Supreme Court Opinions

Constitutional ex post facto prohibitions forbid only punishment beyond what was contemplated at the time the crime was committed. Because the law at the time of Krug’s offenses permitted the Board to consider the same “all existing” information it may now consider, retroactive application of the 1997 amendment to Krug created no risk of additional punishment. The Court therefore rejects Krug’s ex post facto challenge.

Consistent with Swan, the one-year statute of limitations that applies to defamation claims also applies to false light claims. The overlap between the causes of action, in conjunction with the practical considerations and free speech protections, mandates that false light be subject to the same one-year statute of limitations as defamation.

The appropriate standard of review is abuse of discretion. As a result, the Court reverses the judgment of the Appellate Division and remands the case to the trial court for consideration of the prosecutor’s denial under that standard.

N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(j) falls outside the scope of the Graves Act. It sets forth a distinct substantive offense that must be charged independently, even though it is cognizable only when paired with a corresponding prior offense under N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(a), (b), (c), or (f).

The expungement statute does not bar release of the report because the IA report is not a criminal record. The expungement statute and the expungement order entered by the Sussex County Superior Court do, however, bar release of any information related to the lieutenant’s arrest, conviction, or the disposition of his criminal case. Counsel for defendants has certified that the IA report in this case contains “information pertaining to [the lieutenant’s] arrest, charges and [the] disposition” of his criminal case. Therefore, pursuant to the expungement statute and order, any such information must be redacted from the IA report. The Court affirms but modifies the Appellate Division’s judgment. It remands to the trial court to perform those redactions in camera and to then conduct the common law balancing test set forth in Rivera on the remainder of the IA report. If the court finds that the “interests that favor disclosure outweigh concerns for confidentiality,” Rivera, 250 N.J. at 135, it must redact the additional information specified in Rivera, id. at 150, and then release the redacted report to plaintiff. As to the sealing of court documents, the Court leaves undisturbed the Appellate Division’s direction

By its plain language, N.J.S.A. 43:16A-12.2 directs that “unpaid benefits” be distributed to the decedent’s estate unless the PFRS member has nominated a beneficiary by “written designation.” Because Isaac made no such designation here, the Board must distribute Isaac’s $208,950.03 in unpaid benefits to his estate in accordance with the statutory mandate.

Under the circumstances presented here, the automobile exception to the warrant requirement did not apply and the police were required to obtain a warrant before searching the car.

Only franchisees can bring suit under the FPA. NJCAR is a trade association whose members consist of franchisee motor vehicle dealerships in New Jersey. NJCAR is not itself a motor vehicle franchisee, and it therefore lacks statutory standing to sue under the FPA.

Based on the CRA’s plain language, as well as the legislative history and fundamental purpose of compassionate release, the Court agrees with the Appellate Division that physical examinations are not statutorily mandated to render a medical diagnosis that complies with the statute. The Court concludes, however, that the DOC’s decision to deny M.R. a Certificate of Eligibility in August 2023 was arbitrary, capricious, and unreasonable. Every applicant seeking compassionate release must be examined for both a terminal condition and a permanent physical incapacity. In this instance, the medical records relied upon by the DOC’s attesting physicians, as well as their corresponding explanations, were insufficient to support the agency’s conclusion that M.R. did not suffer from such a physical incapacity.

The trial judge’s inquiry into the allegations in this case was inadequate. When allegations of juror misconduct arise during trial, the court must assess their plausibility. Once the court is satisfied that the allegations are sufficiently plausible to require questioning, the court is obligated to conduct a specific and probing examination of the juror to determine whether misconduct occurred. Here, the trial judge determined the allegations required an inquiry of the juror but then failed to ask questions that directly addressed the allegations.

The Court finds evidence that the Legislature intended to authorize the supersession of the Paterson Police Department in two statutes: (1) L. 2023, c. 94 (Chapter 94), which the Legislature adopted in the wake of the supersession to facilitate the OIC’s leadership of the Department; and (2) L. 2023, c. 74, the appropriations bill for the fiscal year ending on June 30, 2024, in which the Legislature appropriated funds for the Attorney General’s continued operation of the Department. The Court does not base its holding on other statutes and authorities cited by defendants in support of their argument that the Attorney General has general authority to supersede a municipal police department over local officials’ objections if the Attorney General determines that such an action is warranted. The Court declines to reach the question whether the Attorney General has supersession authority in circumstances other than the specific setting of this case.

Under the circumstances presented here, sentencing counsel was not constitutionally ineffective because her performance was not deficient.

Under the facts as presented in this case, charity care is not an unconstitutional “per se” physical taking of private property without just compensation. It does not grant an affirmative right of access to occupy hospitals; it does not give away or physically set aside hospital property for the government or a third party; and it does not deprive hospitals of all economically beneficial use of their property. Charity care is also not an unconstitutional “regulatory” taking of private property without just compensation. That is due to the highly regulated nature of the hospital industry and the legislatively declared paramount public interest that the charity care program serves. Hospitals remain free to challenge their annual subsidy allocations through administrative channels and to lobby the Legislature to make policy changes that would address more broadly the concerns they raise. But the charity care program does not run afoul of the Takings Clause, and the Court therefore affirms the Appellate Division’s judgment, as modified.

The Court views N.J.S.A. 40A:7-12 to require a planning board to independently evaluate the merits of a deannexation petition and make an objective recommendation to the municipality’s governing body. That did not occur in this case. Plaintiffs met their burden of proof with respect to all three prongs of N.J.S.A. 40A:7-12.1, and the trial court properly ordered deannexation.

Under N.J.R.E. 406, evidence of a specific, repeated, and regular business habit or practice, whether corroborated or not, would have  been admissible to establish a rebuttable presumption that Altice had acted in conformity with that habit or practice. But here, Altice produced insufficient evidence of such habit or practice. And because there is no proof that Altice emailed plaintiff the critical customer service agreement, the Court does not reach whether there exists mutual assent to waive a jury trial and arbitrate the dispute.

The Commission’s map represents a proper exercise of the substantial discretion the MWL grants to ward commissions to set the boundaries of municipal wards. The Court does not concur with the Appellate Division’s ruling that additional factfinding is necessary to determine whether the Commission’s map meets N.J.S.A. 40:44-14’s compactness requirement. The Court reverses the Appellate Division’s judgment on that claim and reinstates the trial court’s judgment as to the Commission’s compliance with the MWL without further proceedings. The Court’s conclusion that the Commission complied with the MWL compels rejection of the equal protection claim. And, in light of its holding that the map did not violate either the MWL or the New Jersey Constitution, the Court affirms the Appellate Division’s determination that the trial court properly dismissed the Community Organizations’ NJCRA claim.

Applying First Amendment principles stated in Smith v. Daily Mail Publishing Co., 443 U.S. 97, 98, 102-03 (1979), and Florida Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524, 530 (1989), the Court views Caputo’s specific address to constitute truthful information, lawfully obtained, that addresses a matter of public concern. As the parties agree and the trial court and Appellate Division determined, Daniel’s Law serves a state interest of the highest order: the protection of certain public officials and their immediate family members living in the same household so that those officials can perform their duties without fear of reprisal. See N.J.S.A. 56:8-166.3. Daniel’s Law, as applied to prevent Kratovil’s proposed republication of Caputo’s exact home address, is narrowly tailored to serve that state interest.

The relevant case law and court rule on presentments contemplate the existence of both a grand jury investigation and an actual presentment for an assignment judge to review. But here, no grand jury has completed an investigation, and no presentment exists. Courts cannot presume the outcome of an investigation in advance or the contents of a presentment that has not yet been written. It was therefore premature for the trial court to conclude that any potential presentment in this matter had to be suppressed. The State has the right to proceed with its investigation and present evidence before a special grand jury. If the grand jury issues a presentment, the assignment judge should review the report and publish it if it complies with the legal standards outlined in the Court’s opinion. The Court cannot and does not decide the ultimate question in advance.

Although the Fifth Amendment does not afford a defendant in a PDVA FRO hearing blanket immunity, a defendant may invoke the privilege against self-incrimination in response to specific questions that raise reasonable risks of self-incrimination, and no adverse inference may be drawn from the exercise of that right. The PDVA immunity provision contained in N.J.S.A. 2C:25-29(a) is not coextensive with the privilege against self-incrimination and is therefore insufficient to safeguard a defendant’s rights under the Fifth Amendment.