Supreme Court Opinions

Under the facts as presented in this case, charity care is not an unconstitutional “per se” physical taking of private property without just compensation. It does not grant an affirmative right of access to occupy hospitals; it does not give away or physically set aside hospital property for the government or a third party; and it does not deprive hospitals of all economically beneficial use of their property. Charity care is also not an unconstitutional “regulatory” taking of private property without just compensation. That is due to the highly regulated nature of the hospital industry and the legislatively declared paramount public interest that the charity care program serves. Hospitals remain free to challenge their annual subsidy allocations through administrative channels and to lobby the Legislature to make policy changes that would address more broadly the concerns they raise. But the charity care program does not run afoul of the Takings Clause, and the Court therefore affirms the Appellate Division’s judgment, as modified.

The Court views N.J.S.A. 40A:7-12 to require a planning board to independently evaluate the merits of a deannexation petition and make an objective recommendation to the municipality’s governing body. That did not occur in this case. Plaintiffs met their burden of proof with respect to all three prongs of N.J.S.A. 40A:7-12.1, and the trial court properly ordered deannexation.

Under N.J.R.E. 406, evidence of a specific, repeated, and regular business habit or practice, whether corroborated or not, would have  been admissible to establish a rebuttable presumption that Altice had acted in conformity with that habit or practice. But here, Altice produced insufficient evidence of such habit or practice. And because there is no proof that Altice emailed plaintiff the critical customer service agreement, the Court does not reach whether there exists mutual assent to waive a jury trial and arbitrate the dispute.

The Commission’s map represents a proper exercise of the substantial discretion the MWL grants to ward commissions to set the boundaries of municipal wards. The Court does not concur with the Appellate Division’s ruling that additional factfinding is necessary to determine whether the Commission’s map meets N.J.S.A. 40:44-14’s compactness requirement. The Court reverses the Appellate Division’s judgment on that claim and reinstates the trial court’s judgment as to the Commission’s compliance with the MWL without further proceedings. The Court’s conclusion that the Commission complied with the MWL compels rejection of the equal protection claim. And, in light of its holding that the map did not violate either the MWL or the New Jersey Constitution, the Court affirms the Appellate Division’s determination that the trial court properly dismissed the Community Organizations’ NJCRA claim.

Applying First Amendment principles stated in Smith v. Daily Mail Publishing Co., 443 U.S. 97, 98, 102-03 (1979), and Florida Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524, 530 (1989), the Court views Caputo’s specific address to constitute truthful information, lawfully obtained, that addresses a matter of public concern. As the parties agree and the trial court and Appellate Division determined, Daniel’s Law serves a state interest of the highest order: the protection of certain public officials and their immediate family members living in the same household so that those officials can perform their duties without fear of reprisal. See N.J.S.A. 56:8-166.3. Daniel’s Law, as applied to prevent Kratovil’s proposed republication of Caputo’s exact home address, is narrowly tailored to serve that state interest.

The relevant case law and court rule on presentments contemplate the existence of both a grand jury investigation and an actual presentment for an assignment judge to review. But here, no grand jury has completed an investigation, and no presentment exists. Courts cannot presume the outcome of an investigation in advance or the contents of a presentment that has not yet been written. It was therefore premature for the trial court to conclude that any potential presentment in this matter had to be suppressed. The State has the right to proceed with its investigation and present evidence before a special grand jury. If the grand jury issues a presentment, the assignment judge should review the report and publish it if it complies with the legal standards outlined in the Court’s opinion. The Court cannot and does not decide the ultimate question in advance.

Although the Fifth Amendment does not afford a defendant in a PDVA FRO hearing blanket immunity, a defendant may invoke the privilege against self-incrimination in response to specific questions that raise reasonable risks of self-incrimination, and no adverse inference may be drawn from the exercise of that right. The PDVA immunity provision contained in N.J.S.A. 2C:25-29(a) is not coextensive with the privilege against self-incrimination and is therefore insufficient to safeguard a defendant’s rights under the Fifth Amendment.

The practice of purchasing a competitor’s name as a keyword does not, in itself, constitute a violation of the RPCs. However, the Court requires that attorneys employing this strategy include a clear and conspicuous disclaimer on the landing page of their website when a user clicks on such a paid advertisement.

Municipalities and municipal corporations, as defined by N.J.S.A. 1:1-2, that engage in frivolous litigation are subject to sanctions under the FLS. The Supreme Court of the United States has recognized “that municipalities, unlike States, do not enjoy a constitutionally protected immunity from suit,” Jinks v. Richland County, 538 U.S. 456, 466 (2003), and neither the FLS nor any other substantive law in New Jersey has immunized municipalities from FLS liability for filing frivolous pleadings like the Borough was found to have filed here. 

Whether defendant should have retreated was a critical part of certain offenses charged in this case. Jurors heard the State press the point at trial; they also heard conflicting accounts of who the “initial aggressor” was and whether the apartment was defendant’s “dwelling.” But the jury received no direction as to how those disputed facts related to -- or had the potential to negate -- the duty to retreat in this case. Under the circumstances, the failure to give the jury guidance on the castle doctrine was clearly capable of producing an unjust result. It was therefore plain error not to instruct the jury on the issue.

Because of the defect in Liberty’s PoA, El Sol did not submit a CoS that validly bound Liberty to execute the Contract Bond, and its bid was therefore incomplete. The NJTA did not act in an arbitrary, capricious, and unreasonable manner when it rejected El Sol’s legally deficient bid.

The DEP’s initial grant of the waiver did not create a property interest in the continued suspension of Clarios’s remediation obligations. Neither the controlling statutes and regulations nor a mutually explicit understanding between the parties provided an entitlement to the indefinite continuance of the waiver; to the contrary, the governing laws and agency materials all anticipate the DEP’s ability to enforce remediation obligations in the future.

The Court disagrees with the Appellate Division’s conclusion that it was the arbitrator, not the parties, who introduced the question of carried interest in the arbitration. The remedy of modification under N.J.S.A. 2A:23B-24(a)(2) is not warranted in this case, and the Appellate Division’s review of the award did not conform to the deferential standard governing judicial review of arbitration awards

The WPL defines “wages” as “direct monetary compensation for labor or services rendered by an employee, where the amount is determined on a time, task, piece, or commission basis.” N.J.S.A. 34:11-4.1(c) (emphasis added). Under that definition, compensating an employee by paying a “commission” for “labor or services” always constitutes a wage under the WPL. Therefore, a “commission” under the WPL cannot be excluded from the definition of “wages” as a “supplementary incentive.”

An individual outside the reach of New Jersey’s jurisdiction is not a party within the definition of the CNA for purposes of allocation. But that individual may be a joint tortfeasor for purposes of seeking contribution under the JTCL. The Court therefore affirms the judgment of the Appellate Division, as modified.

The Court’s review of the record reveals that Respondent invited a subordinate court employee to his summer home, provided beer and shots of hard liquor that the two drank liberally over the course of several hours, discussed intimate details of the employee’s sexual relationship with her boyfriend, and then touched her in a sexually suggestive manner without her consent. Because of the blatant and serious nature of Respondent’s misconduct, the Court finds beyond a reasonable doubt that there is cause for removal.

The Court Rules allow certified attorneys to pay referral fees to lawyers in other states even if they are not licensed here, and the payment of referral fees does not raise concerns about the unauthorized practice of law. The Court vacates Opinion 745, which reached the opposite conclusion.

D.T. has not demonstrated that the Archdiocese’s exercise of supervisory authority over McCarthy gave rise to the minimum contacts between the Archdiocese and New Jersey that would be necessary to exercise specific jurisdiction under Fourteenth Amendment due process principles in the setting of this appeal

Preemption is not an issue here because the N.J.S.A. 3B:3-14 does not conflict with the federal regulations that govern U.S. savings bonds. Given that the DSA did not direct the disposition of the savings bonds, the bonds have no bearing on Michael’s -- and later the Estate’s -- obligation to pay Jeanine $200,000, and the bonds’ value should not have been credited against that obligation. Pursuant to the DSA, the Estate must make whatever payments remain to Jeanine. 

When a defending physician practices in more than one specialty and the treatment involved falls within any of that physician’s specialty areas, then an AOM from a physician specializing in one of those specialties is sufficient.