Opinion Summaries

In this matter of first impression, the court addresses the elements of second-degree purchasing firearm parts to manufacture a firearm without a serial number, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-9(k) (Paragraph k), and the application of the territorial jurisdiction statute, N.J.S.A. 2C:1-3.  In doing so, the court rejects defendant's argument that Paragraph k is comprised of one element.  Instead, the court concludes Paragraph k requires the State prove defendant: (1) purchased a ghost gun kit; (2) acted with purpose to manufacture or assemble a firearm; and (3) was not registered or licensed to manufacture or assemble a firearm in this state.

Although the evidence presented to the grand jury revealed the purchase of ghost gun kits occurred in Pennsylvania, and was lawful in that jurisdiction, the State presented sufficient evidence from which the jury could infer defendant purchased the kits with the purpose of manufacturing firearms in New Jersey, satisfying the culpability element under N.J.S.A. 2C:1-14(h)(3)(b), and territorial jurisdiction under N.J.S.A. 2C:1-3(a).

The court also rejected the State's argument that defendant waived his right to appeal from the denial of his motion to dismiss the indictment when he entered his guilty plea.  Although the motion was not specifically referenced in the plea form, defendant did not indicate "Yes" or "No" in response to Question 4(e), "Do you further understand that by pleading guilty you are waiving your right to appeal the denial of all other pretrial motions except the following"? Nor did defendant directly answer the court's inquiry, "Do you understand by pleading guilty you are waiving your right to appeal the denial of any and all pretrial motions you or your attorney filed?"  Further, the State did not object when, during the plea hearing, defense counsel informed the court the "motion that was heard on the legality of the statute . . . can be appealed." 

The issues in this appeal are whether defendant's conviction for a fifth offense of driving while intoxicated (DWI) should be reversed on the ground that trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by refusing to present a psychiatric defense and whether defendant was entitled to a jury trial given the 180-day sentence imposed.  The court affirms the tenet that DWI is a strict-liability offense for which mental-state defenses are unavailable and that defendant is not entitled to a jury trial where the period of incarceration does not exceed six months. 

Here, defendant was convicted following a municipal court bench trial at which he admitted to consuming alcohol, exhibited indicia of intoxication, and failed field sobriety tests.  Although defendant attributed his conduct to persecutory paranoia and amnesia unrelated to alcohol use, his trial counsel declined to pursue a psychiatric defense.  The court holds that counsel's decision was reasonable and compelled by law, as mental-state defenses such as insanity are not viable in DWI prosecutions.  In so holding, the court adopts as precedent the case of State v. Inglis, 304 N.J. Super. 207 (Law Div. 1997).

Counsel's refusal to advance a legally untenable defense did not fall below professional standards.  Nor did the sentence of 180 days in county jail entitle defendant to a jury trial.  The court reaffirms that a single petty offense subject to no more than six months' incarceration does not meet the threshold for jury-trial protections, even when accompanied by significant collateral penalties such as years-long license suspension and installation of an ignition interlock device.  The conviction and sentence are affirmed.

Constitutional ex post facto prohibitions forbid only punishment beyond what was contemplated at the time the crime was committed. Because the law at the time of Krug’s offenses permitted the Board to consider the same “all existing” information it may now consider, retroactive application of the 1997 amendment to Krug created no risk of additional punishment. The Court therefore rejects Krug’s ex post facto challenge.

Consistent with Swan, the one-year statute of limitations that applies to defamation claims also applies to false light claims. The overlap between the causes of action, in conjunction with the practical considerations and free speech protections, mandates that false light be subject to the same one-year statute of limitations as defamation.

The appropriate standard of review is abuse of discretion. As a result, the Court reverses the judgment of the Appellate Division and remands the case to the trial court for consideration of the prosecutor’s denial under that standard.

N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(j) falls outside the scope of the Graves Act. It sets forth a distinct substantive offense that must be charged independently, even though it is cognizable only when paired with a corresponding prior offense under N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(a), (b), (c), or (f).

The expungement statute does not bar release of the report because the IA report is not a criminal record. The expungement statute and the expungement order entered by the Sussex County Superior Court do, however, bar release of any information related to the lieutenant’s arrest, conviction, or the disposition of his criminal case. Counsel for defendants has certified that the IA report in this case contains “information pertaining to [the lieutenant’s] arrest, charges and [the] disposition” of his criminal case. Therefore, pursuant to the expungement statute and order, any such information must be redacted from the IA report. The Court affirms but modifies the Appellate Division’s judgment. It remands to the trial court to perform those redactions in camera and to then conduct the common law balancing test set forth in Rivera on the remainder of the IA report. If the court finds that the “interests that favor disclosure outweigh concerns for confidentiality,” Rivera, 250 N.J. at 135, it must redact the additional information specified in Rivera, id. at 150, and then release the redacted report to plaintiff. As to the sealing of court documents, the Court leaves undisturbed the Appellate Division’s direction

By its plain language, N.J.S.A. 43:16A-12.2 directs that “unpaid benefits” be distributed to the decedent’s estate unless the PFRS member has nominated a beneficiary by “written designation.” Because Isaac made no such designation here, the Board must distribute Isaac’s $208,950.03 in unpaid benefits to his estate in accordance with the statutory mandate.

In this appeal, the court addresses the interplay between the Recovery Court expungement statute, N.J.S.A. 2C:35-14(m), and the law that governs expungements generally, N.J.S.A. 2C:52-1 to -32.1, as they relate to expungement of juvenile adjudications sought following completion of Recovery Court. 

The State appeals from a trial court order expunging petitioner's entire record including his juvenile delinquency adjudications after he successfully completed a Recovery Court special probation sentence. The State, joined by the New Jersey Attorney General as amicus, argues juvenile delinquency adjudications of non-expungable offenses if committed by an adult are not eligible for expungement despite successful completion of Recovery Court.  They warn a contrary interpretation defies legislative intent. 

In response, P.L., supported by amicus, the Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers of New Jersey, asserts the plain language of N.J.S.A. 2C:35-14(m) allows expungement of juvenile adjudications because adjudications are not convictions specifically excluded from post-Recovery Court relief. 

Relying on the plain language of both statutes, the court concludes the Legislature did not incorporate certain restrictions from the general expungement statute into the Recovery Court statute addressing expungement of adult criminal and juvenile adjudication histories, N.J.S.A. 2C:35-14(m). As a result, Recovery Court graduates may expunge all eligible offenses under this statute, including juvenile adjudications otherwise non-expungable if sought under the general expungement law.

Under the circumstances presented here, the automobile exception to the warrant requirement did not apply and the police were required to obtain a warrant before searching the car.

Only franchisees can bring suit under the FPA. NJCAR is a trade association whose members consist of franchisee motor vehicle dealerships in New Jersey. NJCAR is not itself a motor vehicle franchisee, and it therefore lacks statutory standing to sue under the FPA.

Based on the CRA’s plain language, as well as the legislative history and fundamental purpose of compassionate release, the Court agrees with the Appellate Division that physical examinations are not statutorily mandated to render a medical diagnosis that complies with the statute. The Court concludes, however, that the DOC’s decision to deny M.R. a Certificate of Eligibility in August 2023 was arbitrary, capricious, and unreasonable. Every applicant seeking compassionate release must be examined for both a terminal condition and a permanent physical incapacity. In this instance, the medical records relied upon by the DOC’s attesting physicians, as well as their corresponding explanations, were insufficient to support the agency’s conclusion that M.R. did not suffer from such a physical incapacity.

The trial judge’s inquiry into the allegations in this case was inadequate. When allegations of juror misconduct arise during trial, the court must assess their plausibility. Once the court is satisfied that the allegations are sufficiently plausible to require questioning, the court is obligated to conduct a specific and probing examination of the juror to determine whether misconduct occurred. Here, the trial judge determined the allegations required an inquiry of the juror but then failed to ask questions that directly addressed the allegations.

The Court finds evidence that the Legislature intended to authorize the supersession of the Paterson Police Department in two statutes: (1) L. 2023, c. 94 (Chapter 94), which the Legislature adopted in the wake of the supersession to facilitate the OIC’s leadership of the Department; and (2) L. 2023, c. 74, the appropriations bill for the fiscal year ending on June 30, 2024, in which the Legislature appropriated funds for the Attorney General’s continued operation of the Department. The Court does not base its holding on other statutes and authorities cited by defendants in support of their argument that the Attorney General has general authority to supersede a municipal police department over local officials’ objections if the Attorney General determines that such an action is warranted. The Court declines to reach the question whether the Attorney General has supersession authority in circumstances other than the specific setting of this case.

The court considers whether, under the standard set forth in State v. Daniels, 182 N.J. 80 (2004), a prosecutor in summation impermissibly accused defendant of tailoring his testimony based on what he had witnessed while attending his trial.  The court also considers whether the jury's acquittal of defendant on the sexual-assault, robbery, and aggravated-assault charges required vacation of the conviction on the charge of possession of a weapon for an unlawful purpose.

In summation, the prosecutor attacked defendant's credibility by stating defendant in his testimony had told "a story of having consent" after he "sat through this entire trial, hearing the testimony of every witness, after he heard all of the evidence against him, after having time to construct a new narrative."  The court holds the prosecutor could have challenged defendant's credibility using evidence in the record but instead impermissibly attacked his credibility based on his exercise of his fundamental rights to attend his trial and confront witnesses presented against him.  Pursuant to Daniels, the court vacates the convictions and remands for a new trial. 

Because the unlawful-purpose conviction was supported by sufficient evidence in the record, the court, following State v. Banko, 182 N.J. 44 (2004), rejects defendant's argument that the unlawful-purpose conviction must be vacated due to the acquittals of the other charges. 

In the unpublished portion of the opinion, the court addresses defendant's argument regarding his sentence.

Under the circumstances presented here, sentencing counsel was not constitutionally ineffective because her performance was not deficient.

Under the facts as presented in this case, charity care is not an unconstitutional “per se” physical taking of private property without just compensation. It does not grant an affirmative right of access to occupy hospitals; it does not give away or physically set aside hospital property for the government or a third party; and it does not deprive hospitals of all economically beneficial use of their property. Charity care is also not an unconstitutional “regulatory” taking of private property without just compensation. That is due to the highly regulated nature of the hospital industry and the legislatively declared paramount public interest that the charity care program serves. Hospitals remain free to challenge their annual subsidy allocations through administrative channels and to lobby the Legislature to make policy changes that would address more broadly the concerns they raise. But the charity care program does not run afoul of the Takings Clause, and the Court therefore affirms the Appellate Division’s judgment, as modified.

     In this appeal, the court was asked to consider whether plaintiff, a municipal court administrator, is an employee of the Administrative Office of the Courts (AOC), thereby allowing her to assert a claim against the AOC under the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination, N.J.S.A. 10:5-1 to -49.  Following the court's review of various statutes and court rules, it concluded that if the Legislature had intended municipal court administrators to be considered employees of the AOC, it could have expressly done so.  Instead, the Legislature enacted N.J.S.A. 2B:12-10(a), specifically establishing that municipalities "shall provide for an administrator" of municipal courts and pay "their compensation."  Moreover, N.J.S.A. 2B:12-1(a) provides "[e]very municipality shall establish a municipal court," not the AOC.  Although the AOC provides certain oversight and supervision of municipal courts, that does not equate with the AOC establishing an employer-employee relationship with plaintiff.

The Court views N.J.S.A. 40A:7-12 to require a planning board to independently evaluate the merits of a deannexation petition and make an objective recommendation to the municipality’s governing body. That did not occur in this case. Plaintiffs met their burden of proof with respect to all three prongs of N.J.S.A. 40A:7-12.1, and the trial court properly ordered deannexation.

Under N.J.R.E. 406, evidence of a specific, repeated, and regular business habit or practice, whether corroborated or not, would have  been admissible to establish a rebuttable presumption that Altice had acted in conformity with that habit or practice. But here, Altice produced insufficient evidence of such habit or practice. And because there is no proof that Altice emailed plaintiff the critical customer service agreement, the Court does not reach whether there exists mutual assent to waive a jury trial and arbitrate the dispute.