Published Appellate Court Opinions

Appellant was serving a life sentence imposed in 1979 for murder, and a consecutive four-year term of incarceration imposed in 2003, for a 2001 drug offense committed during his incarceration. When appellant became parole eligible, the Parole Board aggregated his sentences pursuant to N.J.S.A. 30:4-123.51(h), denied appellant parole, and imposed a 240-month future eligibility term (FET).

The Legislature amended N.J.S.A. 30:4-123.53, promulgating a new standard for parole eligibility for offenses committed after August 18, 1997. Prior to the amendment, the Board could deny parole release if it appeared from a preponderance of the evidence that there is a substantial likelihood the inmate will commit a crime under the laws of this State if released on parole at such time. Following the amendment, the parole eligibility standard changed and now states the Board may deny parole where it appears by a preponderance of the evidence the inmate has failed to cooperate in his or her own rehabilitation or that there is a reasonable expectation the inmate will violate conditions of parole if released on parole at that time

The question on appeal is what standard for parole eligibility should apply where a parole eligible inmate is serving sentences for offenses committed before and after the effective date of the statute promulgating the new standard. The court holds the new standard does not apply to parole determinations for inmates eligible for parole who are serving sentences entered prior to August 18, 1997. The Board must determine parole eligibility for such inmates by considering the pre-amendment standard.

The court remanded the matter to the Board to reconsider its decision applying the proper standard. The court also directed the Board to correlate its findings with the length of the FET imposed, considering the sentence for the 2001 offense, which drew the lengthy FET, was just four years.

In this tax foreclosure matter, defendant, U.S. Bank-Cust/Sass Muni VI DTR (U.S. Bank), a large tax lien investment fund, appeals from final judgment and an order denying its motion to vacate final judgment. U.S. Bank had previously obtained ownership of real property by foreclosing on a tax sale certificate, and then failed to pay property taxes. The Chancery Division granted the opposed motion for final judgment without affording the requested oral argument or providing a cogent reason to deny argument. U.S. Bank thus was not told when final judgment would be entered, which would also end its redemption period. Because oral argument was not provided, the court reverses.

Defendant is charged with second degree unlawful possession of a handgun and related charges. The trial court granted defendant's motion to suppress the physical evidence without conducting an evidentiary hearing or considering oral argument from counsel. This court granted the State's motion for leave to appeal and now reverses the trial court's ruling. Pursuant to Rule 3:5-7(c), "[i]f material facts are disputed, testimony thereon shall be taken in open court." When the material facts are contested, the parties must be given the opportunity to probe the veracity of the State's witnesses.

After allegedly rejecting a recommended thirty-year NERA term and entering an open plea to a nine-count indictment, defendant Lewis Hooper was sentenced to sixty years in State prison, forty-four of which were to be served without parole. He appeals his sentence and the denial of his motion to withdraw his open plea after sentencing based on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.

Because defendant established a prima facie case of ineffective assistance of counsel, we conclude the trial court erred when it refused to consider defendant's claim merely because it was raised in conjunction with a motion to withdraw his plea after sentencing and not in a PCR proceeding. In this case, there was no good reason for the trial court to have insisted that defendant file an appeal and then a petition for PCR in order to have his ineffective assistance claim heard, instead of hearing it along with defendant's Slater motion

We also vacate defendant's sentence on account of the court's failure to address the Yarbough factors after determining to impose an extended-term sentence and remand for resentencing, if necessary, following the hearing on defendant's motion to withdraw his plea.

A dispute over the termination of a tenured public school janitor is subject to arbitration under the jurisdiction of the Commissioner of Education and not the Public Employment Relations commission, even if a collective negotiations agreement dictated the length of service required to attain tenure.

Plaintiff ex-wife appeals from post-judgment orders denying her application for a QDRO payable to plaintiff from defendant's ERISA protected annuity funds to enforce unpaid counsel fee, expert fee, and tuition reimbursement awards. She also appeals from the denial of enforcement of counsel fee judgments by an enhanced wage garnishment. The court reverses, finding the counsel fees, expert fees, and tuition reimbursement related to child support or property distribution, and enforcement of those awards by a QDRO payable to plaintiff did not violate ERISA's anti-alienation provision. The counsel fee judgments were also enforceable by an enhanced wage garnishment to the extent they related to an underlying support obligation

The Education Law Center, a non-profit organization, was found to have standing to appeal the Commissioner of Education's final decisions approving increases in enrollment and the expansion of physical plants for seven Newark charter schools.The panel held that even in former Abbott districts, it is the district that bears the burden of demonstrating that charter school funding will prevent delivery of a thorough and efficient education. Furthermore, the panel decided the Commissioner's interpretation of the relevant regulation authorized the grant of approval for expansions that would require satellite campuses, in as yet undetermined locations.charter schools.

In State v. Witt, 223 N.J. 409, 415 (2015), the Supreme Court revised the standards under New Jersey law governing police searches of motor vehicles that have been lawfully stopped at the roadside. The Court held such roadside searches may be conducted without a warrant if: (1) the police have probable cause to believe the vehicle contains evidence of criminal activity; and (2) the situation arose from unforeseeable and spontaneous circumstances. Id. at 446-48.

The appellate court declines to engraft upon Witt a limitation that would disallow such otherwise-permissible roadside searches in situations where the police have a basis to tow away and impound the vehicle. Consequently, the trial court's suppression order that was founded upon such a rationale is reversed. Moreover, there was no unreasonable delay in this case by the officers in making their decision to proceed with the search at the scene based on probable cause.

This dispute concerns the allowable scope of negotiations for employee contributions to health care and prescription coverage (collectively health insurance) costs in accordance with L. 2011, c. 78, §§ 39 and 41 (Chapter 78), codified at N.J.S.A. 52:14-17.28c and N.J.S.A. 18A:16-17.1. Chapter 78 prescribed health insurance contribution rates for public employees over a four-year period beginning July 1, 2011 and ending June 30, 2015, at gradually increasing rates designated Tier 1, Tier 2, Tier 3 and Tier 4.

Petitioner Ridgefield Park Education Association appealed the scope of negotiations ruling by the Public Employment Relations Commission (PERC) in favor of respondent Ridgefield Park Board of Education, that Chapter 78 preempted the terms of the parties' collective negotiations agreement (CNA) for the period July 1, 2014 to June 30, 2018, such that the Association members were required to contribute at the Tier 4 rate throughout the remaining three years of the 2014-2018 CNA and not just for the first year – July 1, 2014 - June 30, 2015. The court reverses the final agency decision because under the circumstances presented PERC's interpretation of Chapter 78 is contrary to the Legislature's intent since it creates the absurd result of a financial hardship of having Association members contribute at the Tier 4 level for three additional years. The court further remands the matter to PERC to fashion and implement an appropriate remedy within sixty days to refund Association members their health insurance contributions that were improperly deducted.

The court affirmed defendant's burglary and criminal mischief convictions, rejecting his contentions, raised as plain error, regarding the court's jury instructions and police witnesses' identification-related testimony. The court also rejected defendant's argument that he must be resentenced because of a breakdown in his relationship with his trial counsel. Although a defendant is entitled to conflict-free representation, the court holds that he may not profit from undermining his attorney-client relationship through his own abusive or threatening conduct. Despite defendant's insults and threats, defense counsel wished to proceed, as did defendant. The court discerned no basis for resentencing.

Regulations adopted by the Department of Banking and Insurance to implement the provisions of the Health Claims Authorization, Processing and Payment Act (HCAPPA), L. 2005, c. 352 (codified as amended in various sections of titles 17, 17B, and 26 of the New Jersey Statutes Annotated), are valid because: HCAPPA permits payers to obtain reimbursement of overpayments of claims paid, including claims under "stand-alone" or "dental-only" plans, and allows payers to offset overpayments to a provider against future claims the provider submits for other persons

At issue in this appeal is an arbitration clause of a contract for work performed by a general contractor to implement an energy services program for a school district. The arbitration clause provided disputes "may be settled by binding arbitration." In that respect, it conflicted with a request for proposals for the contract and another prior agreement between the parties for the same project, both of which mandated litigation of disputes in a judicial forum.

The court concludes the terms of the arbitration clause, when read in pari materia with the mandatory governing law provisions of the prior documents between the parties are permissive and not mandatory. Accordingly, the court affirms the Law Division order enjoining and dismissing the arbitration proceedings filed by defendant.

The panel publishes this opinion at the Supreme Court's request. Trucking companies registered with the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration, subject to the Truth in Leasing regulations, 49 C.F.R. pt. 376, in conjunction with the Motor Carrier Act, 49 U.S.C. §§ 13901, 13902, 14102, and 14704, are required to have lease agreements in place with independent drivers enumerating all deductions taken from their pay. The Truth in Leasing requirements apply even if the trucking company retains a third party to manage payments to drivers and to manage delivery paperwork. The trucking company's purpose in contracting the functions to a third party was to avoid the perception it was the drivers' employer, and to maintain the drivers' status as independent contractors. The trucking company alone, however, scheduled deliveries. That the trucks were "leased," to the third party was inconsequential so long as the trucking company retained exclusive control over the shipping schedule.

The majority further found that defendant's failure to raise a new fact-sensitive argument to the trial judge, based on records not available to the trial court, precluded the issue from being considered on appeal. Judge Accurso dissented on that point.

In this insurance coverage dispute, the court interprets a homeowner's insurance policy's water-damage exclusion. The court holds that damage caused by a water-main break under a public street, which released water that flowed down a driveway into plaintiff's first-floor apartment, was not excluded as a loss caused by "flood," "surface water," or "water below the surface of the ground." Therefore, the court reverses the trial court's order granting summary judgment dismissal of the homeowner's complaint for coverage, and remands for further proceedings.

In this post-conviction relief appeal, defendant asserts he was denied his right to represent himself under Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975). Defendant timely, clearly, and unequivocally asserted his right to represent himself, orally and in writing, but the court failed to rule on it. Defendant claims he believed his request was denied, and proceeded to trial with counsel. The PCR court denied relief, concluding defendant waived his right to represent himself. On appeal, the court holds that a defendant may, by conduct, waive a previously asserted right to represent himself, but the evidence must clearly demonstrate that the defendant intentionally relinquished the known right of self-representation. Proof that defendant went to trial with counsel is, on its own, insufficient proof of waiver. The court remands for an evidentiary hearing on whether defendant waived his right to represent himself

The Appellate Division held that when a municipality violates the beach fee statute, N.J.S.A. 40:61-22.20, by charging unreasonable beach fees, that violation constitutes the deprivation of a substantive civil right under the New Jersey Civil Rights Act (CRA), and a successful plaintiff is entitled to counsel fees. However, because the CRA requires the violation of an unambiguous, specific statutory or constitutional provision, most of the conduct plaintiffs proved in this case, while wrongful, did not establish CRA violations or entitle them to counsel fees.

In these three similar matters, appellants were involuntarily held for longer than the law permits prior to entry of a temporary commitment order. By the time their motions to vacate could be heard, they were discharged from confinement; the trial judge thus denied the motions on mootness grounds. In these appeals, which were consolidated, the court held that, even if appellants' motions were technically moot because they had been released, they were entitled to a ruling on the merits because of the significant liberty interests at stake and because such occurrences were capable of repetition yet likely to evade review.

The court holds that where N.J.S.A. 19:23-22.4 requires that sample primary ballots be printed in Spanish and English, the official primary ballots, including mail-in ballots, must also be printed in Spanish and English.

In this action arising out of the alleged breach of a home improvement contract, a Law Division judge granted defendants' belated motion for discovery sanctions. The court barred plaintiffs from presenting expert testimony or evidence of damages at trial, resulting in the involuntary dismissal of plaintiffs' case. Defendants filed the motion in disregard of discovery rules requiring them to file the motion before the discovery end date, certify they had made a good faith effort to obtain the delinquent discovery, and certify they were not delinquent in their discovery obligations. In addition, defendants had never demanded expert reports in discovery.

On appeal, the court vacated the discovery sanction and dismissal orders. The court held that a trial court abuses its discretion by effectively barring claims as a discovery sanction without explaining its reasons for overlooking the discovery rules intended to assure uniformity and fairness in such matters.

Affirming the grant of summary judgment dismissing the plaintiff-insurer's subrogation action, the court broadly interprets the waiver-of-subrogation provisions of a widely used American Institute of Architects (AIA) form construction contract. The court relies on the contract's plain language, the majority view of other states' courts, and the evident goal to transfer the risk of construction-related losses to insurers and preclude lawsuits among contracting parties. In particular, the court rejects the insurer's argument that the subrogation waiver was limited to damages to the "Work" incurred during construction. Rather, the subrogation waiver extended to claims related to damages to property outside the Work, incurred after completion, because the insurance the owner obtained to comply with the contract also provided coverage for those damages.