Opinion Summaries

Based on the CRA’s plain language, as well as the legislative history and fundamental purpose of compassionate release, the Court agrees with the Appellate Division that physical examinations are not statutorily mandated to render a medical diagnosis that complies with the statute. The Court concludes, however, that the DOC’s decision to deny M.R. a Certificate of Eligibility in August 2023 was arbitrary, capricious, and unreasonable. Every applicant seeking compassionate release must be examined for both a terminal condition and a permanent physical incapacity. In this instance, the medical records relied upon by the DOC’s attesting physicians, as well as their corresponding explanations, were insufficient to support the agency’s conclusion that M.R. did not suffer from such a physical incapacity.

The trial judge’s inquiry into the allegations in this case was inadequate. When allegations of juror misconduct arise during trial, the court must assess their plausibility. Once the court is satisfied that the allegations are sufficiently plausible to require questioning, the court is obligated to conduct a specific and probing examination of the juror to determine whether misconduct occurred. Here, the trial judge determined the allegations required an inquiry of the juror but then failed to ask questions that directly addressed the allegations.

The Court finds evidence that the Legislature intended to authorize the supersession of the Paterson Police Department in two statutes: (1) L. 2023, c. 94 (Chapter 94), which the Legislature adopted in the wake of the supersession to facilitate the OIC’s leadership of the Department; and (2) L. 2023, c. 74, the appropriations bill for the fiscal year ending on June 30, 2024, in which the Legislature appropriated funds for the Attorney General’s continued operation of the Department. The Court does not base its holding on other statutes and authorities cited by defendants in support of their argument that the Attorney General has general authority to supersede a municipal police department over local officials’ objections if the Attorney General determines that such an action is warranted. The Court declines to reach the question whether the Attorney General has supersession authority in circumstances other than the specific setting of this case.

The court considers whether, under the standard set forth in State v. Daniels, 182 N.J. 80 (2004), a prosecutor in summation impermissibly accused defendant of tailoring his testimony based on what he had witnessed while attending his trial.  The court also considers whether the jury's acquittal of defendant on the sexual-assault, robbery, and aggravated-assault charges required vacation of the conviction on the charge of possession of a weapon for an unlawful purpose.

In summation, the prosecutor attacked defendant's credibility by stating defendant in his testimony had told "a story of having consent" after he "sat through this entire trial, hearing the testimony of every witness, after he heard all of the evidence against him, after having time to construct a new narrative."  The court holds the prosecutor could have challenged defendant's credibility using evidence in the record but instead impermissibly attacked his credibility based on his exercise of his fundamental rights to attend his trial and confront witnesses presented against him.  Pursuant to Daniels, the court vacates the convictions and remands for a new trial. 

Because the unlawful-purpose conviction was supported by sufficient evidence in the record, the court, following State v. Banko, 182 N.J. 44 (2004), rejects defendant's argument that the unlawful-purpose conviction must be vacated due to the acquittals of the other charges. 

In the unpublished portion of the opinion, the court addresses defendant's argument regarding his sentence.

Under the circumstances presented here, sentencing counsel was not constitutionally ineffective because her performance was not deficient.

Under the facts as presented in this case, charity care is not an unconstitutional “per se” physical taking of private property without just compensation. It does not grant an affirmative right of access to occupy hospitals; it does not give away or physically set aside hospital property for the government or a third party; and it does not deprive hospitals of all economically beneficial use of their property. Charity care is also not an unconstitutional “regulatory” taking of private property without just compensation. That is due to the highly regulated nature of the hospital industry and the legislatively declared paramount public interest that the charity care program serves. Hospitals remain free to challenge their annual subsidy allocations through administrative channels and to lobby the Legislature to make policy changes that would address more broadly the concerns they raise. But the charity care program does not run afoul of the Takings Clause, and the Court therefore affirms the Appellate Division’s judgment, as modified.

     In this appeal, the court was asked to consider whether plaintiff, a municipal court administrator, is an employee of the Administrative Office of the Courts (AOC), thereby allowing her to assert a claim against the AOC under the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination, N.J.S.A. 10:5-1 to -49.  Following the court's review of various statutes and court rules, it concluded that if the Legislature had intended municipal court administrators to be considered employees of the AOC, it could have expressly done so.  Instead, the Legislature enacted N.J.S.A. 2B:12-10(a), specifically establishing that municipalities "shall provide for an administrator" of municipal courts and pay "their compensation."  Moreover, N.J.S.A. 2B:12-1(a) provides "[e]very municipality shall establish a municipal court," not the AOC.  Although the AOC provides certain oversight and supervision of municipal courts, that does not equate with the AOC establishing an employer-employee relationship with plaintiff.

The Court views N.J.S.A. 40A:7-12 to require a planning board to independently evaluate the merits of a deannexation petition and make an objective recommendation to the municipality’s governing body. That did not occur in this case. Plaintiffs met their burden of proof with respect to all three prongs of N.J.S.A. 40A:7-12.1, and the trial court properly ordered deannexation.

Under N.J.R.E. 406, evidence of a specific, repeated, and regular business habit or practice, whether corroborated or not, would have  been admissible to establish a rebuttable presumption that Altice had acted in conformity with that habit or practice. But here, Altice produced insufficient evidence of such habit or practice. And because there is no proof that Altice emailed plaintiff the critical customer service agreement, the Court does not reach whether there exists mutual assent to waive a jury trial and arbitrate the dispute.

The State appealed trial court orders terminating Megan's Law, N.J.S.A. 2C:7-1 to -23, and Community Supervision for Life (CSL), N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6.4, obligations applicable to S.O. and G.N. (collectively, Registrants).  The court vacated the trial court orders and remanded both matters for further proceedings.

These appeals raised the novel issue of whether the "public safety prongs" in the termination provisions of Megan's law, N.J.S.A. 2C:7-2(f), and CSL, N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6.4(c), require trial courts to consider all subsequent non-sexual and sexual offenses when determining whether a registrant poses a threat to the safety of others.  The court concluded the public safety prongs contain ambiguous language, since they are susceptible to more than one interpretation.  Based on this ambiguity, the court applied principles of statutory construction, which required an examination of extrinsic evidence.   In reaching a decision, the court considered the legislative intent, legislative history and prior decisional law and interpreted the public safety prongs to require a trial court to determine whether a registrant established they were not likely to pose a threat to the safety of others, sufficient to warrant termination of their Megan's Law and CSL obligations, without confining its analysis to the threat of sexual re-offense.  

The court concluded, when evaluating whether the public safety prongs have been satisfied, trial courts shall engage in a holistic assessment of the individual registrant, considering the factual predicates for subsequent non-sexual and sexual offenses, a registrant's tier classification, Registrant Risk Assessment Scale (RRAS) score, any applications to modify their tier classification, expert psychological evaluations, evidence of therapeutic programs and counseling attended, and any other relevant proofs.   

In this slip and fall case, plaintiff attempts to expand the principles of sidewalk liability for commercial properties to a residential property that was unoccupied and undergoing renovations.  This court upholds the motion judge's rejection of plaintiff's invitation to adopt such expanded principles of liability. 

As an alternative argument, plaintiff contends the common law protection for residential property owners was nullified here because the defendant homeowners allegedly increased the sidewalk's slippery condition by negligently clearing snow from it. The court rejects this contention as well. 

Even viewing the record in a light most favorable to plaintiff, the motion judge properly deemed the evidence insufficient to present a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the homeowners had worsened the sidewalk's actual condition before her slip and fall.  The undisputed record establishes that the photographs plaintiff crucially relies upon to prove the sidewalk's supposedly worsened condition at the time of her fall were taken much later, after an intervening winter snowstorm—according to plaintiff's weather expert—had deposited as much as another 3.5 inches of snow in the area.  The weather data thus undermined plaintiff's contentions about the nature of the sidewalk's condition at the time of the accident, rendering her theory of liability untenable.

The court therefore affirms summary judgment and the dismissal of plaintiff's complaint. 

         In this appeal, the court reversed the trial court's decision permitting three write-in votes to be counted in the February 15, 2025 Toms River Board of Fire Commissioners, District No. 1 election. Petitioner Michael Hopson was an unsuccessful candidate for a position as a fire commissioner.  The trial court's decision changed the election results from a tie between Hopson and defendant Anthony Cirz to Cirz winning by one vote.  The court held the trial court misapplied N.J.S.A. 19:49-5, because the plain language of the statute prohibits the counting of a write-in vote for any person who is a candidate listed on the ballot.

         The court affirmed the trial court's decision not to count mail-in ballots that were deficient and incapable of being cured. Thus, the court remanded the matter for entry of an order for a run-off election between Hopson and Cirz for the one open seat.

The Commission’s map represents a proper exercise of the substantial discretion the MWL grants to ward commissions to set the boundaries of municipal wards. The Court does not concur with the Appellate Division’s ruling that additional factfinding is necessary to determine whether the Commission’s map meets N.J.S.A. 40:44-14’s compactness requirement. The Court reverses the Appellate Division’s judgment on that claim and reinstates the trial court’s judgment as to the Commission’s compliance with the MWL without further proceedings. The Court’s conclusion that the Commission complied with the MWL compels rejection of the equal protection claim. And, in light of its holding that the map did not violate either the MWL or the New Jersey Constitution, the Court affirms the Appellate Division’s determination that the trial court properly dismissed the Community Organizations’ NJCRA claim.

Applying First Amendment principles stated in Smith v. Daily Mail Publishing Co., 443 U.S. 97, 98, 102-03 (1979), and Florida Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524, 530 (1989), the Court views Caputo’s specific address to constitute truthful information, lawfully obtained, that addresses a matter of public concern. As the parties agree and the trial court and Appellate Division determined, Daniel’s Law serves a state interest of the highest order: the protection of certain public officials and their immediate family members living in the same household so that those officials can perform their duties without fear of reprisal. See N.J.S.A. 56:8-166.3. Daniel’s Law, as applied to prevent Kratovil’s proposed republication of Caputo’s exact home address, is narrowly tailored to serve that state interest.

     In this matter of apparent first impression, the court was asked to determine whether a future statutory lien pursuant to N.J.S.A. 30:4D-7.2 ("Medicaid Lien Statute") has priority over an accrued Division of Developmental Disabilities ("DDD") lien pursuant to N.J.S.A. 30:4-80.1 ("DDD Lien Statute").  The effect of that priority would be to bar appellant, DDD, from recovering on its lien against the inherited property of G.W. ("Gabrielle"), an adjudicated incapacitated person.    

     The court concluded the Medicaid Lien Statute and the DDD Lien Statute are not inconsistent with one another.  The Medicaid Lien Statute is clear that although Medicaid liens are "preferred claim[s] against the recipient's estate" and "have a priority equivalent to" N.J.S.A. 3B:22-2(d), N.J.S.A. 30:4D-7.2(d)(1) (emphasis added), they cannot come into being until the recipient of the funds has passed away, as "[a] lien may be filed against and recovery sought from the estate of a deceased recipient." N.J.S.A. 30:4D-7.2(a)(1) (emphasis added).  By its plain language, a Medicaid lien may attach only to the estate of a decedent, not the property of a living person.  When both liens exist at the same time, an existing DDD lien cannot take priority over an existing Medicaid lien.  However, in a situation such as this one, where no Medicaid lien exists because the recipient is still alive, DDD is entitled to recover on its lien, the only statutorily recognized lien in existence.  

     Because the plain language of the Medicaid Lien Statute and the DDD Lien Statute demonstrate DDD is entitled to recover its lien now and the DDD lien is not subordinate to a non-existing Medicaid lien, the court vacated the trial court's order finding the future Medicaid lien had priority over the existing DDD lien and remanded for an order consistent with its opinion.  However, the court affirmed the trial court's appointment of the Arc of Bergen and Passaic Counties ("Arc") as the guardian of Gabrielle's property and ordered Arc and DDD to engage in the compromise process pursuant to N.J.S.A. 30:4-80.6(c) regarding DDD's lien.  

The relevant case law and court rule on presentments contemplate the existence of both a grand jury investigation and an actual presentment for an assignment judge to review. But here, no grand jury has completed an investigation, and no presentment exists. Courts cannot presume the outcome of an investigation in advance or the contents of a presentment that has not yet been written. It was therefore premature for the trial court to conclude that any potential presentment in this matter had to be suppressed. The State has the right to proceed with its investigation and present evidence before a special grand jury. If the grand jury issues a presentment, the assignment judge should review the report and publish it if it complies with the legal standards outlined in the Court’s opinion. The Court cannot and does not decide the ultimate question in advance.

     The court considers if judicial estoppel prevents a party from benefiting by making representations in state court that are inconsistent with those previously made to obtain a modification of an automatic stay imposed by a federal court in a bankruptcy case.

     While this automobile-accident case was pending in the Law Division, defendant filed a petition for bankruptcy in the federal bankruptcy court.  Plaintiff moved for a modification of an automatic stay issued by the bankruptcy court.  He represented to the court he was pursuing a judgment only in the amount of defendant's insurance coverage.  Plaintiff made the same representation in the Law Division in opposition to defendant's motion for a stay.  Based on plaintiff's representations, the Law Division judge denied defendant's stay motion and the bankruptcy court granted plaintiff's motion and modified its automatic stay, expressly to permit plaintiff to pursue a judgment limited to the amount of insurance coverage.  The Law Division case proceeded to trial; the jury awarded plaintiff a verdict far in excess of the amount of the insurance coverage. Plaintiff requested and obtained a judgment in the amount of the verdict plus relief granted pursuant to Rule 4:58-2(a).  The Law Division judge denied defendant's multiple motions to mold the verdict to the insurance-coverage amount, or in the alternative for a new trial or remittitur.

     Based on the equitable doctrine of judicial estoppel and applicable bankruptcy law, the court reversed and remanded for entry of an order molding the verdict to the amount of the insurance coverage.

     The court takes this opportunity to clarify the legal principles that govern motions for a new trial based on evidence not previously available to the defense.  Such motions, the court explains, can arise in two distinct circumstances:  (1) where the prosecutor was in possession of the "new" evidence but failed to disclose it to the defense—a discovery violation—and (2) where the defense discovers the new evidence through its own efforts.  In Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), the United States Supreme Court addressed the first situation.  In State v. Carter, 91 N.J. 86 (1982), the New Jersey Supreme Court considered both situations and devised what has been applied as a general test for resolving newly discovered evidence motions.   

     Defendant contends the prosecutor committed a discovery violation by not disclosing that its key trial witness had accepted a plea agreement tendered by the prosecutor in an unrelated matter eight years before defendant's murder trial. The court explains that the separate multi-prong tests set forth in Brady and Carter overlap but are not identical, which can lead to confusion.  The court considers whether the trial judge ultimately reached the correct conclusion in denying defendant's motion for a new trial notwithstanding that the judge did not cite to the governing precedent, Brady.

     The court emphasizes that the Carter and Brady tests share a common element: whether the jury's verdict would have been different had the defense been aware of the new evidence before trial. The question of "materiality" under both Carter and Brady is essentially a form of harmless error analysis.  Further, the court explains, while the two tests start from a different factual predicate, they converge on the fact-sensitive question of whether the trial outcome would have been different if the defense had been aware of the new evidence before trial.  The court further holds there is no practical difference between the materiality/harmless error elements set forth in the Brady and Carter formulations.  Thus, the court reasons, the motion judge's findings under Carter allow it to evaluate the materiality element of the Brady test, which requires reversal of a conviction only where there is a reasonable probability that had the evidence suppressed by the prosecutor been timely disclosed to the defense, the trial result would have been different. The court concludes that in this application, the newly discovered information would not have led to a different trial result. 

     The court also addresses defendant's contention the motion judge abused discretion and violated defendant's due process and compulsory process rights by refusing to enforce a subpoena to the Crime Stoppers program concerning possible reward payments to the State's witness.  The court concludes the motion judge did not provide adequate reasons explaining his decision.  The court thus remands for the motion judge to make additional findings of fact and conclusions of law.

     Defendant was charged with the illegal possession of a firearm and other offenses.  He appeals the denial of his motion to suppress a gun that police found after opening his companion's backpack without a search warrant. 

     Two police officers encountered the companion on the street after she and defendant got out of a parked car that had been described in a Be-On-the-Lookout (BOLO) report of a recent shooting.  After defendant fled the scene, the police handcuffed the companion and put her in the back seat of a police car.  The police then secured her belongings, including her backpack, in the front seat of the squad car.  She told the police she thought defendant had put a weapon in her backpack at an earlier time.  The police immediately opened the backpack without seeking a warrant. 

     The prosecution solely invoked the automobile and the exigent circumstances exceptions to the warrant requirement and did not rely on consent-to-search nor other exceptions. 

     In reversing the suppression denial, the court holds: (1) defendant had standing to challenge the backpack search; (2) the automobile exception to the constitutional warrant requirement does not apply because the backpack was not the fruit of the automobile search; and (3) the State failed to demonstrate exigent circumstances to justify the immediate necessity to open the backpack, which was secured in a police car and not accessible to the either the handcuffed companion or defendant. 

Defendant K.H. appeals from his jury trial convictions for aggravated sexual assault and burglary.  He claims DNA evidence police collected from him should have been suppressed because his consent to the buccal swab test was coerced.  He argues inter alia that it was unlawful for detectives to ask for consent after he invoked his Miranda rights, citing the court's recent decision in State v. Amang, __ N.J. Super. __ (App. Div. 2025). 

The present case probes the underlying rationale and boundaries of the bright line rule established in Amang.  In that case, the court held that under the New Jersey Constitution, police may not ask a person in custody to grant consent to a search if they had previously asserted the right to confer with an attorney during the administration of Miranda warnings.  In adopting that bright line rule, the court stressed the unique ability of attorneys to protect the Fifth Amendment rights of a client undergoing custodial interrogation. 

The court in the present appeal makes clear the categorical rule announced in Amang is triggered only by an arrestee's assertion of the right to confer with counsel.  It is not triggered by a defendant's assertion of the right to remain silent. 

Although it is not disputed that defendant in this case invoked his Miranda rights, the motion court did not make a specific finding on whether defendant requested to confer with an attorney, as he claims.  The court concludes that a remand for further factfinding is unnecessary in this case because in any event, the motion court correctly found that defendant's DNA would ultimately have been obtained under the inevitable discovery doctrine.  The court notes, however, the Miranda waiver form used in this case, like the one used in Amang, documents whether the arrestee invoked Miranda rights, but does not memorialize whether they asked to confer with counsel, asserted the right to remain silent, or asserted both rights guaranteed under Miranda. 

That distinction is important not only with respect to applying the Amang rule but also to ensure compliance with Fifth Amendment case law that precludes police from reinitiating custodial interrogation after the arrestee has asserted the right to counsel.  The court recommends that the Attorney General and county prosecutors review existing Miranda waiver forms to consider whether they should be revised to facilitate documenting whether an arrestee asserted the right to confer with counsel.