In this public corruption matter, the court considers the State's procedural and substantive challenges to a Law Division order dismissing a 111-page, multiple count, "speaking indictment" that followed a protracted grand jury presentation. The detailed State indictment charged George E. Norcross, III, Philip A. Norcross, William M. Tambussi, Dana L. Redd, Sidney R. Brown, and John J. O'Donnell – purported members of the alleged "Norcross Enterprise" – with conspiracy to violate the New Jersey Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), N.J.S.A. 2C:41-1 to -6.2, conspiracy to commit theft by extortion and criminal coercion, official misconduct, and other offenses.
Distilled to its essence, the indictment asserted the Enterprise members exerted pressure on private individuals and entities, and public officials, to advance the Enterprise's goals related to redeveloping the City of Camden. One of those goals allegedly was accomplished by obtaining three redevelopment projects, two of which yielded some Enterprise members lucrative tax credits.
The motion judge was persuaded by defendants' arguments that the indictment, on its face, failed to allege the criminal offenses charged and violated the applicable statutes of limitations. In his decision, the judge accepted as true the indictment's allegations and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom.
As a threshold matter, the court reaffirms a speaking indictment is subject to the same facial review as non-speaking indictments. Although the court assumes the truth of all facts alleged in the indictment, the court is not persuaded it must afford the State the benefit of all reasonable inferences drawn from those facts.
On de novo review, the court concludes the charges arising from the RICO and two of the three general conspiracies, and the official misconduct offense, were untimely, and the remaining charges failed to state the offense charged or were time-barred, or both. The court therefore affirms the dismissal order for slightly different reasons than the motion judge.
In reaching its decision on the time-barred conspiracy counts, the court considers, as a matter of first impression, whether the receipt of ongoing, otherwise lawful payments – here, tax credits – tolls the applicable statute of limitations. Persuaded by federal law, the court holds the long-term, recurring award of tax credits does not extend the statute of limitations for a conspiracy offense.
The court similarly considers the novel issue underscoring the State's theory that the receipt of a benefit extended the statute of limitations for an official misconduct charge when the indictment did not assert an express agreement to perform the act of misconduct in exchange for that benefit. The court concludes the mere receipt of a benefit under those circumstances does not extend the life of an official misconduct charge indefinitely.
In view of its decision, the court finds it unnecessary to reach defendants' contentions that the acts alleged in the indictment amounted to no more than "hard bargaining" and that such conduct was not subject to the relevant statutes. Similarly, the court does not consider the arguments raised by the attorney defendants, as supported by amici curiae, that the indictment of attorneys for actions involving the practice of law would exert a chilling effect, detrimental to lawyers and their clients.