Supreme Court Opinions

Under the circumstances, the trial court properly suppressed the identification in this case. The Court proposes revisions to Rule 3:11 to offer clearer guidance on which photos officials should preserve when they use an electronic database. In addition, to guard against misidentification, the Court places on the State the obligation to show that an eyewitness was not exposed to multiple photos or viewings of the same suspect.

The State failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that, under the totality of the circumstances, defendant’s statement was voluntary. Defendant may withdraw his guilty plea. The failure to record the identification procedure as required by Delgado requires a remand to allow defendant the benefit of a hearing to inquire into the reliability of the identification and any other remedy deemed appropriate by the trial court.

The six members of the Court who participated in this matter agree upon the non-exclusive factors identified in the concurring opinion that govern a court’s determination when a requestor, not otherwise authorized by statute or regulation to have access to a given student record, seeks a court order mandating disclosure of that record pursuant to N.J.A.C. 6A:32-7.5(e)(15). An equally divided Court affirms the Appellate Division’s determination that a "student record" under N.J.A.C. 6A:32-2.1 retains its protected status under New Jersey law notwithstanding the school district’s redaction from that record of "personally identifiable information," as required by FERPA and its implementing regulations.

The Court does not agree that the trial court erred in refusing to grant defendants summary judgment on plaintiff’s CEPA claim related to the alleged refusal to destroy documents, but affirms as to the fraudulent timekeeping allegations.

Because the Utah court limited the presentation of evidence of a business dispute between respondent and the law firm, and because evidence that may exist in Utah cannot be compelled by respondent here, the Court cannot conclude that the OAE has proven by clear and convincing evidence that respondent knowingly misappropriated law firm funds under circumstances justifying greater discipline than that imposed in Utah.

No reasonable trier of fact could find that Arthur knew or had special reason to know that Kenneth was engaged in a sexual relationship with a minor. Accordingly, Arthur had no duty to report Kenneth. The record similarly fails to provide a basis for liability to attach to GEM. Because the record here is determinative of Arthur’s and GEM’s liability, the Court need not decide whether a co-worker or employer with knowledge or a special reason to know that a co-worker or employee is engaged in a sexual relationship with a minor has a legal duty to report that co-worker or employee.

Upon review of the PFRS statute’s plain language and history, the Court finds that the Legislature did not intend for children of PFRS members to meet a dependency requirement to receive survivor benefits. The Court’s finding is consistent with the PFRS’s underlying policy goal of financially protecting the family members of deceased PFRS members.

The Court has significant concerns about the procedure followed in this case. Neither the script set forth on the Miranda card nor the detective’s statement to defendant addressed whether defendant agreed to waive his rights before answering questions. However, any error in the trial court’s admission of the statement was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt because the State presented overwhelming independent evidence of defendant’s guilt. And, although the State should have moved to dismiss the charges on which the jury had deadlocked before the court considered evidence relevant to those charges, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in applying three aggravating factors to impose an extended-term sentence at the high end of the statutory range.

The Court defers to the trial judge’s determination that the disputed footage was played for the jury during the State’s case-in-chief and notes that defense counsel consented to the admission of the surveillance footage depicting the moments surrounding the shooting, including the video segment at issue. The court did not abuse its discretion in permitting the prosecutor to play the video segment during his closing remarks, and the prosecutor’s comments were reasonable and fair inferences supported by the evidence presented at trial.

The Court modifies the judgment of the Appellate Division and remands this matter to the OAL for further proceedings to allow the City the opportunity to demonstrate that the hospital records are admissible as business records, and the opportunity to present any other theories of admissibility.

The circumstances at issue in McKenney, which heavily depended on the prejudice caused to the party disadvantaged by the surprise change in trial testimony, are distinguishable from the change in testimony here. Here there was no demonstration that the changed testimony caused prejudice to T.L., and the plain error standard does not compel reversal, especially because counsel’s failure to object was likely strategic. Under the circumstances, T.L. is not entitled to a new trial.

The trial courts’ resolution of these matters was correct and consistent with clear rulings from the United States Supreme Court that bind state and federal courts on how challenges such as plaintiffs’ should proceed. Those rulings do not permit threshold issues about overall contract validity to be resolved by the courts when the arbitration agreement itself is not specifically challenged. Here, plaintiffs attack the sales contracts in their entirety, not the language or clarity of the agreements to arbitrate or the broad delegation clauses contained in those signed arbitration agreements. The Supreme Court’s precedent compels only one conclusion: an arbitrator must resolve plaintiffs’ claims about the validity of their sales contracts as well as any arbitrability claims that plaintiffs may choose to raise.

The Court answers both parts of the first certified question in the affirmative: a life insurance policy procured with the intent to benefit persons without an insurable interest in the life of the insured does violate the public policy of New Jersey, and such a policy is void at the outset. In response to the second question, a party may be entitled to a refund of premium payments it made on the policy, depending on the circumstances.

The State may appeal a Drug Court sentence only when the sentencing judge makes a plainly mistaken, non-discretionary, non-factual finding under N.J.S.A. 2C:35-14(a). Because application of N.J.S.A. 2C:35-14(a)(9) requires fact-finding and an exercise of the sentencing judge’s discretion, a sentence based on application of that factor is not appealable as an illegal sentence.

The 2009 amendments to N.J.S.A. 2C:35-7’s sentencing structure reflect a more flexible sentencing policy that renders Caliguiri’s reasoning no longer viable. The presumption against PTI for second-degree offenders cannot be applied to N.J.S.A. 2C:35-7(a) offenders. And the presumption against PTI for the “sale” of narcotics was not applicable here because defendant was charged with possession with intent to “distribute” and there is no allegation or evidence that he sold the narcotics. The decision to deny defendant’s application must be reevaluated.

An individual sentenced to a fixed minimum term of parole ineligibility under N.J.S.A. 2C:40-26(c) may not serve his or her sentence intermittently at night or on weekends pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:43-2(b)(7).

New Jersey does not have territorial jurisdiction to prosecute Ferguson, Potts, or Byrd for the drug-induced death of Cabral in New York.

The judgment of the Appellate Division is affirmed substantially for the reasons expressed in the panel’s opinion.

Although the Legislature may decide that N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4(a)(1) should not apply in juvenile proceedings based on conduct such as that at issue here, nothing in the current text of that statute precludes the adjudication in this case. The Court declines to rewrite the statute’s plain language in this appeal. However, the Family Part court’s adjudication must be reversed because the court’s disavowal, at the disposition hearing, of critical aspects of its previously-stated factual findings undermined its determination as to both offenses. In this extraordinary setting, it is unclear whether the State met its burden to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that D.M. violated N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4(a)(1). Accordingly, the Court affirms on other grounds the panel’s judgment.

Defendant’s confession and the drug evidence must be suppressed.