A plain reading of the relevant statutes dictates that special disciplinary arbitration is not limited to municipal officers, so arbitration is available to public university police officers like Officer DiGuglielmo. Further, pursuant to N.J.S.A. 40A:14-210, an officer suspended with pay prior to termination is eligible to engage in special disciplinary arbitration. The Court therefore reinstates PERC’s decision.
The Court agrees with the Appellate Division that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in deciding to hear the defendant’s waiver motion before considering his suppression motion. The Court declines, however, to adopt a preference that the Family Part hear suppression motions before waiver motions, holding instead that it is within the discretion of the Family Part to determine its schedule of proceedings and manage its calendar. The Court sets forth factors that Family Part judges should take into consideration in exercising their discretion as to the order in which to hear waiver and suppression motions.
After reviewing the relevant statutes and authorities that must be considered in balancing the competing interests and rights of a sexual assault victim and the person accused of the sexual offense, the Court sets forth a framework of procedures and considerations to apply going forward when a prosecutor seeks to withhold from discovery a sexual assault victim’s address. Because neither the ruling of the trial court nor that of the Appellate Division sufficiently addresses the competing interests explored in the Court’s opinion, the Court remands the matter for a more fulsome balancing of the competing interests.
The Tax Sale Law bears no hostility toward investors who otherwise meet the requirements of N.J.S.A. 54:5-89.1 when they prematurely attempt to redeem. Although the investor must always intervene before being allowed to redeem, a misstep like that which occurred here puts the tax sale certificate holder in no worse position than it would have possessed had the error not occurred. Here, because the LLC provided Calderon with more than nominal consideration and because the parties had the benefit of the chancery judge’s full consideration of their competing legal and equitable arguments, the LLC’s premature attempt to redeem should not vitiate the right to redeem it fairly acquired.
It was error to admit defendant’s statements after detectives failed to honor his invocation of the right to counsel, and that error was not harmless in light of the circumstantial nature of the evidence against defendant and his statements’ capacity to undermine his credibility before the jury.
The coach’s acts and omissions alleged here are governed by a simple negligence standard rather than the heightened standard of recklessness the Court applied when one participant injures another during a recreational activity.
As a matter of law, the evidence presented, even affording plaintiffs all favorable inferences, does not establish that defendants’ acts or omissions were motivated by actual malice or accompanied by wanton and willful disregard for Ruscitto’s health and safety. A reasonable jury could not find by clear and convincing evidence that punitive damages are warranted based on the facts of this case, and partial summary judgment should have been granted.
Under the totality of the circumstances reviewed here, the State Police detectives who entered the neighboring residence without a warrant did not have grounds to invoke the hot pursuit doctrine. The warrantless entry violated the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article I, Paragraph 7 of the New Jersey Constitution. Although the Court is disturbed by the manner of execution of this warrant, it declines to adopt a rigid, one-size-fits-all approach to the execution of all ATS arrest warrants.
The jury could not have understood that the reasonable corporal punishment language in the child endangerment charge also applied to the simple assault charge. The trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury, in the context of the simple assault charge, that reasonable corporal punishment is not prohibited. Because that error in jury instructions could have led the jury to an unjust result, the Court vacates defendant’s conviction and remands for further proceedings.
The Court joins the majority of jurisdictions that reject a per se ban on claims by new businesses for lost profits damages, and it declines to follow Weiss to the extent that it bars any claim by a new business for such damages. Claims for lost profits damages are governed by the standard of reasonable certainty and require a fact-sensitive analysis. Because it is substantially more difficult for a new business to establish lost profits damages with reasonable certainty, a trial court should carefully scrutinize a new business’s claim that a defendant’s tortious conduct or breach of contract prevented it from profiting from an enterprise in which it has no experience and should bar that claim unless it can be proven with reasonable certainty. The Court remands these matters so that the trial court may decide defendants’ motions in accordance with the proper standard.
The policy’s broad and unambiguous language makes clear that a causal relationship is not required in order for the exclusionary clause to apply; rather, any claim "in any way connected with" the insured’s operations or activities in a county identified in the exclusionary clause is not covered under the policy. Richfield’s operations in an excluded county are alleged to be connected with the injuries for which recovery is sought, so the exclusion applies. Admiral has no duty to defend a claim that it is not contractually obligated to indemnify.
The Compassionate Release Statute does not require that an inmate prove that he is unable to perform any activity of basic daily living in order to establish a "permanent physical incapacity" under N.J.S.A. 30:4-123.51e(l). Rather, the statute requires clear and convincing evidence that the inmate’s condition renders him permanently unable to perform two or more activities of basic daily living, necessitating twenty-four-hour care.
The Commissioner’s finding that East Bay did not supply sufficient information to prove the workers’ independence under the ABC test’s prong C was not arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable, but rather was supported by the absence of record evidence as to that part of the test. The Court is satisfied that all sixteen workers in question are properly classified as employees, and it remands to the Department for calculation of the appropriate back-owed contributions.
Crystal Point may assert direct claims against Kinsale pursuant to the Direct Action Statute in the setting of this case. Based on the plain language of N.J.S.A. 17:28-2, however, Crystal Point’s claims against Kinsale are derivative claims, and are thus subject to the terms of the insurance policies at issue, including the provision in each policy mandating binding arbitration of disputes between Kinsale and its insureds. Crystal Point’s claims against Kinsale are therefore subject to arbitration.
In amending in 1990 Sections 11 and 13 of the Municipal Vacancy Law, N.J.S.A. 40A:16-11 and -13, the Legislature removed the governing body’s discretion to keep vacant a seat previously occupied by a nominee of a political party. Instead, the Legislature empowered the municipal committee of the political party whose nominee previously occupied the vacant seat to submit three names to the governing body. N.J.S.A. 40A:16 11. Section 11 mandates that the governing body choose one of the municipal committee’s three nominees.
The information the officers possessed at the time of the stop did not amount to specific and particularized suspicion that defendant was engaged in criminal activity. Therefore, the officers did not have reasonable and articulable suspicion to initiate an investigatory detention of defendant, and the evidence seized must be suppressed.
As to the duty to warn, an asbestos manufacturer or supplier that places inadequate warnings on asbestos bags used in the workplace has breached its duty to the worker, regardless of whether it provides the employer with the correct information, which is reasonably intended to reach its employees. As to medical causation, the trial court’s modified Model Jury Charge on proximate cause sufficiently guided the jury.
Once defendant invoked his right to counsel, the interrogation should have stopped. Not only did the interrogation continue, but during the questioning, the detective strongly suggested that defendant would give them the information they sought if he were truly innocent. Allowing that entire exchange to be played for the jury was harmful error. In addition, the error was compounded when the prosecutor commented on that portion of the statement that should have never been before the jury in the first place. The Court discerns no error regarding the witness testimony or any of the prosecutor’s other comments during summation.
The stop was not supported by a reasonable and articulable suspicion of a motor vehicle violation. N.J.S.A. 39:3-75, which governs automotive safety glass, does not apply to window tint violations. Consistent with the plain language of N.J.S.A. 39:3-74, reasonable and articulable suspicion of a tinted windows violation arises only when a vehicle’s front windshield or front side windows are so darkly tinted that police cannot clearly see people or articles within the car.