Supreme Court Opinions

Subject to the limits imposed here by the Court, the Bond Act does not violate the Constitution

Neither federal nor state protections against compelled disclosure shield Andrews’s passcodes

The Court concurs in substantial part with the ACJC’s factual findings and holds that clear and convincing evidence supports the ACJC’s determination that respondent committed the Code violations charged. The Court modifies the ACJC’s recommendation that respondent be removed from judicial office, however, and instead imposes on respondent a three-month suspension from judicial duties.

When all factors bearing upon retroactivity are weighed -- whether the rule's purpose "would be furthered by a retroactive application," the State's reliance on the previous rule, and "the effect a retroactive application would have on the administration of justice," State v. Henderson, 208 N.J. 208, 300 (2011) -- pipeline retroactivity is appropriate. Considering the evidence presented in G.E.P.'s case, the admission of CSAAS testimony did not deny him a fair trial, and the Court reverses the Appellate Division's judgment as to him. As to R.P., C.P., and C.K., the CSAAS testimony bolstering the alleged victims' testimony was clearly capable of producing an unjust result, and their convictions were thus properly reversed by the Appellate Division.

The language of the kidnapping statute, along with the case law construing that language, must be read in a sensible manner and not taken to an illogical conclusion. Holding a victim in captivity for a period of four to five hours, while assaulting and sexually abusing her, satisfies the “substantial period” requirement of the kidnapping statute -- even if the length of the confinement is co-extensive with the continuous sexual and physical abuse of the victim. In addition, the Court cannot find that, as a matter of law, the terrifying four-to-five-hour period of C.M.’s confinement was “merely incidental” to the sexual violence committed against her. There is no basis to disturb the jury’s verdict.

The Court answers the certified question in the affirmative. A CFA claim alleging express misrepresentations -- deceptive, fraudulent, misleading, and other unconscionable commercial practices -- may be brought in the same action as a PLA claim premised upon product manufacturing, warning, or design defects. It is the nature of the claims brought, not the nature of the damages sought, that is dispositive of whether the PLA precludes the separate causes of action. In other words, the PLA will not bar a CFA claim alleging express or affirmative misrepresentations.

All claims related to the MCPO defendants’ acts or alleged omissions associated with duties imposed by the Directive constitute state prosecutorial functions. The Department’s parsing of the pleadings in this matter led to crabbed determinations about the scope of law enforcement activity that are inconsistent with the letter and purpose of Wright. The Court finds the Department’s four determinations -- which reflect shifting and conflicting positions -- to be arbitrary and unreasonable.

The expert report relied on by the Township did not apply any reliable methodology to assure that the assessment allocating the costs among the properties was “in proportion to and not in excess of the benefits conferred,” as required by N.J.S.A. 58:4-12(d)(1) and other statutes. The Court is constrained to invalidate Sparta Township Resolution 6-1, which imposes a special assessment on plaintiffs’ properties to recoup the costs of the dam restoration project. The Township must pass a resolution allocating costs based on a valid methodology in accordance with the applicable statutes and relevant case law.

The Court answers the certified question in the negative. A party who files a successful motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim is not precluded by the entire controversy doctrine from asserting claims in a later suit that arise from the same transactional facts.

The history of the CJRA reveals the Legislature did not intend to authorize criminal contempt charges for violations of release conditions. Beyond that, allowing such charges for all violations of conditions of release, no matter how minor, is at odds with the purpose and structure of the CJRA. No-contact orders are treated differently, however, because the CJRA did not modify settled law relating to them. In State v. Gandhi, 201 N.J. 161 (2010), the Court held that violations of no-contact orders -- even if issued as part of a pretrial release order -- can serve as a basis for contempt charges. That precedent remains firmly in place. Because neither appeal here involved a violation of a no-contact order, the Court reverses the judgment of the Appellate Division and dismisses the contempt charges against both defendants.

It was error to grant summary judgment because, construing all inferences in Christian Mission’s favor, there is evidence that the property might have been used in a manner that could satisfy N.J.S.A. 54:4-3.6’s actual use requirement -- storage of religious items and/or other church-related activities at the property before construction began, during construction, and as of the valuation date in 2012.

The NJAA may apply to arbitration agreements even if parties to the agreements are exempt under section 1 of the FAA. Therefore, the parties in both Colon and Arafa are not exempt from arbitration and their arbitration agreements are enforceable. In Arafa, the arbitration agreements are enforceable under the NJAA. In Colon, the arbitration agreements are enforceable under either the FAA or the NJAA, which will be determined by the trial court upon remand when it resolves whether the employees in that case were transportation workers engaged in interstate commerce.

The NJAA may apply to arbitration agreements even if parties to the agreements are exempt under section 1 of the FAA. Therefore, the parties in both Colon and Arafa are not exempt from arbitration and their arbitration agreements are enforceable. In Arafa, the arbitration agreements are enforceable under the NJAA. In Colon, the arbitration agreements are enforceable under either the FAA or the NJAA, which will be determined by the trial court upon remand when it resolves whether the employees in that case were transportation workers engaged in interstate commerce.

For summary judgment purposes, the Court must accept as true the sworn deposition testimony of Baskin and the independent eyewitness, who both stated that Baskin’s open and empty hands were above his head, in an act of surrender, when Detective Martinez fired the shot. Under that scenario, a police officer would not have had an objectively reasonable basis to use deadly force. The law prohibiting the use of deadly force against a non-threatening and surrendering suspect was clearly established, as evidenced by cases in jurisdictions that have addressed the issue. Thus, Detective Martinez was not entitled to qualified immunity on summary judgment.

The use of fair market value credit by this debtor to obtain a money judgment against a creditor -- in the absence of a deficiency claim threatened or pursued or any objection being raised at the time of the sheriff’s sales -- is inconsistent with sound foreclosure processes and, moreover, inequitable in the circumstances presented.

Section 12 does not require a formal application when a prosecutor agrees not to request a mandatory extended-term sentence under N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6(f) yet seeks the benefit of a Section 12 plea agreement. Here, defendant was given ample notice that he was extended-term eligible and that the State was seeking the benefit of Section 12 for the negotiated plea agreement, and defendant did not object to the State’s proffer that he was extended-term eligible. The Court affirms the judgment of the Appellate Division upholding his sentence. Given the importance of ensuring consistency and accuracy in sentencing, the Court provides guidance for future cases where the State agrees not to request an extended term but still seeks the benefit of a negotiated waiver of the CDRA’s mandatory sentencing requirements under N.J.S.A. 2C:35-12.

Under the circumstances here, the jury should have had full access to the cooperating witness’s plea agreement history through the defense counsel’s unfettered examination of that history. The trial court’s limitations on defendant’s cross examination were in error. Defendant was deprived of his right to confrontation and denied a fair trial. His conviction for conspiracy to commit burglary is vacated.

Relying on two statutes addressing assignments, N.J.S.A. 2A:25-1 and N.J.S.A. 46:9-9, as well as common-law assignment principles, the Court holds that Investors had the right as an assignee of the Mortgage and transferee of the Note to enforce the Note. The Court construes N.J.S.A. 12A:3-309 to address the rights of CitiMortgage as the possessor of a note or other instrument at the time that the instrument is lost, but not to supplant New Jersey assignment statutes and common law in the setting of this appeal or to preclude an assignee in Investors’ position from asserting its rights according to the Note’s terms. Read together, those three statutes clearly authorized the assignment and entitled Investors to enforce its assigned Mortgage and transferred Note. The Court does not rely on the equitable principle of unjust enrichment invoked by the Appellate Division.

The arrangement by which Gourmet Dining operates Ursino is taxable as a lease or lease-like interest. The public-benefit-oriented exemption provisions in issue were not intended to exempt the for-profit operator of a high-end, regionally renowned restaurant situated on a college campus, when the overriding purpose of this commercial endeavor is focused on profitmaking. Gourmet Dining, as the exclusive operator and manager of this restaurant establishment, must bear its fair share of the local real property tax burden.

The Court answers the certified question in the negative. Under equitable principles of New Jersey law, the made-whole doctrine does not apply to first-dollar risk, such as a self-insured retention or deductible, that is allocated to an insured under an insurance policy.