Supreme Court Opinions

The practice of purchasing a competitor’s name as a keyword does not, in itself, constitute a violation of the RPCs. However, the Court requires that attorneys employing this strategy include a clear and conspicuous disclaimer on the landing page of their website when a user clicks on such a paid advertisement.

Municipalities and municipal corporations, as defined by N.J.S.A. 1:1-2, that engage in frivolous litigation are subject to sanctions under the FLS. The Supreme Court of the United States has recognized “that municipalities, unlike States, do not enjoy a constitutionally protected immunity from suit,” Jinks v. Richland County, 538 U.S. 456, 466 (2003), and neither the FLS nor any other substantive law in New Jersey has immunized municipalities from FLS liability for filing frivolous pleadings like the Borough was found to have filed here. 

Whether defendant should have retreated was a critical part of certain offenses charged in this case. Jurors heard the State press the point at trial; they also heard conflicting accounts of who the “initial aggressor” was and whether the apartment was defendant’s “dwelling.” But the jury received no direction as to how those disputed facts related to -- or had the potential to negate -- the duty to retreat in this case. Under the circumstances, the failure to give the jury guidance on the castle doctrine was clearly capable of producing an unjust result. It was therefore plain error not to instruct the jury on the issue.

Because of the defect in Liberty’s PoA, El Sol did not submit a CoS that validly bound Liberty to execute the Contract Bond, and its bid was therefore incomplete. The NJTA did not act in an arbitrary, capricious, and unreasonable manner when it rejected El Sol’s legally deficient bid.

The DEP’s initial grant of the waiver did not create a property interest in the continued suspension of Clarios’s remediation obligations. Neither the controlling statutes and regulations nor a mutually explicit understanding between the parties provided an entitlement to the indefinite continuance of the waiver; to the contrary, the governing laws and agency materials all anticipate the DEP’s ability to enforce remediation obligations in the future.

The Court disagrees with the Appellate Division’s conclusion that it was the arbitrator, not the parties, who introduced the question of carried interest in the arbitration. The remedy of modification under N.J.S.A. 2A:23B-24(a)(2) is not warranted in this case, and the Appellate Division’s review of the award did not conform to the deferential standard governing judicial review of arbitration awards

The WPL defines “wages” as “direct monetary compensation for labor or services rendered by an employee, where the amount is determined on a time, task, piece, or commission basis.” N.J.S.A. 34:11-4.1(c) (emphasis added). Under that definition, compensating an employee by paying a “commission” for “labor or services” always constitutes a wage under the WPL. Therefore, a “commission” under the WPL cannot be excluded from the definition of “wages” as a “supplementary incentive.”

An individual outside the reach of New Jersey’s jurisdiction is not a party within the definition of the CNA for purposes of allocation. But that individual may be a joint tortfeasor for purposes of seeking contribution under the JTCL. The Court therefore affirms the judgment of the Appellate Division, as modified.

The Court’s review of the record reveals that Respondent invited a subordinate court employee to his summer home, provided beer and shots of hard liquor that the two drank liberally over the course of several hours, discussed intimate details of the employee’s sexual relationship with her boyfriend, and then touched her in a sexually suggestive manner without her consent. Because of the blatant and serious nature of Respondent’s misconduct, the Court finds beyond a reasonable doubt that there is cause for removal.

The Court Rules allow certified attorneys to pay referral fees to lawyers in other states even if they are not licensed here, and the payment of referral fees does not raise concerns about the unauthorized practice of law. The Court vacates Opinion 745, which reached the opposite conclusion.

D.T. has not demonstrated that the Archdiocese’s exercise of supervisory authority over McCarthy gave rise to the minimum contacts between the Archdiocese and New Jersey that would be necessary to exercise specific jurisdiction under Fourteenth Amendment due process principles in the setting of this appeal

Preemption is not an issue here because the N.J.S.A. 3B:3-14 does not conflict with the federal regulations that govern U.S. savings bonds. Given that the DSA did not direct the disposition of the savings bonds, the bonds have no bearing on Michael’s -- and later the Estate’s -- obligation to pay Jeanine $200,000, and the bonds’ value should not have been credited against that obligation. Pursuant to the DSA, the Estate must make whatever payments remain to Jeanine. 

When a defending physician practices in more than one specialty and the treatment involved falls within any of that physician’s specialty areas, then an AOM from a physician specializing in one of those specialties is sufficient.

Subsection (k) of N.J.S.A. 40A:14-118.5 does not permit plaintiffs to review the video in this case because Fuster has already requested that the video be retained for three years and Devine is neither the subject of the video nor one of the other specified persons entitled to review. The Court does not decide whether subsection (l) of the BWCL abrogates OPRA’s exemptions because there is no OPRA exemption that supports defendants’ refusal to release the video in this case. OPRA does not contain any explicit exemption for information received by law enforcement regarding an individual who was not arrested or charged. Neither has New Jersey case law ever held that such information must automatically be withheld under OPRA. The Court therefore reverses the Appellate Division’s judgment and orders that the body worn camera footage be released to plaintiffs under the circumstances of this case, without reaching plaintiffs’ common law claims.

When a plaintiff accepts a final judgment, that party may still appeal if the party can show that (1) it made known its intention to appeal prior to accepting payment of the final judgment and prior to executing the warrant to satisfy judgment, and (2) prevailing on the appellate issue will not in any way impact the final judgment other than to potentially increase it. Because Brehme cannot show either that she expressed her intention to appeal before accepting payment of the final judgment and before her counsel executed the warrant to satisfy the judgment or that the appeal will not impact the final judgment other than to increase it, Brehme’s appeal cannot proceed. For that reason, no decision rendered can affect the outcome of the case, and her appeal was properly dismissed as moot.

The trial court’s finding that Celestine’s crimes were extraordinarily heinous, cruel, and depraved was supported by substantial evidence in the record, and the trial court’s application of extraordinary aggravating factor one was not an abuse of discretion. In addition, in denying Celestine’s petition for compassionate release, the trial court appropriately considered significant mitigating factors raised by Celestine alongside the extraordinary aggravating factors raised by the State.

The applicable version of the TSL in this case is unconstitutional to the extent it allows for the forfeiture of surplus equity without just compensation. New Jersey recognizes a property right to surplus equity in real property, and because private lienholders act jointly with local government under the TSL to perform a traditional public function -- the collection of taxes -- they may be considered state actors. The Court rejects the argument that the surplus equity initially foreclosed in this case was not taken for a public use. The Court affirms as modified the judgment of the Appellate Division based on the reasoning in Tyler; it does not rely on Rule 4:50-1(f). 

The Appellate Division’s judgment is affirmed substantially for the reasons expressed in Judge Sabatino’s opinion. The Court concurs with the Appellate Division’s guidance and list of non-exclusive factors for trial courts to consider in exercising their discretion, although the Court notes that the concerns raised in the study about intentionality cited by defendants would need to be tested under the standard articulated in State v. Olenowski, 253 N.J. 133 (2023). The Court also agrees with the recommendation that the Model Criminal Jury Charge Committee consider a model charge regarding jury requests to replay video evidence. The Court offers additional comments on why watching a video in slow motion is not beyond the ken of an average juror, and why playing the difficult-to-perceive recording here in slow motion to assist the jury was not an alteration or distortion of the video.

Here, Hartford has no duty to defend the employer. The employee’s allegations of simple negligence, gross negligence, and recklessness (the negligence-based claims), which are subject to the workers’ compensation exclusivity bar, are not covered under Part One of the insurance policy and are excluded from coverage under Part Two of the policy. Additionally, the employee’s allegations of intentional wrongdoing are excluded under the policy.

There is no support in the governing statutes, the court rules, or New Jersey case law for the fee awards sought in this appeal. The trial court properly exercised its discretion when it denied the fee applications, and the Appellate Division ruled correctly when it affirmed the trial court’s determination.