the court had to construe N.J.S.A. 18A:6-14 and determine what impact its decision to remand had on the suspended educators' entitlement to back pay while the remand was pending. The statute provides for an educator's suspension without pay for 120 days or until the issuance of a final determination of the disputed tenure charges, whichever is sooner. If the matter is not resolved within 120 days, compensation must resume until a determination is reached. In this case, the court concluded that the entitlement to compensation after 120 days continues under the statute despite the fact there was an initial award terminating employment that was vacated and remanded, without a dismissal of the tenure charges.

N.J.S.A. 2C:44-3(a) permits imposition of an extended prison term when a defendant was convicted of at least two separate prior crimes but only if "the latest" of those crimes was committed or the defendant's "last release from confinement" occurred – "whichever is later" – within ten years of the charged crime. Because the last of defendant's prior crimes was committed in Florida ten years and three weeks before the crime charged here, and because defendant was not "confined" – he was sentenced in Florida to a probationary term and being on probation is not the same as being "confined" – the court reversed and remanded for further proceedings, including development of the State's late claim that the consequences of defendant's violation of the Florida probationary term within the ten-year period permits a finding of "confinement" within the meaning of N.J.S.A. 2C:44-3(a).

In these appeals, the court reviewed orders compelling arbitration because the automobile sales contracts executed by plaintiffs included an agreement to arbitrate all disputes. Although the record revealed disputed facts about contract-formation issues that the trial courts must be resolved before arbitration may be compelled, the court also recognized there was no dispute that the parties mutually agreed to rescind those sales contracts. Consequently, among other things, the court held that the trial judges erred in compelling arbitration of any claims relating to the agreements to rescind, which did not contain arbitration provisions. The orders under review were reversed and both cases remanded for trial court proceedings to determine, among other things, whether plaintiffs' claims were based on the sales contracts or on the agreements to rescind.

The amendment to count two of defendant’s indictment was a violation of defendant’s right to grand jury presentment under the New Jersey Constitution. Defendant waived his right to object to the map’s authentication.

In these appeals, the court reviewed orders compelling arbitration because the automobile sales contracts executed by plaintiffs included an agreement to arbitrate all disputes. Although the record revealed disputed facts about contract-formation issues that the trial courts must be resolved before arbitration may be compelled, the court also recognized there was no dispute that the parties mutually agreed to rescind those sales contracts. Consequently, among other things, the court held that the trial judges erred in compelling arbitration of any claims relating to the agreements to rescind, which did not contain arbitration provisions. The orders under review were reversed and both cases remanded for trial court proceedings to determine, among other things, whether plaintiffs' claims were based on the sales contracts or on the agreements to rescind

In this appeal the court interprets two statutes concerning the right of Camden citizens to vote on the classification of their school district. That vote will determine whether members of the Camden City Board of Education (Board) are elected or appointed by the mayor. Plaintiffs contend that a vote on that issue was required in April 2014, under a 2010 amendment to the Municipal Rehabilitation and Economic Recovery Act (MRERA), N.J.S.A. 52:27BBB-63.1(c). Defendants counter that because the school district was placed into full State intervention in 2013, the classification vote is not required until the district satisfies certain performance indicators under the Quality Single Accountability Continuum Act (QSAC), N.J.S.A. 18A:7A-49(e). MRERA and QSAC contain provisions that set forth different frameworks for school district classification votes.

The court holds that the 2010 amendment to MRERA governs because its language is clear in granting Camden citizens the right to a school district classification vote, and nothing in QSAC restricts that right. Granting Camden citizens the right to a school district classification vote does not interfere with the State's full intervention because the Board will continue to serve in an advisory role until the conditions of QSAC are satisfied. Accordingly, the trial court's August 15, 2016 order dismissing plaintiffs' complaint is reversed. The case is remanded with direction that the trial court conduct a hearing within thirty days to determine when the school district classification vote will be held.

N.J.S.A. 2C:7-2(g) is unconstitutional as applied to juveniles adjudicated delinquent as sex offenders. In the absence of subsection (g), N.J.S.A. 2C:7-2(f) provides the original safeguard incorporated into Megan’s Law: no juvenile adjudicated delinquent will be released from his registration and notification requirements unless a Superior Court judge is persuaded that he has been offense-free and does not likely pose a societal risk after a fifteen-year look-back period.

The case concerns the State's use, in a criminal prosecution, of defendant's answer filed in a parallel civil forfeiture action. As part of its proof that defendant was the occupant of a bedroom in which drugs were seized, the State introduced in evidence the defendant's forfeiture answer, in which he asserted that he owned $2900 in cash seized from the same bedroom. While rejecting defendant's Fifth and Sixth Amendment arguments, the court held that the process by which defendant was induced to file his answer in the civil forfeiture action was fundamentally unfair. Although the State should have been barred from introducing the answer, it was harmless error in light of the other evidence linking defendant to the premises.

The court also provided some procedural guidance for future forfeiture cases, and referred the issue to the Criminal and Civil Practice Committees for their consideration

Because the trial court’s determination that the driver ultimately knowingly and voluntarily gave consent to search is supported by sufficient credible evidence, the trial court properly denied defendant’s motion to suppress the evidence seized during the search.