Supreme Court Opinions

The only information the officer possessed at the time of the stop was the race and sex of the suspects, with no further descriptors. That information, which effectively placed every single Black male in the area under the veil of suspicion, was insufficient to justify the stop of the vehicle and therefore does not withstand constitutional scrutiny.

When an arrest occurs outside a home, the police may not enter the dwelling or conduct a protective sweep in the absence of a reasonable and articulable suspicion that a person or persons are present inside and pose an imminent threat to the officers’ safety. This sensible balancing of the fundamental right to privacy in one’s home and the compelling interest in officer safety will depend on an objective assessment of the particular circumstances in each case, such as the manner of the arrest, the distance of the arrest from the home, the reasonableness of the officers’ suspicion that persons were in the dwelling and likely to launch an imminent attack, and any other relevant factors. A self-created exigency by the police cannot justify entry into the home or a protective sweep. Here, a protective sweep was not warranted in the Radel case but was constitutionally justified in the Terres case.

When an arrest occurs outside a home, the police may not enter the dwelling or conduct a protective sweep in the absence of a reasonable and articulable suspicion that a person or persons are present inside and pose an imminent threat to the officers’ safety. This sensible balancing of the fundamental right to privacy in one’s home and the compelling interest in officer safety will depend on an objective assessment of the particular circumstances in each case, such as the manner of the arrest, the distance of the arrest from the home, the reasonableness of the officers’ suspicion that persons were in the dwelling and likely to launch an imminent attack, and any other relevant factors. A self-created exigency by the police cannot justify entry into the home or a protective sweep. Here, a protective sweep was not warranted in the Radel case but was constitutionally justified in the Terres case.

Lapsley’s injuries arose out of and in the course of her employment because the parking lot where she was injured was owned and maintained by the Township, adjacent to her place of work, and used by Township employees to park. Lapsley was therefore entitled to benefits under the Workers’ Compensation Act.

*The statutory framework for sentencing juveniles, if not addressed, will contravene Article I, Paragraph 12 of the State Constitution. To remedy the concerns defendants raise and save the statute from constitutional infirmity, the Court will permit juvenile offenders convicted under the law to petition for a review of their sentence after they have served two decades in prison. At that time, judges will assess a series of factors the United States Supreme Court has set forth in Miller v. Alabama, which are designed to consider the "mitigating qualities of youth." 567 U.S. 460, 476-78 (2012).

*The statutory framework for sentencing juveniles, if not addressed, will contravene Article I, Paragraph 12 of the State Constitution. To remedy the concerns defendants raise and save the statute from constitutional infirmity, the Court will permit juvenile offenders convicted under the law to petition for a review of their sentence after they have served two decades in prison. At that time, judges will assess a series of factors the United States Supreme Court has set forth in Miller v. Alabama, which are designed to consider the "mitigating qualities of youth." 567 U.S. 460, 476-78 (2012).

Here, sufficient evidence was present for a reasonable jury to find that what Livingston Township Councilmembers perceived to be Police Chief Handschuch’s discriminatory attitude toward Township Manager Meade influenced the Council’s decision to terminate her, in violation of the LAD. Accordingly, the Court reverses the grant of summary judgment and remands this matter for trial.

The Court affirms the judgment of the Appellate Division substantially for the reasons expressed in Judge Sabatino’s published opinion. The determination of whether to admit, under N.J.R.E. 701, lay opinion testimony estimating the perceived ranges of children’s ages or heights is best suited for case-by-case assessment. The Court disapproves of State v. Koettgen and its categorical approach to the admission of such lay opinion evidence about age. Henceforth, the trial court, acting as gatekeeper, shall assess whether there exists a proper foundation for the lay opinion being offered, and if so, allow its admission subject to a Rule 403 balancing of the relative probative value and prejudicial effect of the testimony. The Court generally endorses and adds to the Appellate Division’s helpful guidance to trial courts when performing that gatekeeping role and protecting against the admission of unreliable age-related lay opinion testimony.

A defendant’s youth may be considered only as a mitigating factor in sentencing and cannot support an aggravating factor. On resentencing, the sentencing court should consider mitigating factor fourteen -- that “the defendant was under [twenty six] years of age at the time of the commission of the offense.” N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(b)(14). The weight to be given to that factor is within the sentencing court’s discretion.

The State’s reliance on an affidavit by a non-testifying witness to introduce over defendant’s objection the results of the database search violated defendant’s right to confront the witnesses against him. And, under the totality of the circumstances, Carrion’s second statement should have been suppressed because the Miranda warnings issued to Carrion prior to his second statement to police were insufficient in these circumstances to ensure that his waiver of rights was voluntary and knowing. Because of its holding on the suppression issue, the Court cannot conclude that the denial of defendant’s right to confrontation constituted harmless error. For the purposes of future matters, to ensure protection of defendants’ confrontation rights and the orderly production of essential witnesses in judicial proceedings, the Court addresses a method to avoid confrontation violations in these settings.

A violation occurred when the State was allowed to enter into evidence information set forth in the affidavit of a non-testifying officer concerning the no-permit results from a search of the State firearm registry, and that violation was not cured by testimony concerning the search of an Essex County firearm database. Further, the trial court’s incorrect N.J.R.E. 609 ruling constituted harmful error requiring reversal of the conviction. However, the Court declines to adopt the position that an evidentiary ruling that results in a defendant’s decision not to testify can never be harmless.

The Court agrees with the Appellate Division that the Ciluffo pro tanto credit does not further the legislative intent expressed in the Comparative Negligence Act and does not reflect developments in case law over the past four decades. In its stead, the Court sets forth a procedure to apportion any damages assessed in the trial of this case and future successive-tortfeasor cases in which the plaintiff settles with the initial tortfeasors prior to trial.

Because Mecouch was a Medicare enrollee in 2016, Cooper -- a Medicare provider -- was required to bill and accept payment from Medicare, which promptly covered Mecouch’s medical expenses in accordance with its fee schedule. Cooper could not seek payment from Selective other than for reimbursement of the Medicare co-payments and deductibles.

The Court affirms the Appellate Division’s invalidation of N.J.A.C. 10:72-4.4(d)(1) as inconsistent with its state enabling legislation and contrary to legislative intent. But the Court has grave concerns that the regulation’s method of operation is also inconsistent with the federal Medicaid law. The Court accordingly vacates that portion of the Appellate Division’s analysis that rejected the federal-law argument by cross-petitioners.

The appropriate standard to determine whether sexual activity was consensual under SASPA is not the prostration of faculties standard, which focuses on the mental state of the defendant, but rather the standard articulated in State in Interest of M.T.S., 129 N.J. 422 (1992), which is applied from the perspective of the alleged victim. The M.T.S. standard requires a showing that sexual activity occurred without the alleged victim’s freely and affirmatively given permission to engage in that activity. The standard for consent for an alleged victim in a SASPA case should be no different than the standard for consent for an alleged victim in a criminal sexual assault case. The Court reverses and remands this matter to the trial court for assessment under the standard articulated in M.T.S.

The Legislature placed on DCPP the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that a parent abused or neglected a child, N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.46(b)(1), and the Judiciary has no commission to exercise equitable powers to alter the statutory burden of proof set forth by the Legislature. The Court disapproves of the Appellate Division cases that have imported the doctrine of conditional res ipsa loquitur from the common law into a comprehensive statutory scheme to relieve DCPP of its burden of proving that a particular parent abused or neglected a child. The Court remands for a new hearing.

The Court reverses in Melvin and affirms in Paden-Battle. Article I, Paragraph 1 of the New Jersey Constitution bestows upon all citizens certain natural and unalienable rights. From those rights flows the doctrine of fundamental fairness, which protects against arbitrary and unjust government action. Fundamental fairness prohibits courts from subjecting a defendant to enhanced sentencing for conduct as to which a jury found that defendant not guilty.

The Court reverses in Melvin and affirms in Paden-Battle. Article I, Paragraph 1 of the New Jersey Constitution bestows upon all citizens certain natural and unalienable rights. From those rights flows the doctrine of fundamental fairness, which protects against arbitrary and unjust government action. Fundamental fairness prohibits courts from subjecting a defendant to enhanced sentencing for conduct as to which a jury found that defendant not guilty.

*After conducting a de novo review of the record and affording deference to the credibility findings of the Special Master, the Court concludes that the OAE has failed to establish by clear and convincing evidence that Robertelli violated the RPCs. The disciplinary charges must therefore be dismissed.

Owning a dog is a substantially public endeavor in which people do not have a reasonable expectation of privacy that exempts their personal information from disclosure under the privacy clause of OPRA.