Supreme Court Opinions

The policy’s broad and unambiguous language makes clear that a causal relationship is not required in order for the exclusionary clause to apply; rather, any claim "in any way connected with" the insured’s operations or activities in a county identified in the exclusionary clause is not covered under the policy. Richfield’s operations in an excluded county are alleged to be connected with the injuries for which recovery is sought, so the exclusion applies. Admiral has no duty to defend a claim that it is not contractually obligated to indemnify.

The Compassionate Release Statute does not require that an inmate prove that he is unable to perform any activity of basic daily living in order to establish a "permanent physical incapacity" under N.J.S.A. 30:4-123.51e(l). Rather, the statute requires clear and convincing evidence that the inmate’s condition renders him permanently unable to perform two or more activities of basic daily living, necessitating twenty-four-hour care.

The Commissioner’s finding that East Bay did not supply sufficient information to prove the workers’ independence under the ABC test’s prong C was not arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable, but rather was supported by the absence of record evidence as to that part of the test. The Court is satisfied that all sixteen workers in question are properly classified as employees, and it remands to the Department for calculation of the appropriate back-owed contributions.

Crystal Point may assert direct claims against Kinsale pursuant to the Direct Action Statute in the setting of this case. Based on the plain language of N.J.S.A. 17:28-2, however, Crystal Point’s claims against Kinsale are derivative claims, and are thus subject to the terms of the insurance policies at issue, including the provision in each policy mandating binding arbitration of disputes between Kinsale and its insureds. Crystal Point’s claims against Kinsale are therefore subject to arbitration.

In amending in 1990 Sections 11 and 13 of the Municipal Vacancy Law, N.J.S.A. 40A:16-11 and -13, the Legislature removed the governing body’s discretion to keep vacant a seat previously occupied by a nominee of a political party. Instead, the Legislature empowered the municipal committee of the political party whose nominee previously occupied the vacant seat to submit three names to the governing body. N.J.S.A. 40A:16 11. Section 11 mandates that the governing body choose one of the municipal committee’s three nominees.

The information the officers possessed at the time of the stop did not amount to specific and particularized suspicion that defendant was engaged in criminal activity. Therefore, the officers did not have reasonable and articulable suspicion to initiate an investigatory detention of defendant, and the evidence seized must be suppressed.

As to the duty to warn, an asbestos manufacturer or supplier that places inadequate warnings on asbestos bags used in the workplace has breached its duty to the worker, regardless of whether it provides the employer with the correct information, which is reasonably intended to reach its employees. As to medical causation, the trial court’s modified Model Jury Charge on proximate cause sufficiently guided the jury.

Once defendant invoked his right to counsel, the interrogation should have stopped. Not only did the interrogation continue, but during the questioning, the detective strongly suggested that defendant would give them the information they sought if he were truly innocent. Allowing that entire exchange to be played for the jury was harmful error. In addition, the error was compounded when the prosecutor commented on that portion of the statement that should have never been before the jury in the first place. The Court discerns no error regarding the witness testimony or any of the prosecutor’s other comments during summation.

The stop was not supported by a reasonable and articulable suspicion of a motor vehicle violation. N.J.S.A. 39:3-75, which governs automotive safety glass, does not apply to window tint violations. Consistent with the plain language of N.J.S.A. 39:3-74, reasonable and articulable suspicion of a tinted windows violation arises only when a vehicle’s front windshield or front side windows are so darkly tinted that police cannot clearly see people or articles within the car.

Defendants have the right to be released two years after a judge orders them detained, excluding delays attributable to the defendant, if the prosecutor is not ready to proceed to trial. N.J.S.A. 2A:162-22(a)(2)(a). The statute is silent about what happens if the parties are ready but there are not enough courtrooms or judges to try the case. In addressing that dilemma, the Court attempts to balance the relevant interests in a way that comports with defendants’ rights under the CJRA.

In light of all the defendants’ conduct regarding KDS and KPS to strip Robert of his rightful interests, equity cannot abide imposing a marketability discount to the benefit of defendants. The trial court’s acceptance of Robert’s expert’s valuation of the company fell within its broad discretion and was fully supported by the record. Defendants were given the opportunity to present an expert valuation of the companies on remand but made the strategic decision not to do so. The Court declines to provide defendants with another bite of this thoroughly chewed apple and reinstates the judgment of the trial court.

Once Rivas invoked his right to counsel on March 18, however ambiguously, the detectives were required to clarify the ambiguity or cease questioning. The detectives did neither. Instead, the detectives interrogated Rivas for nearly six hours, eliciting a confession. After the improper interrogation and Rivas’s tainted confession -- a confession Rivas had reason to believe was lawful -- Rivas asked to see the detectives again. Those remarks cannot be fairly characterized as Rivas voluntarily initiating further communications with the detectives because the questioning never truly ceased. The interrogation and the request to speak again with the detectives were inextricably intertwined.

The crime-fraud exception cannot be properly applied to marital communications that preceded the Legislature’s amendment of N.J.R.E. 509. The Court finds no evidence that the Legislature intended that amendment to retroactively apply to otherwise privileged marital communications that occurred prior to that amendment. The trial court’s admission of the text messages therefore constituted error. However, that error was harmless given the extensive evidence presented by the State in support of defendant’s official misconduct convictions.

After reviewing the noble principles that infuse the public policy underpinning this cause of action, the Court declines to consider property, in whatever form, to be equally entitled to the unique value and protection bestowed on a human life. The Court nevertheless expands the rescue doctrine to include acts that appear to be intended to protect property but are in fact reasonable measures ultimately intended to protect a human life.

A residential real estate sale by absolute auction is distinct from a traditional real estate transaction in which a buyer and seller negotiate the contract price and other terms and memorialize their agreement in a contract. In an absolute auction or an auction without reserve, as is the issue here, the owner unconditionally offers the property for sale and the highest bid creates a final and enforceable contract at the auction’s conclusion, subject to applicable contract defenses. Imposing the three-day attorney review prescribed in State Bar Ass’n on residential real estate sales conducted by absolute auction would fundamentally interfere with the method by which buyers and sellers choose to conduct such sales.

Based on the differences between the federal and state proceedings, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying defendants’ motion to dismiss the indictment. Like the Appellate Division, the Court finds that Special Agent Kopp’s interpretations were expert rather than lay opinions, but that the error in admitting them as lay opinion testimony was harmless. The Court bases its finding of harmless error, however, upon the overwhelming evidence of defendants’ guilt presented at trial, rather than on the hypothetical qualifications of the agent.

A plain reading of N.J.S.A. 2C:1-6(c) reveals that the Legislature intended the statute of limitations to begin to run once the State was in possession of both the physical evidence from the crime and the suspect’s DNA. To hold otherwise would contradict the language of the statute which directs the statute of limitations to begin when the State is in possession of both items needed to generate a match. To find that the statute of limitations begins when a match is confirmed would render the second half of the provision superfluous. Here, the statute of limitations began to run in 2010, when the FBI’s updated scientific guidance rendered the Lab capable of generating a match based on the DNA samples in its possession.

The Court affirms the judgment of the Appellate Division substantially for the reasons expressed in Judge Messano’s published opinion.