Respondent landlord initiated a summary action for nonpayment of rent against appellant and her husband. Appellant vacated the apartment due to allegations of domestic violence, while her husband remained on the premises. A default judgment for possession was entered against the husband alone, after which a warrant of removal was executed. Subsequently, appellant paid the outstanding rent, and with respondent, executed a consent to surrender the property. She later moved to vacate the judgment for possession entered against her husband and to seal the court record.
Appellant now appeals from the trial court's order denying her motion to vacate the judgment of possession entered against the husband and seal the court record. The court addresses two novel legal questions: whether a consent order to surrender property to a landlord constitutes a judgment for possession in landlord-tenant cases under our governing law; and whether such a consent order remains a public record for seven years.
The court concluded a consent order to surrender property to a landlord, based on its substantive nature and underlying purpose, is fundamentally different from a judgment for possession. Specifically, it reflects a voluntary agreement rather than an adjudication of the landlord's right to possession. The court held a consent order is subject to the sealing provision of Rule 1:38-3(f)(11) and is shielded from public view.