Opinion Summaries

The court affirms the dismissal on summary judgment of a volunteer firefighter's whistleblower claim against Colts Neck Volunteer Fire Company No. 2, and several individual officers and members of the fire company, finding volunteer firefighters are not entitled to the protections of the Conscientious Employee Protection Act (CEPA), N.J.S.A. 34:19-1 to -14. Because plaintiff is not an employee of the fire company, its vote to strip him of his membership in the organization in alleged retaliation for his letters to the fire company's fidelity carrier and Colts Neck's Executive Fire Council, even if true, is not a violation of CEPA.

The grand jury indicted defendant, a sitting Superior Court judge, for official misconduct, N.J.S.A. 2C:30-2b, and two counts of hindering the apprehension of her boyfriend, the subject of an active arrest warrant for robbery. N.J.S.A. 2C:29-3a(1) and (2). The indictment alleged that with a purpose to benefit herself and her boyfriend, defendant refrained from performing a duty inherent in the nature of her office, i.e., to "enforce an arrest warrant . . . by failing to adequately notify the . . . Police Department of . . . [her boyfriend's] intended appearance or presence at her residence." The hindering counts alleged defendant "harbored or concealed" her boyfriend and offered or provided aid to avoid discovery or apprehension or to effect escape. The Law Division judge granted defendant's motion to dismiss the official misconduct charge but denied her motion as to the two hindering counts. The court granted each party's motion for leave to appeal.

The court affirmed, holding that under the circumstances presented, the judge did not have a duty, inherent in her office, to notify police of her boyfriend's location or that he was shortly appearing at her home. The court also concluded the State had produced some evidence before the grand jury to support the indictment on the hindering counts.

Where there was nothing in the jury’s communications with the trial court to suggest that any juror had reached a determination on a factual or legal issue, the trial court’s decision to instruct the deadlocked jury to continue deliberations and attempt to reach an agreement, and to later substitute an alternate for an ill juror after the deadlock had been announced, did not constitute plain error.