Published Tax Court Opinions

Tax Court: Anita K. Leather v. Director, Division of Taxation, Docket No. 000852-2018; opinion by Sundar, J.T.C., decided October 23, 2019. For plaintiff – Anita Leather (Self-Represented); for defendant – Gurbir S. Grewal, ttorney General of New Jersey (Miles Eckardt, Deputy Attorney General).

Held: Defendant’s motion for summary judgment seeking dismissal of plaintiff’s complaint challenging the assessment of New Jersey gross income tax (“GIT”) is enied. Although legally obtained Department of Veterans Affairs (“VA”) disability benefits are exempt from GIT, if such benefits are fraudulently obtained, as plaintiff’s ex-husband did during tax years 2000-2009 when plaintiff and he were married and filed joint tax returns, then the benefits are subject to GIT under N.J.S.A. 54A:5-1(o) as income from a criminal act. As defendant assessed plaintiff after the normal three-year statute of limitations had expired, for suspension of the same and for the assessment to stand, the returns subject to assessment must have been “false or fraudulent” and “filed with an intent to evade tax.” N.J.S.A. 54A:9-4(c)(1)(B). Such intent must be evinced by “conduct intended to conceal, mislead, or otherwise prevent the administration and collection of the taxes imposed by the laws of this State.” N.J.A.C. 18:2-2.9(b); 2.9(d). The facts in support of defendant’s summary judgment motion only show that plaintiff did not know that her then-husband’s VA benefits were obtained by fraud, or whether the benefits were includable as income, and that she reported the benefits to the CPA who prepared the GIT returns. Defendant however presented no evidence to prove that plaintiff filed a false or fraudulent GIT return for tax years 2000-2009 with an intent to evade tax that was known to be due. The statute of limitations thus acts to bar granting summary judgment as a matter of law. The lack of evidence in support of an intent to evade tax similarly means that defendant is not entitled to summary judgment with respect to the 50% civil fraud penalty imposed on plaintiff. Because summary judgment is denied on statutory grounds, there is no need to address plaintiff’s equitable argument that she should be afforded “innocent spouse relief” like that available under the I.R.C. § 6015.

Tax Court: EGDC C/O AM Resurg Mgmt v. Rutherford Borough, Docket Nos. 004521- 2012, 002730-2013, 002112-2014, 003453-2015, 003586-2016, 003546-2017; opinion by Orsen, J.T.C., decided October 16, 2019. For plaintiff — Amber N. Heinze (Irwin & Heinze, P.A., attorneys); for defendant — Kenneth A. Porro (Chasan, Lamparello, Mallon & Cappuzzo, P.C., attorneys).

Plaintiff, EGDC C / O AM Resurg Mgmt, sought property tax relief for the 2012 through 2017 years.Defendant, Rutherford Borough, filed a motion for partial summary judgment seeking entry of an order determining that plaintiff’ s properties be valued as a single economic unit along with two other properties owned by a third party.Defendant maintained that a reciprocal easement agreement executed between the parties created a unity of use and unity of ownership between all of the parcels.The court determined that the agreement failed to show a unity of use between the parcels. Moreover, the court found that the agreement did not create a unity of ownership or beneficial ownership between the separate owners of the parcels.Accordingly, the court denied defendant’ s motion for partial summary judgment for the parcels to be treated as a single economic unit.

Tax Court: City of Newark v. Twp. of Jefferson, Docket Nos. 006324-2016, 007392-2015, 007399-2015, 007940-2014, 007937-2014; City of Newark c / o NWCDC v.Twp.of Jefferson, Docket Nos.006324 - 2016,007392 - 2015; City of Newark c / o Newark Watershed Corp.v.Twp.of Jefferson,Docket Nos.005970 - 2012, 005969 - 2012; City of Newark c/o Newark Watershed v.Twp.of Jefferson, Docket Nos.005555 - 2011, 008214 - 2010, 008215 - 2010; Newark Watershed Corp.v.Twp.of Jefferson;Docket Nos.013604 - 2009, 013606 - 2009, 013601 - 2009;opinion by Bianco, J.T.C., decided October 3, 2019. For plaintiff– Philip Elberg(Medvin & Elberg, attorneys);for defendants - Lawrence P.Cohen(Lavery, Selvaggi, Abromitis & Cohen, P.C., attorneys).

Held: The court affirmed the assessments of the subject property, awatershed, rejecting both the plaintiff’ s and defendant’s expert appraisers’ respective conclusions of value under the Sales Comparison Approach.The court also rejected plaintiff’ s expert appraiser’s conclusion that the highest and best use of the subject property was timber harvesting as unsupported since the expert appraiser could not find one sale of land in New Jersey that was soldfor timbering purposes.Plaintiff’ s expert appraiser further failedto show comparability between the heavily wooded and deed - restrictedsubject property in northern New Jersey and proposed comparable sales of deed - restricted farmland in southern New Jersey.The court alsorejected defendant’ s expert appraiser’ s proposed comparable sales of deed - restricted properties to not - for -profit corporations and public entities, given that he made no adjustments for the differences in the restrictions between those proposed comparables and the subject property.

This opinion decides whether the mobile baking pan racks (“Racks”) used by plaintiff in its business of manufacturing baked products are subject to use tax. The amount of tax in dispute is $19,319.65 (exclusive of interest and penalties). Plaintiff claims that the Racks are indispensable to the manufacturing process, and therefore, are exempt under N.J.S.A. 54:32-8.13(a), which statute exempts from tax (sales or use), receipts from sales of “machinery, apparatus, or equipment” (hereinafter “MAE”) which is used or consumed “directly and primarily in the production of tangible personal property by manufacturing, processing, assembling or refining.” Defendant claims that the exemption does not apply to the Racks because they are trolleys akin to dollies, used for the convenience of plaintiff to manually transport the to-be-baked products from one area to another since they are too heavy to be carted or carried by foot.

Tax Court: NJ DEP/UFT c/o Cream Ridge Golf, LLC v. Twp of Upper FreeholdDocket No. 007457-2017; opinion by Gilmore, J.T.C., decided July 26, 2019. For plaintiff Cream Ridge Golf, LLC – Katherine B. Galdieri (The Kelly Firm, PC, attorneys); for plaintiff NJ DEP/UFT – Jamie M. Zug (Gurbir S. Grewal, Attorney General of New Jersey, attorney); for defendant – Dennis Anthony Collins (Collins, Vella and Casello, LLC, attorneys).

For-profit taxpayer/operator of State-owned golf course sought exemption from local property taxes for the subject property, which includes a golf course, pro shop, driving range, restaurant, and maintenance buildings. NJ DEP/UFT joined action in support of exemption. Taxpayer moved for summary judgment and the defendant, Township of Upper Freehold opposed. Held: Operation of State-owned golf course by for-profit entity furthers public purpose of development of lands by the State for recreational purposes. Operation of restaurant by for-profit entity on State-owned property supports primary recreational purpose of the subject property. Requirement under RFP, operation agreement, and lease agreement for payment of property taxes does not preclude application of local property exemption. Application for local property tax exemption subsequent to NJ DEP/UFT’s RFP procedure and entering into operation agreement is not in violation of public bidding laws or the square corners doctrine. The subject property qualifies for local property tax exemption under N.J.S.A. 54:4-3.3, 2.3, and 1.10.

Tax Court: 160 Chubb Props., LLC v. Twp. of Lyndhurst

Docket Nos.002442-2014; 006305-2015; opinion by Orsen, J.T.C., decided May31, 2019. For plaintiff – Joseph G. Ragno and Robert J. Guanci(Waters, McPherson, McNeill, P.C., attorneys); for defendant –Kenneth A. Porro (Chasan Lamparello Mallon & Cappuzzo, P.C.,attorneys).

Following the court’s decision in 160 Chubb Props., LLC v. Twp. of Lyndhurst, 30 N.J. Tax 613 (Tax 2018), defendant, Township of Lyndhurst, moved for reconsideration, primarily based on the same arguments presented in its opposition to plaintiff’s original motion for relief under the Freeze Act, namely, that increased tenant occupancy; the cost of work to be performed under construction permits; and the sales price of the property, demonstrate prima facie that a substantial and meaningful change in value occurred between the base year 2015 and freeze year 2017, warranting a plenary hearing. Defendant’s only new arguments alleged that plaintiff, 160 Chubb Properties, LLC, had no legal standing to file the Freeze Act motion, and by granting Freeze Act relief for the 2017 tax year, the subsequent owner of the property received a “windfall.” The court found that a motion for reconsideration is not meant to re-litigate issues already decided or otherwise award a proverbial ‘second bite at the apple’ to a dissatisfied litigant. The court also found that defendant ignored the reality that it is the new owner, and not plaintiff, asserting entitlement to Freeze Act relief. Because the 2015 base year judgment caption identifies plaintiff as 160 Chubb Properties, LLC, the new owner was required under R. 8:7(d) to adopt this caption for purposes of making the Freeze Act application. The court additionally found that the new owner not only has standing to seek relief under the Freeze Act, but is entitled to invoke its protections. The court determined that defendant’s “windfall” argument does not represent the legislative intent of the Freeze Act, since the Freeze Act is a legislatively conferred right that attaches to ownership. Accordingly, the court denied defendant’s motion for reconsideration.

Tax Court: Valerie Shedlock and Judith Solan, Coexecutors of the Estate of Anthony Calleo v. Dir., Div. of Taxation,

Docket No.008644-2018; opinion by Bianco, J.T.C., decided April 30, 2019.For plaintiffs – Stephen L. Klein (Law Office of Stephen L. Klein,attorney); for defendant – Miles Eckardt (Gurbir S. Grewal,Attorney General of New Jersey, attorney).

Plaintiffs, Valerie Shedlock and Judith Solan (“Heirs”), moved to invalidate defendant’s notice of assessment and seek a refund of taxes, and interest paid, and costs of suit. The Heirs argued that defendant erroneously included the real property located at 270 Farnham Avenue, Lodi, New Jersey (“Subject Property”) as a taxable asset of the estate of the Anthony Calleo (“Decedent”) for inheritance tax purposes. Defendant, Director of the Division of Taxation (“Director”), moved to dismiss the complaint with prejudice claiming that, the transfer of the Subject Property was intended to take effect upon the Decedent’s death, and is therefore subject to the inheritance tax. The court determined that the motives of the Decedent were inconsequential where the transfer of a property was made more than three years prior to the decedent’s death. The court further determined that because the Decedent transferred and conveyed his right, title and interest in the Subject Property more than three years before death, the transfer was not intended to take effect at or after the Decedent’s death. Therefore, the Heirs’ motion to invalidate the Director’s notice of assessment and refund taxes and interest paid was granted. However, the Heirs’ demand for costs of suit was denied.

Tax Court: VNO 1105 State Hwy 36, L.L.C., by Stop & Shop v.Township of Hazlet,;

Docket Nos. 004038-2013; 008116-2014; 007353-2015; 002076-2016; 003935-2017; opinion by Sundar, J.T.C., decided April 2, 2019. For plaintiff - David B. Wolfe and Eileen Toll (Skoloff & Wolfe, P.C., attorneys); for defendant - James H. Gorman; for New Jersey Division of Taxation and Monmouth County Board of Taxation - Michelline Capistrano Foster (Gurbir S. Grewal,Attorney General of New Jersey, attorney).

Held: Defendant’s motion in limine to bar testimony and report of plaintiff’s proffered expert witness, an assessor in another taxing district, Township of Wall, is granted. The court’s conclusion is based on an application of the underlying principles and provisions of the Local Government Ethics Law (which apply to assessors), which are echoed in the various published guidelines for assessors, including in N.J.A.C. 18:12A-1.9(l), and 18:17- 4.1(a)(3), all of which emphasize the importance of an assessor avoiding any engagement in a private capacity that will reasonably be considered as improper or would impair the integrity of his/her office and position as assessor. An assessor, as a face of the government, and quasi-legislative agent of the State, is expected to possess and exercise high standards of ethics, professionalism, and public responsibility. As such, there is a public expectation that an assessor would not challenge or support challenges to local property tax assessments set by another assessor. Here, Wall Township assessor’s appearance in support of plaintiff taxpayer’s challenge to defendant assessor’s assessments raises such concerns. The court can control the type and nature of testimony to be proffered, and also decide whether the individual being proffered as a witness can be accepted since it can proceed in any manner compatible with R. 1:1-2(a).

Tax Court: Mitchell Medoff v. Dir., Div. of Tax’n;. Docket No. 009867-2018, opinion by Cimino, J.T.C., decided March 1, 2019. For plaintiff - David S. Neufel and Jeremy S. Cole (Flaster Greenberg, attorneys); for defendant – Ramanjit K. Chawla (Gurbir S. Grewal, Attorney General of New Jersey, attorney).

In 2009, the Legislature amended the law to tax lottery winnings. Previously, such winnings were free from income tax. Plaintiff paid taxes from 2009 through 2012 on installments from a 1993 prize. After the Tax Court’s decisions in 2016 holding the 2009 law invalid as it applied to prizes won prior to its enactment, plaintiff sought a refund. The refund was sought outside the three year statute of limitations imposed on Gross Income Tax refunds.

Even if a tax provision is found to be invalid, a refund can only be allowed in accordance with statute. Plaintiff could have filed a timely request for refund as did the lottery winners in the 2016 decisions invalidating the retroactive application of the 2009 law. There is not any equitable basis such as square corners or manifest injustice to override the statute of limitations in this case.

Tax Court: Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Dir., Div. of Taxation, Docket No. 008305-2007, opinion by Sundar, J.T.C., decided February 27, 2019. For plaintiff – Craig B. Fields and Mitchell A. Newmark (Morrison & Foerster, L.L.P., attorneys); for defendant – Marlene G. Brown and Joseph Palumbo (Gurbir S. Grewal, Attorney General of New Jersey, attorney).

Held: Defendant did not reasonably and fairly exercise its discretion in deeming only a portion of the royalty expenses paid by plaintiff to its subsidiary as excepted from the addback requirements simply because subsidiary paid a smaller amount of corporation business tax (“CBT”) based on its New Jersey allocation factor which was lower than plaintiff’s New Jersey allocation factor. Where the subsidiary included the entire amount of the royalties as its income, and paid CBT on its allocated portion, and defendant did not dispute the validity of either plaintiff’s or the subsidiary’s allocation factor, the difference in their respective allocation factors, does not, without more, mean that plaintiff established that only a partial addback of the royalty payments was unreasonable. Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment is granted.

Tax Court: Verizon New Jersey, Inc. v. Hopewell Borough Docket Number 12215-2009; opinion by Brennan, J.T.C., decided January 28,2019. For plaintiff – Susan A. Feeney and Farhan Ali (McCarter & English, LLP, attorneys); for defendant – Joseph C. Tauriello,attorney.

Following the court’s decision in Verizon New Jersey, Inc. v.Hopewell Borough, 26 N.J. Tax 400 (Tax 2012), the parties proceeded to trial to resolve the definition of the statutory term “local telephone exchange” and for a determination as to whether plaintiff provided 51% of the dial tone and access for the Hopewell Telephone Exchange, as of January 1, 2008. The Tax Court defined “local telephone exchange” as being a geographic area as depicted on the exchange maps filed with Verizon’s tariff. The court also found that having adopted this definition of a “local telephone exchange,” Verizon continued to furnish in excess of 51% of the dial tone and access in the Hopewell Telephone Exchange as of January 1, 2008. The Tax Court affirmed the imposition of the business personal property tax pursuant to N.J.S.A. 54:4-1 for tax year 2009.

Tax Court: Abdul M. Momoh-Oare v. Dir., Div. of Taxation, Docket No. 013111-2016; opinion by Gilmore, J.T.C., decided January 28,2019. For plaintiff – Abdul M. Momoh-Oare (Pro se); for defendant – Steven J. Colby (Gurbir S. Grewal, Attorney General of New Jersey, attorney).

A resident taxpayer challenged imposition of New Jersey sales tax on his in-state purchase of a motor vehicle, alleging that his export of the vehicle to Nigeria exempted the transaction from state sales tax. Taxpayer moved for summary judgment and the Director, Division of Taxation cross-moved for summary judgment. Held: Taxpayer’s purchase did not qualify for exemption from sales tax on motor vehicle purchases under New Jersey statutes or regulations, and imposition of sales tax in this matter did not violate the Import-Export Clause of the United States Constitution, art. I, § 10, cl. 2. Therefore, the court denied taxpayer’s motion for summary judgment, and granted the Director, Division of Taxation’s cross-motion for summary judgment denying taxpayer’s refund claim and dismissing the complaint.

Tax Court: Barbara J. Hertz v. Borough of Lincoln Park,, Docket No. 009897-2017; opinion by Bianco, J.T.C., decided January 8, 2019.or plaintiff – Barbara J. Hertz (pro se); for defendant – Jacquelin P. Gioioso (The Buzak Law Group, LLC, attorneys).

.Plaintiff, Barbara J. Hertz, appealed to the denial of her 2017 Farmland Assessment application on her property. Defendant, borough of Lincoln Park, sought affirmation of the denial by the Morris County Board of Taxation. For the reasons that follow, the court determined that plaintiff failed to establish that “not less than five acres of the property are . . . actively devoted to agricultural or horticultural use” as required for Farmland Assessment under N.J.S.A. 54:4-23.2. First, the court found that most of her alleged “crops” appear to be naturally occurring growth in a forest setting and determined that the haphazard and uncared for use of land does not necessarily qualify the land for farmland assessment. Second, the court determined that plaintiff failed to prove that the unused area of the Subject Property is “beneficial to the property” under N.J.A.C. 18:15-6.2. Third, the court determined that plaintiff’s land measurements were unreliable and unverifiable; and, her testimony was not credible, contradictory,and self-serving. Lastly, the court determined that the municipal tax assessor fulfilled his statutory obligation to address plaintiff’s application for Farmland Assessment. Therefore, the court affirmed the judgment of the Morris County Board of Taxation denying plaintiff’s 2017 Farmland Assessment application for the plaintiff’s property

Tax Court: Arthur G. Nevins, JR. and Amanda Nevins v. Dir., Div.of Taxation,Docket No. 013075-2015; opinion by Bianco, J.T.C., decided January 8, 2019. For plaintiffs – Arthur G. Nevins, Jr.(pro se); for defendant – Abiola G. Miles (Gurbir S. Grewal,Attorney General of New Jersey, attorneys). Plaintiffs, Arthur G. Nevins, JR. and Amanda Nevins, moved to annul defendant’s final determination with regard to their 2008 New Jersey gross income tax. They argued that the defendant failed to timely assess the tax within the three-year limitations period under N.J.S.A. 54A:9-4(a). Defendant, the Director of the Division of Taxation (“Director”), moved to dismiss the complaint with prejudice claiming that exceptions to the statute of limitations under N.J.S.A. 54A:9-4(c) apply. The court determined that the general three-year statute of limitations period is not implicated as the amount of tax voluntarily reported as due by plaintiffs on their self-processed return is assessed on the date of filing of the return. The court also determined that a notice of deficiency is not required to be issued for self-assessed taxes. Lastly, the court ruled that the Director had the authority to assess the plaintiffs’ 2008 gross income tax at any time under N.J.S.A. 54A:9- 4(c)(1)(C), because plaintiffs did not appropriately report the changes made by the Internal Revenue Service to the Division of Taxation according to N.J.S.A. 54A:8-7. Therefore, the court granted the Director’s motion for summary judgment to dismiss the complaint with prejudice and affirmed the Director’s final determination.

Tax Court: 160 Chubb Properties, LLC v. Township of Lyndhurst, Docket Nos. 002442-2014, 006305-2015; opinion by Orsen, J.T.C., decided December 14, 2018. For plaintiff – Joseph G. Ragno and Robert J. Guanci (Waters, McPherson, McNeill, P.C., attorneys); for defendant – Kenneth A. Porro (Chasan, Lamparello, Mallon & Cappuzzo, P.C., attorneys).

Plaintiff, 160 Chubb Properties, LLC, sought relief under N.J.S.A. 54:51A-8 (“Freeze Act”) for the 2017 tax year based on the settled and adjudged tax assessment for the 2015 base tax year. Defendant, Township of Lyndhurst, opposed application of the Freeze Act for the 2017 tax year arguing that plaintiff waived Freeze Act protection under the settlement agreement. Defendant also sought a plenary hearing arguing that plaintiff performed improvements to the property precluding Freeze Act relief. The court determined that the Freeze Act applies unless the taxpayer affirmatively waives its application. The court found that the settlement agreement did not contain an affirmative waiver, nor was any evidence offered that plaintiff agreed to limit Freeze Act protection. The court also found that defendant was not entitled to a plenary hearing since it did not make a prima facie showing that a substantial and meaningful change in value occurred to the property. The court determined that defendant’s bare allegations of increased tenant occupancy; the cost of work to be performed under construction permits; and the sales price of the property were insufficient to demonstrate a change in value. Accordingly, the court granted plaintiff’s motion to apply the Freeze Act to the 2017 tax year assessment.

Tax Court: ADP Vehicle Registration, Inc. v. Director, Div., of Taxation; Docket No. 014946-2014, opinion by Nugent, J.T.C., decided on December 11, 2018. For plaintiff – Hollis L. Hyans, admitted pro hac vice (Morrison & Foerster, L.L.P., attorneys; Steven T. Rappoport, on the briefs); for defendant – Marlene G. Brown (Gurbir S. Grewal, Attorney General of New Jersey, attorney).

The court grants plaintiff (“Taxpayer”) partial summary judgment reversing defendant’s (“Taxation”) decision to tax 100% of Taxpayer’s income, finding Taxpayer maintained a Regular Place of Business (RPOB) outside of New Jersey, as defined by N.J.A.C. 18:7-7.2. Taxpayer was a wholly-owned subsidiary of ADP, Inc., that claimed to operate as a California holding company conducting no activity, and whose sole asset was an 80% partnership interest in a California general partnership with offices in that State that operated a computerized vehicle registration service nationwide. In its analysis, the court focused on the partnership’s business due to the unitary nature of the two entities. The parties’ dispute centered on interpretation of the RPOB regulation where Taxpayer argued the language therein did not constitute a list of absolute requirements to be met, contrary to Taxation’s strict interpretation. Based on the plain language of the regulation coupled with precedent that applied an objective standard to the RPOB analysis, the court found Taxpayer’s argument to be more persuasive. On that basis, the court concluded that Taxpayer maintained an RPOB outside of the State entitling Taxpayer to apportion income away from New Jersey, pursuant to N.J.S.A. 54:10A-6.

Patricia A. Doherty & The Estate Of James Robert Doherty, Jr. v. Director, Division of Taxation, Docket No. 011661-2016; opinion by Cimino, J.T.C., decided August 17, 2018. For plaintiff - Robert E. Salad (Cooper,Levenson, attorneys); for defendant – Ramanjit K. Chawla (GurbirS. Grewal, Attorney General of New Jersey, attorney). Under the Gross Income Tax (GIT) Act, a resident of the State of New Jersey is taxed on 100% of income regardless of whether the income is generated in-state or out-of-state, or a combination thereof. Certain credits are allowed against taxes assessed on SCorporation income allocated to other states so long as that income is not allocated to New Jersey. Taxpayers sought a credit not only against income allocated to Pennsylvania, but also income allocated to New Jersey because Pennsylvania had allocated a greater share of the income to itself. Taxpayers’ argument was that New Jersey would still receive its share of taxes for income allocated to New Jersey since the Pennsylvania rate is lower. The Legislature set forth a method of credit calculation that plainly precludes a credit against income allocated to New Jersey.The Legislature did not intend to cede its authority to determine the method of allocation of income to Pennsylvania. As a result,taxpayers are only entitled to a credit for taxes that are not allocated to New Jersey in accordance with the allocation determined by New Jersey law.

Ronald Bentz v. Township of Little Egg Harbor, Docket No. 009763-2017; opinion by Sundar, J.T.C., decided July 25, 2018. For plaintiff – Ronald Bentz, Self-Represented; for defendant - Robin La Bue (Gilmore & Monahan P.A., attorneys); for intervenor, Director, Division of Taxation – Stephen J. Colby (Attorney General of New Jersey, attorney).

Held: Plaintiff’s complaint seeking to declare N.J.S.A. 54:4- 8.10(a) as unconstitutional because it does not list the 1986 conflict in Libya as one of defined periods of “time of war” is dismissed. The principles of separation of powers prohibit the court from engrafting a conflict into N.J.S.A. 54:4-8.10(a) when it has not been specifically designated as such by the Legislature.

Borough of Red Bank v. RMC-Meridian Health, Docket Nos. 000007-2016, 000008-2018; opinion by Sundar, J.T.C., decided July 25, 2018. For plaintiff – Martin Allen and Kevin A. MacDonald (DiFrancesco Bateman, Kunzman, Davis, Lehrer & Flaum, P.C., attorneys); for defendant – Susan Feeney and Farhan Ali (McCarter & English, L.L.P., attorneys).

Held: Plaintiff thus cannot seek to impose omitted assessments on defendant’s property for two tax years under the general omitted assessment law, based on a trial court’s opinion in an unrelated litigation that an unrelated hospital, which was found to be operating for profit, is not entitled to a tax exemption. Plaintiff’s complaints are therefore dismissed.