Summary - A-1342-18
Defendant appeals from his jury trial convictions for first -degree robbery and related crimes. He contends the trial court erred in ruling the State could use defendant's hospital-bed statements for impeachment purposes after ruling that the interrogating detectives had failed to properly administer Miranda warnings. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). Defendant also contends the trial court erred in permitting a victim to make an in-court identification notwithstanding that her recollection was tainted when a detective told her that photographs of her stolen watch, that were taken by the perpetrator during the robbery, had been extracted from defendant's cell phone.
At the time of the interrogation, defendant was in a hospital intensive care unit awaiting overdue dialysis. Defendant was hooked up to an intravenous line (IV) and an electrocardiogram (EKG). A notation in his medical chart shows that he was suffering from "toxic/metabolic derangement." The Miranda waiver colloquy and ensuing interrogation was not audio- or videorecorded, even though the detectives had traveled to the hospital for the purpose of interviewing defendant.
The court concludes the detectives were not qualified to make a medical judgment as to defendant's cognitive capacity. Because the hospital -bed interrogation was not electronically recorded, the trial judge could not independently assess defendant's outward condition. Importantly, the trial judge candidly acknowledged that he did not have the benefit of an expert medical witness and thus did not fully understand the meaning of some of the terms used in defendant's hospital chart to describe defendant's medical condition at the time of the police interrogation.
The court recognizes that judicial review of the circumstances of a custodial interrogation must be "searching and critical" to ensure protection of a defendant's constitutional rights. Furthermore, the State bears the burden to prove the voluntariness of defendant's hospital-bed admissions beyond a reasonable doubt. The court therefore deems it necessary to remand the case for the State to present expert testimony concerning defendant's medical condition and for the trial court to make specific findings of fact and law as to the impact of that condition on the voluntariness of defendant's statements to police, considering the totality of all relevant circumstances.
The court rejects the State's alternative argument on appeal that even if the trial court erred in permitting the statements to be used for impeachment purposes, that error was harmless. The record in this case clearly shows that the trial court's ruling to allow defendant's statements to be admitted for impeachment purposes significantly impacted defendant's decision to waive his right to testify on his own behalf. The court follows New Jersey and United States Supreme Court precedent that almost any error in allowing otherwise inadmissible evidence to be admitted for impeachment purposes results in reversal because an appellate court cannot not logically term "harmless" an error that presumptively kept the defendant from testifying.
The court also addresses—and rejects—defendant's contention that the trial court erred by permitting a victim to make an in-court identification of defendant, and by declining to instruct the jury that a detective had tainted her memory by mentioning defendant's name when discussing a photograph defendant had taken of the victim's stolen watch. The court notes this is an unusual situation in that the suggestive information was not conveyed during a traditional pretrial identification procedure such as a photo-array session. Rather, the information was conveyed when the victim confirmed that the photograph, she was shown depicted her watch that was stolen during the robbery.The court concludes the information as to defendant's name, which was conveyed to the victim before trial, was suggestive in that it had the capacity to influence the victim's in-court identification. However, that circumstance was fully presented to the jury through skillful cross-examination. Indeed, the victim candidly acknowledged that her positive in-court identification was influenced by a deduction she drew from the information provided by the detective, not from her independent recollection of the physical appearance of the robber. The court concludes that in these circumstances, there was little danger that the jury might overstate its inherent ability to evaluate evidence offered by an eyewitness who honestly believed her identification of the perpetrator is accurate. The court thus concludes that the trial judge did not abuse his discretion in ruling that any inherent unreliability in the victim's in-court identification would be better addressed to the jury by way of cross-examination and appropriate instructions.