Supreme Court Opinions

Because Mecouch was a Medicare enrollee in 2016, Cooper -- a Medicare provider -- was required to bill and accept payment from Medicare, which promptly covered Mecouch’s medical expenses in accordance with its fee schedule. Cooper could not seek payment from Selective other than for reimbursement of the Medicare co-payments and deductibles.

The Court affirms the Appellate Division’s invalidation of N.J.A.C. 10:72-4.4(d)(1) as inconsistent with its state enabling legislation and contrary to legislative intent. But the Court has grave concerns that the regulation’s method of operation is also inconsistent with the federal Medicaid law. The Court accordingly vacates that portion of the Appellate Division’s analysis that rejected the federal-law argument by cross-petitioners.

The appropriate standard to determine whether sexual activity was consensual under SASPA is not the prostration of faculties standard, which focuses on the mental state of the defendant, but rather the standard articulated in State in Interest of M.T.S., 129 N.J. 422 (1992), which is applied from the perspective of the alleged victim. The M.T.S. standard requires a showing that sexual activity occurred without the alleged victim’s freely and affirmatively given permission to engage in that activity. The standard for consent for an alleged victim in a SASPA case should be no different than the standard for consent for an alleged victim in a criminal sexual assault case. The Court reverses and remands this matter to the trial court for assessment under the standard articulated in M.T.S.

The Legislature placed on DCPP the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that a parent abused or neglected a child, N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.46(b)(1), and the Judiciary has no commission to exercise equitable powers to alter the statutory burden of proof set forth by the Legislature. The Court disapproves of the Appellate Division cases that have imported the doctrine of conditional res ipsa loquitur from the common law into a comprehensive statutory scheme to relieve DCPP of its burden of proving that a particular parent abused or neglected a child. The Court remands for a new hearing.

The Court reverses in Melvin and affirms in Paden-Battle. Article I, Paragraph 1 of the New Jersey Constitution bestows upon all citizens certain natural and unalienable rights. From those rights flows the doctrine of fundamental fairness, which protects against arbitrary and unjust government action. Fundamental fairness prohibits courts from subjecting a defendant to enhanced sentencing for conduct as to which a jury found that defendant not guilty.

The Court reverses in Melvin and affirms in Paden-Battle. Article I, Paragraph 1 of the New Jersey Constitution bestows upon all citizens certain natural and unalienable rights. From those rights flows the doctrine of fundamental fairness, which protects against arbitrary and unjust government action. Fundamental fairness prohibits courts from subjecting a defendant to enhanced sentencing for conduct as to which a jury found that defendant not guilty.

*After conducting a de novo review of the record and affording deference to the credibility findings of the Special Master, the Court concludes that the OAE has failed to establish by clear and convincing evidence that Robertelli violated the RPCs. The disciplinary charges must therefore be dismissed.

Owning a dog is a substantially public endeavor in which people do not have a reasonable expectation of privacy that exempts their personal information from disclosure under the privacy clause of OPRA.

Based on the record, Hannah has established that his counsel rendered constitutionally deficient representation and that, but for counsels’ errors, there is a reasonable probability that the outcome of the trial would have been different. The Court reverses the judgment of the Appellate Division denying Hannah post-conviction relief, vacates his judgment of conviction, and remands for a new trial.

*The pre-voir dire disqualification, excusal, or deferral of jurors is not a stage at which defendant is entitled to be present or be represented, and defendant has failed to support his representative-cross-section claim.

As the Appellate Division instructed, the trial court on remand must (1) substantially consider the factors advanced in BMW and incorporated into New Jersey law by Baker and (2) must "ensure that the measure of punishment is both reasonable and proportionate to the amount of harm to the plaintiff and to the general damages recovered," in keeping with the guidance in State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 425-26 (2003). The Court modifies the Appellate Division's instructions to add that the trial court -- and all trial courts reviewing a punitive damages award issued by a jury against a public entity defendant -- must also apply the heightened scrutiny called for in Lockley and underscored in the companion case of Green v. Jersey City Board of Education, 177 N.J. 434 (2003).

The forfeiture of defendant’s pension under N.J.S.A. 43:1-3.1 does not constitute a fine for purposes of an excessive-fine analysis under the Federal or State Constitutions. Because the forfeiture is not a fine, the Court does not reach the constitutional analysis for excessiveness.

The right of privacy, and particularly privacy in one’s telephone conversations, is among the most valued of all rights in a civilized society. McQueen’s custodial status in the stationhouse did not strip him of all constitutional protections. Article I, Paragraph 7 broadly protects the privacy of telephone conversations in many different settings. McQueen and Allen-Brewer had a reasonable expectation of privacy in their conversation in the absence of fair notice that their conversation would be monitored or recorded. The recorded stationhouse telephone conversation was not seized pursuant to a warrant or any justifiable exigency and therefore must be suppressed.

The relevant date for purposes of determining whether subsection (g) is effective as to a particular registrant is the date on which that registrant committed the sex offenses that would otherwise bar termination of registration under subsection (f). Thus, subsection (g) does not apply to registrant.

The Dog Bite Statute’s strict liability standard applies to the claim of an independent contractor who agrees to care for a dog. The statute’s plain language reveals no legislative intent to recognize an exception to strict liability under the Dog Bite Statute for any category of injured plaintiffs. See N.J.S.A. 4:19-16. However, the Comparative Negligence Act, N.J.S.A. 2A:15-5.1 to -5.8, applies to plaintiff’s strict liability claim, and plaintiff’s status as a professional experienced in the care of dogs is relevant to an allocation of fault. Genuine issues of material fact warrant the denial of plaintiff’s motion for partial summary judgment on her common-law claims.

The immunities from liability provided by the Good Samaritan Act, N.J.S.A. 26:2B-16, and most TCA provisions invoked by defendants do not apply here. Defendants’ actions may be entitled to qualified immunity under certain TCA provisions on which defendants rely, however, if the involved officers’ actions were discretionary, rather than ministerial, in nature. In this instance, because of a factual dispute, that determination is for the jury to make upon remand.

The mandatory period of parole supervision imposed under NERA is part of a unitary sentence that is penal in nature. The State has kept Njango in prison for more than a year beyond his release date. Without credit for the excess prison time, Njango would serve more time in the custody of the Department of Corrections than authorized by his sentence. Under the fundamental fairness doctrine -- an integral part of the due process guarantee of the New Jersey Constitution -- the excess time Njango erroneously served in prison must be credited to reduce the period of his parole supervision.

*To avoid serious constitutional concerns, the Court interprets the statute narrowly and holds that N.J.S.A. 39:3-33 requires that all markings on a license plate be legible or identifiable. If a frame conceals or obscures a marking in a way that it cannot reasonably be identified or discerned, the driver would be in violation of the law. In practice, if a registration letter or number is not legible, the statute would apply; but if a phrase like "Garden State" is partly covered but still recognizable, there would be no violation.

*To avoid serious constitutional concerns, the Court interprets the statute narrowly and holds that N.J.S.A. 39:3-33 requires that all markings on a license plate be legible or identifiable. If a frame conceals or obscures a marking in a way that it cannot reasonably be identified or discerned, the driver would be in violation of the law. In practice, if a registration letter or number is not legible, the statute would apply; but if a phrase like "Garden State" is partly covered but still recognizable, there would be no violation.

Annese’s lay opinion testimony is rationally based on the witness’s perception and therefore satisfies the first prong of N.J.R.E. 701. Based on Annese’s extensive contacts with defendant, the absence of any other identification testimony, and the quality of the surveillance photograph, the testimony meets the second requirement of N.J.R.E. 701 because it will assist the jury in determining a fact at issue in defendant’s trial. Sanitized to avoid disclosure of defendant’s status as a parolee at the time of his alleged offense, Annese’s lay opinion testimony will not be so prejudicial that its probative value is substantially outweighed by the risk of undue prejudice, and that testimony should not be excluded under N.J.R.E. 403. The Court concurs with the Appellate Division that the trial court abused its discretion when it barred Annese’s lay opinion testimony.