In this matter, the court addressed whether the trial court erred in finding the parties have children in common, leading the trial court to dismiss plaintiff's complaint pursuant to the Victim's Assistance and Survivor Protection Act (VASPA), N.J.S.A. 2C:14-13 to -21.
Plaintiff and S.S. divorced in 2019 and have since been involved in extensive post-judgment litigation regarding their two minor children. He subsequently alleged defendant, who at the time was S.S.'s boyfriend and is now her husband, sexually abused the children. Plaintiff filed an order to show cause concerning the alleged acts of abuse. In March 2020, the trial court entered an order barring defendant "from any further contact with the children pending further order" of the court. This order remains in effect to this day.
In 2024, plaintiff filed a VASPA complaint against defendant alleging cyber harassment and obtained a temporary protective order (TPO). The trial court entered an order to show cause directing plaintiff to show cause why his VASPA complaint and TPO should not be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. Following oral argument, the trial court determined it would only have jurisdiction over the VASPA matter "if the part[ies] could not be defined as . . . victim[s] of domestic violence" under N.J.S.A. 2C:14-14. It explained it would not have jurisdiction if the parties had a "child in common" under N.J.S.A. 2C:25-19(d) of the Prevention of Domestic Violence Act (PDVA), N.J.S.A. 2C:25-17 to -35.
The trial court then noted, relying on D.V. v. A.H., 394 N.J. Super. 388 (Ch. Div. 2007), although plaintiff and defendant do not "biologically" have children in common, "they [do] have . . . step-children in common." It explained, while "child in common" is not defined under the PDVA, plaintiff and defendant were in a "family-like setting[]." It ultimately found step-children fell within the meaning of a "child in common" under N.J.S.A. 2C:25-19(d). Therefore, the trial court concluded it had no jurisdiction over the VASPA matter, dismissed the claim, and vacated the TPO.
The court concluded the trial court improperly relied on D.V. In distinguishing D.V., it noted the plaintiff and the defendant in that case both had parental rights, even though the plaintiff was not a biological parent. 394 N.J. Super. at 390. The facts here are not analogous. Not only does defendant not have any parental rights, but he has also been barred from having any contact with the children for over five years. The court observed this was far afield from the "judicially joined" parties involved in D.V. Under the present circumstances, the court determined the parties do not have a "child in common" for the purposes of N.J.S.A. 2C:25-19(d), and plaintiff should have been permitted to proceed with his VASPA action.