Supreme Court Opinions

None of the individual errors that Butler alleges require that his convictions be overturned, but the accumulation of errors in this case deprived him of his constitutional right to a fair trial. 

Because defendant could not establish that the existing jury pool violated his right to trial by a jury drawn from a representative cross-section of the community, the Court agreed with the trial court’s determination not to dismiss the jury pool that had been summoned before the Governor issued EO 411. 

The Erlinger error is subject to harmless error review and was harmless under the circumstances of this case.  However, as written, N.J.S.A. 2C:44-3(a) is inconsistent with the principles announced in Erlinger.  The Court calls upon the Legislature to revise this provision to comport with Erlinger’s mandate.

The CNA’s grievance procedure conflicts with -- and is thus preempted by -- the Title IX Regulations because 34 C.F.R. § 106.45(b) mandates that any grievance procedures beyond those specified in that section “must apply equally to both” the alleged victim and the alleged harasser, but the CNA’s arbitration process excludes the alleged victim. 

The Heck favorable-termination rule applies to civil rights claims brought under the CRA, or the CRA and TCA jointly, just as it does to claims brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.  Counts One, Two, and Three of plaintiffs’ complaint were timely filed because the claims accrued, and the statute of limitations began to run, on June 1, 2020.  However, any claim for false arrest/imprisonment would have accrued before May 27, 2020, and Count Four was therefore correctly dismissed as untimely. 

The LLA has grown -- along with New Jersey’s own growth and development -- into a “liberally construed . . . inducement” for landowners to open “their property for sport and recreational activities” without “fear of liability.” N.J.S.A. 2A:42A-5.1. Rollerblading, which is akin to “skating,” is the type of “recreational activity” contemplated by the Legislature, see id. at -2, just as Van Saun Park is the type of open and expansive “premises,” see id. at -3, for which this legislative grant of immunity is both intended and necessary. The LLA thus immunizes Bergen County for the accident at issue

The Court adopts the standard set forth in Section 51 of the Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers for determining when an attorney owes a duty of care to a non-client. Here, the defendant attorney did not owe non-client plaintiff Helen Christakos a duty of care under either Section 51(2) or Section 51(3).

There are valid reasons not to disclose records in particular cases to ensure safety and security at correctional institutions and to avoid interfering with an inmate’s rehabilitation, among other concerns. See Thompson, 210 N.J. Super. at 123. But because the plain language of N.J.A.C. 10A:71-2.2 bars disclosure in all cases, it violates settled constitutional principles.

The Court reverses the judgment of the Appellate Division in part, substantially for the reasons stated in Judge Gilson’s thoughtful dissent. The Court addresses the standard for whether to instruct on passion/provocation manslaughter.

The Appellate Division’s judgment is affirmed substantially for the reasons stated in Judge Puglisi’s thorough and thoughtful opinion. The Court adds two comments.

Like the Appellate Division, the Court sees no reason to depart from the detailed analysis and sound reasoning in Judge Sabatino’s opinion in Morison.

Based on the plain language of the relevant statutes, a municipality in Sea Bright’s position is a governing body authorized to pursue withdrawal from a school district to form or enlarge a regional school district pursuant to N.J.S.A. 18A:13-47.11. Accordingly, Sea Bright may seek approval of its proposed withdrawal.

Under the totality of the circumstances in this case, the police acted in an objectively reasonable manner to meet an exigency that did not permit time to secure a warrant. No bright-line rule governs the question of exigency, and determining whether the exigency exception to the warrant requirement applies requires courts to conduct an objective, fact-sensitive analysis. Drawing de novo legal conclusions from the facts found by the trial judge, the Court finds that here, time was of the essence, delay was not reasonable, and seizure of the DVR by the police without a warrant was justified by exigent circumstances.

A valid personal guaranty of a company’s indebtedness requires the signer to unambiguously manifest their intent to be personally bound. There are multiple ways a corporate representative can unambiguously manifest an intent to personally guarantee an underlying agreement. Here, Ferreira did not unambiguously manifest an intent to personally guarantee the underlying corporate agreement.

The Court agrees with the trial courts and Appellate Division that the State has not met its burden in establishing the reliability of SBS/AHT testimony here.

Neither remedy Wilkerson seeks finds support in the statutory scheme.

Constitutional ex post facto prohibitions forbid only punishment beyond what was contemplated at the time the crime was committed. Because the law at the time of Krug’s offenses permitted the Board to consider the same “all existing” information it may now consider, retroactive application of the 1997 amendment to Krug created no risk of additional punishment. The Court therefore rejects Krug’s ex post facto challenge.

Consistent with Swan, the one-year statute of limitations that applies to defamation claims also applies to false light claims. The overlap between the causes of action, in conjunction with the practical considerations and free speech protections, mandates that false light be subject to the same one-year statute of limitations as defamation.

The appropriate standard of review is abuse of discretion. As a result, the Court reverses the judgment of the Appellate Division and remands the case to the trial court for consideration of the prosecutor’s denial under that standard.