K.G. VS. NEW JERSEY STATE PAROLE BOARD C.C. VS. NEW JERSEY STATE PAROLE BOARD J.L. VS. NEW JERSEY STATE PAROLE BOARD D.C. VS. NEW JERSEY STATE PAROLE BOARD (NEW JERSEY STATE PAROLE BOARD) (CONSOLIDATED) (RECORD IMPOUNDED) - Published

Appellants K.G, C.C., J.L., and D.C. are convicted sex offenders who are monitored by respondent New Jersey State Parole Board (the "Board") as offenders who are subject to parole supervision for life ("PSL") under N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6.4. Each appellant challenges certain conditions of PSL, most of which restrict Internet use, that the Board has imposed upon them. The instant appeals follow in the wake of the New Jersey Supreme Court's decision in J.I. v. N.J. State Parole Bd., 228 N.J. 204 (2017), which addressed the parameters of the Board's authority to impose conditions restricting Internet access.

We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand in part. In particular, we reach the following major legal conclusions: (1) the Board's imposition of Internet monitoring conditions upon PSL offenders, including the use of monitoring software, mandatory password disclosure, and unannounced device inspections, does not facially violate the constitutional protections against unreasonable searches or the constitutional rights to privacy; (2) the Board's use of the terms "Internet-capable device," "social networking service," "frequenting establishments whose primary purpose is the sale of alcohol," and "sexually-oriented websites, material, information or data" does not violate due process under the void for vagueness doctrine; (3) all conditions restricting Internet access, including monitoring conditions, should be reasonably tailored to the circumstances of the individual offender, "taking into account such factors as the underlying offense and any prior criminal history, whether the Internet was used as a tool to perpetrate the offense, the rehabilitative needs of the offender, and the imperative of public safety[,]" J.I., 228 N.J. at 224; and (4) in the administrative appeals process, PSL offenders are not entitled to discovery and are only entitled to a hearing when warranted based on "the timing of and justification for the Internet restriction, the severity and length of the restriction, whether facts are contested or uncontested, and whether credibility determinations must be made." Id. at 233.