Supreme Court Opinions

The plain language of the Religious Aid Clause bars the use of taxpayer funds to repair and restore churches, and Morris County’s program ran afoul of that longstanding provision. Based on its understanding of the current state of the law, including the United States Supreme Court’s recent decision in Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia, Inc. v. Comer, 582 U.S. ___, 137 S. Ct. 2012 (2017), the Court concludes that that the application of the Religious Aid Clause in this case does not violate the Free Exercise Clause.

The jury properly apportioned fault between defendant and the John Doe defendant because plaintiff and defendant acknowledged the role of John Doe in the accident, plaintiff’s UM carrier was aware of the litigation, and plaintiff had fair and timely notice that defendant would assert that John Doe was the cause of the accident.

(1) The inclusion of language prohibited by N.J.A.C. 13:45A-5.3(c) in contracts of sale or sale orders for the delivery of household furniture may alone give rise to a violation of a "clearly established legal right of a consumer or responsibility of a seller" for purposes of the TCCWNA. N.J.S.A. 56:12-15. (2) A consumer who receives a contract that includes language prohibited by N.J.A.C. 13:45A-5.3(c), but who suffers no monetary or other harm as a result of that noncompliance, is not an "aggrieved consumer" entitled to a remedy under the TCCWNA. N.J.S.A. 56:12-17.

Due to the complete absence of notice by Ferrante to NJM at any point over years of litigation, including the lack of notice about the high-low agreement or completed jury trial during the UIM process, NJM may refuse to pay the UIM benefits.

Search warrants are prospective in nature—they authorize the taking of action. A later-obtained search warrant does not retroactively validate preceding warrantless conduct that is challenged through a suppression motion focused on the legitimacy of the seizure that gave rise to a later search. The State must bear the burden of proving the legitimacy of the seizure that led to a later warrant and search—in this case the stop.

The totality of the circumstances in this case evince an objective exigency, relaxing the need for a warrant and rendering the officer’s warrantless blood draw constitutional.

The sentencing court did not abuse its discretion during defendant’s sentencing proceedings or infringe defendant’s allocution right in any way.

Sufficient credible evidence supported the trial court’s determination that defendant was given an adequate opportunity to present the vehicle’s registration before the search commenced. When a driver is unwilling or unable to present proof of a vehicle’s ownership, a police officer may conduct a limited search for the registration papers in the areas where they are likely kept in the vehicle. When a police officer can readily determine that the driver or passenger is the lawful possessor of the vehicle—despite an inability to produce the registration—a warrantless search for proof of ownership will not be justified.

The Court finds no valid inventory search and therefore affirms the Appellate Division’s determination that the evidence seized during the search should be suppressed.

Hearsay is generally admissible in a VOP hearing. When assessing the State’s ability to rely on hearsay to satisfy its proof obligation without contravening a defendant’s due process rights, a court fundamentally should consider the State’s reasons for relying on hearsay forms of evidence and the reliability of the evidence for its proposed purpose. In this matter, the State failed to provide any justification for relying on hearsay, and the hearsay evidence was not sufficiently reliable for its asserted purpose of substantiating the new criminal charges against defendant.

Because the critical causative conduct in this case was a failure to enforce the law, Bierals is entitled to absolute immunity. The City’s liability is conditioned on that of Bierals, and thus the City is entitled to absolute immunity as well.

The affidavit supporting a search warrant disclosed in discovery need not be disclosed as a matter of course, and no particular circumstances necessitated disclosure of that affidavit here. To the extent that the trial court’s order of release served as a “sanction” for the State’s failure to meet what the court viewed to be the State’s discovery requirements, that release order was improper.

N.J.A.C. 12:17-9.3(b) does not generally impose a notice-and-inquiry requirement on every claimant who has departed her work because that work aggravated a medical condition. Nonetheless, Ardan failed to meet the burden imposed by the regulation. The Appellate Division panel properly decided this appeal based on the version of the statute that was in effect when Ardan applied for unemployment benefits in 2012.

The court erred by allowing evidence that defendant threatened to burn down his girlfriend’s homes and by admitting John’s hearsay statements that defendant was responsible for the arson. However, the errors were not capable of producing an unjust result because of the overwhelming weight and quality of the evidence against defendant.

The proper standard of appellate review of pretrial detention decisions is whether the trial court abused its discretion by relying on an impermissible basis, by relying upon irrelevant or inappropriate factors, by failing to consider all relevant factors, or by making a clear error in judgment. Here, the trial court abused its discretion.

Because the State never proved an essential element of the certain persons charge to the jury, defendant’s conviction cannot stand.

The cumulative effect of both errors denied defendant his right to a fair trial.

The Appellate Division erred in concluding that the holding in Heien is applicable here. The motor vehicle statutes pertinent here are not ambiguous. The officer’s stop of defendant’s motor vehicle was not an objectively reasonable mistake of law that gave rise to constitutional reasonable suspicion; the stop was therefore unconstitutional.

Because the trial court’s error in preventing plaintiff from replaying a portion of the deposition during summation at the first trial resulted in a miscarriage of justice, the trial court properly granted plaintiff’s motion for a new trial. Further, the trial court erred in permitting Dr. Vasen to bolster his testimony using "congruent" opinions in reports of non-testifying doctors during the first trial rather than simply explain the sources of information used in forming his opinion.

The Division met its burden of proof concerning A.B.’s abuse or neglect of A.F. under N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.21(c)(4). The Court finds insufficient proof of willful abandonment under N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.21(c)(5) and reverses on that issue. The hearsay evidence was properly suppressed.