Supreme Court Opinions

The sought-after affidavit is physical evidence of the crimes of witness tampering and kidnapping for which defendant and others have been charged. It is therefore subject to reciprocal discovery under Rule 3:3-13(b)(2)(B) and (D).

N.J.S.A. 18A:6-16 provides the basis to refer a case to arbitration but does not limit an arbitrator’s authority to impose penalties. The award here is reinstated.

Ocean Walk has not pled facts supporting a conclusion that its business losses were caused by a “direct physical loss” or “direct physical . . . damage” under the policy language. And even if Ocean Walk had pled facts supporting a finding of a covered “loss” or “damage,” the losses it alleges are excluded from coverage by the policies’ contamination exclusion.

N.J.S.A. 2C:28-5(a) is not unconstitutionally overbroad. It may, however, have been unconstitutionally applied to defendant in this case. The Court therefore vacates defendant’s witness tampering conviction, without dismissing any portion of the indictment, and remands the case for a new trial on that charge. The Court does not vacate defendant’s conviction for carjacking.

Defendant’s possessory or ownership interest in the suitcase ceased when he fled police outside Penn Station and deliberately left his suitcase behind in a public place with no evidence of anyone else’s interest in the bag. Because the State has demonstrated by a preponderance of the evidence that the suitcase was abandoned, defendant is without standing to challenge its seizure and search.

A mental state of recklessness -- defined in this context as “morally culpable conduct, involving a ‘deliberate decision to endanger another,’” Counterman v. Colorado, 600 U.S. 66, 79 (2023) -- is constitutionally sufficient for a “true threats” prosecution under N.J.S.A. 2C:12-3(a). An objective component is also necessary for a “true threats” prosecution to survive constitutional scrutiny: the State must prove that a reasonable person similarly situated to the victim would have viewed the message as threatening violence. Here, defendant was charged with terroristic threats in violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:12-3(a) and/or (b). On remand, the jury should be charged that they must unanimously agree as to whether defendant violated N.J.S.A. 2C:12-3(a), (b), or both.

The refund provision is limited in scope: N.J.S.A. 56:8-2.11 provides relief only to victims of food-related fraud as identified in Chapter 347 and does not extend to all CFA violations. Because the allegations in this matter are unrelated to misrepresentations of the “identity of food,” plaintiffs are not entitled to a full refund under N.J.S.A. 56:8-2.11.

Finding no reason to treat impermissibly suggestive events during trial preparation differently from other suggestive identification procedures, the Court extends the relevant principles in Henderson to trial preparation sessions. Witnesses who have made a prior identification should not be shown photos of the defendant during trial preparation -- neither new photos of the defendant for the first time nor, absent good reason, the same photos they previously reviewed. If a party can demonstrate a good reason to show witnesses a photo of the defendant they previously identified, the party must prepare and disclose a written record of what occurred. If, however, a witness has not previously identified a suspect, investigators can conduct an identification procedure during pretrial preparation in accordance with Henderson. A record of the procedure should be created and disclosed under Rule 3:11. Here, to determine the admissibility of the identification evidence, the Court remands to the trial court to conduct a hearing under United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967), and develop a more complete factual record.

 The judgment of the Appellate Division is affirmed substantially for the reasons expressed in Judge Smith’s opinion.  The Court agrees with the Appellate Division’s assessment that petitioner was never eligible for the exemption under N.J.S.A. 52:14-17.28d(b)(3) and that correcting the erroneous exemption was therefore proper.  Neither petitioner’s subsequent service nor his purchase in 2013 of four years of military service credit could change the fact that he did not meet the bright line drawn by the Legislature by June 28, 2011.  The Court also agrees with the Appellate Division’s determination that it was not necessary to reach the issue of equitable estoppel, and it offers additional comments on that point. 

 The judgment of the Appellate Division is affirmed substantially for the reasons expressed in Judge Gilson’s opinion. 

Keim was “in the course of employment” under the “authorized vehicle rule” at the time of the accident because Above All authorized a vehicle for him to operate and his operation of that identified vehicle was for business expressly authorized by Above All.

Defendant was in custody at the hospital in light of the police presence around her bed area.  But no interrogation or its functional equivalent occurred before her spontaneous and unsolicited admission.  Miranda warnings were therefore not required, and defendant’s statement -- that she “only had two shots prior to the crash” -- is admissible at trial.

Based on the plain language of the 2021 Amendment, the Court concurs with the trial court and Appellate Division that the Legislature did not intend to bar trial courts from considering evidence of the child’s relationship with the resource family when they address the fourth prong of N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1(a).  The trial court properly considered the relationships between the children and their resource families when it considered the fourth prong of the best interests test, N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1(a)(4), and its determination as to all four prongs of that test was grounded in substantial and credible evidence in the record. 

Daubert-based expert reliability determinations in criminal appeals will be reviewed de novo, while other expert admissibility issues are reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard.

The Court reverses the Appellate Division’s judgment because it conflicts with Lehmann v. Toys ‘R’ Us, Inc., 132 N.J. 587 (1993), and L.W. v. Toms River Regional Schools Board of Education, 189 N.J. 381 (2007). Under Lehmann, sexual touching of areas of the body linked to sexuality happens, by definition, because of sex. The Court affirms the denial of plaintiffs’ motions to amend their complaint and to obtain certain records.

In a criminal jury trial, there is a presumption that foreign language interpretation services will be provided in person, which is consistent with the New Jersey Judiciary’s longstanding practice. The Court sets forth guidelines and factors to assist trial courts in deciding whether VRI should be used during criminal jury trials, and it remands the matter for the trial court to reconsider whether VRI is appropriate in the current case after assessing those factors.

The “religious tenets” exception of N.J.S.A. 10:5-12(a) -- “it shall not be an unlawful employment practice” for a religious entity to follow the tenets of its faith “in establishing and utilizing criteria for employment” -- is an affirmative defense available to a religious entity when confronted with a claim of employment discrimination. Here, it is uncontroverted that St. Theresa’s followed the religious tenets of the Catholic Church in terminating Crisitello. St. Theresa’s was therefore entitled to summary judgment and the dismissal of the complaint with prejudice.

The definition of “medical facility” under N.J.S.A. 59:6-1 does not restrict the substantive immunities granted in N.J.S.A. 59:6-4, -5, or -6, which are also not “superseded in the jail suicide context.” However, there was evidence presented in this case, both at the summary judgment stage and at trial, that falls outside of any immunities granted by N.J.S.A. 59:6-4, -5, and -6. The jury could reasonably have concluded from that evidence that the County defendants were negligent. The trial court was therefore correct to refuse to dismiss plaintiff’s negligence count at the summary judgment stage and to refuse to overturn the jury’s verdict after trial. The Court accordingly affirms the judgment of the Appellate Division, as modified.

The trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding manifest necessity justified a mistrial here. As the Appellate Division held, the State can present the counts of aggravated manslaughter and death by auto to a new grand jury based solely on the reckless driving evidence, without any evidence on intoxication.

A movant need not present evidence on all of the cohabitation factors set forth in Konzelman v. Konzelman, 158 N.J. 185, 202 (1999) -- or in N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23(n), for cases in which the PSA was executed after the statute’s enactment -- to make a prima facie showing. If the movant’s certification addresses some of the relevant factors and is supported by competent evidence, and if that evidence would warrant a finding of cohabitation if unrebutted, the trial court should find that the movant has presented prima facie evidence of cohabitation and should grant limited discovery tailored to the issues contested in the motion, subject to any protective order necessary to safeguard confidential information. Here, defendant presented prima facie evidence as to several of the Konzelman cohabitation factors, and that evidence, if unrebutted, would warrant a finding of cohabitation. Defendant was therefore entitled to limited discovery.