The question presented to the trial court was whether the immunity statute relating to DCPP referrals found at N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.13 confers immunity to DCPP referrals made with the intent to harass a victim of domestic violence as defined under the Prevention of Domestic Violence Act, N.J.S.A. 2C:25-17 to -35. There was no prior precedent resolving this issue. In harmonizing the two statutes, the trial court found that it would be contrary to legislative intent to confer immunity in the realm of domestic violence as that would permit the weaponization of DCPP referrals as a means of perpetrating domestic violence.
This matter arose out of an application for a final restraining order under the Prevention of Domestic Violence Act. At the conclusion of the trial, the only predicate act surviving was the act of calling DCPP to report allegations of abuse in order to harass the victim. The trial court noted that the Legislature intended to protect children as the primary purpose in enacting the immunity statute regarding DCPP referrals. Additionally, N.J.S.A. 2C:25-18 expressly provides that children can suffer emotionally from the exposure to domestic violence, and that children may also be a victim of domestic violence. Thus, the trial court concluded that the application of the DCPP immunity statute to allegations of harassment under the Prevention of Domestic Violence Acts fails as a matter of law under the doctrine of absurdity. Even though the trial court found that the defendant committed the predicate act of harassment by making reports to DCPP, the trial court ultimately found that the plaintiff failed to satisfy the second prong of Silver v. Silver, 387 N.J. Super. 112 (App. Div. 2006), and denied the application for a final restraining order.